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.pdfA Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages
Author(s): Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, John W. Payne
Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 1998), pp. 287-314 Published by: Springer
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Law and HumanBehavior,Vol.22, No. 3, 1998
A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages
Reid Hastie,14David A. Schkade,24and John W.Payne34
A |
study |
was conductedto |
civil |
juries' |
decisions |
concerningdefendants' |
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|
investigate |
|
liabilityfor punitivedamagesin tort cases.A total of 121 six-membermockjuries
citizens were |
summaries |
|
composed of jury-service-eligible |
presented |
of previously |
decidedcases and given a comprehensiveinstructionon the defendant'sliabilityfor punitivedamages.Most of the mockjuriesdecidedthatthe considerationof punitive
damageswas warranted,althoughappellateand trialjudgeshad concludedthat they
werenot warrantedThe. |
to |
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the |
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liablewas |
due to |
jurors' |
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tendency |
find |
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defendant |
partly |
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to considerthe |
full |
set |
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conditions |
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the |
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failure systematically |
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of legallynecessary |
for |
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verdicts |
rendered.Individual |
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in the |
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were not |
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they |
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differences |
jurors'backgrounds |
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relatedto theirverdicts;incomeand |
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were |
relatedto |
judgments. |
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strongly |
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ethnicity |
weakly |
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The social processesin deliberationon civiljuries weresimilarto the dynamicsof |
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deliberationthathave been observedin criminal |
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juries. |
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The |
study |
of |
decision |
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is still in its |
infancy(Hensler, 1988;Litan, |
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civil-jury |
making |
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1993;MacCoun,1989;Saks,1992). |
How do individual |
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jurorscomprehendevidence |
and instructionson the law, and reason to a verdict?What are the dynamicsof the jurydeliberationprocess?Are there systematichabitsof judgmentor biases in reasoning that might produce departuresfrom just and proper verdicts in civil cases?Althoughwe knowlittle aboutthe decisionprocessesin civiljuries,the out-
comes of civil |
decisionshavereceivedconsiderable |
and |
||
jury |
scholarly |
publicscrutiny |
duringthe past decade, with many observersconcludingthat the system is in a state of crisis (e.g., Huber, 1988;Mahoney& Littlejohn,1989;and see reportsin Adler, 1994;Daniels & Martin,1986). Other policy makersand scholarshave re- sponded to the apparentcrisis with argumentsand evidence that the system, at least "on the average"or in comparisonto the practicalalternativeof benchtrials, is workingproperlyand that the data cited by criticswho are concerned about excessiveverdictsare incompleteor of limitedgenerality(Clermont& Eisenberg,
|
of |
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CO 80309. |
1PsychologyDepartment,University |
Colorado,Boulder, |
||
of |
|
of |
TX 78712. |
2Department |
Management,University |
Texas,Austin, |
3FuquaSchoolof Business,Duke University,Durham,NC 27708.
4Correspondencemaybe addressedto any of the authors.
287
0147-7307/98/0600-0287$15.00/1 ? 1998 American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association
288 Hastie,Schkade,and Payne
1992; Daniels & Martin, 1995; Lempert, 1993; Saks, Hollinger, Wissler, Evans, & Hart, 1997; Schuck, 1993; Vidmar, 1995).
What is incontrovertible is that in a nonnegligible number of cases juries render distinctively harsh antidefendant judgments and set dramatically large awards. Virtually all of these extreme verdicts are substantially reduced or reversed by appellate courts; the reduction rate is over 50% for many classes of awards (e.g., American Law Institute, 1991; Broder, 1986; Daniels & Martin, 1990; Landes &
Posner, 1986; Ostrom, Hanson, & Daley, 1993; Peterson, Sarma, & Shanley, 1987). These observations imply that, under some conditions, trial juries render verdicts
that are consistently discrepant from legal principles and precedents.
One focus of the controversy over the performance of the civil jury is on punitive damage awards. Historically, punitive damages were introduced into the common-law tort system to punish and deter conduct that approached criminal levels of egregiousness and maliciousness. At first punitive damages were rarely awarded, but since the late 1970s, juries have imposed punitive damages with in-
creasing frequency and in escalating amounts (the largest punitive damages award in the history of civil jury trials was the $5,000,000,000 award assessed against the Exxon Corporation in 1994, following the Exxon Valdezoil spill).
In a typical jury trial in which punitive damages are sought, there is an initial determination of liability with three possible outcomes: the defendant is not liable for any damages; the evidence demonstrates the defendant's conduct was negligent and only compensatory damages may be warranted;or the defendant's conduct was more than negligent and reached levels of reckless or malicious conduct and both compensatory and punitive damages may be warranted (Ghiaridi & Kircher, 1995; Roeca, 1984). The legally necessary conditions that must be established to conclude that punitive damages are warranted identify conduct that approaches criminal lev-
els of reprehensibility (indeed, some states do not allow punitive damages in civil trials, but instead apply criminal sanctions to the same types of misconduct). A typical set of requirements to conclude that a defendant's conduct was reckless enough to warrant punitive damages includes subjective consciousness of a foreseeable and probable grave danger consequent on the conduct, conscious disregard for the danger by the defendant, conduct that was a gross deviation from an ordi- nary level of care, and the occurrence of the dangerous outcome (Eades, 1993). The application of these instructions requires jurors to make several difficult, sub- jective judgments of intangible conditions.
The Supreme Court appears to be trying to develop a uniform, principled doctrine for the assessment of punitive damages. Some justices are concerned that current procedures do not provide sufficient guidance and control of jury verdicts (e.g., O'Connor dissenting in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, et al., 1991; Kennedy concurring, and O'Connor, White, and Souter dissenting in TXO Prod. Corp. v.Alliance Resources Corp.,et al., 1993; Steven's lead opinion in Honda Motor Co., Ltd., et al., v. Karl L. Oberg, 1994; and Breyer concurring in BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr, 1996). The explicit goals of punitive damage awards are to deter and punish the defendant's conduct; thus, they are a mixture of civil and criminal law traditions. Jurors can be expected to have a variety of interpre- tations of these concepts and to exhibit considerable variability in their expression
LiabilityDecisions |
289 |
of these conceptson monetarydamagescales.The jurors'decisionproblemis com- pounded by the lack of clear instructionson these concepts or the provisionof examplesor standardsfor awardamounts(the situationseems even less controlled
than that confrontingjurorswhen they are presentedwith criminalsentencingde- cisions;Brown,1996;Luginbuhl,1992;Wiener,Pritchard,& Weston,1995).Justice Stevens writing a majorityopinion commented on the Court'sprimaryconcern about punitive damage awards: "The problem that concerns us ... is that a jury
will not follow those instructionsand |
may |
returna |
lawless,biased, |
or |
ver- |
|
|
|
arbitrary |
dict"(HondaMotorCo. v. Oberg,1994,p. 2341).A series of relevantdecisionshas
addressedthe issues of |
fair |
jury |
trial |
and |
providingconcep- |
|
prescribing |
|
procedures |
tual tests to determinewhen awardsare excessive(mostnotablyPacificMutualLife v.Haslip,[1991;BMWof NorthAmericanv. Gore,1996;HondaMotorCo. v. Oberg,
and TXOProd. |
v.AllianceResources |
no uniform |
|
1994; |
Corp. |
Corp.,1993).However, |
policy has yet emerged.
In recent writtenopinions,the Courthas focused on proceduralissues con- cerningthe extent to which the trialjury'sdecisionadheresto rationalor consti- tutional principles of due process. Do jurors and juries consider the legally
conditionsandfactorswhentheydetermineliabilityfor punitivedamages prescribed
and set awards?Are unwarrantedor excessiveverdictscommon?Canjuryinstruc-
tions be designedthat will properlyconstrainand guidejury decisions?
The present researchis designed to study the jury'sdecision of whether a defendant has engaged in maliciousor recklessconduct that would warrantthe
considerationof a punitivedamageaward.We have selected the punitivedamages awarddecisionto studybecause it is controversialand there is some evidencethat
judgmentsby jurorsand by higherauthorities(i.e., appellatecourts)are discrepant (Finkel, 1995; Robinson & Darley, 1995). But our primarygoal is to sketch an initial pictureof the juror and jury cognitiveand social processeswhen makinga typicalserious civil decision.
We study the behaviorof jury-eligiblecitizensmakingdecisionsin realistic,
civilcasesthatturnon the |
of whethera defendant'sconduct |
|||
representative |
|
question |
|
useful |
is recklessor not. We use a |
simulationmethod that has |
proven |
||
|
mock-jury |
|
|
in studiesof jurors'decisionprocessesand in providingaccurateprojectionsto the outcomes of real jury trials (see Bray and Kerr, 1979, Hastie, Penrod, and Pen- nington,1983,and MacCoun,1989for explicationand defense of the method).We should note two differencesbetween our methods and the proceduresin actual trials:First,our mockjurorsdid not firstdecide on compensatorydamagesawards before decidingon punitivedamages,as they usuallywould in trials that involve punitivedamages.Second,our case materialswere veridicalsummariesof the evidence from the originaltrialswrittenin an expositoryformat,not in the form of a mock trial with judge, attorney,and witness speakingroles (see example case materialsin the Appendix).
The four stimuluscases were based on cases that had been subjectedto judicialreview,so we can assess the extentto whichour mockjurors'verdictsmatch
the legally endorsedverdicts.Second,there are manysuggestionsthat civiljurors' verdictsare more predictablethan criminaljurors'from characteristicssuch as in-
come and |
political |
orientation |
Which |
characteristicsof |
|
(Hastie, 1991). |
|
background |
290 |
Hastie,Schkade,and Payne |
Table 1. DemographicCharacteristicsof the Participants Sex
45%men
55%women
Age
Median= 47 years(range:25-73) Race/ethnicity
70%White(EuropeanAmerican) 15%AfricanAmerican
12%Hispanic
3% AsianAmerican,NativeAmerican,and other
Income(annualfamily) Median= $40,000(approx.)
(6% less than $15,000;10%over $75,000) Education
Mode = high schooldiploma+ vocational (1% no high schooldiploma;
23%college degreeplusvocationalor professional)
jurors predict their verdicts? Are there any general predictors that exceed the 10% "variance accounted for" in verdicts that is usually observed in studies of criminal
jury decisions (Hastie, et al., 1983; Penrod, 1979)? Third, we will examine jurors' self-reported reasons for their verdicts and the contents of their discussions in deliberation to shed light on their mental and social decision processes. Because we have the conclusions from judicial reviews, we will attempt to identify the differences in processes that discriminate between juror decisions that are consistent and inconsistent with the decisions of judges.
METHODS
Participants
Participants, jury-eligible adult citizens, were sampled from the Denver area by a marketing research firm and paid $50 for participation in the study. The par- ticipants were sampled representatively by residential address and contacted by mail. Approximately 85% of those contacted agreed to participate in the study of
"lifestyles and opinions." A final sample of 726 deliberating mock jurors was ob- tained with the compositional statistics summarized in Table 1.
Materials
Four legally significant cases that required jurors to distinguish between neg- ligent and reckless conduct were selected as the basis for stimulus materials (An- derson v. WhittakerCorp., 1987; Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 1983; Jardel Co. Inc., v. Hughes, 1987; and In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 1972). These cases were selected because they represented a variety of fact situations, because they are fre- quently cited as precedents, and because the proper action on the issue of punitive damages had been decided as a matter of law by trial or appellate court review of
LiabilityDecisions
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Table 2. Summary of Stimulus Cases |
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Case |
Case description |
Court, |
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name |
year |
||||
Anderson |
Fourboaterslost in defective |
District |
|||
|
powerboat afterinadequate |
W.D. Mich. |
|||
|
recall |
|
|
|
1987/88 |
Harper |
Injuredseamandeniedpartof |
FifthCircuit |
|||
|
maintenance |
after |
hiring |
1984 |
|
|
lawyer |
pay, |
|
|
|
Jardel |
|
|
|
Court |
|
mallownerfailedto |
|||||
|
Shopping |
|
|
|
Supreme |
|
preventabductionand rapeof |
of Delaware1987 |
|||
|
in |
|
lot |
|
|
|
employee |
parking |
|
|
|
Queen |
39 seamenlost in dangerously SecondCircuit |
||||
|
designedand operatedmolten |
1970/72 |
|||
|
sulfurcarrier |
|
|
|
291
Actionon punitive damages
Denied
Reversedjuryverdict
Reversedjuryverdict
Affirmeddenial
the original proceedings. In each case, the trial court or a higher court established that the facts did not warrant the consideration of action on punitive damages; two of the cases were originally tried by juries and two were "bench trials," although all could have been tried by juries if the parties had not waived that right. (Table 2 provides a summary of the case citations and dispositions on the issue of punitive damages). Written summaries of the facts were prepared, ranging in length from
approximately 1,000 to 1,500 words (exclusive of the judge's instructions). Care was taken to adhere to the courts' summary statements as closely as possible; thus the case summaries are composed mostly of excerpts from the court opinions.
Jury instructions (approximately 500 words long) on liability and on procedures such as the standard of proof, the unanimity quorum requirement, and the selection of a presiding juror were excerpted from In re The Exxon Valdez,which in turn were derivedprimarilyfrom the instructionsin JardelCo. Inc. v. Hughes.
The instructions provide a detailed prescription of the standards for finding "reckless disregard" and they are consistent with currently accepted standards for de- ciding this issue (see Appendix). The instructions include definitions of malicious conduct and reckless or callous disregard for others, and carefully specify the dif- ferences between negligent and reckless conduct.
The case summaries and instructions were used as scripts for videotapes rep- resenting the four cases (an example case, Jardel Co. Inc. v. Hughes, is included in the Appendix, copies of all case materials are available from the authors). One of these summaries served as the stimulus case for each mock jury. Jurors watched the videotape (durations ranged from 11 to 15 min) and then read a written sum- mary before beginning deliberation.
Procedure
The study was conducted in a conference hotel located in a Denver suburb.
Participantsregistered with the researchersand went to a waiting area until the formal study began. Then, participantsassembled in an auditorium (in groups ranging in size from 38 to 52 participants) and were introduced to their mock-jurytask. They com-
292 |
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Hastie,Schkade,and Payne |
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pleted |
a short |
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information |
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and were instructedthat |
they |
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background |
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questionnaire |
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wouldbe asked,"Tomakea |
legal |
decision |
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likethe ones that |
makein |
legal |
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trials."Then, |
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just |
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jurors |
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they |
were shownone of the |
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stimuluscaseson a |
projection |
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videotaped |
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screenwithan |
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2 x 2 m in size |
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them |
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from |
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imageapproximately |
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(participants'seatingplaced |
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3 m to 15 m fromthe |
screen).They |
were told that the |
judge's |
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approximately |
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instructionson the tapewerethe lawandthattheyshouldadhereto themin making
individualand |
group |
decisions. |
were |
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witha written |
of the to-be- |
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case |
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They |
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provided |
copy |
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judged |
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note |
pads, |
and |
After the |
videotape, |
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includingjuryinstructions, |
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pencils. |
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they were given 10 min to studythe writtenscriptand to take handwrittennotes.
Then |
a |
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theirindividual |
ver- |
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they completed |
questionnaireindicating |
predeliberation |
||
dicts |
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to award |
not |
to award |
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bychecking"Yes,"proper |
punitivedamages;"No," |
proper |
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or "Undecided." |
werealsoaskedto indicatetheirconfidence |
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punitivedamages, |
They |
|
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in the decisionon a 6-pointscale labeledfrom"50%,No idea I amjust guessing,"
to "100%,Absolutelycertainmyverdictis correct." |
|
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||
the trial |
the mock |
were |
into |
six-person |
|
Following |
presentation, |
jurors |
grouped |
mockjuries and went to conferenceroomsto deliberate.Theywere providedwith a copy of the judge'sinstructionsand remindedthat the judge had instructedthem to select a presidingjurorand that theirverdictmust be unanimous.Their deliberationswere videotaped,withtheirknowledgeand permission(one videotapewas lost due to an equipmentmalfunctionandthatjuryis excludedfromcontentanaly- ses of the deliberationprocess).They completeddeliberation,with a verdictor by declaringtheir jury deadlocked.(Four of the 121 juries were unable to reach a conclusionafter 2 hr of deliberation,but did not declarethemselvesdeadlocked.
Theirdeliberationswere terminated the |
and |
they |
willbe classified |
by |
experimenters |
|
as "Hung"in our analyses.)After concludingdeliberation,jurorswere asked to
complete |
a second |
that askedfor their |
personalverdicts,probed |
the |
|
questionnaire |
|
reasonsfor their judgments,and tested their memoriesfor informationfrom the judge's instructions(copies of the originalinstructionswere not availableat this
time). |
Then |
jurors |
were |
paid |
for their |
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and excused. |
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participation |
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RESULTS |
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Verdicts |
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Table3 providesa summaryof the individualverdictpreferencesmeasured before and after deliberation.The 95%confidenceintervalson the proportionsof
"Yes"verdictsare listedfor the individual |
and |
verdicts.Table |
pre- |
|
post-deliberation |
4 presentsthe groupjuryverdicts.The best estimateof the ratesat whichthe mock juries rendered,"Yes,liable for punitivedamages,"verdictsis based on the pro-
of "Yes" |
out of the total numberof |
verdict-renderingjuries, |
exclud- |
|
portions |
juries |
|
|
ing undecidedjuries.The assumptionis that undecidedjurieswould tend to split
accordingto the proportionrepresentedby verdict-renderingjuriesor, shouldthe cases be retried,decide at the rate estimatedby the otherverdict-renderingjuries.
Thus, |
we have calculated95% intervalsaroundthe |
of "Yes" |
ver- |
|
|
proportions |
jury |
|
dicts with the "undecided"verdictsexcludedfrom the totals. The rate at which individualsand juries favored"Yes"verdictsis far above zero for all cases; over
LiabilityDecisions |
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293 |
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Table3. JurorVerdicts |
|
|
||
|
Anderson |
Harper |
Jardel |
MSQ |
Overall |
Predeliberationindividualjurorverdicts |
59% |
76% |
63% |
||
Yes |
62% |
53% |
|||
No |
(116) |
(98) |
(99) |
(142) |
(455) |
30% |
33% |
33% |
17% |
28% |
|
Undecided |
(56) |
(62) |
(55) |
(31) |
(204) |
8% |
14% |
8% |
7% |
9% |
|
95%confidence |
(14) |
(26) |
(14) |
(13) |
(67) |
|
|
|
|
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|
intervals |
55%-69% |
46%-60% |
52%-66% |
70%-82% |
60-67% |
(around"Yes") |
|
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|
|
|
Postdeliberationindividualjurorverdicts |
60% |
81% |
65% |
||
Yes |
52% |
67% |
|||
No |
(97) |
(124) |
(101) |
(150) |
(472) |
43% |
32% |
39% |
16% |
33% |
|
Undecided |
(83) |
(59) |
(65) |
(30) |
(237) |
3% |
1% |
1% |
3% |
2% |
|
95%confidence |
(6) |
(3) |
(2) |
(6) |
(17) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
intervals |
45%-59% |
60%-74% |
53%-67% |
75%-87% |
62%-69% |
(around"Yes") |
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Table4. JuryVerdicts |
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|
||
|
Anderson |
Harper |
Jardel |
MSQ |
Overall |
Juryverdicts |
35% |
68% |
57% |
71% |
58% |
Yes |
|||||
No |
(11) |
(21) |
(16) |
(22) |
(70) |
42% |
32% |
29% |
13% |
29% |
|
Undecided |
(13) |
(10) |
(8) |
(4) |
(35) |
23% |
- |
14% |
16% |
13% |
|
|
(7) |
(0) |
(4) |
(5) |
(16) |
Juryverdicts,hungverdictsexcluded |
68% |
67% |
85% |
67% |
|
Yes |
46% |
||||
No |
(11) |
(21) |
(16) |
(22) |
(70) |
54% |
32% |
33% |
15% |
33% |
|
95%confidence |
(13) |
(10(8) |
|
(4) |
(35) |
|
|
48%-86% |
71%-99% |
58%-76% |
|
intervals |
26%-66% |
52%-84% |
|||
(around"Yes") |
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50%of individual |
favored"Yes"afterdeliberation,andthe "Yes"juryverdict |
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jurors |
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rates were over 50% for three of the four cases. Recall that, in each case, a trial
courtor appellatereviewconcludedthatthe factsdidnot warranta findingof reckless or maliciousconduct.
RelationsbetweenIndividualDifferencesand VerdictPreferences
Simple correlationcoefficients were used to explore relationshipsbetween
factorssuch as participants'sex, age, education,income, and comprebackground
294 |
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Hastie, Schkade, and Payne |
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hension of the |
judge's |
instructionsand their |
and |
postdeliberation |
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predeliberation |
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verdicts and confidence |
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levels associatedwith |
signifi- |
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ratings.Simple probability |
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cance testswere calculatedandthep < .01 levelwas appliedto select relationships for furtherconsideration.No effortwas made to correctfor multipletests to esti- mate "true"family-wideprobabilities(e.g., a Bonferroniinequalityadjustment;
Snedecor& |
Cochran,1980).Thus, |
the |
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doubtlessoverestimate |
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the |
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simpleprobabilities |
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of individual |
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This |
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was followedto avoidcon- |
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reliability |
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relationships. |
procedure |
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fusion over |
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which |
of variableswas the basisfor an individual |
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exactly |
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family |
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are easier to |
adjust- |
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ment; |
we believe the |
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in such cases and |
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simpleprobabilities |
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interpret |
no attemptto "inflate"the numberof significantrelationshipsreportedis intended.
Twomeasuresof verdict |
wereused: |
(i) |
the |
verdictselected |
preferences |
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simple |
("no"the defendantwas not liable,codedas "1"and "Yes"the defendantwas liable
for |
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codedas |
whenthismeasurewasusedin |
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undecided |
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punitivedamages, |
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"2"; |
and |
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a score |
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analyses, |
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the |
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wereexcludedfromthe |
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(ii) |
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from0 |
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jurors |
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calculations); |
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to 100 |
ranging |
("No" |
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defendantwasnot liablewitha confidenceof |
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the defendantwas |
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liablewitha confidenceof |
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100%) |
("Yes" |
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a confidence |
of 50%witheitherverdictwas |
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100%); |
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rating |
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a scoreof 50 andundecided |
wereincludedin the |
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assigned |
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assigned |
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jurors |
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analysis |
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a scoreof 50. Somedata |
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woulduse a |
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witha |
logistic |
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analysts |
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logisticregressionmodel, |
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transformation |
to the |
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ratherthanthe ordi- |
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applied |
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binary-valueddependentvariable, |
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naryleastsquaresmodelswe usedin ouranalysesHowever,. followingNeter,Wasserman, and Kutner(1983, p. 361) we believe that there is little to be gained (and
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to be lost in |
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fromthe |
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if the meanre- |
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something |
comprehensibility) |
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logisticapproach |
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sponsesrangebetween.20 and .80,as theydo in our results. |
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= |
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< .01 |
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the four |
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income |
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verdicts |
-.10, p |
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Combining |
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cases,jurors' |
predicted |
(r |
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for the |
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verdict |
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with |
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income |
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unweightedpredeliberation |
measure), |
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higher |
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participants |
likelierto decide "Not liable."Effectsof the individualdifferencefactorof ethnic
or raceweredifficultto assessbecauseof the smallsampleof non-White background
jurors.Rather than attemptingto make fine distinctionsamongracialcategories,
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were conductedto |
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the |
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White |
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with |
minorityjurors |
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analyses |
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compare |
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majority |
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jurors |
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African-Americanand |
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White |
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werelikelierto favor |
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(primarily |
verdictthan |
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Hispanicjurors). |
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jurors |
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< |
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a "No |
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verdict:r = -.13, |
p |
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liability" |
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minorityjurors(predeliberation |
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re- |
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.01; |
confidence |
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verdict:r = |
-.10, |
p |
< |
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weightedpredeliberation |
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.01). Exploratory |
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were also |
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and the results |
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the correlationco- |
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gressionanalyses |
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performed |
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supported |
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the confidence |
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efficientsummariesFor. |
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the mostsensible |
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to |
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example, |
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equation |
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predict |
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- |
6.30 |
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verdictscore on a 0-100 scale was:-1.27 |
(income) |
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weightedpredeliberation |
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(race) + |
72.66; R2 = |
.015; F(2, 715) = |
5.31, p |
< .01, with both coefficients and the |
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constant |
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at |
thep |
< .05level.The |
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to |
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the |
simpleunweighted |
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significant |
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equation |
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predict |
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verdicts |
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= not liable,2 = |
liable,withundecided |
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excludedfromthe analysis) |
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(1 |
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jurors |
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was -.02(income)- .12(race) + 1.88; (R2 = .024; F(2, 649) = |
8.12, p < .001, with |
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both coefficientsand the constant |
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at the |
p |
< |
.05 level. |
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significant |
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Comprehension of the Judge's Instructions |
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were askedto recall |
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of the |
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instructionson |
liability |
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Participants |
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portions |
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judge's |
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by |
meansof |
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on each |
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elementrelevantto theirdecisions |
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specificquestions |
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important |
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Liability Decisions |
295 |
(e.g., "Whatis the legal definitionof 'recklessor callous disregardfor the rights of others?'[If you cannot rememberthe legal terms,try to state this definitionin
your own words]").Writtenresponsesto these questionswere "scored"based on accuracyof recall of nine elements or legal distinctionsfrom the instructionsTwo. researchassistantswere trainedto code the responsesin terms of lenient criteria in which recall of the gist of each element was scored correctif paraphrasespre- servedthe approximatemeaningof the originalinstructionThese. scoreswere converted to a percent correctmetricwith possiblescores rangingfrom 0% to 100%
correct.Intercoder |
was |
high |
as assessedvia a |
simple |
correlationbetween |
reliability |
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codes for 48 double-codedquestionnaires(r = +.86); for the 48 questionnaires, 90% of the paired scoreswere within5% of one anotherfor the two coders.
The overall level of |
on this |
test was low: |
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performance |
recall-comprehension |
The median score was 5% correct (the mean was 9%); 30% of the participants receiveda score of 0 correctand the highscorewas 67%correct.These low scores
cannot be attributedto nonresponsesdue to low motivationto complywith the decisiontask;therewere almostno blankresponseformsand the 0 comprehension scores were usually assigned to lengthy,but incorrectresponses.A simple word
count of the contentsof the |
on the |
test |
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responses |
memory-comprehension yielded |
a range of from 0 words to 167 words;there were only 16 jurors(2%) whose re- sponses were blank (0 words); and the median numberof wordswrittenwas 43
(the mean was 41). |
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Severalindividualdifference |
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factors |
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of |
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background |
predictedcomprehension |
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the instructions: |
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was better:r = |
-.24, p |
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juror age (youngerjurors'comprehension |
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< |
.001), juror |
education |
(better |
educated |
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was better: r = |
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jurors'comprehension |
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|||||||
+.32, p |
< |
.001),juror |
income |
(higher |
income |
|
was better:r |
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jurors'comprehension |
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= +.16, p |
< .001), and juror ethnicity(Whitejurors'comprehensionwas better |
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than minorityjurors:r = |
+.14, p < .001). Exploratoryregressionanalyseswere |
also performedandthe resultssupportedthe correlationcoefficientsummariesFor.
the most sensible |
equation |
to |
predict |
individual |
levels on |
example, |
|
comprehension |
|||
a 0-100 scale was: -0.25(age) + 3.34(education)+ 3.26(race) + |
7.21; R2 = .19; |
F(3, 705) = 54.98,p < .001, with all coefficientsand the constantsignificantat
the p < .001 level. |
score was |
|
correlatedwith |
|||
The instruction |
|
|||||
|
recall-comprehension |
|
significantly |
|
||
the confidence |
|
verdict |
|
for |
only |
the Anderson |
|
weighted predeliberation |
preference |
|
case (r = -.21, p < .01;r = -.23, p < .01 for the simpleunweightedverdictpref-
erence with undecided |
jurors |
excludedfrom the |
who were |
|
|
analysis).Participants |
better able to comprehendand recall the instructionswere also likelierto decide "not liable."
The PresidingJuror Role
There was a tendencyfor the jurorselected to presideover deliberationsto possess "dominant"social characteristics:the presidingjurorwas more likelyto be male (r = -.19, p < .01) and to be bettereducated(r = +.13,p < .01).Exploratory regressionanalyseswere also performedand the resultssupportedthe correlation