Background Guide HSC autumn 2014

The turning point and the later events

On 15 January 1999 the Racak massacre occurred when in retaliation for KLA attack on 4 policemen Serb security forces killed 45 Kosovo Albanians. The Racak massacre was the culmination of the KLA attacks and Yugoslav reprisals that had continued throughout the winter of 1998–1999. The incident was immediately condemned as a massacre by

the Western countries and the United Nations Security Council, and later became the basis of one of the charges of war crimes leveled against Milosevic and his top officials. This massacre was the turning point of the war. NATO decided that the conflict could only be settled by introducing a military peacekeeping force under the

auspices of NATO, to forcibly restrain the two sides.

On 30 January 1999 a set of "nonnegotiable principles" was issued which made up a package known as "Status Quo Plus"—effectively the restoration of Kosovo's pre-1990 autonomy within Serbia, plus the introduction of democracy and supervision by international organisations. It also called for a peace conference to be held in February 1999 at

11

the Château de Rambouillet outside Paris.

The Rambouillet talks began on 6 February 1999, with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana negotiating with both sides. The Yugoslavian delegation was led by then president of Serbia Milan Milutinovic, while Milosevic himself remained in Belgrade. The talks caused major disagreement between the Albanian and the Yugoslavian side.

On 18 March 1999, the Albanian, American, and British delegations signed the Rambouillet Accords while the Yugoslav and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. The Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo and non-military part of the agreement, while rejecting a NATO troop presence.

On March 22 the final ultimatum was delivered to Serbia by NATO. Hours before the announcement, Yugoslavia declared a state of emergency citing an imminent threat of war and began a huge mobilisation of troops and resources. On 24 March NATO started its bombing campaign against

Yugoslavia. It was carried out without the authorization of the UN.

However, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General said, "It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force is legitimate in the pursuit of peace." Russian Duma condemned NATO attack.

12

NATO's bombing campaign lasted from 24 March to 11 June 1999 (78 days), involving up to 1,000 aircraft. NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions. The proclaimed goal of the NATO operation was that the Yugoslav troops would have to leave Kosovo and be replaced by international peacekeepers. The campaign was designed to destroy Yugoslav air defenses and high-value military targets.

On March 25 FRY broke off diplomatic relations with United States, Germany, Great Britain and France. NATO military operations switched increasingly to attacking Yugoslav units on the ground, hitting targets as small as individual tanks and artillery pieces, as well as continuing with the strategic bombardment. This activity was, however, heavily constrained by politics, as each target needed to be approved by all nineteen member states. Montenegro was bombed on several occasions but NATO eventually desisted to prop up the precarious position of its antiMilosevic leader, Dukanovic. So-called "dual-use" targets, of use to both civilians and the military, were attacked, including bridges across the Danube, factories, power stations, schools, houses, nurseries, hospitals, telecommunications facilities and the headquarters of Yugoslavian Leftists, a political party led by Milosevic's wife. NATO justified the bombing of such targets as they were "potentially useful to the Yugoslav military " however, some see the actions as violations of international law and the Geneva Conventions in particular.

On 3 April 1999 Central Belgrade was hit by NATO missiles for first time. Air commanders bombed FRY and Serbian Interior Ministries as they seeked to make clear their determination to "go after the head of the snake" in Serbia. On April 3 Russian President Yeltsin spoke out against bombing

13

and possibility of a NATO ground war against Serbia and warned that Russia could be forced into a European or worldwide war.

At the same time a series of mishaps of NATO appeared during the bombings including mistakenly hitting the targets not planned to be attacked that led to casualties. In April American forces mistakenly stroke on column of Kosovo Albanian refugees, reportedly killing at least 60. At the start of May, a NATO aircraft attacked an Albanian refugee convoy, believing it was a Yugoslav military convoy, killing around fifty people. Seven days after that in night of extensive bombing, NATO planes mistakenly targeted Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing 3 and wounding 20. UN Security Council met to discuss the US's "terrible mistake" and violent demonstrations ensued in China. In a separate incident, a NATO cluster bomb missed an airfield and stroke a market and a hospital near Nis, reportedly killing 15. On May 22 NATO mistakenly bombed a KLA position in Kosare, reportedly killing 67. In a week a NATO missile went off-course and stroke a residential neighborhood in Surdulica, killing at least 20.

Meanwhile the conflict appeared little closer to a resolution and NATO countries began to seriously consider conducting ground operations in Kosovo. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was a strong advocate of ground forces and pressured the United States to agree; his strong stance caused some alarm in Washington as American forces would be making the largest contribution to any offensive. U.S. President Bill Clinton was extremely reluctant to commit American forces for a ground offensive. Instead, Clinton authorised a CIA operation to look into methods to destabilise the Yugoslav government without training KLA troops. At the

14

same time, Finnish and Russian diplomatic negotiators continued to try to persuade Milosevic to back down. Tony Blair would order 50,000 British soldiers to be made ready for a ground offensive: most of the available British Army.

However, in the meantime the diplomatic meetings were held throughout the conflict. On May 6 at the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Germany, the Russians begin limited cooperation with the allies. On June 1 Final round of talks began. Discussion continued up until negotiators departed for Belgrade two days later. FRY informed Germany of its readiness to accept G8 principles for ending bombing. On 3 June 1999, Milosevic accepted the terms of an international peace plan to end the fighting, with the national parliament adopting the proposal amid contentious debate. On June 8 During G8 talks in Cologne, allies and Russia reached an agreement on possible UN resolution to sanction the peace deal. After more discussions, NATO and FRY officials finally initiated a Military Technical Agreement to govern the Serb withdrawal.

15

References

1)Robert Bideleux (1998). Kosovo’s conflict. History Today, 48

2) A Kosovo Chronology. Frontline

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.ht ml

3)Noam Chomsky (2001) A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo.

Z-Magazine http://www.chomsky.info/articles/200005--.htm

4)Flashback to Kosovo's war. BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165042.stm

5)Stefan Wolff (1999). The Kosovo Conflict. http://www.stefanwolff.com/research/the-kosovo-conflict

6)Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, John G. McGinn. Disjointed War. Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999.

7)Ethnic tensions and economic crisis. Extracted from the Wikipedia article on Yugoslavia in 2006. http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/62/329.html

8)

Kosovo

War.

Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War

9)Тарасов А. Экономические причины Югославской войны.

http://saint-juste.narod.ru/yugo.htm

10) Кагарлицкий

Б.

Косовский

узел.

http://scepsis.net/library/id_1760.html

16

Glossary

Backward (adj) – отсталый, workforce productivity –

производительность труда, entity – субъект,

peasant – крестьянин, contribute – способствовать, superstitions – суеверия, prejudice - предубеждение, rural – сельский,

paved the way – подготовило почву ,

erupt into violence – перерасти в насилие,

seeking to ensure – желая обеспечить,

implement – претворить в жизнь, level (v) – выравнивать,

inflow – приток,

trigger (v) – спровоцировать, secession – отделение, выход из состава государства,

expel – исключить, dismantle - разоружать, seize – захватить,

arms cache – тайный склад с оружием,

perceived – кажущийся, inflammatory –

провокационный,

on a shoestring – на скудные средства,

embrace – вступать на путь, disillusioned – разочарованный, guerilla squad – партизанский отряд,

offensive – атака,

наступательная операция, advance – наступление, indiscriminate –

неизбирательный,

hostilities – военные действия, ceasefire – прекращение огня, activation warning – оповещение о введении в действие,

massacre – бойня, retaliation – ответные меры,

reprisals – ответное наступление, condemn – осуждать,

17

under the auspices – под покровительством, unhindered –

беспрепятственный, imminent threat –

непосредственная угроза, combat mission – боевая задача, proclaimed – объявленный, precarious position – шаткое положение,

ground war – наземная война, mishap – происшествие, casualties – потери убитыми и ранеными,

ensue – являться результатом, withdrawal – вывод войск

2