Categorical Terrorism_Goodwin

seemingly"sociallyclose"to them,even

2036 * SocialForcesVolume84, Number4 * June2006

does seem to be a huge "socialdistance"separatingthose revolutionarieswho practice categoricalterrorism(andthose theyclaimto speakfor),on the one hand,andtheircivilian targets,onthe otherThe.conflictsinFrenchAlgeria,Palestine/Israel,SriLankaandChechnya

wereorarecharacterized	extreme	-	intermsofwealth,status,
by	polarization			power,ethnicity

andreligion.

Nonetheless,the social-polarizationtheoryof terrorismis plaguedby a numberof

To		with,howcould		or"intractableoffenses"arise
ambiguities.	begin		"enduringgrievances"

betweengroupsthatareinfactfunctionallyindependent,groupsthatdo notcooperatewith one anothereconomically,politically,militarilyorotherwise?(Senechalde laRoche1996:111)

Indeed,wouldnotfunctional violencebetweengroupsby independenceactuallydiscourage

makingit difficultforone groupto plausiblyblamethe otherforits grievances?Ifmyown livelihoodreallydoes notdependinanyway on some othergroup,whywouldIcareif its membershavemoremoneythanme or dress differentlyor do not recognizeme on the street?Extremelysociallydistantgroupscare littleaboutone another,so why wouldone blamethe otherforits ills,letaloneattackit?

Proponentsof the social-polarizationthesis arevagueaboutthe preciseformsof social distancethatencourageextremehatred,moralrepulsionor at least callousindifference between groups- sentimentsthat would seem to be necessaryfor groupsto support terroristviolenceagainstcivilians.Theyspeakinverygeneraltermswhendescribingthegoals

of revolutionarygroups,andtheysay virtuallynothingaboutthe strategicgoals of terrorist

violence.		itis difficultto determinefromthisliterature
Accordingly,			preciselywhyrevolutionary
would		attackcivilians,be	distant"orotherwise,instead
groups	indiscriminately		they"socially

of employingothermeansto attaintheirgoals.Willjustanytypeof "enduringgrievances"

leadto terrorism?

to Senechalde laRoche,"Invasions,

and

According

militarydictatorships,

other

of domination

fertileconditionsforterrorism.(1996:119)" Butwould

patterns

provide

their

to

a

not

invasionsand

military

militarydictatorshipsencourage

opponents

adopt strategy

of conventionalor

warfare

forces?

Why

attackciviliansin these

guerrilla

againstmilitary

contexts?"Terrorists

demanda restorationof the

claimsDonaldBlack,"such

typically

past,"

as

lost

ora

customaryway

of life."(2004:18)But,

politicalindependence,

territory,

again,why

attackcivilians

in

of such

goals?

How do these

or

indiscriminately

pursuit

goals require

encourageterrorism? Finally,therehaveinfactbeensituationsinwhichgroupshavemassacredpeoplewhoare

JanGross(2001),forexample,recounts neighbors.

howtheChristianresidentsofthe PolishtownofJedwabnebrutallyandindiscriminatelykilled theirJewishneighbors(orstood bysilently)inJuly1941- 1,600men,womenandchildren

inall.3 to at leastone (non-Jewish)resident,theJews ofJedwabnewere Previously,according

"ongood termswiththe Poles.Dependingon each other.Everybodywas on a first-name basis,Janek,Icek... Lifeherewas, Iwouldsay,somehow idyllic."(Gross2001:18)There seem to have been extensiveeconomic relationsbetween Jedwabne'sJewish and nonJewish residents(most Jews were craftsmenand merchants),as well as considerable residentialintegration.

A Theory of Categorical Terrorism
Wecan		to movetowarda better		of	terrorism
		begin	understanding categorical			byconsidering
the			of civilianswhichrevolutionaries		forviolence.How
	precisecategories			(sometimes)target		the
revolutionaries			construct"and attributeblameto theirenemies is
		"socially				something

aforementionedtheories generallydo not examine.Yet, clearly,revolutionariesdo not indiscriminatelyattackjustanyciviliansornoncombatantsIndeed,. revolutionariesarealso

A

of

Terrorism* 2037

Theory

Categorical

interestedin

theactive

or

of certainciviliansSo. whichare

usually

winning

support allegiance

the "bad"or

civilianswhom

they

attack?

blameworthy

When

a

of

revolutionaries

threaten

theyemploy

strategy

categoricalterrorism,

generally

andattackwhatwe

call

civilians."4Revolutionariesviewthese

categories

might "complicitous

of civiliansas

insofaras

arebelievedto

benefitfromtheactions

complicitous

they

(1)routinely

of the

orstate thatthe revolutionaries

the

or

government

oppose, (2)support

government

havea substantial

to influenceorto directthe

orstate.

state,and/or(3)

capacity

government

Such complicitousciviliansare akinto what CharlesTillycalls "politymembers,"that is,

which"can		claimto the		of actionor			of resources
groups	routinelylay		generation			yielding		by
agentsof the government.(Rule" andTilly1975:55)
Theprecisecategoriesof civiliansthatrevolutionariesview as complicitousdependon
howrevolutionariesconstruetheextant			orderthat		are	to		Different
		political		they	trying		change.

typesof complicitousciviliansaregenerallyassociatedwithdifferentregimetypes(see Table 4). Preciselyhow revolutionariesconstrueor sociallyconstructpoliticalregimes, hence complicitouscivilians,is a complexprocess,one thatdepends,amongotherthings,on an organization'sideology,collectivememoryandpracticalexperience(as filteredthroughits

ideology). One group might view the United States, for example, as					a genuinely
		inwhichthe	is	in
representativedemocracy			generalcitizenry	complicit governmentpolicies,
whereasanother		viewthe UnitedStatesas a			inwhich
	groupmight		are	"bourgeoisdemocracy"
the	or			Totakeanother
only	bourgeoisie	wealthybusinesspeople complicitous.			example,

some Palestiniansbelievethat IsraeliJewish settlers in the West Bankand Gazaarethe

complicitousciviliansof a settlerregime,whileotherPalestiniansbelievethatallIsraeliJews, includingJews livingwithinIsrael'spre-1967borders,arethecomplicitousciviliansof a settler regime,understoodina verydifferentsense. Inanyevent,one willnotbe ableto understand

why

certain

of civilianswithout

the

revolutionarygroupstargetparticularcategories

confrontandthe

grasping

revolutionaries'

of the

orderthat

complicitous

understanding

political

they

civiliansassociatedtherewith.

Table4:

of

Terrorism:

Civilians"

Targets

Categorical

"Complicitous

Howdo revolutionariesconstruethe extantpoliticalregime?

PoliticalRegime

ComplicitousCivilians

Autocracy

Croniesoftheautocrat

not

the

wealthy

(usually anonymous),

or

Dominanteconomic

the

wealthy

Oligarchy "Bourgeois

class, businesspeople,

Democracy"

Authoritarian

members

Single-party

Party

Regime

Ethnocracy

Dominantethnic

group

Settler

Settlers

Regime

ColonialorNeocolonial

and

Expatriate

compradorbourgeoisie,metropolitan

("Puppet")Regime

ofthe

metropolis

bourgeoisie,generalcitizenry

Democracy

Generalcitizenry

government and

2038 * SocialForcesVolume84, Number4 * June2006

Butwhyindiscriminatelyattackorthreatencomplicitouscivilians?Toanswerthisquestion, we needto understandnotonlyhow revolutionariessociallyconstructspecificciviliansas

enemiesbutalsohowtheyweighthe costs andbenefitsof violentlyattackingsuchenemies once they havebeen defined.What,then, arethe potentialstrategicbenefitsof terrorist

				-		-
attacksagainstcomplicitouscivilians?Themainstrategicobjective					the primaryincentive
of	terrorismtoinduce		civiliansto		orto	proactively
	categorical	complicitous		stopsupporting,

demand changes in, certaingovernmentpolicies or the governmentitself. Categorical

terrorism,inotherwords,				aimsto	suchintense		to		civilians
			mainly		apply	pressure complicitous
that	they	will demand that "their"					or abandon	policies	that the
				governmentchange
revolutionaries			Researchonterrorism			thatthereareseveralother
		oppose.			suggests				strategic

objectivesbehindindiscriminateattackson complicitouscivilians,including:

*Toprovokea violentoverreactionby thegovernmentagainstthe revolutionariesandtheirpresumedsupporters,ultimatelybenefiting therevolutionaries

*Toundermineeffortsat peace or reconciliationbetween the

competing oppositional groups, ultimately benefitingtherevolutionaries

* Toattract,retainand/orboost the moraleof revolutionariesand supporters

*Toavenge specificacts forwhichcomplicitousciviliansareheld responsible

*Toseize orrecoverterritoryfromthegovernment

Thefactthata groupormovementmayhaveone ormoreof these strategicobjectivesor incentivesdoes not automatically"cause"categoricalterrorismWhether.such goals will actuallyinducerevolutionariesto adopta strategyof categoricalterrorismdepends on a number of other factors, includingwhether revolutionariesbelieve they have the organizationaland technicalcapacityto wage an effectivecampaignof terrorismMore. generally,the strategicchoice of revolutionariesto employcategoricalterrorismis much complicatedbythe factthatthisstrategyalso has manypotentialcosts as wellas benefits.

Researchon terrorism			thatthereare severalreasons	why	revolutionaries
a	of	suggests			might
		terrorism:
reject	strategy	categorical

*Complicitousciviliansmaybe potentialmembersoralliesof the revolutionarymovement.

*Nonviolentappealsorprotestsmayinfluencecomplicitouscivilians moreeffectivelythanthreatsorviolence.

*Terrorismmayangeror repel the membersorsupportersof the revolutionarymovement.

*Terrorismmayharmorpreventallianceswithactuallyorpotentially

sympatheticthirdparties.

*Terrorismmayprovokestaterepressionforwhichtherevolutionaries willbe blamedbytheirconstituents.

*Terrorismmayprovokestaterepressionthatwillseverelyweakenor evendestroytherevolutionarymovementitself

Becausethereareoftenverygood reasonsto employand rejecta strategyof terrorism, revolutionariesusuallyconfronta numberof "strategicdilemmas."(Jasper2004:7-10)There maybe no simplesolutionto these dilemmas,becauserevolutionariesmayhaveimperfect

A	of	Terrorism* 2039
	Theory	Categorical

informationaboutthe politicalregime,complicitousciviliansor even theirown presumed constituents,andthuscannoteasilypredictreactionsto terrorismBecause.these dilemmas are notalwayseasilyresolved,moreover,they do notclearlydirectrevolutionariesalonga particularlineof action.Thismayhelpaccountforthe sheerunpredictabilityof some terrorist attacksas wellas the seemlyquixoticorself-defeatingcharacterof others.

Onestrategicdilemma,whichJasperlabels"naughtyor nice"(2004:9),has to do with whethercollectiveactionis moreeffectivewhen itinvolvesfriendlypersuasionorcoercion. Forrevolutionaries,one concernis whethercomplicitouscivilianswillbe moreeffectively influencedby nonviolentappealsorprotestsorbyviolenceandthreats.Nonviolentappeals

arerelativelycheap,butthey maynotwork;andviolence,even when efficientlyexecuted, maybackfire,inducingcomplicitouscivilians,forexample,notto pressure"their"government to changeits ways butto redoubletheirsupportforit.Theless familiarrevolutionariesare withtheculturalbeliefsandassumptionsof complicitouscivilians(i.e.,thegreaterthecultural distancebetweenthese groups),the morelikelytheyareto strategicallymiscalculate.

Anotherstrategicdilemma,whichJaspercalls"reachingoutorreachingin,"concernsthe "issueof whetherto playto insideoroutsideaudiencesonce theyaredefined."(2004:10)As notedabove,one reasonwhyrevolutionarygroupssometimesemployterrorismto attract, retainand/orboostthe moraleof activists,butthismayonlyserveto alienatepotentialallies. Onthe otherhand,heedingsuchalliesandrejectingterrorismmayunderminethe moraleof activistsandrisklosingthe politicalinitiativeto moreviolentorganizations(Bloom2005:chap. 4). Thisdilemmais evidentamongPalestiniangroups.TerrorismagainstIsraeliJews has sometimes won the approvalof manyPalestinians(andotherArabs),but at the cost of alienatingpotentialalliesoutsidethe MiddleEast.5

Revolutionaries'calculationsaboutwhethertheyshouldemploycategoricalterrorismas a strategyarenotmadeina vacuum,outsideof anysocial,politicalorculturalcontext.Atheory of categoricalterrorismneeds to specifythe keycontextualfactorsthatcreateincentivesor disincentivesforrevolutionariesto engage insuchterrorismSometimes.these factorspull

in both directions,but sometimes they may convincerevolutionariesthattheirstrategic dilemmasmaybe moreorless adequatelyresolvedbya consistentcourseof action.

The		factorsina		of	terrorismmustbethosethateitherbluror
	key			theory	categorical	orderthata			brighten
the		affectiveandmoraldistinctionsbetweenthe							revolutionary
	cognitive,					political
	seeksto			andthecivilianswho liveunderthat		orderFactors.thatblurthis
group			change		political
distinction					insofaras the latterrests			the revolutionaries'
		encouragecategoricalterrorism,					upon

failureorrefusalto drawa moral,affectiveoreven conceptualdistinctionbetweena hated politicalregimeand"its"citizensorsome subsetofthem.Factorsthatbrightenthisdistinction discourageterrorismbydissociatingciviliansfromthetargetedregimeanditspolicies.

Mytheoryproposesthatthreekeycontextualfactorsstronglyinfluencethe decisionof revolutionarieseitherto employornotto employcategoricalterrorism(see Table5).First,and most importantly,terrorismis encouragedwhen revolutionariesperceive that certain categoriesof civilians- complicitouscivilians- benefitfrom,support,demandortolerate extensiveandindiscriminatestateviolenceorstateterrorismagainstthe revolutionariesand

theirpresumedconstituents.Thisperceptionis moreor less stronglyencouragedbythe

of	butalso	by	institutional	and	everyday
ideologies	revolutionaryorganizations,		arrangements

practicesthat (a) blurthe boundariesbetween the governmentand these complicitous civilians(e.g.,elections)and/or(b)blurthe boundariesbetweenthe militaryandcomplicitous civilians(e.g., universalconscription)In. other words, practicesthat tend to elide the distinctionbetween state and citizen, on the one hand, or between combatantand noncombatant,on the other,also tend to elide the willingness or even capacityof revolutionaries(andothers)to makemoral,affectiveoreven cognitivedistinctionsbetween

these categories.

2040 * SocialForcesVolume

Number4

*

2006

84,

June

Table5:

Variables

Revolutionaries'Useof

Terrorism

Key

Affecting

Categorical

+-

1.

civilians

extensivestate

vs.

Stateviolenceislimitedand/or

Complicitous

support

violence/stateterrorism

conspicuouslyopposedby

civilians

Boundariesbetweenthestateandcitizensareblurred vs.

complicitous

State

from

(a)

combatantsand

vs.

autonomy

society

Boundariesbetweenthe

from

(b)

military/

Militaryautonomy

society

2.

civilians/noncombatantsareblurred

vs.

and/orthepoliticalregime

civiliansarenumerousand

civiliansarefewand

Complicitous

relatively

Complicitous

unprotected

well

alliancesor

vs.

protected

3.Weakorabsent

alliances

political

cooperation

Significantpolitical

betweenrevolutionariesand

civilians

betweenrevolutionariesand

complicitous

(i.e.,

civilians

and/orterritorial

stronglinguistic,religious,

complicitous

segregation)

I notedearlierthat revolutionarygroupsthat haveemployeda strategyof categorical terrorismareusuallydrawnfrom,andclaimto acton behalfof,populationsthathavesuffered extensiveandoften indiscriminatestate repression(inFrenchAlgeria,the West Bankand Gaza,SriLankaandChechnya)In. eachof these cases, moreover,therewas oris a perception bythe revolutionariesof substantialciviliansupportfor(ortolerationof)thatrepression(by Europeansettlers,Israelis,SinhaleseandRussians,respectively)Indeed,. the governments that carriedout the repressionin these cases had a substantialmeasureof democratic legitimacyamongcomplicitouscivilians;some stilldo. Democraticrightsandinstitutionsare ofteneffectiveat creatingthe impression(especiallyat some socialdistance)of substantial solidaritybetween citizensand "their"states. When extensive and indiscriminatestate violenceis seen to be supportedbyciviliansand/ororchestratedbydemocraticallyelected governments,itis hardlysurprisingthatrevolutionarieswouldtendto viewbothrepressive states and the civilianswho seem to stand behindthose states as legitimatetargetsof counter-violence,typicallyjustifiedas "self-defense."Noris itsurprisingthatretributionfor such violencewouldbe directedat civiliansas well as at the state's armedforces.Andit

wouldalso be reasonableunderthese circumstancesfor revolutionariesto concludethat

attackingciviliansmightcause the latterto put substantialpressureon "their"states to changetheirways. Extensivestate ("wholesale")terrorismbegets extensiveoppositional ("retail")terrorism,in other words, only when there exists a citizenrywith significant

democratic

The latterwould

to be a

for extensive

rights.

appear

necessary precondition

terrorism

2005,Goodwin

categorical

(Pape

2006).

A second contextualfactorthatencouragescategoricalterrorismis the existenceof a

and

of

civilians.

large

relativelyunprotectedpopulation

complicitous

Bycontrast,categorical

terrorismis

whenthe

of

civiliansis

small

discouraged

category

complicitous

comparatively

and,

such civiliansare few and far between and/orwell

protected(usually

accordingly,

because of theirwealthand/orpoliticalstatus).Hence,categoricalterrorismis muchmore likelywhenanentireethnicgroupornationalityis viewedby revolutionariesas complicitous as compared,forexample,to a smallsocialclass orthe croniesof anautonomous,"above class"dictatorAnd,. infact,allmajorcases of categoricalterrorismseem to haveentailedthe

use of violenceandthreatsagainsta largeethnicornational group.

Thisfactorhelpsto explainwhythe SandinistaFrontinNicaraguacarriedoutvirtuallyno terrorismduringtheirarmedconflictwiththe personalisticSomozadictatorship,anotherwise

bloodyinsurgencyduringwhichsome 30,000peoplewere killed(Booth1985).Complicitous civiliansin this context consisted of a tiny numberof Somoza croniesand a loyalelite

			A	of		Terrorism* 2041
				Theory	Categorical
bothof whichwere drawn		from			small	bourgeoisieVirtually.
opposition,	mainly		Nicaragua's
allotherciviliansin	fromthe lowliest			to Somoza's
	Nicaragua,	peasant			bourgeoisopponents,

were viewed bythe Sandinistasas potentialallies,and indeedmanywouldbecome such (Everingham1996).Hadthe Somozadictatorshipbeen supportedby moreor largersocial strataorbya particularethnicgroupof substantialsize,the Sandinistaswouldundoubtedly haveengagedinmorecategoricalterrorismagainstthese groups.

Thethirdmaincontextualfactorthatencouragesterrorismis a particulartypeof "social distance,"namely,theweaknessorabsenceof politicalalliancesbetweenrevolutionariesand theirpresumedconstituentsandcomplicitousciviliansIn.fact,whereone findsthistypeof politicaldistanceas wellas mass-supportedstateviolence,ideologiesand/orculturalidioms thatdepictcomplicitousciviliansas blameworthyandperhapseveninherentlyevilareespecially likelyto resonateamongthe victimsof thatviolence.Simplyput,these victimswillnothave experiencedanypositivepoliticalinteractionswithcomplicitousciviliansto weighagainstthe palpableevilthatthelatterareseento countenanceordirectlyperpetrateThere. hasinfactbeen a hugepoliticaldistanceinthisparticularsense- separatingthoserevolutionarieswhopractice categoricalterrorism(andthosetheyclaimto speakfor)andtheirciviliantargets.

By contrast,categoricalterrorismis discouragedwhen there are significantpolitical alliancesorformsof cooperationbetweenrevolutionariesandcomplicitouscivilians(For. a similarargumentaboutethnicrioting,see Varshney2002.)Inotherwords,whenrevolutionary groupsand theirconstituentshave a historyof collaboratingpoliticallywith significant numbersof complicitouscivilians,they are not likelyto classifycomplicitousciviliansas enemies. To attacksuch civiliansindiscriminatelywould jeopardizepoliticallyvaluable alliancesandthe resourcesandlegitimacyattachedto them.

I believethatthis lastfactoris extremelyimportantfor understandingwhythe ANCin SouthAfricarejecteda strategyof categoricalterrorismThe.ANCeschewed this strategy even thoughthe apartheidregimethatit soughtto toppleemployedveryextensivestate violenceagainstitsopponents.Thisviolence,moreover,was clearlysupported(ortolerated) by largesegments of the white, especiallyAfrikaner,population.The NationalistParty governmentsthatunleashedthe securityforcesagainstthe regime'senemieswere elected bythe whitepopulationSo. whydidthe ANCadhereto an ideologyof "multiracialism"and refuseto view whites as such as enemies?The answerlies, I believe,in the ANC'slong

of	withwhiteSouth		of British		-	as well
history	collaborating	Africans,especially		background

as with Indianand "colored"(mixedrace)SouthAfricansinthe anti-apartheidstruggle.

		inthis		was theANC's				collaborationwithwhitesin
Perhapsespeciallyimportant				respect		long		leaderof MK,theANC's
theSouthAfricanCommunist				an
		PartyTellingly,.			important,long-time
armed	was Joe	Slovo,	a white Communist.			to		an IsraeliJew		leading
wing,					(Try		imagine
Hamas'sarmed		or an AmericanChristian							Forthe ANCto have
	wing				directingal-Qa'ida.)
	attackedSouthAfricanwhiteswouldhavesouredthis								strategicrelationship,
indiscriminately

which,amongotherthings,was essentialforsecuringsubstantialSovietaidforthe ANC.In sum, given the long-standingmultiracial- includinginternational- supportfor the anti-

		a	of	terrorism				civilians
apartheidmovement, strategy categorical					againstcomplicitous(white)
madelittle		ormoralsense to ANCleaders.
	strategic				- andseems to retrodict
In		of	terrorism
	sum, mytheory		categorical	predicts			accurately-
thatwhen revolutionaries				attack			attackthose		large
			indiscriminately		civilians,they generally
and			of civiliansor		and		those whoare	perceived
	unprotectedcategories			noncombatants,		only

as benefitingfrom,supportingand/orhavinga substantialcapacityto influencestates that employextensive, indiscriminateviolenceagainstrevolutionariesand theirconstituents.

However,if revolutionariesperceivesignificantnumbersof these "complicitouscivilians"as actualor potentialsupporters(oras capableof beinginfluencedby nonviolentappealsor protests),then they willnot be attacked.Whetherspecific categoriesof civilianswill be

2042 * SocialForcesVolume84, Number4 * June2006

perceivedas potentialalliesby revolutionariesdepends mainlyupona historyof political interactionandcooperation(orlackthereof)betweenthese civiliansandthe revolutionaries. Categoricalterrorism mostlikelywheretherehasbeenlittlesuchinteractionorcooperation, resultinginweakpoliticalalliancesbetweenthe revolutionariesandcomplicitousciviliansfor example,wherethe revolutionariesand complicitousciviliansspeak differentlanguages, practicedifferentreligions,claimthe same land,and/orareterritoriallysegregated.

Theessentialelementsofthistheorycanbe representedbymeansof a conceptualspace,

representedin 1.Thefirstvariableis a measureof the extentto whichrevolutionaries Figure

perceivecivilian for(and/ortolerationof)extensiveandindiscriminatestateviolence support

orstateterrorismagainstthemselvesandtheirconstituentsThis.variablecanbe saidto be "strong"ifstateviolenceis greatand revolutionariesbelievethatlargenumbersof civilians supportortolerateit.Thisvariablewouldbe "weak"if state violenceitselfis limitedor if revolutionariesbelievethatrelativelyfew civilianssupportit,howeverextensiveorlimitedthat

violencemaybe. Thesecond variableis the strengthof the cross-cuttingpoliticalalliances that connect (orfailto connect) revolutionariesand theirconstituentsand complicitous

civilians.	terrorismoccurswhenandwhererevolutionaries		civilian
Categorical		perceivestrong
support for extensive state		violence and cross-cutting politicalties	between the

revolutionariesandcomplicitousciviliansareweak(i.e.,when revolutionarygroupsfallinto the upperleft regionof the conceptualspace in Figure1).Otherwise,revolutionarieswill adoptstrategiesof conventionaland/orguerrillawarfareand/ortargetedassassination.

Figure1.A Theoryof CategoricalTerrorism

Cross-cuttingpoliticalalliancesandlorcooperation

betweenrevolutionariesand complicitouscivilians

Weak

Strong

French Algeria

Perceivedciviliansupportfor Israel/Palestine extensivestate violenceagainst SriLanka revolutionariesandtheir Chechnya

Strong

SouthAfrica

Apartheid

constituents			[categoricalterrorism]
			NorthernIreland			BasqueCountry
				(1970s-80s)
		Weak	ElSalvador			Nicaragua(1970s)
				(1980s)
Conclusion
Al-Qa'ida and 9/11
Byway	of	letmeturnto the		of whetherthe		outlinedhere
		conclusion,		question	theory		explains

whyal-Qa'idaandaffiliatedIslamistgroupshavecarriedoutextensivecategoricalterrorism,

theattacksof		11,2001.Ibelievethatitdoes.Tobe		al-Qa'idaanditsaffiliates
including	Sept.			sure,
differfromother		thathave		terrorisminsofaras
revolutionaryorganizations			practicedcategorical
a	transnational		movementThat.is to		al-Qa'idanot
theyrepresent genuinely		revolutionary			say,

onlyhas militantsin morethanone nationalsociety,whichis by no meansunusualamong revolutionarygroups,butit also opposes andseeks to overthrownotjustone, butseveral politicalorders(Gunaratna2002).Al-Qa'idaisalsounusualinsofaras ithasemployedextensive

					A		of		Terrorism* 2043
						Theory		Categorical
	terrorism		thecitizensof statesthatitis				to influencebutnotoverthrow.
categorical		against					trying
AI-Qa'idahas a pan-Islamicrevolutionaryproject,viewingitself as the vanguardand
defenderof thetransnationalummaorMuslim									inal-Qa'ida's
				communityUnfortunately,.						view,
this		transnational		is		balkanizedand			violentlyoppressedby
	multiethnic,		community currently
	secularand						fromMoroccoto			as
"apostate"			"hypocritical"pseudo-Islamicregimes,							Mindanao,

wellas bythe "Zionistentity"in PalestineAnd.standingbehindthese regimes- and now

	-	is the			U.S.		to a lesser	extent,	otherWestern
occupyingIraq			powerful			government(and,
				the United		This	thatthe UnitedStatesis the
governments,especially					Kingdom). perception
ultimate	whichis					un-lslamic		inthe Muslimworldis
power				proppinguprepressive,			regimes

the fundamentalsourceof al-Qa'ida'sconflictwiththe UnitedStates.AI-Qa'idabelievesthat

untilthe U.S.	-	the "far	- can be			to end its		forthese
government		enemy"			compelled		support
- the "near		- andwithdrawits			fromMuslim		local
regimes	enemy"			troops		countries,		struggles

againstthese regimescannotsucceed(Anonymous2002,Doran2001).

Butwhy killordinaryAmericansinadditionto U.S.armedforces?Whywouldal-Qa'ida targetthe WorldTradeCenter,forexample,inadditionto U.S.militaryinstallations?Shortly after9/11, OsamabinLadendescribedthe rationaleforthe attacksinan interviewthatfirst

inthe Pakistani

on Nov. 2001:

appeared

newspaperAusaf

7,

TheUnitedStatesandtheiralliesare

usin

Palestine,Chechnya,

killing

Palestineand

That's

Muslimshave the

to

Kashmir,

Iraq.

why

right

out

attacksonthe

U.S....

TheAmerican

should

carry

revenge

people

rememberthat

taxestotheir

andthat

voted

fortheir

theypay

government

they

Their

makes

and

provides

president.

government

weapons

themto Israel,whichtheyuse to killPalestinianMuslims.Giventhat

theAmerican

is a committeethat

the

people,

Congress

represents

the factthatit

agrees

withtheactionsof theAmerican

government

thatAmericainits

is

fortheatrocitiesthat

proves

entirety responsible

itis committingagainstMuslimsI.demandtheAmericanpeople to take note of their government'spolicy against Muslims. They describedtheirgovernment'spolicyagainstVietnamas wrong.They shouldnow takethesamestandthattheydidpreviouslyTheonusis onAmericanstopreventMuslimsfrombeingkilledat the handsof theirgovernment. (Quotedin Lawrence2005. 140-1.)6

BinLadenseems to be sayingherethat because the UnitedStates is, in his view, a genuinelyrepresentativedemocracy,ordinarycitizensareresponsiblefortheviolentactionsof "their"government(and,indirectly,of governmentssupportedbythe UnitedStates)inMuslim countries(WiktorowiczandKaltner2003:88-9)AI. -Qa'idaviewsordinaryAmericancitizensas complicitouscivilians- morallyculpableforthe U.S.-sponsored"massacres"of Muslimsina numberof countriesThis.ideawas alsoexpressedbyMohammadSidiqueKhan,one of the foursuicidebomberswho killedmorethan50 peopleinLondononJuly7, 2005.Ina videotape broadcastonal-Jazeeratelevisionon Sept. 1, 2005,Khansaid,"Yourdemocraticallyelected governmentscontinuouslyperpetuateatrocitiesagainstmypeopleallovertheworldAnd.your

supportof themmakesyoudirectlyresponsible,justas Iamdirectlyresponsibleforprotecting andavengingmyMuslimbrothersandsisters."(BBCNews2005)

Tobe sure,al-Qa'ida'sprecisestrategicgoalinattackingU.S.citizensremainsunclear:Was 9/11a reprisalformassacrescarriedoutorsupportedbythe UnitedStates?Was9/11 meant to "wakeup"Americansto whattheirgovernmentwas doinginthe Islamicworld,inthe hope thattheywouldforceitto changeits policies?Orwas the goalperhapsto provokea violent overreactionby the U.S.government,luringit intoAfghanistan,where it would become

encourage,al-Qa'ida's

2044 * SocialForcesVolume84, Number4 * June2006

boggeddown(liketheSovietUnionbeforeit)inan unwinnablewar?Orsome combinationof

these goals?Whatis certain,however,is al-Qa'ida'sbeliefthatitis logicalandindeedjustfor itto attackordinaryAmericansinorderto bringaboutchangein"their"government'spolicies.

As insimilarcases inwhichrevolutionarieshaveturnedto a strategyofterrorism,al-Qa'ida perceivesthatthe state violenceandoppressionwhichit and its constituentssufferhas widespreadciviliansupportinthe UnitedStates.Atthe sametime,al-Qa'idaandits Islamist sympathizersobviouslydo nothavethetypeof historyof politicalcollaborationwithAmerican citizenswhichmightleadthemto rejecta strategyof categoricalterrorism;language,religion andgeographyhavecreateda formidablechasmbetweenthetwo.Theconfluenceof these factors,as elsewhere, has stronglyencouraged,and continuesto terroriststrategyagainstthe UnitedStatesanditsallies.

Notes

1. Someauthorsseem to assumethatthetacticof suicidebombingis inherentlyterroristin nature(e.g., Bloom2005;Pape2005).Thisis incorrectSuicide.bombingsmayeitherbe partof a strategyof conventionalorguerrillawarfare(iftheyareaimedat militaryand/or

political ora strategyofterrorism(ifaimedatordinaryciviliansornoncombatants) targets)

(Goodwin2006).

2.Severalindiscriminatebombingswerecarriedout byANCcadresduringthe mid-1980s, contraryto ANCguidelines,butthese causedrelativelyfew casualtiesandwerepublicly denouncedbythe ANCleadershipThere. were also manyincidentsof violenceagainst cadres in ANCcamps outside of SouthAfrica,includingthe killingof dissidentsand presumeddissidents.Butthese were targetedkillings,not the kindof indiscriminate violencethatIwishto explaininthisarticle.

3.Of course, I do not mean to claimthat this massacreis an exampleof categorical terrorismIt.was notperpetratedbyanoppositionalpoliticalgroup;onthecontrary,itwas

encouraged by	the	governing	Nazi	occupation	forces in Poland.			the
							Accordingly,
Jedwabnemassacreis nota case of terrorismas Iam						the	it	clearly
						using	term,although

hasaffinitieswithterrorism,likeotherstate-sanctionedatrocities.

4.Mythanksto StevenLukesforsuggestingthisterm.

5.See the variouspollsconductedsince 1993 by the PalestinianCenterfor Politicaland SurveyResearch(http://www.pcpsr.org/index.html).

6.Priorto 9/11,ina December1998interviewthatappearedonal-Jazeeratelevision,binLaden remarked,"EveryAmericanis ourenemy,whetherhe fightsdirectlyorwhetherhe pays taxes.Perhapsyouhaveheardthe recentnewsthatthree-quartersof theAmericanpeople

supportClintoninattackingIraqThis. isa peoplewhosevotesarewonwheninnocentsdie, whose leadercommitsadulteryandgreatsins andthensees his popularityrise- a vile peoplewho haveneverunderstoodthe meaningof values."(quotedinLawrence2005:70)

A	of	Terrorism* 2045
	Theory	Categorical

References

Anonymous[MichaelScheuer]2002. .ThroughOurEnemiesEyes:OsamabinLaden,RadicalIslam,andthe

FutureofAmerica. Inc.

Brassey's,

BBCNews. 2005. "Londonbomber:Textinfull."						1. Accessed at:		http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/
4206800.stm.					Sept.
Bergesen,AlbertJ.,andOmarLizardo2004. ."InternationalTerrorismandtheWorld-SystemSociological."
22:38-52.
Theory
Black,Donald2004.			."The	ofTerrorism."			22:14-25.
			Geometry		SociologicalTheory
Bloom,Mia2005.		.	toKillThe.AllureofSuicideTerrorColumbia.					Press.
		Dying					University
Carr,Caleb2003.	.TheLessonsof Terror:A				of Warfare		CiviliansRevised.edition.Random
House.					History	Against
Booth,John.1985.TheEndandtheBeginning.TheNicaraguanRevolutionSecond.editionWestview.Press.
Chomsky,Noam.2001.9-11.SevenStoriesPress.
Clark,RobertP 1984.The					1952-1980.		ofWisconsinPress.
			BasqueInsurgents:ETA,			University

Crenshaw,Martha1981. ."TheCausesofTerrorism." Politics13:379-99.

Comparative

Davis,StephenM.1987.Apartheid'sRebels:InsideSouthAfrica'sHiddenWarYale. Press.

University

Doran,MichaelScott.2001."SomebodyElse'sCivilWar: andtheAssaultonAmerica." Ideology,Rage, Pp.

31-52.HowDidThisHappen?TerrorismandtheNew WarJames.F Hoge,Jr.andGideonRose, editorsPublicAffairs. .

Richard2003. .Armed			The		oftheIRAOxford.		Press.
English,		Struggle:		History		University
Everingham,Mark1996.	.RevolutionandtheMulticlassCoalitionin						of	Press.
					NicaraguaUniversity. Pittsburgh
Ganor,Boaz. 1998. "DefiningTerrorism:Is One Man'sTerroristAnotherMan'sFreedomFighter?"
International		Institutefor		Counter-Terrorism,Herzlia,Israel.Sept. 24. Accessed at:
Policy
http://www.ict.org.il/.
Gareau,FrederickH.2004.StateTerrorismandtheUnitedStates:From							tothe Waron
Terrorism.	Press.					Counterinsurgency
Clarity
Gibbs,JackP 1989.			ofTerrorismAmerican."				Review54:329-40.
"Conceptualization					Sociological

Goodwin,Jeff.2001.No OtherWayOut.StatesandRevolutionaryMovements,1945-1991.

Cambridge

UniversityPress.

.2004. "WhatMustWeExplainto ExplainTerrorism?"SocialMovementStudies3: 259-62.

.2006. "WhatDoWeReallyKnowAbout(Suicide)Terrorism?"ForthcomingSociologicalForum.

Gross,JanT 2001.			TheDestructionoftheJewish			in	Poland.
Books.	Neighbors.				Community Jedwabne,			Penguin
Gunaratna,Rohan2002.			.InsideAI-Qa'ida:GlobalNetworkof TerrorColumbia				Press.
						University
Herman,Edward,and			O'Sullivan1989. .The"Terrorism"			The	andInstitutionsThat
		Gerry			Industry. Experts
ShapeOurViewofTerrorPantheon.				.

Hoffman,Bruce.1998.InsideTerrorismColumbia.UniversityPress.