A dynamic model of insurgency the case of the war in iraq (Larry Blank)

Blank et al.: A Dynamic Model of Insurgency

5. Data from the Iraq War

A comprehensive report by the Brookings Institution, "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," contains data on U.S. troop fatalities, number of U.S. troops wounded, non-U.S. and U.K. coalition military fatalities, estimates of Iraqi civilians killed, number of multiple fatality bombings in Iraq, number kidnapped, estimated strength of the insurgency, number of foreign fighters in the insurgency, size of Iraqi security forces on duty, and many other variables. All of the data used for this study came from this report and the report is updated frequently (www.brookings.edu/iraqindex). The U.S. Department of Defense also provides many statistics concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) including number of active duty military personnel engaged in OIF and number of military personnel killed and wounded in action.

In Table 2, the first column contains the number of U.S. troops in Iraq and the second column contains the number of coalition troops, excluding Iraqi security forces. The third column contains the number of individuals making up the Iraqi security forces (which includes the police and the armed forces) and the fourth column is the total size of the U.S.-led coalition which includes the Iraqi security forces.

Table 3 contains more data taken from the Brookings Institution report. The first column contains number of multiple fatality bombings where a multiple fatality bombing includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs that caused at least three fatalities. The numbers increased from March 2003 to December 2006 indicating the growth in the insurgency over this period. The second column contains estimates of the total number of insurgents detained or killed which the Brookings report states are very rough figures. If they are correct, they indicate a roughly constant level of insurgent fatalities and capture rate. The third column contains the estimated strength of the insurgents or number of insurgents in Iraq. These numbers are again very rough estimates. The fourth column contains number of daily attacks by insurgents and militias. These figures show an increasing trend from March 2003 to November 2006, similar to the number of bombings.

After the initial push into Iraq in March 2003, a significant number of U.S. and coalition troops were withdrawn after meeting little resistance. The size of the coalition (excluding Iraqi forces) fell from 173,000 troops in May 2003 to 139,000 troops in February 2004. With the onset of the insurgency in late 2003 and early 2004, the size of the coalition (excluding Iraqi forces) was increased and remained close to 162,000 troops in 2004 and most of 2005. More U.S. troops were sent into Iraq towards the end of 2005 as a precautionary measure due to the national election in Iraq and were withdrawn shortly thereafter. Between 153,000 and 160,000 coalition troops (excluding Iraqi forces) remained in Iraq throughout

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Table 2. Size of the U.S.-led Coalition (Brookings Institution Report: "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq")

		U.S. and Coalition		U.S.-led Coalition
		Troops (excluding	Iraqi Security	(including Iraqi
May 2003	U.S. Troops	Iraqi forces)	Forces	Security Forces)
	150,000	173.000	7,000-9,000
June	150,000	171,000	N/A
July	149,000	170,000	30,000	200,000
August	139,000	161,000	37,170	198,170
September	132,000	156,000	44,200	200,200
October	131,000	156,000	66,800	222,800
November	123,000	146,900	94,800	241,700
December	122,000	146,500	99,600	246,100
January 2004	122,000	147,600	108,800	256,400
February	115,000	139,000	125,000	264,000
March	130,000	154,000	134,991	288,991
April	137,000	162,000	124,253	286,253
May	138,000	162,000	135,712	297,712
June	138,000	161,000	145,317	306,317
July	140,000	162,000	95,088	257,088
August	140,000	163,700	91,468	255,168
September	138,000	162,600	98,708	261,308
October	138,000	162,000	110,998	272,998
November	138,000	162,000	113,506	275,506
December	148,000	173,000	118,009	291,009
January 2005	150,000	175,300	125,373	300,673
February	155,000	180,000	141,761	321,761
March	150,000	172,000	151,618	323,618
April	142,000	164,000	159,493	323,493
May	138,000	161,000	168,227	329,227
June	135,000	158,000	168,674	326,674
July	138,000	161,000	173,900	334,900
August	138,000	161,000	182,900	343,900
September	138,000	160,000	192,100	352,100
October	152,000	174,000	211,000	385,000
November	160,000	183,000	214,000	397,000
December	160,000	183,000	223,700	406,700
January 2006	136,000	157,000	227,300	384,300
February	133,000	153,000	232,100	385,100
March	133,000	153,000	250,500	403,500
April	132,000	152,000	253,700	405,700
May	132,000	152,000	265,600	417,600
June	126,900	146,900	264,600	411,500
July	130,000	149,000	269,600	418,600
August	138,000	157,000	298,000	455,000
September	144,000	162,000	307,800	469,800
October	144,000	161,200	312,400	473,600
November	140,000	158,000	323,000	481,000
December	140,000	155,200	323,000	478,200
January 2007	132,000	146,650	323,000	469,650
February	135,000	149,010	323,180	472,190
March	142,000	155,205	329,800	485,005
April	146,000	159,196	333,100	492,296
May	149,700	161,812	348,700	510,512
June	157,000	168,524	353,100	521,624
July	160,000	171,508	353,100	524,608
August	162,000	173,685	359,700	533,385
September	168,000	180,279	359,700	539,979
October	171,000	182,668	359,700	542,368
November	162,000	173,589	429,630	603,219

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Blank et al.: A Dynamic Model of Insurgency

Table 3. Bombings and Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents (Brookings

Institution Report: "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq")

	Number of Multiple	Number of Insurgents	Number	Number of Daily Attacks
May 2003	Fatality Bombings	Detained and Killed	of Insurgents	by Insurgents and Militia
	0	1000
June	0	1000			8
July	1	1000			16
August	4	1000			18
September	3	750			25
October	13	750			32
November	6	3,000	5,000		32
December	14	1,000	5,000		19
January 2004	9	2,500	3,000-5,000		19
February	17	2,000	NA		21
March	9	1,750	NA		24
April	9	2,000	5,000		53
May	9	2,000	15,000		53
June	19	1,220	15,000		45
July	11	1,000	20,000		47
August	13	2,500	20,000		77
September	16	2,500	20,000		58
October	17	2,000	20,000		61
November	11	3,000	20,000		77
December	17	2,000	more than 20,000		52
January 2005	28	2,500	18,000		61
February	18	1,000	18,000		54
March	13	1,000	16,000		45
April	21	1,000	16,000		60
May	36	2,000	16,000		70
June	34	2,000	15,000-20,000		70
July	26	2,000	no more than 20,000		70
August	27	3,000	NA		70
September	46	3,000	NA		90
October	39	2,000	15,000-20,000		100
November	41	2,000	15,000-20,000		90
December	21	2,000	15,000-20,000		75
January 2006	30	2,000	15,000-20,000		75
February	39	2,000	15,000-20,000		75
March	37	2,000	15,000-20,000		75
April	40	2,000	20,000+		80
May	56	2,000	20,000+		100
June	57	2,500	20,000+		100
July	53	2,500	20,000+		140
August	52	2,500	20,000+		160
September	57	2,500	20,000+		170
October	56	2,500	20,000-30,000 with militias		180
November	65	2,500			185
December	69
January 2007	44
February	56
March	51
April	53
May	42
June	39
July	43
August	28
September	30
October	34
November	22

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most of 2006. Throughout the conflict, however, U.S. troops have been sent into Iraq in response to more insurgent attacks. Some of these U.S. troops have come from neighboring Kuwait. Thus the size of the coalition has responded to conditions on the ground and the net recruitment rate coefficient of the coalition has been positive in many instances. The insurgent attacks also steadily increased (Figure 5) which suggests that the insurgents have responded to the coalition’s presence and the net recruitment rate coefficient of the insurgents was positive prior to the surge.

Figure 5. Size of Coalition and Number of

Insurgent Attacks

Attacks	200															600000
	150															500000
																400000
Insurgent	100															300000
	50															200000
																100000
	0	July-03	October	Jan-04		July	October	Jan-05	April July	October	Jan-06		July	October	Jan-07	0
					April							April				April
									Date

		Insurgent Attacks		Coalition Size

The "surge" of 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq which began in early 2007, has been reported to have been successful. The number of U.S.-troop fatalities decreased from 84 in January 2007 to 35 in November 2007 (Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, November 29, 2007, pg.16). The estimated number of Iraqi civilian fatalities decreased from 2,800 in January 2007 to 800 in October 2007 (Iraq Index, pg. 4).

6. Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, a system of differential equations was used to model the insurgency in Iraq. What differentiated this model from other models of conflict was that the presence of U.S.-led forces was allowed to have two competing effects on the number of insurgent attacks: (1) it could lead to more attacks by insurgents and

(2) it could lead to fewer attacks. Similarly, the model allowed for the number of attacks by insurgents to increase or decrease the size of the coalition.

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Blank et al.: A Dynamic Model of Insurgency

There are several policy implications that are derived from the model of insurgency. In particular, movement toward the conditions for coalition victory require (a) increasing the combat effectiveness of the coalition, (b) lowering the recruitment rate of the insurgents, (c) reducing the combat effectiveness of the insurgents, and/or (d) increasing the recruitment rate of the coalition. Different strategies and tactics have been deployed by the U.S.-led coalition throughout the conflict. The recent success of the "surge" for example, is not only due to an increase in the recruitment rate of the coalition but also due to tactics used there. As stated by Time Magazine:

But the most significant change that Petraeus brought to Iraq has to do with how troops are deployed. Previously, most U.S. troops had been sequestered in five huge military bases. They would patrol the collapsing cities, usually in motorcades, and then return to their fortresses. Petraeus established a network of joint security stations in the neighborhoods of Baghdad and its environs where U.S. troops and Iraqi forces live and work together. That created a constant military presence in the streets. This heavily armed version of community policing was a central tenet of the counterinsurgency doctrine that Petraeus helped develop during his time at Fort Levenworth (December 31, 2007, pg.110).

This tactic served to reduce the recruitment rate of the insurgents and increase the combat effectiveness of the coalition.

There is evidence that the surge has worked. Multiple fatality bombings have decreased along with the number of Iraqi civilian deaths. Furthermore, Iraqi citizens who fled Iraq are now starting to return. There are, however, problems that remain. The Iraqi government has not been able or willing to fully integrate the Sunnis into the dominant Shi'ite-led parliament and armed forces. Without a political reconciliation between the groups, little may be accomplished by the government.

The drop in violence that has occurred in Iraq since the "surge" may be temporary. As stated by Time Magazine:

The U.S. military has recruited thousands of Sunni insurgents to join the fight against jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, but the Shi'ite militias mainly responsible for last year's sectarian carnage remain largely untouched. In August, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, ordered it not to attack American troops. But U.S. commanders on the ground know there was no goodwill behind the decision. "It wasn’t because Sadr saw Jesus--let's put it that way,"

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says Major Christopher Coglianese, a staff officer in Baghdad. More likely, the Mahdi Army is waiting for the Americans to begin their drawdown from Baghdad next year. Sunnis worry that when the U.S. troops leave, the Shi'ite militias will resume their programs (December 24, 2007, pp. 59-61).

Some type of limited U.S. presence in Iraq may need to be maintained to keep the violence from returning. This is consistent with the model of insurgency in that the equilibrium in which C = 0 and I = 0 (there is no coalition presence in Iraq and insurgent attacks are zero), is unstable.

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