Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America by James Davison Hunter (z-lib.org)

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as the Liberty Lobby, Clergy and Laity Concerned, Concerned Women for America, and People for the American Way, have a staff of twenty to fifty or more, budgets of a half a million to 10 million dollars, and are efficiently administered. They carry enormous social power.82 Yet what is relevant here is neither the size nor effectiveness of the organizations but their very existence. Their very presence on the political landscape aptly symbolizes the nature and direction of a major realignment in public culture.

Justifying the New Alliances

It is essential to note that the realignment of public culture does not take place without tension. For example, the memory of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism remains in the minds of many Catholics and Jews, refreshed periodically by incidents of interreligious prejudice. Suspicions on all sides linger. Yet insofar as the resolution to the issues of contemporary public debate (abortion, the role of women, the changing structure of the family, homosexuality, nuclear proliferation, the "failures" of public education, the meaning of the "separation between church and state," and the like) is not forthcoming, the pressures for interreligious realignment in public culture mount. At the same time, the pressure to tolerate or overlook c;xisting tensions also ris.es.

Yet it is not enough to simply tolerate the tensions. Given the long history of interreligious antagonism, realignment must be justified. On the progressivist side, such explanations are linked to basic concerns for survival. As a publication of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations in 1983 put it, the "renaissance of interreligious communication and cooperation ... emerges out of profound concern with the moral and social issues of the 80's which uniquely threaten our physical and political survival. The nuclear arms race, the suffering engendered by a rate of unemployment unsurpassed since Depression Days and radical attempts to eradicate First Amendment Constitutional protections; almost every social issue, every social welfare concern is being addressed by interreligious coalitions of decency."83 A spokesman for the progressively oriented Washington Interreligious Staff Council agreed: "Different communities of faith converge because they share the same conception of the common good."84

Interestingly, on the orthodox side, the justification for interreligious cooperation is also linked to survival. A statement made in 1986

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by the Fundamentalist writer Tim LaHaye is illuminating in this regard. Despite basic theological differences, he begins, "Protestants, Catholics and Jews do share two very basic beliefs: we all believe in God to Whom we must give account some day for the way we live our lives; we share a basic concern for the inoral values that are found in the Old Testament." LaHaye continues,

If religious Americans work together in the name of our mutually shared moral concerns, we just might succeed in re-establishing the civic moral standards that our forefathers thought were guaranteed by the Constitution.

I realize that such statements may cause me to lose my fundamentalist membership card, but I really believe that we are in a fierce battle for the very survival of our culture.... Obviously I am not suggesting joint evangelistic crusades with these religions; that would reflect an unacceptable theological compromise for all of us. [Nevertheless], all of our nation's religious citizens need to develop a respect for other religious people and their beliefs. We need not accept their beliefs, but we can respect the people and realize that we have more in common with each other than we ever will with . the secularizers of this country. It is time for all religiously committed citizens to unite against our common enemy.85

In 1984, the Evangelical activist Franky Schaeffer observed that

our backs are against the wall and we are facing an aggressively secularistic society whose powerful elements are deliberately attempting to eradicate what little remains of orthodox religious in- 'ftuence in society. The majority of Christians are either asleep or simply do not care. The minority of activist believers no loriger have the luxury of concentrating solely on denominational and church af~airs and petty theological differences. The time has come for those wlio remain to band together in an ecumenism of orthodoxy. Unlike liberal ecumenicism which is bound together by unbelief, this ecumenicism is based upon what we agree to be the essence of the Christian faith, including an orthodoxy of belief in social concerns and priorities.86

It is not just the Protestant fundamentalists who feel these pressures to cooperate.87 As the director of the public affairs office of Agudath Israel argued, "joint efforts with Catholics and Protestants do not mean that

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we Jews are endorsing their theology." He said, "We can overlook our religious differences because politically, it makes.sense."88 A spokesman for the Catholic League maintained, "The issues are too important to have a denominational focus."89 Rabbi Joshua 0. Haberman similarly noted, "As a Jew, I differ with a variety of Bible-believing Christians on theology, our nation's social agenda, and matters of public policy. I am, at times, repelled by fits of fanaticism and a narrow•minded, rigid dogmatism among fundamentalist extremists. Yet far greater than these differences and objections is the common moral and spiritual frame of reference I share with Christians, including fundamentalists. The Bible gave our nation its moral vision. And today, America's Bible Belt is our safety belt, the enduring guarantee of our fundamental rights and freedoms."90

Th~ moral reasoning employed by both sides of the cultural divide to legitimate these alliances, then, is very much alike. In brief, though the alliances being formed among the orthodox or among the progressives across religious tradition are historically "unnatural" they hav~ become pragmatically necessary. In the end, they are justified by the simple dictum that "an enemy of an enemy is a friend of mine."

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD DIVIDE

The divisions among Protestant, Catholic, and Jew have had such a significant place in Western civilization for so many centuries that it is difficult to imagipe pluralism (at least in this context) in any other way. These formal divisions (and to a lesser extent, those ecclesiastical divisions within these faiths) remain the significant ones in the popular imagination, the relevant ones for public policy, and the decisive ones in intellectual circles, particularly in modern social science. They remain part of the taken-for-granted scenery of public life in America and Europe.

The ways in which scholars conceptualize pluralism is especially interesting, for here we see that the habits of social science are as difficult to break as any. With a few exceptions, social science has continued over the past two decades to measure religious and cultural pluralism in a · manner that reifies, as it were, the divisions among the major religious traditions as the correct way to think about cultural pluralism in America. Based upon this methodology, social science has also gradually docu-

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mented religion's declining significance as an explanatory variable. Whether one is a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew simply does not mean very much when attempting to explain variations in people's attitudes or values. As a result, the larger social scientific community has come to assume that general religious preference may be irrelevant or "epiphenomena!." Indeed, in many recent empirical investigations, formal religious variables have not even been included as a part of the research strategy. They just do not make any difference anymore.

Old habits die hard but die they must, for the evidence strongly suggests that the significant divisions on public issues are no longer defined by the distinct traditions of creed, religious observance, or ecclesiastical politics. These do remain strong sources of personal meaning and communal identity, but their consequence for public culture has dwindled substantially. In other words, it is increasingly difficult to speak of the Protestant position or the Catholic position or the Jewish position (or, for that matter, the Mormon or Buddhist position) vis-a-vis American public culture. Meanwhile, other kinds of differences have expanded: increasingly, the politically consequential divisions are those that separate the orthodox from the progressive within religious traditions. And orthodox and progressive factions of the various faiths do not speak out as isolated voices but increasingly as a common chorus. In this, the political relevance of the historical divisions between Protestant and Catholic and Christian and Jew has largely become defunct.

Yet I want to stress again that the lines separating orthodox and progressive, or conservative and liberal, are not, in reality, always sharp. Some notable ideological cross-currents flow against the larger cultural tendencies. First, even if their numbers are relatively few, one cannot ignore the presence on the public scene of, among others, pro-life feminists and libertarians, Mormon and Pentecostal homosexuals, Evangelical Christian pacifists, and secularists (even atheists) who are politically conservative, and Fundamentalists who are socialists. Second, and even. harder to ignore, are the myriad individuals that define themselves more or less in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Although some may lean ideologically toward the orthodox camp while others lean toward progressivism, no one can fairly describe them as extremists. Third, groups and individuals on the orthodox side have sharp disagreements with others on the orthodox side, and the same is true for the progressivist side. And fourth, there are some who would certainly be classified as being on one side of the cultural divide or another but they wish to

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fight their battles alone-they choose not to be aligned at all. All of these realities cannot be disregarded. Yet recognizing the existence of these counterintuitive developments cannot negate the broader tendencies in the realm of public culture. The dominant impulse at the present time is toward the polarization of a religiously informed public culture into two relatively distinct moral and ideological camps.

Competing Moral Visions

The realignment of public culture takes institutional form in a shifting configuration of religious and political associations and organizations. This is the lesson of the preceding chapter. At issue are two relatively distinct and competing visions of public life. To identify the predominant and polarizing tendencies as "orthodox" and "progressive" suggests a great deal about the nature of these visions. Knowing something about the specific political agenda pursued by either-side-reveats·-even more. But to truly understand the depth of contemporary cultural conflict and its historical significance, it is essential to probe more thoroughly into the perspectives on public life being advocated.

Yet, does it go too far to suggest that both sides of the cultural divide represent something as coherent as "perspective"? Certainly there are no comprehensive philosophical treatises articulating in full measure the nature and profile of these visions. There are no modern manifestos declaring a coherent system of programs and goals. What actually exists in public discussion are, very often, nothing more than jumbled accumulations of pronouncements, accusations, appeals, and partisan analyses. It would be foolish· to deny the complexity of the divisions, the subtleties and ambivalent moral commitments in the hearts and minds of ordinary Americans. As I have emphasized from the start, Americans find stances across a wide spectrum of values and perspectives. Despite this complexity, it is possible to discern certain cultural tendencies. That is to say, all of these pronouncements, allegations, complaints, and ap-

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peals seem to reveal broad, yet still distinct and opposing cultural impulses. These impulses, I would argue, have come to be rather strong in public discourse mainly because they have been embraced and promoted through the elites and institutions of special interest organizations. As such, they are suggestive of more comprehensive visions of public life-public philosophies whose general contours can be roughly sketched out as ideal types.'

COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE

As we learned in chapter 2, one of the chief tasks of a public philosophy centers around the problem of national identity-deciding who we as a nation have been, coming to grips with who we are now, and defining what we should aspire to become in the future. Often the mechanism for articulating our public philosophies (and thus the meaning of national identity) is nothing more than a simple narrative-chronicles that begin with an account of the nation's mythic origin and end with a vision of its future. The impact of these stories is critical. When they are intelligible, credible, and compelling to those who hear them_, not only do they inspire a sense of cohesion within communities but they provide a ready justification for the nation's conduct in world affairs-for only actions consistent with a nation's self-conception (what it has been and what it aspires to be) will be an appropriate field of national endeavor.

The general public philosophies that have evolved on either side of the cultural divide have been presented many times in recent years and therefore require neither an exhaustive review nor a detailed analysis. But a brief overview of the opposing ideals of national identity and purpose will offer a beginning point for considering the underlying cultural differences that split these new coalitions of conviction.

History As Ideology

The Orthodox Vision

The most effusive interpreters of the mythic origins of the republic on the side of cultural conservatism are the Evangelical Christians. Theirs, of course, is not the only version. Orthodox Catholics and Jews tell the story from a different angle, one that tends to emphasize the

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generally religious rather than the specifically Christian nature of .the story. Intellectually oriented neo-conservatives stress the generally moral rather than religious nature of the story. Yet all of these versions would have at least a distant resonance with the Evangelical account, particularly in how each of these would understand the republic's founding ideals.

The Evangelical Protestant account of the nation's founding has a very long history, to be sure. Indeed, many of the earliest stories were fashioned by Protestant leaders who. lived through the events of those years, some who actually participated in shaping those events-John Witherspoon, John Adams, Timothy Dwight, Patrick Henry. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, much the same story was retold, if not by Evangelicals, then by kindred spirits, through song (such as "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," written in 1862), literature (from the fiction of Herman Melville to the poetry of Walt Whitman), political oratory (from Abraham Lincoln to Woodrow Wilson), and sermon (as in the revivalism of Billy Sunday). Present-day Evangelicalism, then, is the contemporary bearer of a story that claims a very long past.

We were introduced to the Evangelical account by Chuck Mcllhenny at the opening of this book when he described the Christian heritage that was the context for the nation's founding. It is a start. The larger account varies in detail from Chuck's, but through linking the nation's birth to divine will, the story, as told by some of the most vocal and visible of contemporary Evangelical spokespeople, has a rough coherence. To them, America is, in a word, the embodiment of Providential wisdom. Evangelical journalist Rus Walton put it very simply when he wrote that "the American system is the political expression of Christian ideas."2 In The Light and the Glory, Peter Marshall and David Marvel contended that a divine call upon America can be traced from the very earliest events in the nation's history (including the spiritual calling that Columbus himself received to seek undiscovered lands) to the present, and that this call is still valid today. 3 Another Evangelical author observed that "God's hand was in the founding of this country and the fiber of Christ is in the very fabric of America."4 According to another, our "civil government is ordained of God [and] ... America was founded upon Christian principles,"5 upon the idea that America is "the greatest Christian nation the world has ever known."6 Arguing more in line with the sensibilities of their new partners in the culture war, Fundamentalist writer Tim LaHaye contends that "it is improper to say that America was founded on Christian principles, for that would unnecessarily exclude the Jewish community. America was founded on biblical principles,

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all of which are found in the Old Testament."7 A similar appeal comes from the Religious Roundtable, which asserts that the United States was "born and built upon basic principles of righteousness" and for this reason "has been blessed and exalted in her short 200 year history like no other nation in history.''8 This assertion garners support from orthodox Catholics. As Mae Duggan puts it, "the founders of our nation, George Washington, James Madison, and even Thomas Jefferson (who did not have any church affiliation), believed that government must be based on God; that governmental structures must have an authority greater than itself, which is God. This is the meaning of our motto, 'In God We Trust.' "

For many, however, the rhetoric goes beyond generalities. Many in the Evangelical camp further contend that: the founding documents themselves reftect the hand of divine providence. Argues LaHaye, "The last six commandments of the Decalogue, dealing with man's treatment of his fellowman, and the civil laws of the Old Testament formed the basis for our laws and our Constitution."9 The Evangelical writer and attorney John Whitehead argues that "the concept of a secular state was nonexistent in 1776 as well as 1787, and no less so in 1791 when the Bill of Rights was adopted." At the framing of the Constitution, Whitehead maintains, the American population "lived under laws that were either written directly from the Scriptures or inffuenced by them."10 Whitehead is not alone. "The Founding Fathers," John Eidsmoe writes, "were Newtonians. They believed in absolute, unchanging, God-given laws of science-as well as moral laws. When Jefferson spoke of the 'laws of nature and of nature's God' in the Declaration of Independence, he used language both Christians and Deists would approve.... To the Founding Fathers, law was God-given, absolute, unchanging and revealed to man through Scripture, nature and conscience." 11 Still others have gone so far as to call the Constitution and the Bill of Rights "divinely inspired."

The genius of the "American experiment," from this perspective, was the creation of institutions that would guarantee both freedom and justice. Freedom and justice, however, are cast in a particular way within this mythic tradition.

·The meaning of freedom, as it is emphasized within the various orthodox communities, is the freedom enjoyed by a society when it does not live under despotism; the freedom of a society to govern itself-what philosopher Charles Taylor has called "civic freedom." 12 It is precisely for this reason that the contrast between the United States and its Eu-

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ropean allies (or the "free" world) and the Soviet Union and the former communist bloc played such a key part in the Evangelical and even conservative Catholic world view. Their definition of freedom made that contrast important.

This definition of freedom also naturally highlights the importance of economic self-determination, as in "free" enterprise. Conservative Catholics have not championed this notion so much in part because of Rome's longstanding concern for the interests of organized labor. The Spirit ofDemocratic Capitalism, a book by Catholic scholar Michael Novak, is a notable exception to the rule. But among the more vocal public theologians within the Evangelical tradition, the celebration of capital- ism-the freedom to pursue economic gain without government inter- ference-is virtually unqualified. 13 jerry Falwell repeatedly claimed that "God is in favor of freedom, property, ownership, competition, diligence, work and acquisition. All of this is taught in the Word of God, in both the Old and New Testaments." Therefore "people should have the right to own property, to work hard, to achieve, to earn, and to win."14 Elsewhere Falwell has written that "the free-enterprise system is clearly outlined in the Book of Proverbs in the Bible. Jesus Christ made it clear that the work ethic was a part of His plan for man. Ownership of property is biblical. Competition in business is biblical."15 In a similar vein, religious broadcaster Pat Robertson has contended that while "communism and capitalism in their most extreme, secular manifestations are equally doomed to failure, ... free enterprise is the economic system most nearly meeting humanity's God-given need for freedom.... Capitalism satisfies the freedom-loving side of humanity."16 Such theologies have even been translated into practical, profit-oriented seminars. At the Marriott Hotel, Anaheim, California, in 1981, Evangelist Bill Bright (founder of Campus Crusade for Christ) and Texas billionaire Nelson Bunker Hunt led a three-day financial seminar in which participants were instructed in the biblical foundations of free enterprise and economic success. As one participant enthusiastically stated, "God is an all-time Capitalist, not a Socialist."17

Underlying the reverential endorsement of capitalism among these Evangelicals is the conviction that economic and spiritual freedoms go ·hand in hand, that one is impossible without the other. 18 Some trace the relationship to the Old Testament land laws that linked private property to the freedom from state coercion, especially from taxation. 19 Others see a less complicated connection: the relationship between investing

.and taking profits is essentially the sam~ as that between giving and