Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

Table 3.8

NM quantities under the IAEA Safeguards in states possessing no nuclear weapons (as of 1996)

								NM quantity, t
		Material	1995				1997			2002
			INFCIRC	INFCIRC		INFCIRC			INFCIRC	INFCIRC		INFCIRC
			/153		/66		/153		/66	/153		/66
	Plutonium		388		29			430–	32–35	540–610		39–44
							460*)
	Highly enriched		10.0		0.4		10.0		0.4	10.0		0.4
	uranium
	Low-enriched		36900		2410		39200 –		2700 –	44900 –		3400 –
	uranium						41100		2800	50300		3800
	Source material		70200		3980		80000 –		4500 –	108200 –		5600 –
							84000		4700	121200		6300
*) forecast data.
												Table 3.9
			Facilities under the IAEA safeguards in states
			possessing no nuclear weapons (as of 1999)
		Facility type						INFCIRC/153			INFCIRC/66
		Power reactors							231			14
		Research reactors and			critical				173			11
		assemblies
		Conversion facilities							13			1
		Fuel fabrication facilities							39			5
		Reprocessing facilities							6			1
		Fuel enrichment facilities							10			0
		Separate storage facilities							64			2
		Other facilities (> 1 eff. kg)							76			2
		Other facilities (< 1 eff. kg)							481			22
		Non-nuclear facilities							0			2
					TOTAL:				1093			60

It may be concluded that the system of IAEA safeguards is growing to global dimensions, and there is little material left uncontrolled. Nevertheless, implementation of these safeguards is not free from certain difficulties. The first to be mentioned among them are the problems

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associated with existence of the so-called “thresho ld” states and the efficiency of the safeguards themselves. In recognition of the above, the IAEA is taking steps towards strengthening the safeguards regime. In 1995, the Board of Governors of the Agency set up a committee for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards and entrusted it with drafting a model additional protocol seeking to improve the Agency’s capability to reveal undeclared nuclear activities. In 1997, the Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol prepared by the Committee as an addendum to the comprehensive agreements for application of the safeguards [5]. The Protocol comes into force after the Agency receives written notification made by a state on acceptability of the Protocol terms, or once it is signed by representatives of a state and the Agency.

At present, the IAEA member-states submit declarations with information on nuclear materials, on the processes these materials are involved in, and on nuclear facilities containing NM. The Protocol stipulates submission of an extended declaration on nuclear activities of a state. Such a declaration together with certain verification work should make the nuclear fuel cycle of a country and its associated activities more transparent. In addition to the data on all nuclear materials, an extended declaration will include information about all other nuclear activities, such as:

∙description of all processes and location of all facilities related to nuclear activities (industrial, R&D, personnel training);

∙identification of industrial, commercial and military facilities found in immediate proximity to nuclear installations.

Any process to produce nuclear materials or articles containing them is bound to leave some trace in the environment. The extent and nature of such traces depend on a number of factors, including the production technology, materials, loss limitation measures, and possible trails left by NM migrating beyond the nuclear site boundaries. Thus, the results of field tests in Sweden (1993) showed traces of nuclear activities in water and deposit samples up to 20 km away from the facility, depending on the local transport and water mixing conditions. Therefore, the Additional Protocol provides for wide application of sensitive environmental monitoring methods developed to detect traces of nuclear activities.

Provision of inspectors’ access to materials, equipment and installations is a key aspect in implementation of the safeguards. For regular inspections within the framework of the INFCIRC/153 Agreement, access should be provided to the places where such access was recognized as essential for

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fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the Agency in regard to the safeguards. Extended access is a crucial factor in consolidating the system of safeguards. This implies access to any place at the facilities covered by the IAEA safeguards. The extended access approach also applies to the areas included in an extended declaration, which have no NM at all or contain small quantities of materials exempt from the safeguards, but are associated with the nuclear activities mentioned in the extended declaration. Besides, to enhance the transparency of nuclear activities, pursuant to the Additional Protocol, a state should seek to facilitate access to industrial, commercial or military installations located in the immediate proximity to nuclear facilities.

For a state which is a party to a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an effective Additional Protocol, review of all available information should show absence of not only any evidence of diversion of the safeguarded nuclear material, but also of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Therefore, application of the safeguards is intended to lead to a positive conclusion that all nuclear materials in a state are placed under safeguards, with their use limited to peaceful nuclear activities, or are duly accounted for. For the Agency to be able to arrive at such a conclusion, it has to assess all state-level information resulting from implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, as well as all available and relevant information from other sources.

Confidence of the Agency and member–states in relia bility of the conclusions drawn from the results of safeguards application, is directly dependent on the quality of measures taken to collect, analyze and evaluate the relevant information. Such measures should be exhaustive, detailed and effective. Declarations made in accordance with the additional protocol present extensive information on national nuclear programs. Additional information arises from implementation of the extended access approach on the sites. The Agency collects substantial data from a wide spectrum of open sources with simultaneous assessment of their reliability, and applies new technologies, such as use of images from commercial satellites. The IAEA will also use the information voluntarily provided by member–states concerning export of nuclear materials, cases of illegal circulation of materials, etc. Assessment of the nuclear activities of a state is based then on three components:

∙ assessment of the national nuclear program on the strength of the evidence of non-diversion of declared nuclear materials; this serves as a bases for subsequent assessments;

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∙assessment made on completion of the additional protocol measures; it covers the information contained in the original extended declarations of states, as well as the results of actions pursuant to the additional protocol; and

∙conclusions arising from continuous monitoring of the national nuclear program.

By acting upon the Additional Protocol, the Agency can make national nuclear activities more transparent, while recognizing the right of states to protect their sensitive information.

3.2. Export control system

Export control is one of the key tools of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons [6]. It embraces a package of measures taken to ensure compliance with the effective international standards and rules for trade in materials, equipment and technologies potentially usable in production of nuclear weapons. The export control system is based on the licensing procedure for exporting the products and technologies covered by specially developed check lists. Export control is brought into effect at two levels: as international regimes and national systems.

The international regime of export control is built by joint efforts of states upon agreements between them, aimed at establishing control over export of products relating to development and production of nuclear weapons. International export control regimes are based on the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article III.2 of the NPT bans transferring to any non-nuclear-weapons state source or special fissionable material and equipment designed for production of special fissionable material, unless they are covered by the IAEA Safeguards.

The requirements of Article III.2 of the NPT are not exhaustive, however, and a number of issues were left unresolved, for example:

∙the equipment and materials meant for production of special fissionable material have not been specified;

∙the conditions for control over nuclear technology transfer have not been addressed;

∙nor have been addressed the conditions for control over repeated NM transfers;

∙the Article does not require that the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA be recognized. As a result, international NM transfers to non-signatory nonnuclear states have been regulated for many years by the incomplete IAEA system of safeguards described by INFCIRC/66.

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Zangger Committee

The awareness of these outstanding issues led states to set up international organizations, such as Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (London Club), which developed mechanisms and recommendations for control over international transfers of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and equipment. The states involved in these international activities are listed in Table 3.10.

					Table 3.10
	International export control regimes
State	Zangger	NSG	State	Zangger		NSG
	Committee			Committee
Australia	+	+	Luxemburg	+		+
Austria	+	+	Netherlands	+		+
Argentina	+	+	New Zealand			+
Belarus		+	Norway	+		+
Belgium	+	+	Poland	+		+
Bulgaria	+	+	Portugal	+		+
Brazil		+	Russia	+		+
UK	+	+	Rumania	+		+
Hungary	+	+	Slovakia	+		+
Germany	+	+	Slovenia	+		+
Greece	+	+	USA	+		+
Denmark	+	+	Turkey	+		+
Israel			Ukraine	+		+
Ireland	+	+	Finland	+		+
Iceland			France	+		+
Spain	+	+	Czechia	+		+
Italy	+	+	Switzerland	+		+
Canada	+	+	Sweden	+		+
Cyprus		+	SAR	+		+
China	+		Japan	+		+
South Korea	+	+
Latvia		+	IN ALL	35		39

In the period of 1971 to 1974, a group of states most advanced in the nuclear sphere (15 states at the beginning) held a series of meetings in Vienna. Professor Claude Zangger from Switzerland presided over those

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meetings. The purpose of the meetings was to reach agreement on the following:

∙more specific definition of the equipment and materials intended for processing, use or production of special fissionable material;

∙development of the terms and conditions for regulating export of such equipment and materials in accordance with Article III.2 of the NPT.

The following terms for export of NM and equipment were agreed upon:

∙transfer of source or fissionable material is banned unless the material to be supplied is covered by the IAEA safeguards;

∙the equipment and materials included in the “Trigge r List” and intended for production of special fissionable material, may not be transferred unless the fissile material produced by this equipment is placed under the IAEA control;

∙materials and equipment may not be re-exported unless this material (equipment) is placed under the IAEA control.

The Trigger List drawn up by the Committee includes the following equipment and materials:

∙source and special fissionable materials;

∙reactors and reactor components;

∙non-nuclear materials for reactors;

∙facilities for reprocessing irradiated fuel and the associated equipment;

∙facilities for fabrication of fuel elements;

∙facilities for separation of uranium isotopes and the associated equipment;

∙facilities for production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and the associated equipment.

In 1974, the agreements of the Zangger Committee and the Trigger List of equipment and materials which may only be transferred under international control, was published by the IAEA as document INFCIRC/209.

Nuclear Suppliers’ Group

The nuclear test carried out by India in 1974 made it clear that the Zangger Committee agreements had failed to bar completely the proliferation routes of nuclear weapons. In the same year of 1974, the major countries involved in supply of nuclear materials and equipment, set up the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) to supplement and reinforce the

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terms and conditions for nuclear export, formulated by the Zangger Committee. Like the latter, the NSG is based on a voluntary collective political agreement between its member–countries. S ince 1991, the NSG has had no official relations with the IAEA.

In 1976, the Group developed and published its fundamental document the Guidelines for Nuclear Export (INFCIRC/254). The NSG extended the List compiled by the Zangger Committee by adding uranium conversion processes, toughened up the requirements for their transfers to other countries, and introduced restrictions on supply of dual-purpose products.

Conditions for supply of products covered by the NSG list

Part 1 of the NSG Guidelines describes the supply conditions and includes a check list of materials, installations, equipment and components usable for production of special fissionable material. Unlike the Trigger List of the Zangger Committee, the NSG list extends controls to the technologies for production of items mentioned in the Trigger List.

The NSG interprets “technology” as technical data m aterialized, essential to design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities for enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.

For items of the extended list to be exported, they should have physical protection at least at the level recommended by the IAEA. The NSG Guidelines prohibit export of source and special fissionable materials, of products and the associated processes mentioned in the check list:

∙to any non-nuclear country which has no obligations in law in regard to the full-scope IAEA safeguards;

∙unless the exporter is sure that the exports will be used for peaceful purposes.

Exceptions may only be made if:

∙the export is of importance to safe operation of an existing facility covered by the IAEA safeguards;

∙the export follows the agreements made before April 4, 1992 (NSG meeting in Warsaw).

Dual-purpose products and the conditions for their export

Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines contains the conditions for export and a check list of dual-purpose materials and equipment subject to export control.

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Materials and equipment are treated as dual-purpose products if they could significantly promote activities aimed at production of nuclear explosive devices.

The list of dual-purpose products includes:

industrial equipment: radial– and linear–rolling ma chine-tools; numerically controlled tools; vacuum furnaces; presses; robots; vibration testing equipment;

materials: aluminum; beryllium; bismuth; tungsten; zirconium, etc.; equipment for uranium isotope separation;

equipment of facilities for heavy water production (omitted in the Trigger List);

equipment for development of blasting systems; equipment for conducting explosions;

components and equipment for conducting NW tests; other items of export (tritium).

The Guidelines ban export of dual-purpose products and technologies subject to export control (on the list) to any non-nuclear country for use in activities relating to nuclear explosions, or in NFC facilities outside the IEAE safeguards.

Export control in Russia

Involvement of a country in international export control regimes implies:

∙provision of a national legal framework consistent with the adopted agreements;

∙adherence to the regime principles in the national policy;

∙participation in the forums of member–countries.

Export control law

The Export Control Law has been in force in Russia since 1999. It specifies the main methods of legal regulation of foreign-economic activities, such as:

∙identification of products and technologies under control;

∙licensing procedure for foreign trade in products and technologies under control;

∙customs control;

∙law enforcement measures applied to persons who have violated the foreign-economic regulations.

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A typical feature of this law is broad construction on the notion of export (Article 1). Foreign-economic activities embrace foreign trade, investments and other activities, including cooperation in international exchange of goods, information, services, and intellectual products.

In-house export control programs (IHECP)

IHECP establishment is made incumbent by the law (Article 16) upon all organizations involved in scientific or industrial activities associated with national defense and security of the RF and receiving profits from operations with products and technologies under control. Organizations will set up such programs to ensure compliance with the Russian laws and regulations in their foreign-economic activities in relation to goods, information, services, and intellectual products potentially usable for producing weapons of mass destruction. The National Research Center of the RF Physics and Energy Institute has developed a draft model IHECP for organizations in the Rosatom framework.

References

1.Бабаев Н.С., Адамов Е.О., Рыжов М.Н., Соболев И.А. МАГАТЭ. Грин Лон, 1997.

2.STATUTE as amended up to 23 February 1989 - International Atomic Energy Agency/

3.The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – INFCIRC/153, IAEA, 2008.

4.Safeguards Techniques and Equipment. /International Nuclear Verification Series, No.1 (Revised). - IAEA, Vienna, 2003.

5.Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between State and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards – INFCIRC/540, IAEA, 2008.

6.Владимирова С.В., Зябкин М.В., Клочко Г.Г., Левченко В.М. и др. Учебный курс по ядерному экспортному контролю. Обнинск: ГНЦ РФ ФЭИ, 2003.

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CHAPTER 4

NATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION SAFEGUARDS. SPECIAL MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND ITS ASPECTS

Reasons for special handling of nuclear materials

The idea of safe management of nuclear materials (NM) underlies any nuclear enterprise, including nuclear power, and is central to the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy adopted in Russia in 1995.

NM safety is a complex notion of many facets, such as nuclear safety; radiation and chemical safety; security, etc. All these aspects require appropriate conditions for NM handling, i.e. special management. Thus, special management is a combination of measures and means adopted to provide comprehensive safety of NM handling in a way that will be environmentally friendly and acceptable for the general public.

Considerable efforts have been made in the world towards such management of nuclear materials, these efforts aimed not only at NM security but also at the fullest possible knowledge of such materials. Safe NM management has three major aspects, i.e., accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials (AC&PP), which lie at the root of the national non-proliferation safeguards in Russia.

There are several factors that call for a special approach to nuclear materials.

1. Nuclear materials – at least some of them – are sufficiently valuable in commercial and energy terms. To illustrate this point, suffice it to mention an agreement signed in 1993, pursuant to which Russia was to supply 500 t of highly enriched uranium to the United States within 20 years, blending it down to a low enrichment level before delivery. The contract stipulates that the United States Enrichment Corporation shall convert the uranium to a form suitable for fueling nuclear reactors and shall sell it on the world market. For the 500 t of uranium, the US was to pay ~ $ 8 billion, which was tantamount to buying it at about $ 16 per gram of HEU. It goes without saying that the lower the material quality, the lower its price. World markets offer 1 kg of natural uranium for $ 60–80 (this figure, naturally, changing with time). Needless to say that nuclear materials are valued for their energy potential – t he whole nuclear power of the world relies on this property. The remarkably high calorific value of nuclear fuel is explained by the fact that every fission act liberates energy of about 200 MeV. For comparison, an act of chemical interaction between oxygen and carbon (fossil fuel burning) results in ~ 4 eV.

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