Information Systems - The State of the Field

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we believe the future existence of the information systems discipline, at least as a distinct discipline, is at risk.

Issues and Opinions papers published in the MIS Quarterly are supposed to communicate

well-developed and well-articulated position statements concerning emerging, paradoxical, or controversial issues in the discipline of MIS. It is expected that such articles would open new areas of discourse, close stale areas, and/or offer fresh, insightful views on topics of importance to MIS academicians and executives.

In publishing Benbasat and Zmud’s paper and my editorial, I hoped to motivate colleagues to engage in a discourse about the future of the information systems discipline. I am delighted with the outcome that has occurred; indeed, it has far exceeded my expectations. A series of papers has been published on the debate in the Journal of the Association for Information Systems (e.g., see Volume 4, 2003) and the Communications of the Association for Information Systems (e.g., see Volume 12, November 2003). More Issues and Opinions papers have also been published in the MIS Quarterly (e.g., Whinston and Geng, 2004). Several panel sessions have been held at the International Conference on Information Systems (e.g., Karahanna et al., 2003). The debate among participants at these panel sessions has been lively and constructive. Clearly, Benbasat and Zmud’s paper has touched a nerve among many colleagues within the information systems discipline. At least for the moment, my perceptions are that the debate is subsiding. I believe, however, that the nerve is still raw.

In this paper, I reflect briefly on some particular aspects of the debate that has been engendered by Benbasat and Zmud’s paper. In particular, I characterize two types of argument that have appeared within the debate and comment on my perceptions of their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, if a vigorous debate is to resume again at some time in the future, I argue that it must take a particular form if long-term, productive outcomes are to occur.

CHARACTERIZING THE DEBATE

Since the publication of Benbasat and Zmud’s paper, two types of commentaries have appeared. The first type I characterize as nature- of-the-discipline commentaries. In these commentaries, the authors articulate their views on the scope and content of the information systems discipline and the important questions they believe that research within the discipline ought to address. The second type

Characterizing the Debate 295

I characterize as logic-of-the-core commentaries. In these commentaries, the authors address the logic underlying the arguments made about whether having a theoretical core within a discipline lays the foundation for the discipline eventually attaining a clear identity and/or academic legitimacy.

By far, most papers published on the debate are nature-of-the- discipline commentaries. As a discipline, we seem resolute in our determination not to confront directly the argument about the relationship between building a theoretical core in a discipline and attaining a distinct identity and/or academic legitimacy in the discipline. It is interesting to speculate on why we seem reluctant to pursue this matter.

In my view, nature-of-the-discipline commentaries often provide interesting insights into colleagues’ beliefs about phenomena the information systems discipline ought to address. They are singularly unhelpful, however, in resolving the issue of whether having a theoretical core is necessary if the information systems discipline is ever to attain a clear identity or academic legitimacy. The protagonists in these commentaries pass each other like ships in the night. For the most part, they make no reference or only token reference to the views of other protagonists. Instead, they focus on articulating their own views about the information systems discipline. In such commentaries, what basis exists for choosing among competing views? Is it whether the views articulated are congruent with one’s own views? Is it the colorfulness or appeal of well-crafted rhetoric? Is it the justification one finds for one’s own past research endeavors? Is it social pressure from one’s peers or powerful colleagues within one’s discipline?

Moreover, from a Kuhnian perspective, the paradigms that exist within a discipline provide the basis for defining its boundaries, not the idiosyncratic views of individual members of the discipline (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 15, 23–34). In a particular discipline, phenomena are interesting or uninteresting, depending on whether they allow a paradigm within the discipline to be further articulated or tested. An individual’s own views of the nature of the discipline of which they claim membership are incidental unless they are driven by a paradigm within the discipline (although subsequently they may be important if they underpin a scientific ‘revolution’).

One paper that addresses logic-of-the-core arguments is Lyytinen and King (2004). It also provides a nature-of-the-discipline commentary, but it commits to a logic-of-the-core argument. I applaud Lyytinen and King’s paper, because it allows us to engage directly in determining where we agree and disagree in the debate. In this regard, I disagree with a number of their arguments, but I will not articulate

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the details here. Rather, using Lyytinen and King’s paper, I will comment briefly on some important issues in the debate that are still unresolved.

THEORETICAL CORES AND ACADEMIC

LEGITIMACY IN A NUTSHELL

Lyytinen and King challenge the notion that academic legitimacy depends on the presence of a theoretical core. Leaving aside the specifics of their argument, I believe they fail to understand or articulate clearly the views of those who believe a theoretical core is important to the IS field. Some who argue for the importance of a theoretical core contend that having a theoretical core is a necessary condition for academic legitimacy, which is the converse of Lyytinen and King’s key premise. Others contend that having a theoretical core is a necessary and sufficient condition for a discipline to have academic legitimacy, and that academic legitimacy cannot exist without a theoretical core and vice versa. Some (including myself) contend that having a theoretical core is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for academic legitimacy. Rather, it is a necessary condition for having a clear disciplinary identity. The relationship between disciplinary identity and academic legitimacy is itself an important issue for debate.

In my view, evaluating the validity2 of arguments about the need for a theoretical core in the information systems discipline depends on the following matters:

•Providing precise definitions of constructs such as ‘discipline,’ ‘identity,’ ‘academic legitimacy,’ and ‘theoretical core.’

•Evaluating the validity of premises.

•Evaluating the validity of arguments.

Much could be and has already been written on each of these matters. Nonetheless, Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 223) claim: ‘...none of the commentaries about the IS discipline’s need for a theoretical core have articulated exactly what is meant by the term “theoretical core,” a point acknowledged by Weber (2003).’ In re-reading the cited paper, I fail to see that I ‘acknowledge’ this point. What I do say (p. vi) is:

For me, the key to identifying a core is finding phenomena where existing theories are non-existent or deficient. The key to creating the core is then building theory that is novel—theory that colleagues in other disciplines will acknowledge as belonging to the information

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systems discipline. Conceivably, it might be a completely new theory—one that has no genesis in other disciplines. I suspect that the more-likely outcome is that the theory is a marked adaptation of or extension of a theory that has its roots in another discipline. It will be sufficiently different from its ancestors, however, that ownership will be ascribed to the information systems discipline.

To establish a core for the information systems discipline, I believe we need two creative acts. First, we need to “see” things or phenomena that are not the focus of other disciplines. Alternatively, we need to see things or phenomena that are the focus of other disciplines in new, rich, insightful ways (see the world through a dramatically different lens). Second, we need to build powerful, generic theories to account for these phenomena that are not applications of theories from other disciplines or straightforward extensions of these theories. The “value-add” associated with the theories we propose must be sufficient for other disciplines to ascribe ownership of these theories to the information systems discipline. In other words, we cannot establish our identity as a discipline by fiat. Instead, our identity will emerge only as the outcome of a social process—one in which members of other disciplines acknowledge that the theoretical contributions we have made are important to their own understanding and prediction of some phenomena.

In short, I believe the identity of a discipline is established through the contributions it makes to theory. The core phenomena of the discipline are circumscribed via the theories “owned” by the discipline that account for these phenomena. Disciplinary identity and ownership of theories that other disciplines deem important are linked inextricably. Likewise, the theories owned by a discipline and its core phenomena are linked inextricably.

I also canvassed the matter in Weber (1987) (although I did not use the term ‘core’), and I devoted an entire chapter (Chapter 3) to the topic, ‘The Core of the IS Discipline,’ in Weber (1997). I have a clear idea of what I mean by ‘theoretical core,’ and I believe many others do, as well.

Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 226) claim that a discipline can have academic legitimacy even though it does not have a theoretical core. This observation allows us to sharpen the focus of our debate around the need for a theoretical core. Some might contest the claim made by Lyytinen and King that disciplines like classics, German literature, accounting, and history are ‘legitimate’ academic disciplines. Still others might argue that Lyytinen and King miss the point in their focus on academic legitimacy rather than disciplinary clarity. I believe the debate now needs to focus on what the protagonists mean by ‘discipline’ and ‘legitimacy,’ as well as the validity of premises and arguments.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I characterize the debate on the core of the information systems discipline as falling within two streams. Nature-of-the-discipline commentaries involve protagonists articulating their views on the scope and content of the information systems discipline and the important questions they believe information systems researchers ought to address. Logic-of-the-core commentaries involve protagonists addressing the logic underlying the arguments made about whether having a theoretical core within a discipline lays the foundation for the discipline eventually attaining a clear identity or academic legitimacy. Most papers written on the debate fall into the nature-of- the-discipline stream. These sorts of paper are useful in some respects. Unfortunately, the authors seldom confront each other directly in terms of where they agree or disagree within the debate. Instead, they pass each other like ships in the night.

Lyytinen and King (2004) provide an important opportunity to address logic-of-the-core commentaries, forcing protagonists to confront areas of agreement and disagreement directly. Denigrating logic-of-the-core commentaries by dismissing them summarily as having poorly defined or undefined terms or invalid premises and arguments is less productive than defining critical terms more precisely, articulating premises and arguments more precisely, and evaluating the validity of premises and arguments as best we can. Ultimately, protagonists might agree to disagree on the definition of terms, statements of premises and arguments, and validity of premises and arguments. The grounds on which they agree or disagree, however, would be clear. Others then could evaluate the merits of their positions more easily. Moreover, if we proceed in this way, the protagonists might find good reasons to change their stance in the debate (perhaps several times!). If they do so, they must not be denigrated if productive, open debate is to occur. Overall, I believe the information systems discipline would be the better for the resolution that occurs.

It is important that protagonists in the debate strive to state premises and arguments correctly and consistently. I believe that Lyytinen and King’s (2004) paper falls short in a number of key respects that invite further discussion. It behoves us to bring a satisfactory resolution to substantive matters about the nature and future of the information systems discipline raised by senior scholars like Benbasat and Zmud. If this outcome is to occur, however, we must engage directly in logic-of-the-core arguments. On the other hand, if we persist with nature-of-the-discipline commentaries,

References 299

I believe we will regress rather than make progress with our discourse. I fear the focus will become the quality of our rhetoric rather than the validity of our arguments.

NOTES

1 I am indebted to my colleague John Crossley, Professor of Logic at Monash University, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors that exist in the paper, however, are my responsibility alone.

2Note, Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 223) distinguish between the validity and soundness of an argument. The former refers to the correctness of the logic. The latter refers to the truth of the premises. Using their terminology, a valid argument might be based on untrue premises. In this paper, however, I use the term ‘validity’ in a wider sense to apply to both the correctness of the logic and the truth of the premises. More precisely, the term ‘fallacy’ applies only to the question of whether the logic is correct. See the entry ‘fallacy’ in the Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th edn, 2001, at http://www.bartleby.com/65/fa/fallacy.html.

REFERENCES

Benbasat, I. and Zmud, R. (2003) ‘The identity crisis within the IS discipline: Defining and communicating the discipline’s core properties’, MIS Quarterly, 27(2), June, pp. 183–94.

Karahanna, E., Davis, G. B., Mukhopadhyay, T., Watson, R. T. and Weber, R. (2003) ‘Embarking on information systems’ voyage to self-discovery: Identifying the core of the Discipline’, Panel Session at the Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, 14–17 December 2003.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Lyytinen, K. and King, J. (2004) ‘Nothing at the Center?: Academic Legitimacy in the Information Systems Field’, Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 5(6), June, pp. 220–46.

Orlikowski, W. J. and Iacono, C. S. ‘Research commentary: Desperately seeking the “IT” in IT research—A call to theorizing the IT artifact’, Information Systems Research, 12(2), June, pp. 121–34.

Weber, R. (1987) ‘Toward a theory of artifacts: A paradigmatic basis for information systems research’, Journal of Information Systems, 1(2), Spring, pp. 3–19.

Weber, R. (1997) Ontological Foundations of Information Systems, Coopers & Lybrand, Melbourne.

Weber, R. (2003) ‘Still desperately seeking the IT artifact’, MIS Quarterly, 27(2), June, pp. iii–xi.

Whinston, A. B. and Geng, X. (2004) ‘Operationalizing the essential role of the IT artifact in IS research: Gray area, pitfalls, and the importance of strategic ambiguity’, MIS Quarterly, 28(2), June, pp. 149–59.

14

Further Reflections on the Identity Crisis

Izak Benbasat and Robert W. Zmud

To say that we were surprised by the extent of the reaction of the information systems (IS) community to our article, ‘The Identity Crisis within the IS Discipline: Defining and Communicating the Discipline’s Core Properties’ (Benbasat and Zmud, 2003), is an understatement. Our intent was to provoke debate on what we felt to be an important issue. We very much appreciate this response (both in print and in the rich dialogues we have each enjoyed with colleagues and doctoral students), particularly the time and effort invested by so many of the field’s thought leaders.

We must begin this comment by stating that we still believe strongly in the views presented in our article. That stated, we would like to take this opportunity to communicate three followon thoughts. First, we wish to slightly—but importantly—modify the nomological net used in our article to ‘bound the IS discipline’. Second, we wish (1) to stress that the impetus of our article was not to draw a boundary around the IS discipline but instead to draw a boundary, however fuzzy (Whinston and Geng, 2004), around the phenomenological domain serving as the topical basis of IS scholarly journals and (2) to explain further why we feel such a bound is desirable. Finally, we wish to elaborate on the desirability of refocusing IS research on issues of design, such that research findings might lead to more actionable recommendations to practice.

The IS Discipline’s Nomological Net 301

THE IS DISCIPLINE’S NOMOLOGICAL NET

Figure 14.1 portrays our modified nomological net. The only difference between this figure and the original is that now the central construct is an information system, with the IT artifact highlighted as a defining element of an information system. This does not represent a modification of our earlier ideas.

In our article, we explicitly referred to the application of IT to support task accomplishment within a context (p. 186):

We conceptualize the IT artifact . . . as the application of IT to enable or support some task(s) embedded within a structure(s) that itself is embedded within a context(s). Here, the hardware/software design of the IT artifact encapsulates the structures, routines, norms, and values implicit in the rich contexts within which the artifact is embedded.

Our view of an information system is essentially that expressed very eloquently by Alter (2003a, 2003b) in his discussions regarding IT-reliant work systems. We thus wish to restate our definition as:

We conceptualize an information system . . . as the application of one or more IT artifacts to enable or support some task(s) embedded within structure(s) that themselves are embedded within context(s). Here, the design of an information system encapsulates the structures, routines, norms, and values implicit in the rich contexts within which the IT artifacts are to be embedded.

In fact, Alter states (2003b, p. 496), ‘IT artifact verges on being a synonym for the clearer term IT-reliant work system.’ We agree. Our emphasis on the term ‘IT artifact’ in the original article reflected our

IT/IS managerial,

Information system

methodological,

IT artifact

Usage

Impact

and technological

capabilities

IT/IS managerial, methodological, and operational practices

Figure 14.1 Information systems discipline nomological net

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intent to directly link our ideas to those raised earlier by Orlikowski and Iacono (2001).

BOUNDING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DOMAIN OF IS SCHOLARLY JOURNALS

In defining the nomological net of the IS discipline, it was never our intention to place bounds on the nature of the research to be undertaken by IS scholars. This has been, perhaps, the most misinterpreted aspect of our article. In fact, we state (p. 190):

We emphasize that our intention is neither to discourage IS scholars from pursuing research that excludes the constructs and phenomena depicted in . . . nor to discourage non-IS scholars from publishing appropriately focused research in IS journals. IS scholars have much to contribute to scholarship, regardless of the core issues involved (e.g., service delivery, trust among members of a collaborative group, customer or supplier relationships, organizational learning).

Instead, our concern is with bounding the phenomenological domain of IS scholarly journals.

In our article, we argued that bounding the phenomenological domain of IS scholarly journals was necessary in order to evolve an identity for the IS discipline. We still hold such a view, in particular regarding the identity of the IS discipline for IS scholars situated in business schools. A discipline’s scholarly journals are a primary means through which non-IS scholars in a business school construct—typically, during institutional processes associated with assessing candidates for tenure and/or promotion—an understanding of the discipline. However, a more compelling argument for the desirability of bounding the phenomenological domain of IS scholarly journals lies with another important role of scholarly journals: that of developing the bodies of knowledge associated with the discipline.

Scholarly journals form around communities of scholars possessing overlapping research interests; and a journal’s institutional structure (e.g., editorial policies, editorial governance, editorial processes, etc.) is a direct reflection of these ‘forming’ communities. As editorial leadership positions (editor-in-chief, senior editors, associate editors, board members, etc.) are filled in accordance with in-place institutional

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structures, the vast majority of incumbents are highly likely to be members of these same ‘forming’ communities. Consequently, the intellectual base (i.e., the knowledge held by editors and reviewers) through which scholarly contributions (i.e., journal submissions) are assessed, developed and acted on is a direct reflection of that representing these ‘forming’ communities.

Consider, then, what happens when an article submitted to a scholarly journal investigates a phenomenon distinct from the focal research interests of that journal’s ‘forming’ communities but within the purview of another scholarly community:

·The editors assigned to assess the submission are unlikely to be current with leading thought regarding the phenomenon.

·These editors’ intellectual networks (i.e., the scholars of whom they have strong or weak relationships) are also unlikely to contain individuals who are current with leading thought regarding the phenomenon.

As a consequence, it is unlikely that the outcome of the editorial process assessing the submission will be reflective of current thought regarding the phenomenon. When editorial assessment processes do not reflect leading thought, the development of knowledge regarding a phenomenon at best is either delayed or impaired and at worst is misdirected or deconstructed.

Drawing a boundary around the phenomenological domain of a scholarly journal thus serves the critical role of delineating the knowledge areas actively being developed by the communities of scholars associated with the journal. Submissions whose primary intellectual purpose lay within these knowledge areas are likely to be critiqued and further developed by scholars holding current thought regarding this purpose; submissions whose primary purpose lie outside this domain are not.

Finally, we must reiterate the important observation (Whinston and Geng, 2004) that the research interests of scholarly communities— and, hence, the institutional structures and phenomenological boundaries of scholarly journals—are continuously evolving. Changes to a journal’s institutional structure will invariably result in perturbations to its phenomenological boundary, and new areas of intellectual investigation will continue to emerge to be subsumed within the phenomenological boundary of one or more scholarly journals. What remains critically important, however, is that the scholarly communities developing emerging areas of inquiry hold deep understandings of prior thought salient to such inquiry.