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Contributors

Truman Bewley, Professor of Economics, Yale University

Rebecca Bliege Bird, Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropological Sciences, Stanford University

Samuel Bowles, Research Professor and Director of the Behavioral Science Program, Santa Fe Institute and Professor of Economics, University of Siena

Robert Boyd, Professor of Anthropology, University of California–

Los Angeles

Armin Falk, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zu¨rich

Ernst Fehr, head of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zu¨rich

Urs Fischbacher, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zu¨rich

Christina M. Fong, Research Scientist, Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University

Herbert Gintis, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts and External Faculty, Santa Fe Institute

Michael Gurven, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of California at Santa Barbara

Dan M. Kahan, Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Hillard Kaplan, Professor of Anthropology, University of New

Mexico

Elinor Ostrom, Professor of Political Science, Indiana University

400	Contributors

Peter J. Richerson, Professor of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California at Davis

Rajiv Sethi, Associate Professor of Economics, Barnard College, Columbia University

Joan Silk, Professor of Anthropology, University of California–Los

Angeles

Eric A. Smith, Professor of Anthropology, University of Washington

E. Somanathan, Associate Professor of Economics, Indian Statistical

Institute, Delhi

Index

Adverse selection, 313, 317, 384

Altruism, 7–11, 22, 24, 25, 33, 34, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 60, 63, 69, 77, 79, 111–113, 125, 128, 129, 146–148, 154, 155, 215, 229, 282, 326, 339, 344, 386

Altruistic behavior, 5, 23, 34, 43, 45, 60 Altruistic punishment, 9, 12, 20, 24, 145,

215–219, 222, 223, 226 Anonymity, 11, 12, 15, 17, 26, 28, 184

Assortation/assortative interaction, 231, 238–240, 242, 243, 248

Attitudinal survey, 285

Axelrod, Robert, 7, 8, 34, 43, 52, 64, 126, 144, 184, 186, 215, 226, 248, 367, 374, 395, 396

Bargaining game, 210 Bounded rationality, 157

Bowles, Samuel, 3, 9–11, 22, 24, 25, 32, 35, 37, 95, 118, 120–122, 135, 141, 143, 145, 168, 187, 188, 215, 217, 218, 227, 249, 253, 271, 277, 298, 300, 367, 375, 379, 385, 386, 388, 392, 395, 396

Boyd, Robert, 3, 9, 22, 24, 25, 30, 31, 35, 37–39, 79, 80, 82, 95, 98, 107, 119, 122, 126, 128, 129, 135, 137, 138, 144, 145, 147, 215, 217–219, 225, 227, 248, 249, 367, 375

Bravery, 137

British Household Panel Study, 317 Broadcast efficiency, 123–125, 141 Byproduct mutualism, 77, 78

Capitalism, 142, 380, 389

Charity, 23, 127, 128, 146, 280, 284, 342, 367

Cheap talk, 174, 178

Coalition, 48, 54, 70–72, 103, 119 Collective action, 32, 79, 98, 109, 127, 134,

135, 142, 146, 147, 152, 157, 164, 183, 255, 259, 262, 263, 270, 339–345, 347–352, 355, 357, 358, 361, 364, 366, 367, 380

Collective good, 32, 116–142, 341, 342, 357, 366

Collusion, 164, 171

Common pool resource, 31, 32, 230, 231, 243, 248

Complete contracts, 394

Conditional cooperation, 154, 168, 253 Conditional reciprocity, 116, 117, 119, 126,

127, 129, 132, 136 Conformist transmission, 24

Consequentialist, 195, 197, 199, 200, 211– 213

Cooperation among nonkin, 23, 53, 79, 215

Costly signaling, 11, 31, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 98, 107, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 129, 134, 135, 140, 143–145, 147

Crowding out, 20, 134, 186, 260, 268, 270, 344, 346

Cultural evolution, 9, 30, 31, 218, 219, 226 Cultural group selection, 9, 31, 141 Cultural norms, 27, 98

Dawkins, Richard, 7, 8, 35, 123, 145

de Waal, Frans, 43, 49, 54, 57–61, 63–67, 70, 73, 144

Decentralized sanctions, 233 Density-dependent competition, 217 Deserving poor, 168, 169, 294, 297 Distributional equity, 195, 202 Dictator game, 209, 253, 283, 284 Dominance hierarchy, 44, 49, 107

402

Index

Dominant strategy, 118, 166, 169, 180, 342, 386

Double auction, 160–163

Economic incentives, 152, 155, 174, 175, 264 Efficiency wage, 163

Effort level, 13, 15, 161, 162, 174–178, 319– 323

Egalitarian redistribution, 32, 277 Enforcing cooperation, 134, 135 Equity, 136, 137, 168, 197, 207, 279, 307,

308, 310, 313, 317

Ethnographic data, 5, 29, 107, 116, 129, 136, 138, 215, 283

Evolution of cooperation, 47, 64, 72, 107, 144, 145, 219–223

Evolutionary puzzle, 215

Evolutionary stability, 24, 116, 121, 122, 128, 129, 135, 145, 216, 242, 248

Excess supply of labor, 161, 310, 319, 331 Experimental games, 6, 26, 28, 209 Explicit contract, 32, 177, 178, 395 External incentives, 340

Fairness, 19, 27, 29, 63, 136, 137, 152, 153, 156, 158, 160, 172, 174, 176, 182–184, 189, 193–195, 198, 200, 203, 204, 210, 211, 259, 265, 297, 303, 307–309, 320, 326, 327, 329–331

Falk, Armin, 10, 18, 36, 153, 154, 157, 160– 162, 172, 173, 181, 182, 184, 186–189, 193, 197, 202–204, 206, 207, 209, 211, 214, 248, 249, 319–322, 324, 333, 334, 368, 375

Fehr, Ernst, 3, 10, 13–18, 20, 21, 34, 36, 37, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159–163, 166, 169, 170, 172–179, 182–188, 190, 197, 202–204, 210, 214, 248, 249, 257, 264, 265, 271, 273, 304, 319–324, 331, 333– 335, 367, 369, 375

Feldman, Marc, 9, 36, 370, 375 Fischbacher, Urs, 10, 18, 36, 151, 153, 154,

156, 157, 159, 160, 166, 169, 172, 173, 181, 182, 185–188, 193, 197, 202–204, 206, 207, 209, 211, 214, 248, 249, 324, 331, 333, 367–369, 375

Food sharing, 11, 23, 48, 55–57, 66, 75–77, 79, 80, 84, 86, 103, 107, 108, 111–113, 126, 127, 144

Free-rider, 15, 26, 97, 98, 126, 134, 139, 164, 166, 169–173, 186, 215, 216, 225, 260, 293, 341–347

Ga¨chter, Simon, 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 34, 36, 37, 157, 163, 166, 169, 170, 172, 174–176, 184, 185, 188, 189, 257, 271, 319, 321– 323, 331, 333, 334, 367, 369

Gains from cooperation, 97, 99, 102, 104, 105

Gallup Social Audit, 279, 285, 300 Game theory, 4, 193, 253, 255, 266, 385 Gene-culture coevolution, 9, 23, 24

Gift exchange, 156, 157, 161–163, 174, 182, 184, 209, 309, 312, 320

Gilens, Martin, 278, 279, 289, 293–296, 299, 300

Gintis, Herbert, 3, 9–11, 22, 24, 25, 32, 35, 37, 44, 67, 95, 108, 118, 120–122, 135, 141, 143, 145, 168, 187, 188, 209, 214, 215, 217, 218, 227, 248, 249, 270, 277, 298, 300, 367, 369, 375, 379, 385, 386, 392, 395, 396

Glaeser, Edward, 5, 37, 279, 300, 381, 390, 396

Gossip, 22, 86, 95, 99, 384

Grooming, 48, 52–55, 57, 64, 66–73, 140 Group extinction, 24, 31, 217, 219, 225 Group selection, 8–11, 23, 31, 34, 79, 80, 85,

105, 113, 115, 119, 122, 134, 137, 138, 145, 215, 217, 219, 221–226

Hamilton, William, 3, 7, 8, 34, 37, 43–45, 52, 64, 68, 79, 109, 126, 137, 144, 146, 184, 186, 215, 226, 248, 249

Hamilton’s Rule, 45, 48, 50, 84

Homo economicus, 3, 6, 193, 249, 282–284, 379–381

Honest signaling, 80, 117, 119, 120, 122, 131, 139, 140

Horticulturists, 27

Human peak net production, 89 Hunter-gatherers, 75–77, 88, 108–111, 126,

146

Hyper-fair offer, 28, 29

Implicit contract, 177, 178 Incentive compatibility, 102, 258 Incentive contracts, 177 Incentive effects, 279, 291 Inclusive fitness, 7, 43, 45 Incomplete contracts, 176

Indirect reciprocity, 82, 107, 128, 129, 145– 147

Inequity aversion, 152–155, 166, 185, 195, 202–204, 210, 211

Index

403

Insiders, 163, 174, 296, 388

Intentions, 6, 18, 19, 33, 79, 139, 168, 182, 184, 194, 197–201, 206–208, 211, 212, 324, 329, 346, 365

Inter-group conflict, 137 Internalized norm, 15

Intrinsic motivation, 254, 259, 260, 263, 264, 267

Involuntary unemployment, 163, 173 Irrigation association, 261, 262

Joint ownership, 179, 180, 181

Kindness, 22, 194–197, 199–202, 204–209,

211, 212

Kinship, 43, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 63, 65, 69–71,

84, 98–100, 105

Labor market, 161, 173 Laibson, David, 37, 396 Local commons, 230, 243

Loewenstein, George, 5, 38, 197, 214, 284, 301

Lump-sum transfer, 176

Material payoff, 165, 193, 195, 210, 242, 253, 349

Maynard Smith, John, 8, 10, 38 Median voter model, 277 Migration, 23, 80, 215, 219, 226 Moonlighting game, 18, 19 Moral hazard, 174, 384

Moral sentiments, 32, 63, 98

Morale, 32, 306–310, 312, 314, 316–318, 324–331

Multilevel selection, 9, 34, 45, 73, 113, 138

Mutualism, 58, 78, 82, 125, 126

Nash equilibrium, 120, 122, 185

Natural selection, 30, 44, 79, 97, 117, 219, 226

Neoclassical economics, 3, 345, 389 NIMBY, 263, 352–355, 370, 376, 377 No shirking theory, 312

Nominal wage, 32, 304, 305, 314, 316

One-shot, 13, 25, 26, 63, 64, 125, 142, 152, 156–159, 161, 165, 172, 173, 177, 184, 203, 215, 256, 264

Organizational citizenship, 326–329 Ostracism, 22, 86, 169, 171, 185, 362

Ostrom, Elinor, 10, 15, 16, 20, 31, 38, 169, 171, 184, 189, 190, 248, 250, 253, 254, 257, 258, 260, 264, 266–269, 271–275, 368, 377, 381, 386, 389, 391, 397

Outsiders, 163, 174, 296, 384, 388

Parochialism, 231, 238, 240, 242, 243, 248, 392, 394

Pastoralist, 142

Peer pressure, 169, 386

Performance incentives, 174–176, 264, 305 Piece rates, 307

Positive reciprocity, 155, 212, 213, 318, 362 Price, George, 9, 38

Price’s Equation, 9

Primate, 11, 44, 46–48, 51, 52, 59–61, 63– 65, 67, 72, 73

Principal-agent model, 176, 298 Property rights, 152, 179, 182, 183, 363,

379, 380, 382, 389, 392 Prosocial norms, 27, 30 Public Agenda, 294, 295, 300

Public goods game, 15–18, 118, 169, 170, 173, 186, 202–204, 209, 211

Punishing defectors, 37, 134, 135, 195, 204, 205, 211, 216, 219, 222–224, 226, 227, 346

Punishment condition, 18, 170

Rational behavior, 152, 259

Rational egoist, 253, 254, 259, 263, 265 Real wage, 310, 14, 18, 24, 27, 30, 32, 129,

143, 155, 164, 165, 169, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 253, 254, 259, 265, 341, 342, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 353, 354, 357, 359, 364, 366, 385, 387

Relatedness, 7, 26, 45, 48, 65, 79, 98 Relationship specific investment, 179 Repeated game, 156, 171, 184

Repeated interaction, 8, 94, 118, 152, 153, 156, 157, 171, 215

Reproductive success, 46, 47, 94, 146, 147 Resource regime, 268

Retaliation, 202–204, 211, 346, 347, 358, 386

Revenge, 23, 61, 71, 145

Risk-neutrality, 175, 178 Rule-of-thumb behavior, 156

Sanctioning behavior, 172, 248

Scrounging, 78, 107

404

Index

Self-interest, 3, 7, 11, 25, 30, 32, 33, 94, 95, 153, 156, 157, 160–162, 165, 171, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 230, 232, 243, 254, 257–259, 261, 270, 278, 279, 282, 285–291, 293, 299, 364, 366, 381, 386, 391, 392, 393

Self-interest hypothesis, 151, 152, 158, 165, 169, 170, 173, 183

Self-regarding, 6, 8, 10, 12–17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 32, 33, 230, 277, 282

Sharing norms/systems, 76, 78, 99, 102, 103

Shirking, 175, 177, 186, 264, 315–317, 322, 323, 339, 341, 345

Signaling costs, 11, 117, 143

Small-scale societies, 9, 22, 27, 75, 76, 96, 137, 218, 219

Smith, Adam, 3, 4, 39, 384

Sober, Eliot, 9, 39, 215, 227

Social dilemma, 27, 165, 166, 169, 195, 253, 259

Social dominance, 29, 118, 138

Social policy/public policy, 4, 11, 31, 32, 167, 266, 267, 270, 339, 347, 389, 392 Social preferences, 151–153, 155, 157, 184 Spiteful/envious preferences, 154, 155,

184, 189, 214 Stake size, 156

Standing model, 128, 147, 293, 297 Strategic sanctions, 172, 173

Strong reciprocity, 8–12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22– 25, 27, 30–32, 34, 44, 61, 63, 64, 115, 125, 134, 136, 151–156, 158, 161, 163, 164, 166, 168, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180–184, 194, 229–231, 238, 242, 243, 282, 283, 285, 293, 294, 341–344, 349, 350, 357, 362–366, 382

Structured populations, 242, 248

Tax evasion, 32, 261, 347, 349, 362 The Edda, 277, 300

Tolerated theft, 78–82, 86, 106, 107, 113, 126 Trait-group selection, 80, 81, 86

Trivers, Robert, 3, 7, 8, 39, 43, 52, 73, 76, 113, 126, 138, 148, 184, 190, 215, 227

Trust game, 21, 253, 263, 264

Ultimatum game, 11, 12, 22, 27–29, 156– 160, 162, 182, 184, 186, 194, 198, 201– 203, 209, 211, 253, 321

Unconditional altruism, 9, 45, 154, 155, 381

Unconditional generosity, 116, 132, 137, 141

Unconditional sharing, 131, 133

Wage differentials, 163 Wage formation, 162

Wage rigidity, 303, 304, 306, 310–313, 315– 317, 320, 321, 331

Warfare, 31, 137, 138, 144–147, 171, 217, 396

Welfare recipient, 280, 284, 292, 295, 296 Welfare state, 167, 277, 279, 282, 293, 295,

296, 297

Wilson, David Sloan, 45, 73, 79, 80, 113, 215, 227

Wilson, Edward, 7, 9, 38, 39

World Values Survey, 279

Zahavi, Amos, 79, 113, 115, 116, 118, 140,

148