CHAPTER 20 INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY |
453 |
|
|
|
|
IN THE NEWS
Should the Government Try
to Help Poor Regions?
first economic rule of urban poverty policy: Programs should be person-based, not place-based.
support on the basis of location. Examples of such policies are housing projects and enterprise zones. President Clinton’s recent Rural Housing and Economic Development Assistance for Kentucky or the new Empowerment Zone Grant for East St. Louis, Ill., are quintessential place-based policies.
The problem with place-based programs is that they create incentives to keep the poor in the ghetto. By subsidizing the place, not the person living there, these policies make it more attractive for the poor to stay in high-poverty areas. Indeed, current research shows that supposedly benevolent pro-poor housing and transfer policies play a major role in herding the poor into inner cities.
It’s hard to see the logic in artificially limiting migration and concentrating the poor in areas with low productivity. Movement out of low-productivity, highunemployment areas is one reason that unemployment rates in the U.S. stay low. Moreover, flight from the ghettos
enabled many African-Americans to the social costs of the inner city, black-white segregation in the U.S. declined substantially because of it. Place-based programs also suffer the fact that their benefits go dis-
proportionately to property owners in the areas—and not to the intended beneficiaries. If the government offers credits to firms that invest in a poor region, for instance, then firms will locate there, pushing up property values and rents. But the benefits of increased economic activity will evaporate as higher housing costs eat away the planned ben-
efits to the needy. . . .
If place-based policies are so bad, why are they so popular? A cynic might say that the residents of wealthy suburbs prefer that the poor remain in ghettos. A more practical explanation is that we have place-based politicians who lobby for place-based policies. . . .
A wise alternative to such faulty place-based poverty assistance would be a program that offers tax credits to companies that employ the disadvantaged. This would be a less distortionary means of assisting the poor.
SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1999, p. A22.
NEGATIVE INCOME TAX
Whenever the government chooses a system to collect taxes, it affects the distribution of income. This is clearly true in the case of a progressive income tax, whereby high-income families pay a larger percentage of their income in taxes than do lowincome families. As we discussed in Chapter 12, equity across income groups is an important criterion in the design of a tax system.
CHAPTER 20 INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY |
455 |
misfortune, they are in the best position to decide how to raise their own living standards. Rather than giving the poor in-kind transfers of goods and services that they may not want, it may be better to give them cash and allow them to buy what they think they need most.
ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS AND WORK INCENTIVES
Many policies aimed at helping the poor can have the unintended effect of discouraging the poor from escaping poverty on their own. To see why, consider the following example. Suppose that a family needs an income of $15,000 to maintain a reasonable standard of living. And suppose that, out of concern for the poor, the government promises to guarantee every family that income. Whatever a family earns, the government makes up the difference between that income and $15,000. What effect would you expect this policy to have?
The incentive effects of this policy are obvious: Any person who would make under $15,000 by working has no incentive to find and keep a job. For every dollar that the person would earn, the government would reduce the income supplement by a dollar. In effect, the government taxes 100 percent of additional earnings. An effective marginal tax rate of 100 percent is surely a policy with a large deadweight loss.
The adverse effects of this high effective tax rate can persist over time. A person discouraged from working loses the on-the-job training that a job might offer. In addition, his or her children miss the lessons learned by observing a parent with a full-time job, and this may adversely affect their own ability to find and hold a job.
Although the antipoverty program we have been discussing is hypothetical, it is not as unrealistic as it might first appear. Welfare, Medicaid, food stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit are all programs aimed at helping the poor, and they are all tied to family income. As a family’s income rises, the family becomes ineligible for these programs. When all these programs are taken together, it is common for families to face effective marginal tax rates that are very high. Sometimes the effective marginal tax rates even exceed 100 percent, so that poor families are worse off when they earn more. By trying to help the poor, the government discourages those families from working. According to critics of antipoverty programs, these programs alter work attitudes and create a “culture of poverty.”
It might seem that there is an easy solution to this problem: Reduce benefits to poor families more gradually as their incomes rise. For example, if a poor family loses 30 cents of benefits for every dollar it earns, then it faces an effective marginal tax rate of 30 percent. Although this effective tax reduces work effort to some extent, it does not eliminate the incentive to work completely.
The problem with this solution is that it greatly increases the cost of programs to combat poverty. If benefits are phased out gradually as a poor family’s income rises, then families just above the poverty level will also be eligible for substantial benefits. The more gradual the phase-out, the more families are eligible, and the greater the cost of the program. Thus, policymakers face a tradeoff between burdening the poor with high effective marginal tax rates and burdening taxpayers with costly programs to reduce poverty.
There are various other ways to try to reduce the work disincentive of antipoverty programs. One is to require any person collecting benefits to accept a
456 |
PART SIX THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS |
|
|
|
|
IN THE NEWS
Welfare Reform
for work. The 1996 law limits families to two years of welfare income during any one spell and caps the total time on welfare over a mother’s lifetime at five years.
The number of recipients rose sharply from the early 1960s, to a peak in 1993, when over 4 million American families were on welfare. In that year, an incredible 1 million residents of New York City alone were receiving welfare, up from 250,000 in 1960.
Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and a few other states decided in the late 1980s that this upward trend in
welfare populations while at the same time improving the economic situation of single-parent families. Recently, a careful evaluation of the Massachusetts reforms by economists M. Anne Hill and Thomas J. Main of the City University of New York concluded that they not only greatly reduced that state’s welfare caseload but also encouraged more young women to finish high school and sharpen their economic skills.
What worked in Massachusetts and other pioneering states was applicable throughout the nation, but the reassessment of federal welfare policy
government-provided job—a system sometimes called workfare. Another possibility is to provide benefits for only a limited period of time. This route was taken in a 1996 welfare reform bill. Advocates of time limits point to the falling poverty rate in the late 1990s as evidence supporting this approach. Critics argue that time limits are cruel to the least fortunate members of society and that the falling poverty rate in the late 1990s is due more to a strong economy than to welfare reform.
QUICK QUIZ: List three policies aimed at helping the poor, and discuss the pros and cons of each.
CONCLUSION
People have long reflected on the distribution of income in society. Plato, the ancient Greek philosopher, concluded that in an ideal society the income of the richest
CHAPTER 20 INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY |
457 |
|
|
|
|
was opposed by many intellectuals. Some members of President Clinton’s team quit after the 1996 federal law, over what they considered a betrayal of the welfare state. They argued that most women forced off welfare would become homeless or destitute, since they supposedly are too mentally or physically handicapped or lacking in requisite skills to obtain and hold jobs.
However, this law has been highly successful in reversing the large growth in the number of welfare recipients in the United States. Most mothers forced off welfare found work and provide financial support for their children.
Certainly, the huge decline—by over 40 percent—in the number of single mothers on welfare from the 1993 peak is partly due to the booming economy of the past seven years. However, most of this decline took place in the two years after the passage of the 1996 act. The study of Massachusetts’ experience cited earlier confirms the importance of
the new approach to welfare, since the authors’ research attributes more than one-third of the decline in that state’s welfare role since 1995 to the reforms and not simply to its buoyant economy.
The federal law recognizes that the number of families in need of assistance always rises sharply during bad economic times. This is why each welfare spell is allowed to last up to two years, and mothers with dependent children can have multiple spells, up to a total of five years over their lifetimes. It further acknowledges that some women are handicapped and unable to work. What it aims to discourage is the attraction of welfare to able-bodied women during good times when jobs are available.
The act also recognizes that many poor working mothers will not earn enough to provide a decent standard of living for their families. Children of unmarried working mothers continue to be eligible for Medicaid and food stamps, and they benefit from the earned-income
tax credit that is available only to poorer working parents with children.
One of the most important, if hardest to document, gains from taking families off welfare is their greater self-respect when they provide for themselves. Mothers on welfare convey the impression to their children that it is normal to live off government handouts. In such an environment, it is difficult for children to place a high value on doing well at school and preparing for work by seeking out training on jobs and in schools.
Welfare reform has been a resounding success in inducing unmarried mothers to find jobs. This revolutionary approach to welfare is based on the appreciation that the vast majority of families do much better when treated as responsible adults and offered effective incentives to help themselves.
SOURCE: Business Week, May 24, 1999, p. 18.
person would be no more than four times the income of the poorest person. Although the measurement of inequality is difficult, it is clear that our society has much more inequality than Plato recommended.
One of the Ten Principles of Economics discussed in Chapter 1 is that governments can sometimes improve market outcomes. There is little consensus, however, about how this principle should be applied to the distribution of income. Philosophers and policymakers today do not agree on how much income inequality is desirable, or even whether public policy should aim to alter the distribution of income. Much of public debate reflects this disagreement. Whenever taxes are raised, for instance, lawmakers argue over how much of the tax hike should fall on the rich, the middle class, and the poor.
Another of the Ten Principles of Economics is that people face tradeoffs. This principle is important to keep in mind when thinking about economic inequality. Policies that penalize the successful and reward the unsuccessful reduce the incentive to succeed. Thus, policymakers face a tradeoff between equality and efficiency. The more equally the pie is divided, the smaller the pie becomes. This is the one lesson concerning the distribution of income about which almost everyone agrees.
458 |
PART SIX THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS |
Summar y
Data on the distribution of income in our society. The richest fifth of ten times as much income as the
Because in-kind transfers, the transitory income, and economic important for understanding difficult to gauge the degree of using data on the distribution of When these factors are taken into suggest that economic well-being distributed than is annual income
Political philosophers differ in of government in altering the Utilitarians (such as John Stuart
distribution of income to maximize everyone in society. Liberals (such
distribution of income as if we were ignorance” that prevented us from
stations in life. Libertarians (such as have the government enforce
ensure a fair process but then not be inequality in the resulting distribution
to help the poor—minimum-wage income taxes, and in-kind
each of these policies helps some poverty, they also have unintended side financial assistance declines as income
face effective marginal tax rates that high effective tax rates discourage escaping poverty on their own.
Key Concepts
poverty rate, p. 442 poverty line, p. 442 in-kind transfers, p. 444 life cycle, p. 444
maximin criterion, p. 448 libertarianism, p. 450 welfare, p. 452
negative income tax, p. 454
1.Does the richest fifth of the U.S. four, or ten times the income of
2.How does the extent of income States compare to that of other
3.What groups in the population poverty?
4.When gauging the amount of transitory and life cycle variations difficulties?
a liberal, and a libertarian income inequality is permissible?
and cons of in-kind (rather than cash)
antipoverty programs can discourage the How might you reduce this
are the disadvantages with your
Problems and Applications
1.Table 20-2 shows that income inequality in the United States has increased during the past 20 years. Some factors contributing to this increase were discussed in Chapter 19. What are they?
2.Table 20-4 shows that the percentage of children in families with income below the poverty line is almost twice the percentage of the elderly in such families. How might the allocation of government money across
464 |
PART SEVEN ADVANCED TOPIC |
a more complete understanding of demand, just as the theory of the competitive firm in Chapter 14 provides a more complete understanding of supply.
One of the Ten Principles of Economics discussed in Chapter 1 is that people face tradeoffs. The theory of consumer choice examines the tradeoffs that people face in their role as consumers. When a consumer buys more of one good, he can afford less of other goods. When he spends more time enjoying leisure and less time working, he has lower income and can afford less consumption. When he spends more of his income in the present and saves less of it, he must accept a lower level of consumption in the future. The theory of consumer choice examines how consumers facing these tradeoffs make decisions and how they respond to changes in their environment.
After developing the basic theory of consumer choice, we apply it to several questions about household decisions. In particular, we ask:
Do all demand curves slope downward?
How do wages affect labor supply?
How do interest rates affect household saving?
Do the poor prefer to receive cash or in-kind transfers?
At first, these questions might seem unrelated. But, as we will see, we can use the theory of consumer choice to address each of them.
THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT :
WHAT THE CONSUMER CAN AFFORD
Most people would like to increase the quantity or quality of the goods they con- sume—to take longer vacations, drive fancier cars, or eat at better restaurants. People consume less than they desire because their spending is constrained, or limited, by their income. We begin our study of consumer choice by examining this link between income and spending.
To keep things simple, we examine the decision facing a consumer who buys only two goods: Pepsi and pizza. Of course, real people buy thousands of different kinds of goods. Yet assuming there are only two goods greatly simplifies the problem without altering the basic insights about consumer choice.
We first consider how the consumer’s income constrains the amount he spends on Pepsi and pizza. Suppose that the consumer has an income of $1,000 per month and that he spends his entire income each month on Pepsi and pizza. The price of a pint of Pepsi is $2, and the price of a pizza is $10.
Table 21-1 shows some of the many combinations of Pepsi and pizza that the consumer can buy. The first line in the table shows that if the consumer spends all his income on pizza, he can eat 100 pizzas during the month, but he would not be able to buy any Pepsi at all. The second line shows another possible consumption bundle: 90 pizzas and 50 pints of Pepsi. And so on. Each consumption bundle in the table costs exactly $1,000.
Figure 21-1 graphs the consumption bundles that the consumer can choose. The vertical axis measures the number of pints of Pepsi, and the horizontal axis