Lesson 6

Lesson 6: Philosophy of Mind Introduction

 

Technically, philosophy of mind is a branch of metaphysics that focuses on what the mind is. What makes humans conscious beings--or are we conscious beings at all? Is the mind material, immaterial, or both? In this lesson, the basic concepts and schools of thought related to philosophy of mind will be presented.

 

Substance Dualism

            This is a view that is well-established in philosophy. Its adherents basically contend that "...the mind and the body are composed of different substances and that the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects: size, shape, location, solidity, motion, adherence to the laws of physics, and so on (IEP 2011)."

            Substance dualists have several notable tenets in common. First, the mind is private. While we can access our own minds for purposes of thought or introspection, we cannot sense, nor be sensed by anyone else's mind. Since the mental aspect of reality exists in a non-physical realm, this would only make sense. This leads quickly to the second belief that our knowledge of our own minds is infallible because we have privileged access to it at all times. In contrast, "[i]nformation that reaches us through our senses is notoriously fallible; though the world may appear to us to be a certain way, it may well be other than it appears to be (philosophyof mind.info 2006)." Finally, the mind is not reducible and cannot be fully explained in non-mental terms. Attempts to define the mind, as such, are therefore doomed to be inadequate.

            This school is further broken down into sub-schools depending on how they think the mind and body are related (if at all). Interactionists believe the mind and body causally interact on some level, that is, they affect each other. Occasionalists believe that interactions between the mind and body could only be enabled by God, as do theparallelists. Epiphenomenalists put forth a compromise position, "… asserting that bodily events can have mental events as effects while denying that the reverse is true... (IEP 2011)." 

Property Dualism

            This take on the philosophy of mind holds that mental states are irreducible attributes of brain states. "For the property dualist, mental phenomena are non-physical properties of physical substances. Consciousness is perhaps the most widely recognized example of a non-physical property of physical substances (IEP 2011)." Other dualists argue that mental states and brain states are one in the same, even though the "…states cannot be conceptualized in exactly the same way without loss of meaning (IEP 2011)." Property dualists attempt to define attributes (properties) of mind that are lacked by matter (such as thought or inspiration) or vice versa (such as occupying a certain space or weighing a certain amount) (IEP 2011).

Substance Monists & Materialism

            In contrast to substance dualists, above, the substance monists believed that entire universe was composed of a single type of entity or "stuff." Monists that believe the universe is only comprised of non-physical mind are known as idealists. By far, more substance monists believe the nature of the universe is physical and are called physicalists or, more commonly, materialists.

            For the idealist, abstract concepts are all that truly exists. Things that appear to have physical form are constructs of the mind or ideas. This is similar to Plato's conception of ideal forms and their imperfect manifestations in the physical realm. However, idealism is a minority position and extremely so.

            Materialism boasts a far more plausible explanation for the existence of physical matter (and therefore far more adherents than idealism), but is nevertheless beset with the challenge of explaining non-physical phenomena. Three different concepts were introduced to achieve this end, notably behaviorism, functionalism, and mind-brain identity theory (philosophyofmind.info 2006).

            Behaviorism comes in two varieties: hard and soft. Hard behaviorism attempts to explain the mind in terms of its physically-manifested behaviors and explain them in physical terms (chemical reactions in the brain and so forth). This version is most compatible with empiricism and, to a certain degree, determinism. Soft behaviorism is less extreme, but reduces mental states to behavioral dispositions. That is, mental states are "pretend" and not actual.

            Functionalism defines mental states by their function, as the name would imply. For every mental state, there is a corresponding function that defines it. Whereas behaviorism holds mental states are identical to observable facts about behavior, functionalism asserts that mental states explain facts about behavior (philosophyofmind.info 2006).

            Finally, mind-brain identity theory posits mental states and brain states are identical. Modern materialists hold that the brain and the mind are one in the same. Since mental events appear to be localized to different parts of the brain, current scientific evidence seems to be more supportive of this explanation of mentality than other forms of materialism (philosophyofmind.info 2006).

                                              

Personal Identity

            Also related to the philosophy of mind is self-identity. Is the self (the mind) the same over time or does it change? Various philosophies and psychological theories have arisen to explain what makes a person the same person over time. At what point does a person change so much over time that they are no longer the same person? Or are they still the same, regardless of the changes? (philosophyofmind.info 2006).

            The two main approaches to personal identity propose criteria based on bodily continuity and on psychological continuity, respectively. What makes a person the same over time is the fact their body (in the former case) or their mind (in the latter case) persists over time. A third, albeit more radical explanation, is the bundle theory, which holds that we are nothing more than a collection of mental states. In reality, there is no "self" beyond this sequence of mental states (philosophyofmind.info 2006).