1.3. The permanence in office of the Italian Government.

The conferment of the parliamentary trust, by means of the solemn approbation aside of each Chamber the obvious durations, allows the permanence in office of the Government for the whole duration of the legislature, there is only the one hypothesis of revocation of trust mediated the adoption of a motion of distrust from a Chamber (art. 94.5) what must be signed “at least a tenth of the members of Chamber” and it cannot “be discusses before three days of its presentation”. According to the Article 94.4 of the Constitution “the vow does not give resignations obligation contrary to the proposal of one or both Chambers of the Government”.

The question about the trust is the institute, by means of which the Government declares of making of the determined object of the examination of the Chambers depending on the own permanence in office with the parliamentary approval. The President of the Council assumes this initiation with the assent of the Council of the Ministers. When the Government “puts trust”, it is proceeded voting for nominal appeal, directly to the text is considered essential at the Government with the decay of all presented amendments, then the parliamentary majority is lead to confirm the trust and to reduce the possibility for the opposition of the members of parliament with the activate obstructionist techniques. From the numerous well- known cases in government only two have been originated by the rejection of one question about trust (in 1999 and in 2008), while normally they have been originated by the spontaneous resignations. This diversity of cases is extra parliamentary, that estrange the Parliament of the decisive juridical power on the permanence of the fiduciary report with regard to the Government.

This attempts the Presidents of the Republic of parliamentary to influence on the cases, inviting of the resigning Government to be presented to the Chambers to verify the existence of fiduciary report or at least to supply an exhaustive information with the political reasons of the cases.⁵

Very doubtful seems the possibility that in absence of an expressed constitutional rule in this sense, it is possible to guarantee remaining of a constant fidelity to the engagements originally assumed from a political component of the majority or of one individual parliamentarian.

The cases are determined by decisions of the Council of the Ministers, and are added to determine the resignations of the President of the Council: such a consequence nevertheless not explicitly foreseen by the Constitution, it derives from the completely determinant list.⁶

Comparatively to the powers of the resigning Governments (that they will remain up to the decree of presidential acceptance of the resignations, contemporary to the appointment of the new one govern and countersigned at the new President of the Council), it seems evident the timeliness that they are limited to the alone “clearing of the running affairs”. Two of the praxis, which cases signals also of exercise of significant powers of government part of resigning Governments, in a case this seems to be absolutely a presupposition the Constitution (art. 77.2 of Constitution), in case there are extraordinary necessity of motives and urgency.

The resignations of a Minister do not cause crises of the Government in the juridical point of view and they oblige simply to fill the produced gap, through the appointment of one new Minister or the attribution of the interim to one of the Ministers already in office. To itself it proceeds according to presidential decree at proposal of the President of the Council.

The President's office have specific cases of decay of I advise or of Minister connected with their personal statuses: the Constitution does not plan even not subjective requisitioned details that are appointed by members of the Government.⁷

In the most recent years, there has been highlight of institutes which want to fit and to preclude the acceptance of responsibility for subjects of government, that are in a situation of objective incompatibility for interests conflict with the management of powers of I govern: the solution of the interests conflict has produced at the Law 215/2004. This Law, entitled “Rules in point of resolution of the conflicts of interest”, beyond some opportune general definitions on the duty of the holders of “offices of government”.⁸

The situations of conflict of interest are also foreseen in the case when the act or the omission of a holder of offices of government has “a specific incidence and preferential on the property of the holder, of the consort or of the relatives within the second one degree, or enterprises or societies of they checked”: be verifying of these hypotheses are called to supervise judicial not authorities but the Authority guarantee of the competition and of the market, or in the specific sector the Authority for the guarantees in the communications. These independent authorities, in case they think that they have been verified situations of conflict of interests, they distrust “the enterprise to refrain from anyone behave aimed at availing itself the act ” and, in case of inobservance they inflict upon the enterprise a pecuniary sanction and they report also to the Parliament, while no further consequence is foreseen.⁹