Rome and britain

When Britain was formally annexed to the Roman empire in

ad 43, conditions in the empire were very different to those at the

time of Caesar’s incursions a century before. The crucial difference

was that the tottering and corrupt government of senate and

people (the republic) had been swept away at the battle of Actium

in 31 bc, and replaced by a form of monarchy, where central

direction of imperial policy became possible. The historian,

Tacitus, observed that the empire was the chief beneficiary of this

change, gaining stability and sound government in place of

corruption and exploitation.

During the republic, little thought had been given to the purpose

of empire, and the addition of provinces had largely been

incidental to warfare. Governors, who were members of the highly

competitive senatorial aristocracy, in the main regarded provinces

as sources of revenue to fund their patronage and electoral

expenses; these were the keys to power in the republic. Alongside

them was Rome’s business community, members of the equestrian

order, who undertook for profit – often excessive – the kinds

of task, such as tax-collection and the management of stateproperty,

which in a modern state would be the concern of a civil

service. Although a mechanism existed by which provinces could

seek redress against governmental malpractice (the ‘extortioncourt’

or quaestio de rebus repetundis), access to it was difficult, and its decisions were often corrupted. In short, the comment on

Roman imperialism placed by Tacitus into the mouth of the

Caledonian chieftain, Calgacus, would have applied well to the

Roman attitude to the provinces in the republican period: ‘They

create a desolation, and call it peace.’

Even before the end of the republic, however, some things

had begun to change: during his extended proconsulship in Gaul

(58–50 bc), Julius Caesar clearly indicated directions for reform.

His view that a purpose of empire was to provide a buffer between

Rome and Italy on the one hand and dangerous and distant

enemies on the other pointed in the direction of a ‘frontier-policy’

which could be achieved by the enhancement of natural features –

for example, in western Europe, the river Rhine. Further, the fact

that the Roman army (in Caesar’s time, at least) did not make a

particularly suitable garrison-force carried implications for the

character of the administration of provinces; governors and taxcollectors

needed to be subjected to tighter control, and if cooperation

with provincials was to be secured, privileges of Roman

citizenship had to be extended to those regarded as suitable; the

tax-system had to reflect the need to leave sufficient wealth in the

pockets of those whose cooperation was sought. In the empire, as

In Rome, the authorities looked to rely on a system whereby the

local upper classes undertook burdens at their own expense in

return for political privileges.

Following the victory of Caesar’s adopted son, Octavian (the

future emperor Augustus), over Marcus Antonius in 31 bc, a clear

opportunity – even necessity – existed to develop Caesar’s thinking

and to apply it more widely. Whilst a full discussion of

Augustus’ innovations is beyond the scope of the present chapter,

a few observations are necessary to highlight the changes

experienced by the provinces of the empire.

First, the nature of recruitment to, and service in, the Roman

army was changed. The army, as before, was to consist of two

types of troops. But the legions, who were Roman citizens, were

now made fully professional and permanent by being given a

20-year term of engagement; they served alongside smaller units

of infantry and cavalry, called ‘auxiliaries’ (auxilia), who were not

Roman citizens and who ‘signed on’ for 25 years. These reforms

allowed the army to be used not just for campaigning purposes but for defensive and garrison-duties as well. This army swore an

oath of allegiance to the emperor as its general (imperator), and in a

sense represented the military backing which guaranteed his political

security. As it would have been both offensive and politically

counter-productive to have kept an army of 28 legions and an

equivalent number of auxiliaries (approximately 300,000 troops)

in close proximity to Rome, it was obviously ideal to be able to

disperse them to strategic points in the provinces.

The provinces themselves were divided into two types; those

which were thought to require a military presence are termed

‘imperial’, whilst the rest are called ‘public’. In essence, the

emperor was legally the proconsul of the first group, whilst in the

latter the old practice of choosing governors by lot was maintained.

An essential feature of the principate was the control

exercised by the emperor over the election of state officials

(‘magistrates’) from the senatorial order; this meant that by and

large he approved of those who were elected. In imperial provinces,

the emperor delegated his proconsular authority to a former

magistrate, and was thus able to exercise choice and judgement

over the matter directly; in the case of Britain and other provinces

of major military importance, such delegation was to a senior

figure, a former consul. Such a man was then the de facto governor

of the province, usually for a term of up to three years, and – a

departure from republican practice – received a salary whilst in

post. A poor performance on a governor’s part would definitely

affect future career prospects, and most emperors took considerable

care to choose governors who would be efficient, loyal and

beyond corruption. Although the emperor did not choose the

governors of public provinces, he could influence the choice

and eliminate from the lot those whose appointments might be

unsafe. From the time of Claudius (ad 41–54), it was normal for

all governors to regard themselves as in the emperor’s service.

The financial side of imperial administration was also overhauled.

Imperial appointees from the equestrian order were placed

in all provinces; these procurators were responsible to the emperor

for such matters as tax-collection and the management of state

property (such as grain-supplies and mines), and had under them

junior officials who were also called procurators. In this way,

although financial corruption was not totally banished, all provinces could expect a much more even and fair quality of financial

administration. At first, at least, governors were evidently

unable to interfere in the department of the procurator, though

Tacitus records that in Britain Agricola (governor, ad 77–83) did

act to check abuses of the tax-system; it is possible that this

facility was introduced in the wake of the procuratorial improprieties

which had precipitated Boudica’s rebellion in the province

(see Chapter 2).

The centralised administration put in place by Augustus also

meant that a ‘philosophy of empire’ could more readily be put