!Корпоративное право 2023-2024 / 2013-study-analysis_en
.pdfdirectors. Internally the directors may then take recourse against each other on the basis of their proportionate fault.200
For board resolutions we can derive the following principles from the case law, disregarding the (limited) variations that may exist in the Member States.
First, directors who vote in favour of resolutions in violation of directors’ duties are jointly and severally liable if they have acted with fault. As far as liability for negligent misconduct is concerned, this means that the assessment has to proceed on an individual level, since the applicable standard of care is defined in all Member States in consideration of circumstances that relate to the individual director.201 However, some jurisdictions use the fact that the director has participated in a board decision as a rule allocating the burden of proof. Following a recent judgment by the French Supreme Court,202 French law holds that once it is established that the resolution by the board constitutes a breach of duty (for which the claimant bears the burden of proof), the burden shifts to the director, who is required to show that ‘he behaved as a cautious and careful director, notably by opposing the decision’.203 Luxembourg,204 Maltese,205 and Dutch206 and Spanish law207 contain similar burden of proof rules.
Second, directors who vote against resolutions in violation of directors’ duties are in principle not liable. However, several jurisdictions provide that voting against the resolution alone is not sufficient to exonerate the director. Rather, the director must have attempted to change the decision, have his or her objection recorded in the minutes, and may need to inform the auditor of the resolution. Furthermore, liability may arise if the board proceeds with the implementation of the decision and the director does not take reasonable steps to prevent the implementation.
Third, the director may even face liability if he or she was absent while the board resolved to take the challenged decision. According to the decision of the French Supreme Court mentioned above,208 the rebuttable presumption of liability for the wrongful board resolution applies irrespective of the director’s presence or absence. Another ground for liability may be the director’s failure to attend the board meeting as such. In several Member States, it was emphasised that the directors have an obligation to participate in the decision-making by the board and that repeated absence may amount to negligence with regard to the director’s monitoring duty.209
While these principles are not equally well developed in all Member States, we have not identified any approaches clearly in contradiction of them. The most significant variation in the Member States seems to be the procedural function that joint and several liability assumes in Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Spain. This is in particular relevant for jurisdictions where the burden of proof is normally with the plaintiff.210
200This is expressly provided for by Lithuanian law, see Art. 6.279(2) Civil Code, but constitutes a general principle underlying the law of joint and several liability in all Member States.
201This holds also for jurisdictions that define the standard of care in a largely objective way. Individual elements such as the function and position of the director in the company or the director’s experience and knowledge will always play a role in the evaluation of the case. For more details see the discussion above 2.4.2 ‘Variations in the standard of care and delegation’.
202Cass. Com. 30.03.2010 n°08-17.841, FP-P+B+R+I, n° 08-17.841, Fonds de garantie des dépôts (FGD) c/ Sté Caribéenne de conseil et d'audit: P. Le Cannu: RJDA 7/10 n°760. Revue des sociétés 2010 p. 304.
203For a more detailed discussion of this decision see the French Country Report, p. A 365. Luxembourg law contains a similar provision for so-called responsabilité légale, see the Luxembourg Country Report, p. A 672.
204In Luxembourg, the burden of proof shifts to the director in case of the so-called responsabilité légale, see the Luxembourg Country Report, p. A 672.
205Maltese Companies Act, Art. 147(2). See the Maltese Country Report, p. A 719.
206Dutch Civil Code, Art. 2:9.
207Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act, Art. 237.
208See n 202.
209For example, Finland and Sweden.
210See above 2.4.2 ‘Burden of proof’.
171 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU
2.7 Limitation of liability
Summary of the country reports
Table 2.7.a: Possibilities to limit directors’ liability
Country |
Exclusion in |
Ex ante |
Ex post |
Indemnification |
|
articles |
authorisation by |
ratification by |
in third party |
|
|
shareholder |
shareholders or |
lawsuits or for |
|
|
|
waiver |
costs of |
|
|
|
|
proceedings and |
|
|
|
|
D&O insurance |
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
Not permissible |
- Directors are not |
Waiver and |
D&O insurance is |
|
|
liable if they were |
settlement may be |
available; |
|
|
acting in |
declared five |
coverage |
|
|
accordance with a |
years after the |
excluded for |
|
|
lawful resolution |
claim came into |
intentional |
|
|
of the general |
existence, |
misconduct and |
|
|
meeting, s. 84(4) |
provided that no |
often also for |
|
|
AktG |
minority of at least |
gross negligence |
|
|
NOTE: this does |
20% registers an |
|
|
|
objection, s. 84(4). |
|
|
|
|
not affect the |
|
|
|
|
In waiving the |
|
|
|
|
creditors’ ability to |
|
|
|
|
claims or entering |
|
|
|
|
enforce the |
|
|
|
|
into the |
|
|
|
|
company’s claims |
|
|
|
|
settlement, the |
|
|
|
|
against the |
|
|
|
|
company is |
|
|
|
|
director |
|
|
|
|
represented by |
|
|
|
|
- Approval by the |
|
|
|
|
the supervisory |
|
|
|
|
supervisory board |
|
|
|
|
board; the GM |
|
|
|
|
does not |
|
|
|
|
must give its |
|
|
|
|
exonerate the |
|
|
|
|
consent. The five |
|
|
|
|
directors |
|
|
|
|
year restriction |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
does not apply if |
|
|
|
|
all of the |
|
|
|
|
shareholders give |
|
|
|
|
their consent. |
|
|
|
|
NOTE: waiver or |
|
|
|
|
settlement are not |
|
|
|
|
effective with |
|
|
|
|
respect to |
|
|
|
|
creditors and in |
|
|
|
|
bankruptcy. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Belgium |
The validity of |
Some case law |
Permissible, the |
- Indemnification |
|
such clauses is |
holds that |
conflicted director |
permissible |
|
disputed, since |
directors are not |
can vote as |
- D&O insurance |
|
the law on liability |
liable when |
shareholder. |
|
|
is available and |
|||
|
of directors is |
merely executing |
However, the |
|
|
becoming more |
|||
|
mandatory law. In |
general meeting |
waiver does not |
|
|
common |
|||
|
any case, such a |
decisions. |
affect the rights of |
|
|
|
|||
|
clause cannot be |
However, this |
third parties or the |
|
|
relied on against |
does not free |
right of minority |
|
|
third parties. |
them from having |
shareholders who |
|
|
|
to comply with the |
do not approve |
|
|
|
Companies Code |
the ratification to |
|
|
|
and the articles of |
bring a derivative |
|
|
|
association and |
claim. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
172 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU
|
|
|
does not |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
constitute a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ratification of other |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
managerial errors. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Bulgaria |
1) Duty of care: |
The corporate |
s. 221, no. 10: the |
D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
exclusion for |
organ responsible |
directors may only |
available but not |
|
|
|
|
intentional |
for appointing |
be released from |
common |
|
|
|
|
conduct and gross |
directors can |
liability by the GM; |
|
|
|
|
|
negligence not |
exempt some or |
according to |
|
|
|
|
|
permissible |
all of the board |
common practice, |
|
|
|
|
|
2) duty of non- |
members from the |
this happens at |
|
|
|
|
|
duty of non- |
the annual |
|
|
||
|
|
competition, s. |
|
|
|||
|
|
competition for |
general meeting. |
|
|
||
|
|
237(4): can be |
|
|
|||
|
|
specific |
The director in |
|
|
||
|
|
excluded in the |
|
|
|||
|
|
transactions, for |
question can vote |
|
|
||
|
|
articles |
|
|
|||
|
|
participation in |
if he is also a |
|
|
||
|
|
3) duty of |
|
|
|||
|
|
specific |
shareholder. |
|
|
||
|
|
confidentiality, s. |
|
|
|||
|
|
companies, for |
|
|
|
||
|
|
237(5), and duty |
|
|
|
||
|
|
certain periods, or |
|
|
|
||
|
|
to disclose to the |
|
|
|
||
|
|
generally |
|
|
|
||
|
|
company facts |
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
which may be |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
relevant to the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
activity as |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
directors, s. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
237(3): |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mandatory; |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exemption in the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
articles not |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
permissible |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Croatia |
Not permissible |
Permissible, |
1) Ratification not |
- Indemnification |
|
||
|
|
|
directors not liable |
possible |
possible under |
|
|
|
|
|
if their actions |
2) Waiver: |
some conditions |
|
|
|
|
|
were based on a |
|
|
||
|
|
|
permissible |
- D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
|
resolution by GM; |
|
|||
|
|
|
a) after 3 years; |
available but not |
|
||
|
|
|
the conflicted |
|
|||
|
|
|
common |
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
director cannot |
b) GM gives its |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
vote as |
consent; and |
|
|
|
|
|
|
shareholder |
c) no objection |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from 10% minority |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shareholder |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The waiver is not |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
valid to third |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
parties, in |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
particular the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
creditors |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Cyprus |
Not permissible |
No general power |
The general |
- The company |
|
||
|
|
|
of shareholders to |
meeting may |
may indemnify |
|
|
|
|
|
exempt a director |
accept |
directors against |
|
|
|
|
|
from liability for |
agreements that |
the costs incurred |
|
|
|
|
|
breach of duty |
are voidable |
in legal |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pursuant to s. 191 |
proceedings in |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(self-dealing); but |
which judgment is |
|
|
|
|
|
|
no general power |
given in the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
of shareholders to |
director’s favour |
|
|
|
|
|
|
exempt a director |
or the director is |
|
|
|
|
|
|
from liability for |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
173 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |
|
|
|
breach of duty |
acquitted |
|
|
|
|
- D&O insurance |
|
|
|
|
available but not |
|
|
|
|
common |
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
Not permissible, s. |
Directors are not |
No explicit |
D&O insurance |
|
194(5) |
liable for damage |
provision; not |
available |
|
Commercial Code |
caused by their |
permissible |
|
|
|
execution of a |
|
|
|
|
specific instruction |
|
|
|
|
of the general |
|
|
|
|
meeting, unless |
|
|
|
|
such instruction is |
|
|
|
|
illegal, s. 194(5) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark |
Not permissible |
Not permissible |
- The GM can |
D&O insurance |
|
|
|
grant a discharge |
available, but not |
|
|
|
or waive liability |
common in small |
|
|
|
with simple |
and medium-sized |
|
|
|
majority; the |
enterprises; even |
|
|
|
waiver is binding |
in large listed |
|
|
|
on the company if |
companies |
|
|
|
the information |
directors are not |
|
|
|
received by the |
always covered by |
|
|
|
GM was |
D&O insurance |
|
|
|
essentially correct |
|
|
|
|
and complete, s. |
|
|
|
|
364(2) |
|
|
|
|
- If 10% minority |
|
|
|
|
shareholders |
|
|
|
|
oppose waiver, |
|
|
|
|
any shareholder |
|
|
|
|
can commence |
|
|
|
|
legal proceedings |
|
|
|
|
to recover |
|
|
|
|
damages for the |
|
|
|
|
company, s. |
|
|
|
|
364(3) |
|
|
|
|
- If the company is |
|
|
|
|
declared |
|
|
|
|
bankrupt, the |
|
|
|
|
waiver is no |
|
|
|
|
longer binding, |
|
|
|
|
provided that the |
|
|
|
|
bankruptcy |
|
|
|
|
petition is not |
|
|
|
|
presented later |
|
|
|
|
than 24 months |
|
|
|
|
after the waiver, s. |
|
|
|
|
364(4) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Estonia |
Restriction of |
Breaches of the |
Waiver valid if: |
D&O insurance is |
|
liability to, for |
duty of care: the |
- resolution of the |
available, but not |
|
example, gross |
director is |
widely used due |
|
|
supervisory board |
|||
|
negligence in the |
exculpated if he |
to the high |
|
|
- all significant |
|||
|
articles is |
acts on the basis |
insurance |
|
|
circumstances |
|||
|
permissible (but |
of a lawful |
premium (except |
|
|
about the breach |
|||
|
not valid in |
resolution by the |
in international |
|
|
of duty were |
|||
|
relation to third |
general meeting |
group companies) |
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
174 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU
|
parties or the |
or the supervisory |
disclosed and |
|
|
liquidator); in |
board |
known to the |
|
|
addition, limitation |
|
supervisory board |
|
|
or waiver of |
|
- explicit waiver |
|
|
liability for |
|
|
|
|
|
with regard to a |
|
|
|
intentional breach |
|
|
|
|
|
specific breach of |
|
|
|
of duty is not valid |
|
|
|
|
|
duty |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUT: creditors |
|
|
|
|
and the liquidator |
|
|
|
|
can enforce the |
|
|
|
|
claim in spite of |
|
|
|
|
the waiver |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finland |
- Possible, except |
Unanimity of the |
The annual |
D&O insurance |
|
for deliberate |
shareholders |
general meeting |
available and |
|
actions and gross |
required. |
decides on a |
fairly common, |
|
negligence (Ch. |
|
discharge of the |
especially in listed |
|
22, s. 9(1)). |
|
board of directors, |
companies, but |
|
Exclusion applies |
|
which constitutes |
also in a number |
|
only to liability |
|
a waiver of the |
of private |
|
against the |
|
company’s claims, |
companies |
|
company, not |
|
provided that the |
|
|
shareholders and |
|
information given |
|
|
third parties. |
|
to the AGM was |
|
|
- The right of the |
|
materially correct |
|
|
|
and sufficient (Ch. |
|
|
|
company to |
|
|
|
|
|
22, s. 6(2)). The |
|
|
|
damages may |
|
|
|
|
|
director in |
|
|
|
otherwise only be |
|
|
|
|
|
question must |
|
|
|
restricted by the |
|
|
|
|
|
abstain from |
|
|
|
articles of |
|
|
|
|
|
voting as a |
|
|
|
association with |
|
|
|
|
|
shareholder. |
|
|
|
the consent of all |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shareholders (Ch. |
|
The discharge is |
|
|
22, s. 9(2)) |
|
not binding in |
|
|
|
|
bankruptcy and |
|
|
|
|
the administrator |
|
|
|
|
can file a suit if |
|
|
|
|
the proceedings |
|
|
|
|
have started |
|
|
|
|
within two years |
|
|
|
|
from the director’s |
|
|
|
|
action. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
France |
Not permissible, |
Not permissible, |
Not permissible, |
D&O insurance |
|
Art. L.225-253 |
Art. L.225-253 |
Art. L.225-253 |
available and |
|
Commercial Code |
Commercial Code |
Commercial Code |
common in listed |
|
(for public |
(for public |
(for public |
companies; |
|
companies) |
companies) |
companies) |
infrequently used |
|
|
|
|
in non-listed |
|
|
|
|
companies |
|
|
|
|
|
Germany |
Not permissible |
Exculpates |
1) Waiver: s. 93(4) |
D&O insurance |
|
|
directors for |
- requires a |
available and |
|
|
breaches of the |
common in the |
|
|
|
resolution of the |
||
|
|
duty of care, s. |
public stock |
|
|
|
general meeting |
||
|
|
93(4). As regards |
corporation (AG); |
|
|
|
not later than |
||
|
|
self-dealing and |
mandatory |
|
|
|
three years after |
||
|
|
the duty not to |
retention of 10%, |
|
|
|
the claim came |
||
|
|
compete with the |
s. 93(2) sentence |
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
175 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU
|
|
|
company, the |
into existence, |
3 |
|
|
|
|
|
supervisory board |
and no objection |
|
|
|
|
|
|
can give ex ante |
|
|
||
|
|
|
by 10% minority |
|
|
||
|
|
|
authorisation |
|
|
||
|
|
|
shareholder |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- the waiver is not |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
valid in relation to |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
creditors, s. 93(5) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2) ex post |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
approval of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
competitive |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conduct (s. 88) by |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
the supervisory |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
board is not |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
permissible |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Greece |
Not permissible |
No liability if the |
Waiver: possible |
D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
|
director’s action |
pursuant to Arts. |
available, but not |
|
|
|
|
|
was based on a |
22a(4), 35, but not |
common |
|
|
|
|
|
lawful resolution |
earlier than two |
|
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of the GM, Art. |
years after the |
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22a(2) |
claim was |
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established; the |
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GM must consent |
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and there should |
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be no objections |
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from minority |
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shareholders |
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representing 20% |
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of the capital |
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Hungary |
Under principles |
In single-member |
The general |
D&O insurance |
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of agency law, |
companies |
meeting decides |
available, but not |
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liability can be |
directors may be |
on a discharge of |
common |
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excluded, except |
instructed in a |
the board of |
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for intent, gross |
written form by the |
directors, which |
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negligence, or |
shareholder; if the |
constitutes a |
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criminal |
director acts |
waiver of the |
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behaviour. In |
according to such |
company’s claims, |
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addition, the |
instructions, |
provided that the |
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director’s salary |
he/she is not |
information given |
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must be reduced |
liable. In other |
to the GM was |
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proportionally. |
companies, |
correct and |
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directors are |
sufficient. |
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bound by the |
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decisions of the |
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GM and are |
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supposed to act in |
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compliance with |
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them. Thus, a |
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majority vote in |
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GM can have the |
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effect of ex-ante |
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authorisation. |
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||
Ireland |
Companies Act |
- Shareholders |
- Shareholders |
- It is permissible |
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||
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1963, s. 200(1): |
can authorise |
can ratify a breach |
for a company to |
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any provision in |
conduct which |
- No conclusive |
indemnify a |
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the company’s |
would otherwise |
director against |
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judicial statement |
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articles of |
be a breach of |
the costs in |
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on the question of |
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176 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |
|
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association or any |
duty |
whether the |
relation to |
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contractual |
- No conclusive |
conflicted director |
proceedings |
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provision which |
can vote |
which were |
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judicial statement |
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exempts a director |
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successfully |
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on the question of |
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or indemnifies |
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defended or in |
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whether the |
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him/her against |
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relation to a |
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conflicted director |
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liability “in respect |
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successful |
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can vote; these |
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of any negligence, |
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application for |
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matters are |
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default, breach of |
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relief under s.391, |
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usually settled at |
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duty or breach of |
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see Companies |
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board level. The |
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trust” is void |
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Act 1963, s. |
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|
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conflicted director |
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200(b) |
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is entitled to vote |
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in such cases |
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- D&O insurance |
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available, but not |
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common, except |
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in large listed |
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companies |
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||
Italy |
Possibly |
No rules in the |
Waiver: by |
D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
permissible for |
Civil Code, but the |
ordinary resolution |
available and |
|
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|
breaches of |
provisions on ex |
of the GM, |
common in large |
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|
|
negligible |
post resolution |
provided that |
companies; rarely |
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|
importance (colpa |
may apply by |
there are no |
used in small and |
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lieve) |
analogy |
objections from |
medium-sized |
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minority |
enterprises |
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shareholders |
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representing 20% |
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|
of the capital |
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||
Latvia |
Not permissible |
1) No liability if the |
The GM may |
D&O insurance |
|
||
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|
director acted |
release directors |
available, but not |
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|
bona fide |
from liability for |
common |
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according to a |
specific actions |
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lawful decision of |
after disclosure of |
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the general |
such actions to |
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|
meeting (i.e. the |
the GM. |
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resolution must |
NOTE: The |
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|
have been legal |
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||
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release does not |
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and within the |
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||
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limit the right of |
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||
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powers of the GM) |
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minority |
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2) Supervisory |
shareholders to |
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board approval |
bring a derivative |
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not sufficient |
action or the rights |
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of the creditors |
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and administrator |
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in insolvency |
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proceedings |
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||
Lithuania |
Permissible, |
- Art. 34(5) of the |
Supreme Court: |
D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
except for |
Law on |
ratification by the |
available, but not |
|
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|
|
intentional fault or |
Companies: The |
shareholders does |
common |
|
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|
|
gross negligence, |
articles of |
not exclude or |
|
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|
|
Civil Code, Art. |
association may |
limit the directors’ |
|
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|
|
6.252 |
provide that the |
liability |
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board must obtain |
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the approval of |
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the general |
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meeting of |
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shareholders |
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|
177 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |
|
|
|
before adopting |
|
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|
|
the decisions |
|
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|
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|
|
referred to in |
|
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|
|
subparagraphs 3, |
|
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|
|
4, 5 and 6 of |
|
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|
|
paragraph 4. The |
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|
|
approval of the |
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GM shall not |
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|
release the board |
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|
from responsibility |
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for the decisions |
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adopted. |
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|
|
- Generally, |
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|
|
ratification by |
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shareholders |
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(even if ex ante) |
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|
does not limit the |
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|
|
responsibility of |
|
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|
|
directors (as to |
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|
|
any fiduciary duty) |
|
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|
||
Luxembourg |
Permissible in the |
There is no case |
- Discharge by the |
- Indemnification |
|
||
|
|
articles of |
law as to whether |
GM has the |
permissible, |
|
|
|
|
association or in |
a director could be |
consequence that |
except for |
|
|
|
|
particular |
allowed ex ante |
the company |
intentional fault, |
|
|
|
|
agreements |
by the |
waives its right to |
gross negligence, |
|
|
|
|
between the |
shareholders to |
enforce claims |
or criminal liability |
|
|
|
|
director and the |
take a particular |
against the |
- D&O insurance |
|
|
|
|
company. Some |
action and be |
directors for |
|
||
|
|
is available and |
|
||||
|
|
limits apply |
absolved of |
management |
|
||
|
|
has become very |
|
||||
|
|
(voluntarily |
liability. Belgian |
errors (provided |
|
||
|
|
common |
|
||||
|
|
agreed, without |
case law should |
the director did |
|
||
|
|
|
|
||||
|
|
fraud, not |
be applied here |
not act |
|
|
|
|
|
prohibited by a |
and holds that |
intentionally); this |
|
|
|
|
|
particular legal |
such a vote would |
applies to liability |
|
|
|
|
|
provision, legal |
be effective. |
under Art. 59(1) |
|
|
|
|
|
principles, or to |
|
|
as well as 59(2) |
|
|
|
|
protect creditors |
|
|
- In relation to |
|
|
|
|
or the general |
|
|
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|
|
third parties, the |
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|
|
interest) |
|
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|
|
discharge has no |
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|
|
effect |
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|
||
Malta |
Not permissible, |
The shareholders |
Shareholders can |
- Indemnification |
|
||
|
|
Art. 148(1) |
can authorise |
release a director |
not permissible, |
|
|
|
|
|
related party |
from liability for a |
Art. 148(1), with |
|
|
|
|
|
transactions and |
fully disclosed |
the exception of |
|
|
|
|
|
allow the director |
breach of duty |
indemnity against |
|
|
|
|
|
to compete with |
|
liability incurred by |
|
|
|
|
|
the company |
|
the director in |
|
|
|
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|
|
defending any |
|
|
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|
|
proceedings in |
|
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|
|
which judgment is |
|
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|
|
given in his/her |
|
|
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|
|
favour or in which |
|
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|
|
he/she is |
|
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|
|
acquitted |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- D&O insurance |
|
|
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|
|
available, but not |
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
178 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |
|
|
|
|
|
|
common |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Netherlands |
Exclusion of |
Ex ante exclusion |
Discharge by the |
D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
liability in the |
of liability for |
GM is valid if |
available and very |
|
|
|
|
articles is contrary |
serious |
based on correct |
common, also for |
|
|
|
|
to binding law (s. |
mismanagement |
information in the |
mid-sized |
|
|
|
|
2:9) and |
is not permissible |
annual accounts; |
companies; |
|
|
|
|
accordingly void |
|
|
furthermore, a |
usually combined |
|
|
|
pursuant to s. |
|
|
discharge does |
with a clause |
|
|
|
3:40 |
|
|
not prevent |
providing for |
|
|
|
|
|
|
individual |
indemnification by |
|
|
|
|
|
|
shareholders from |
the company |
|
|
|
|
|
|
instituting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proceedings |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Poland |
Not permissible |
1) Duty of non- |
1) Duty of non- |
- Generally |
|
||
|
|
|
competition, Art. |
competition, Art. |
permissible, but |
|
|
|
|
|
380: consent can |
380: the consent |
not often |
|
|
|
|
|
be given ex ante |
of the supervisory |
concluded in |
|
|
|
|
|
by the supervisory |
board (see left) |
practice |
|
|
|
|
|
board |
may also be given |
(insurance is |
|
|
|
|
|
2) Duty of care: |
after the duty has |
preferred) |
|
|
|
|
|
been breached |
|
|
||
|
|
|
acting on the |
- D&O insurance |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
basis of a |
2) Other duties: |
available and |
|
|
|
|
|
resolution by the |
a) The company |
fairly common in |
|
|
|
|
|
GM does not |
larger companies, |
|
||
|
|
|
and the director |
|
|||
|
|
|
exclude liability, |
but not so much in |
|
||
|
|
|
may enter into an |
|
|||
|
|
|
because the GM |
small and |
|
||
|
|
|
agreement |
|
|||
|
|
|
cannot give the |
medium-sized |
|
||
|
|
|
releasing the |
|
|||
|
|
|
board binding |
enterprises |
|
||
|
|
|
director from |
|
|||
|
|
|
instructions with |
|
|
||
|
|
|
liability, Art. 508 |
|
|
||
|
|
|
respect to the |
|
|
||
|
|
|
Civil Code |
|
|
||
|
|
|
management of |
|
|
||
|
|
|
b) Settlement is |
|
|
||
|
|
|
the affairs of the |
|
|
||
|
|
|
possible: the |
|
|
||
|
|
|
company |
|
|
||
|
|
|
company is |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
represented by |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
the supervisory |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
board, the GM |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
must give its |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
consent (Art. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
395(3), discharge |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
of duties) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c) The GM can |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
issue a resolution |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
releasing the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
director from |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
liability, provided |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
that the GM was |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fully informed |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NOTE: waiver or |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
discharge by the |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GM cannot be |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
used as a defence |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in a derivative |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
action or in |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bankruptcy, Art. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
487 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
|
179 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |
|
|
|
|
|
3) Directors as |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shareholders shall |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
not participate in a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resolution |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
regarding their |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
liability, Art. 413 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Portugal |
- Not permissible, |
No liability if the |
- Art. 74(2): waiver |
- In principle, the |
|
||
|
|
Art. 74(1) |
act is based on a |
is only possible by |
general prohibition |
|
|
|
|
- Some |
resolution by the |
express resolution |
of provisions |
|
|
|
|
shareholders, Art. |
of the |
exempting or |
|
||
|
|
commentators |
|
||||
|
|
72(5). According |
shareholders and |
limiting the |
|
||
|
|
argue that it is |
|
||||
|
|
to the legal |
no objection by a |
directors’ liability |
|
||
|
|
possible to |
|
||||
|
|
literature, the |
minority of at least |
also extends to |
|
||
|
|
exclude directors’ |
|
||||
|
|
provision has to |
10%; the |
any indemnity |
|
||
|
|
liability for |
|
||||
|
|
be interpreted |
conflicted director |
arrangements, i.e. |
|
||
|
|
negligence; only |
|
||||
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restrictively. |
must abstain from |
provisions of the |
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gross negligence |
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Decisions based |
voting as |
articles of |
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or intent could not |
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on false |
shareholder |
association by |
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be excluded |
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information do not |
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which, directly or |
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- Art. 74(3): The |
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exculpate the |
indirectly, the |
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resolution adopted |
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directors. If the |
company |
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by the general |
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decision is |
assumes the |
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meeting to |
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voidable and the |
financial costs of |
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approve the |
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directors |
the liability of its |
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accounts shall not |
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understand that |
own directors |
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imply a waiver of |
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the potential loss |
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the company’s |
- D&O insurance |
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of carrying out the |
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claims, unless the |
available and |
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resolution is |
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facts that |
relatively common |
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relevant, they may |
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establish the |
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be liable if they |
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liability were |
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execute it. |
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specifically made |
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known to the |
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shareholders and |
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no 10% minority |
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objects |
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Romania |
Permissible, |
- It is unclear |
Ratification of the |
- The articles of |
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except for |
whether the |
duty of care is |
incorporation or |
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violations of the |
shareholders can |
permissible as |
the agreement |
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duty to act in |
authorise a |
long as long as |
with the director |
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good-faith and for |
related-party |
the breach is |
may provide that |
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intentional |
transaction. It may |
generated by |
the company shall |
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misconduct or |
be argued that a |
culpa levis only; |
indemnify the |
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gross negligence |
transaction that is |
no ratification of |
director for the |
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contrary to the |
breaches of the |
costs of defending |
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company’s |
duty of loyalty |
against a liability |
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interests is void |
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claim. |
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and can neither |
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- D&O insurance |
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be authorised nor |
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is available and |
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ratified. In any |
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mandatory for |
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case, the |
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joint stock |
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conflicted director |
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companies |
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cannot vote on |
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such a resolution |
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(Art. 127). |
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- Other ex ante |
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authorisations of |
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breaches of the |
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180 |
Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU |