Ing the matter, and does not expressly authorize any repre-

sentation to be made concerning it. (a) If the agent l<nows

his representation to be false, the principal is liable provided

the agent had ostensible authority to make such a representa-

tion.2 {h) If the agent is also consciously ignorant of the

truth or falsity, the principal should be liable, since reckless

statements are equivalent to intentionally deceitful ones.

(4) The principal believes the facts to be as the agent rep-

resented them to be. {a) If the agent knows his represen-

tation to be false, the principal is liable, provided he had

actual or ostensible authority to make such representations.'*

(5) If the agent also believes his representations to be true,

1 " III Cornfoot V. Fowke, it is difficult to suppose that as a matter of

fact the agent's assertion can have been otherwise than reckless; what

was actually decided was that it was misdirection to tell the jury without

qualification ' that the representation made by the agent must have the

same effect as if made by the plaintiff himself;' the defendant's {)lea

averring fraud without qualitiation." Pollock on Torts (5th ed.), p. 291,

note. See criticism of this case in Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 121), 140-

142 ; National Exchange Co. v. Drew, 2 Macq. 103 ; Ludgater i\ Love, 44

L. T. R. 694.

2 3 Q. B. 58. Reversed on other grounds on appeal, 3 Q. B. 68, 1009.

3 Udell V. Atherton, 7 IT. & N. 172 (court equally divided) ; Barwick

V. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259 ; Mackay v. Commercial

Bank, L R. 5 P. C. 394 ; Swire v. Francis, 3 App. Cas. 106 ; Houlds-

worth V. Glasgow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317 ; Indianapolis, &c. Ry. v. Tyng

63 N. Y. 653; City N. B. v. Dun, 51 Fed. Rep. 160.

* Pollock on Torts (5th ed.), pp. 293-294.

200 PRINCIPAL AM) TIIIKI) I'AKTV.

the principal is not liable, since neither principal nor agent

has been guilty of any hitent to deceive, or of a reckless dis-

regard of the conseiiuences of the representation.

It will be observed that deceit may be proved by showing

cither that the prinrijial and agent were both guilty of fraud,

or by showing that the principal was guilty of fraud, or by

showing that the agent was guilty of fraud while acting within

the scope of his authority. If both principal and agent were

innocent of fraud, then no action for deceit w' ill lie.

The idea has been put forward that a personally innocent

principal cannot be held liable in tort for deceit.^ But that

idea has not met with favor, and it now seems reasonably

clear that the personally innocent princi])al is liable in tort

for deceit, if his agent, while acting within the scope of his

authority, makes a deceitful representation knowing it to be

false, or consciously ignorant of its truth or falsity.''^

Under statutes authorizing an arrest in case of fraud in

contracting debt, it is held that a personally innocent lU'inci-

pal cannot be arrested for the fraud of his agent.^

В§ 153. Fraud or misrepresentation for benefit of principal.

Leavin"- aside now the (piestion as to the particular form

of the remedy, we have to consider whether, in order to give

any remedy at all against the principal, the misrepresentation

of the agent must be made for the principal's benefit.

In the^ case of fraud committed by the agent within the

scope of his authority, and for the benefit of the principal, it