Ing to third persons not to injure them by the same act

or omission which causes injury to his principal, is

sometimes termed tnis-feasancr.

The fact that the agent may thus owe a duty to third

persons as well as to his principal seems sometimes to

have been overlooked.

See Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 436,

Cas. Ag. 514; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437,

Cas. Ag. 518; Baird v. Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 Am. St. Rep. 504;

Campbell t. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Ellis

V. McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 42 n. W. Rep. 1113, 15 Am. St. Rep.

308; Mayer r. Building Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. Rep. 620, 28 l.

R. A. 433; Greenberg v. Whiteonib Lumber Co. 90 Wis. 225, 63 N.

W. Rep. 93, 48 Am. St. Rep. 911, 28 L. R. A. 439; Cameron v. Ken-

112 Duties of agent to third persons. [в§в§ 211-213.

yon-Connell Com. Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. Rep. 358, 44 L. R. A.

508.

Compare notes in 22 Am. St. Rep. 512; 48 Am. St. Rep. 923 et

seq.; 28 L. R. A. 433.

§ 212. Trespass — Conversion. —An agent who

wrongfully enters upon another's land, or wrongfully

takes or detains or sells the goods of another, is liable

to the owner for the trespass or the conversion, even

though he acted in good faith, supposing the property

to be that of his principal, or although he did so by the

direction of his principal supposing that the principal

was authorized to give the directions. The fact that he

has delivered to his principal the property taken, or has

paid over to his principal the proceeds of property

wrongfully sold by his direction, is immaterial. No

one can escape the consequences of his wrongful act by

alleging that he did it as the agent of another.

See Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441, 100 Am. Dec. 452; Miller

v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 58 Am. St Rep. 319; Kimball v. Billings, 55

Me. 147, 92 Am. Dec. 581; Wing v. Milliken, 91 Me. 387, 40 Atl. Rep.

138, 64 Am. St. Rep. 238; Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn.

397, 29 S. W. Rep. 361, 28 L. R. A. 421; Swim v. Wilson. 90 Cal. 126,

27 Pac. Rep. 33, 25 Am. St Rep. 110; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass.

357, 33 N. E. Rep. 391, 35 Am. St. Rep. 495.

§ 213. How sued. — The agent may be sued alone,

or, in some cases, jointly with his principal.

See Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78;

Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495; Campbell v. Portland Sugar

Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Mulchey v. Methodist Society, 12b

Mass. 487; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen (Mass.) 420; Shearer v. Evans,

89 Ind. 400.

{В§214-215.] DUTIES OF rRINCIPAL TO AGENT.

113

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO

THE AGENT.

В§ 214. In general.

1. The Payment of Com-

pensation.

215. The right to have com-

pensation.

216. The amount of compensa-

tion.

217. When compensation

deemed to be earned.

— Where authority ter-

minated by the princi-

pal.

— Where authority

wrongfully revoked.

— Agent's duty to miti-

218.

219.

220.

gate his damages.

221. Where authority right-

fully revoked.

222. Where authority termi-

nated by operation of

law.

В§ 223. Where agent abandons

his. undertaking.

224. Where agent acted for

two principals.

225. Where agent violated his

trust.

Where agency unlawful.

Where extra duties re-

quired.

Where agent holds over.

Recoupment by principal.

2. Re-imbursement and

Indemnity of Agent.

230. Agent's right to re-im-

bursement.

231. Agent's right to indem-

nity.

232. None where act un-

lawful.

226.

227.

228.

229.

§214. In general. — The chief duties of the princi-

pal to the agent are (1) to pay him his compensation,

and (2) to indemnify him against loss or injury sus-

tained in the performance of his duty.

1. The Pay men t of Compensation.

§ 215. The right to have compensation. — The

agent's right to compensation may be determined by

the contract of the parties, or be implied by law. Where

the parties have expressly agreed that the agent shall

or shall not be entitled to compensation, their agree-

ment is usually conclusive.

114 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 215-216.

An express agreement to pay is not usually neces-

sary. As a rule, wherever services have been rendered

by one person at the express request of another, the law

will imply a promise by the latter to pay for them.

See Bradford v. Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. 431, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 866,

Cas. Ag. 523.

But no promise to pay will be implied where the

parties are near relatives or others who are members

of the same family;

See Harris v. Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 6 L. R. A. 702; Murphy v. Mui

phy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 9 L. R. A. 820.

or where the services were rendered as a mere act ol

kindness, or upon the hope or expectation, merely, that

they would be paid for.

See Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329; Wood v.

Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 33 Am. Rep. 396.

Though the act when done was unauthorized, its sub-

sequent ratification will give the agent the same right

to compensation as though it had been previously au-

thorized.

See Wilson v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392, Cas. Ag. 526.

§216. The amount of compensation. — Where the

parties have agreed upon the amount of compensation

to be paid, the agreement will usually be conclusive.

See Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. St. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620, Cas. Ag.