- •Contents
- •Editor’s Foreword
- •Introductory Remarks
- •Texts Cited
- •introduction
- •1. Four Questions about Political Philosophy
- •2. Four Roles of Political Philosophy
- •3. Main Ideas of Liberalism: Its Origins and Content
- •4. A Central Thesis of Liberalism
- •5. Initial Situations
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Hobbes’s Secular Moralism
- •3. Interpretations of the State of Nature and the Social Contract
- •1. Preliminary Remarks
- •2. Main Features of Human Nature
- •3. The Argument for Hobbes’s Thesis
- •1. The Reasonable and the Rational
- •2. The Rational Basis of the Reasonable Articles of Civic Concord
- •Liberty
- •Justice
- •Sovereign and Sovereign’s Powers
- •Laws of Nature
- •Content of Laws of Nature
- •1. Introductory Remarks
- •2. The Meaning of Natural Law
- •3. The Fundamental Law of Nature
- •4. The State of Nature as a State of Equality
- •5. The Content of the Fundamental Law of Nature
- •6. The Fundamental Law of Nature as the Basis of Natural Rights
- •1. Resistance under a Mixed Constitution
- •2. Locke’s Fundamental Thesis concerning Legitimacy
- •3. Locke’s Criterion for a Legitimate Political Regime
- •4. The Political Obligation for Individuals
- •5. Constituent Power and the Dissolution of Government
- •1. Problem Stated
- •2. Background of the Question
- •3. Locke’s Reply to Filmer: I: Chapter 4
- •4. Locke’s Reply to Filmer: II: Chapter 5
- •5. Problem of the Class State
- •6. A Just-So Story of the Origin of the Class State
- •1. Introductory Remarks
- •2. Hume’s Critique of Locke’s Social Contract
- •1. Remarks on the Principle of Utility
- •3. The Judicious Spectator
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Stages of History before Political Society
- •3. The Stage of Civil Society and of Political Authority
- •4. The Relevance for the Social Contract
- •1. Contra Original Sin
- •2. Rousseau contra Hobbes: Further Meaning of Natural Goodness—as Premise of Social Theory
- •3. The Possibilities of a Well-Regulated Society
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Social Compact
- •3. The General Will
- •1. The Point of View of the General Will
- •2. The General Will: The Rule of Law, Justice, and Equality
- •3. The General Will and Moral and Civil Freedom
- •4. The General Will and Stability
- •5. Freedom and the Social Compact
- •6. Rousseau’s Ideas on Equality: In What Way Distinctive?
- •1. Introductory Remarks: J. S. Mill (1806–1873)
- •2. One Way to Read Mill’s Utilitarianism
- •3. Happiness as the Ultimate End
- •4. The Decided Preference Criterion
- •5. Further Comments on the Decided Preference Criterion
- •6. Mill’s Underlying Psychology
- •1. Our Approach to Mill
- •2. Mill’s Account of Justice
- •3. The Place of Justice in Morality
- •4. Features of Moral Rights in Mill
- •5. Mill’s Two-Part Criterion
- •6. The Desire to Be in Unity with Others
- •1. The Problem of On Liberty (1859)
- •2. Some Preliminary Points about Mill’s Principle
- •3. Mill’s Principle of Liberty Stated
- •4. On Natural (Abstract) Right
- •Conclusion
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Framework of Mill’s Doctrine
- •3. The First Two Permanent Interests of Humankind
- •4. Two Other Permanent Interests
- •5. Relation to the Decided Preference Criterion
- •6. Relation to Individuality
- •7. The Place of Perfectionist Values
- •1. Preliminary Remarks
- •2. Features of Capitalism as a Social System
- •3. The Labor Theory of Value
- •1. A Paradox in Marx’s Views of Justice
- •2. Justice as a Juridical Conception
- •3. That Marx Condemns Capitalism as Unjust
- •4. Relation to Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution
- •5. The Allocative and Distributive Role of Prices
- •1. Are Marx’s Ideas about Justice Consistent?
- •2. Why Marx Does Not Discuss Ideas of Justice Explicitly
- •3. Disappearance of Ideological Consciousness
- •4. A Society without Alienation
- •5. Absence of Exploitation
- •6. Full Communism: First Defect of Socialism Overcome
- •7. Full Communism: Division of Labor Overcome
- •8. Is the Higher Phase of Communism a Society Beyond Justice?
- •Concluding Remarks
- •1. Preliminary Remarks
- •2. The Structure and Argument of The Methods of Ethics
- •1. Sidgwick’s Account of Justice
- •2. Statement of the Classical Principle of Utility
- •3. Some Comments about Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility (IP-Comparisons)
- •4. Some Features of the Principle of Utility as the First Principle of a Rational Method of Ethics
- •5. Sidgwick’s Critique of Natural Freedom as an Illustration
- •1. Introduction to Utilitarianism
- •2. The Statement of the Classical Principle of Utility (Sidgwick)
- •3. Points about Interpersonal Comparisons
- •4. Philosophical Constraints on a Satisfactory Measure of Interpersonal Comparisons
- •5. Some Points Regarding Greatest Numbers and Happiness and Maximizing Total vs. Average Utility
- •6. Concluding Remarks
- •1. Introduction: Life (1692–1752), Works, and Aims
- •2. Butler’s Opponents
- •3. The Moral Constitution of Human Nature
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Features of Our Moral Faculty
- •3. Outline of Butler’s Arguments for Conscience’s Authority: Sermon II
- •4. Summary of Butler’s Argument for the Authority of Conscience
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Butler’s Method
- •3. Role of Compassion: As Part of Our Social Nature
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Butler’s Argument contra Hedonistic Egoism
- •1. Introduction
- •3. Some Principles of Butler’s Moral Psychology
- •Index
His Doctrine as a Whole
tainly he expects that free institutions will lead to greater cultural diversity, and this he thinks desirable. But his emphasis is on free self-development and self-government; the latter implies self-discipline, and neither, alone or together, should be confused with eccentricity. The basic idea is our interest in individuality understood as the free and reflective formation of our thought and character within the strict limits set by the equal rights of justice for all.
In regard to this last, one must note the very important paragraph on the limits of justice in III: 9:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; . . . In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore more capable of being valuable to others.
. . . To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. . . . To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives.
Mill’s thought here suggests the further idea which unhappily we do not have time to discuss, namely: the greater overall value achieved under free institutions by human diversity when it is the outcome of the self-de- velopment of individuality within the limits of self-government, which include respecting the rights of justice. This is an important theme of Mill’s and of other modern liberalisms. It would not have occurred to Locke: he wouldn’t have supposed that religious diversity itself was good, although he might have thought that it had its compensations by making possible the acceptance of the principle of free faith and toleration.
§7. The Place of Perfectionist Values
1. I conclude with two points. The first concerns the place in Mill of perfectionist values, which he often mentions. Plainly these have a role in
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connection with the principle of dignity and of individuality. But how is this role best understood? In what sense is Mill advocating or endorsing perfectionist values? What political and social institutions, if any, do they justify?
Now Mill certainly recognizes the existence of the perfectionist values of the admirable and the excellent and their opposites, the degrading and the contemptible. And for him, these are significant values. Moreover, he takes it for granted that these values are recognized by us, since in the form of the principle of dignity they underlie his central idea of the decided preference criterion which always involves a judgment of what is appropriate for us. Thus, our recognizing the existence of these values and their great significance for us is a fundamental part of his normative doctrine and is supported by his basic human psychology.
However, in view of the content of the principle of liberty—its exclusion of perfectionist grounds for limiting individual liberty—these values cannot be imposed by the sanctions of law and common moral opinion as coercive social pressure. It is up to each of us together with our friends and associates to settle this for ourselves. In this sense, his doctrine is not perfectionist.
2.The fundamental values of Mill’s political and social doctrine are those of justice and liberty as spelled out in his principles of the modern world. If one were to object that he has left out the perfectionist values, he would reply, I suggest, that he has not left them out. Rather, he would say that he has taken them into account as they should be, namely, by setting out principles that, when realized in social arrangements, will be most effective in leading people freely—and in accordance with their own nature and the advice and urgings of friends and other associates, as best suits them—to give those values a central place in their life.
It is not necessary, I think he would say, to coerce people to pursue activities that realize these values, and trying to do so when the institutions of justice and liberty are not in place does more injury than good. On the other hand, once these institutions are fully in place, the values of perfection will be realized in the most appropriate way in free lives and associations within the bounds of just and free institutions. The values of justice and liberty have a fundamental background role and in that sense a certain priority. Mill would say that he gives perfectionist values their due.
3.As for the second point—the role of Mill’s psychological principles—I
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His Doctrine as a Whole
make the following observation: All moral doctrines contain normative concepts and principles combined with elements of human psychology and political sociology, together with other institutional and historical assumptions. Mill’s view is no exception. Still, it contains but one main normative assumption—the principle of utility, with its associated concepts and values. The essential role of this principle is seen everywhere, and reigns supreme as a doctrine of teleology in the chapter on the logic of practice, or art, at the end of his System of Logic (1843).
The first principles of Mill’s psychology play an essential role, and if they fail or strike us as implausible, then his view fails or seems insecure. In his answer, I have suggested, much depends on them. Yet all moral doctrines depend on their underlying moral psychology. Mill’s doctrine is not peculiar in this respect either.
I have not been much concerned with the overall success of Mill’s view. Instead my object has been to explain how, given his apparently Benthamite beginning, he managed to end up with principles of justice, liberty, and equality not all that far away from justice as fairness, so that his political and social doctrine—lifted from his overall moral view—could give us the principles of a modern and comprehensive liberalism.
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Appendix: Remarks on Mill’s Social Theory [c. 1980]
A.Preliminary Remarks: The Background of Social Theory:
1.It is essential for the understanding of Mill that one understands both his own conception of his vocation (as an educator of public elite opinion with the aim of establishing sufficient consensus on first principles of the modern world for the organic age to come) and the background social theory in the light of which he saw historical development. The essays Utilitarianism (1861), On Liberty (1859), On Representative Government (1861), and
Subjection of Women (1869) must all be read in this light.
2.But they are not sufficient by themselves: other writings present the social theory in more detail, especially Principles of Political Economy (1st edition, 1848; 3rd edition, 1852) and A System of Logic (1843). In the former, especially Book II, Chapters 1–2 (on property); Book IV, Chapters 1, 6–7 (on the Stationary State and the future of the laboring classes); and Book V, Chapters 1–2, 8–11 (on the role of government); and in the latter Book VI (on the method of the social sciences), which book is also the culminating set-piece of his Logic. In addition, see Chapters on Socialism (1879) and the earlier background of the origins of his views, e.g. Autobiography (1873), etc.
B.Representative Government: as the ideally best polity and aim of progressive advance:
1.The first three chapters of this work present Mill’s background social theory and are worthy of careful attention, although other chapters fill out many details: e.g. Chapters 7–8 give Mill’s arguments for some of his controversial proposals regarding proportional representation of minorities and plural voting for those more educated (what is instructive is Mill’s reasons for these proposals and how they fit his overall view). Basic themes are illustrated by the discussion of local government, nationalism, federalism, and government of dependencies in Chapters 15–18.
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Appendix: Mill’s Social Theory
2.Chapter I takes up the fundamental issue of how far the form of government is a matter amenable to rational choice. In paragraphs 4–11 Mill rejects the view (of Bentham) that government is a means to an end (and can be adopted as such) and (of Coleridge) that it is an organic growth not subject to human direction. His conclusion is that within certain conditions (stated in paragraphs 8–9) our institutions are a matter of choice (paragraph 11).
3.Paragraphs 12–14 discuss a fundamental objection to this conclusion: namely, that the form of government is fixed already in all essentials by the distribution of the elements of social power and that the strongest power holds governmental authority: thus any change must be preceded by a change in the distribution of social power. In reply Mill says this doctrine is too imprecise to be assessed; to make it more exact he enumerates six main elements of social power: (i) physical strength (numbers), (ii) property, (iii) intelligence, (iv) organization, (v) possession of governmental authority, (vi) active social power as guided by unified and effective public opinion (and degrees thereof: e.g. to passive and disunited [opinion]). This is a general equilibrium view of social power: it depends on the changing configuration of these elements.
4.Observe that in this chapter and the next two, Mill’s argument supports the realism and practicality of his adopted vocation as public educator: he contends that given the configuration of social elements of power in his day (in the age of transition) the sixth element of power may have considerable weight and those who try to affect it may therefore achieve something. Now it can possibly be done, later perhaps not. Recall On Liberty,
III:19. Mill has, then, a theory that explains the rationality of his vocation.
5.This theory is discussed earlier in the important Book VI of Logic, especially Chapter 10: here Mill contends that the laws which govern the succession of social states must yield the apparent historical fact that major cultural and social changes have been preceded by intellectual changes that have issued from previous states of intellectual development. Since intellectual change is in part autonomous, social change cannot be solely in changes in the other elements of social power.
6.Finally, note that Chapters II–III of On Representative Government help to give sense to Mill’s idea of utility in the broadest sense, that is, as advancing “the permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (On Liberty, I: 11): namely, that the best form of polity for realizing these interests is Represen-
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tative Government (cf. Utilitarianism, II: 3–9, 11–18; III, especially 8–11; On Liberty, III: 2–9), and the tendency historically is towards the conditions that make such government possible. So the broad test of utility is: how well do institutions favor this historical trend and how suited are they to representative government, etc.
C.Principles of Political Economy:
subtitled with some of their applications to social philosophy:
1.The idea that Mill is a defender of what we call laissez-faire capitalism is, I believe, an utter distortion, as can be seen by reading the parts listed in A: 2 above in Political Economy: Mill proposes in Book II rules regarding the holding of property, inheritance, and bequest, etc. that are aimed not, to be sure, at equality of property, but at preventing large concentrations and spreading property not too unequally over all classes over time. These rules are based on utilitarianism as defined in its broadest sense (B: 6 above). Book V, 1–2 and 8–11, especially discusses when government must be active and how.
2.In Book IV Mill actually presents a reinterpretation of the Ricardian notion of a Stationary State, which greatly alters its political and social implications: he sees this state not as a doomsday to be avoided by continual capital accumulation and innovation, but as a desirable state to be welcomed. This shift undercuts the ethos of a modern capitalist society as one of perpetual growth of capital and wealth: see Chapters 1, 5–6.
3.Mill favored what today is often called worker self-management in industry on the grounds, congruent with much of his view, that it encouraged participation and so active and vigorous people. While rejecting state command socialism as bureaucratic, he thought self-management [among workers] in privately owned firms would win out if markets were competitive. His feminism was an important part of this vision. See Subjection of Women, especially Ch. 2.
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marx
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College