02 Text 4 ukrainian-russian asymmetrical relations: the historical dimension
By Orest SUBTELNY
Prof., York University
Asymmetry is a term used, to describe a specific type of international relationship. It refers to the relations between two neighboring states, one much more powerful than the other. Some analysts argue that this state of extreme political, economic and cultural imbalance demands a distinct type of approach, analysis and behavior by the parties concerned. This is especially true on the part of the weaker and more vulnerable partner. Foremost proponents of this view have been Canadian foreign policy specialists who have come to consider Canada's relationship with the USA as a classic example of an asymmetrical relationship. Benefiting from their experience in analyzing relations with their powerful neighbor to the South, it may be useful to examine what benefits may be had from analyzing Ukrainian-Russian relations in terms of asymmetry. : First, a few general comments. It is obvious that in an asymmetrical relationship the more powerful partner enjoys a variety of advantages while the weaker partner must deal with numerous disadvantages. One advantage of the more powerful partner is that it is not wholly dependent on the relationship with the weaker partner. Despite the inconveniences that would occur, the USA could live without Canada, Germany could do without Austria, Australia without New Zealand and, most likely, Russia without Ukraine. Moreover, the more powerful partner usually maintains a series of other international relationships that are more important for it than those with its weaker neighbor. For the latter, this is not the case. For Canada there is no other relationship that matches the importance of the one with the USA. The same is true in the case of Ukraine's contacts with Russia. For the weaker partner, the relationship with the stronger neighbor is the Crucial Relationship, incomparably more important than all the others.
Another aspect of asymmetrical relationships is that they are multidimensional. Especially for the weaker neighbor, they involve the entire gamut of political, military, economic and cultural issues. Consequently, partners in asymmetrical relationships tend to become interwoven to a much greater extent than neighbors of roughly equal standing such as, for example, Germany and France or Sweden and Norway. Finally, asymmetrical relationships are, for obvious reasons, of long duration. Indeed, they exist as long as the two neighbors exist as distinct entities. For this reason, asymmetrical relationships accumulate a vast historical experience or, one might call it, "historical baggage" that usually complicates the way one neighbor perceives the other. It is this "historical baggage" in the relationship of Ukraine and Russia, and especially its impact on the relationship between the two countries, that we wish to concentrate in this discussion. At the outset, it may be useful to pose the following question: how important is histocial experience or, more specifically, the perception of historical experience in the way Russians and Ukrainians perceive their relationship? Does what happened between Russians and Ukrainians in the past have an impact on how they view each other in the present? Clearly, a comment about history in general is in order. History is an exceedingly malleable concept; it can be altered and re-shaped with relative ease. Little wonder that Khrushchev used to say that historians are very dangerous because "they can change everything." Certainly the way the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations has been viewed is a case in point. During the Soviet period, this relationship was characterized by terms such as "fraternal relations". The frequent use of the "elder and younger brother " analogy reinforced the image of warm, family ties. After the collapse of the USSR, this relationship was frequently viewed in a very different, even diametrically opposite, way. But on one aspect of the relationship, there was general agreement: what happened in the past between the two peoples greatly affected the way in which they viewed each other, especially on the level of state relations, in the present. Interestingly, not all asymmetrical relations are as strongly influenced by history as the Russian-Ukrainian one. For example, in the American-Canadian case, the past plays a relatively minor role, perhaps because their history is comparatively brief or due to the Anglo-Saxon tendency not to dwell on the past. In contrast, almost every major issue that confronts the Ukrainians today has a historical dimension to it, one that involves Russia. The East-West distinctions in Ukraine, the Crimean and language issues, the economic problems, even Ukraine's urge to join Europe has a Russian aspect toil.
While the past weighs heavily on the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, it should be noted that the relationship took varying forms in various epochs. There were very different Russias and Ukraines during the centuries of contact. And the representatives of the two peoples and the nature of their contacts also varied greatly. It would be useful, therefore, to glance at the major stages of this relationship, establish the issues that arose between the two peoples at these historical junctures, and identify and characterize the individuals and social groups that raised and formulated these issues. Hopefully, this will enable us to better grasp the nature of this asymmetrical relationship over time.
KYTVAN RUS
It is a general rule that the stronger side in an asymmetrical relationship tends to emphasize what the two neighbors have in common while the weaker side is inclined to stress the differences between them. The Russian and Ukrainian approaches to the heritage of Kyivan Rus are a good example of this rule. The Russian/Soviet view of Kyivan Rus was (and is) that it is the common heritage of three fraternal peoples, the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Implied in this perspective is the assumption that those peoples who were once together should, sooner or later, re-unite. A related assumption is that cultural similarity should lead to political unity. Numerous historical examples of asymmetrical relationships raise doubts about the validity of these assumptions. The Americans and Canadians can easily be called a "fraternal" people with a common heritage and similar culture but neither has shown a serious inclination to political union. The same can be said for the Danes and Norwegians or the Germans and Austrians.
Ukrainian historiography has generally argued that Ukrainians can lay the greatest claim to the heritage of Kyivan Rus. To do so it has emphasized the differences between the southern.principalities and those in the northeast. This reflects the tendency of every nationalism, and especially that of the weaker partner in an asymmetrical relationship, to stress its uniqueness and particularity. Often this takes the form of arguing that distinctions of secondary significance are of decisive importance. Each national historiography seeks to establish a Glorious Past and claim an exclusive right to it. For this reason, Ukrainian historians have usually rejected the Russian approach which argues, in effect, that what is mine is mine but what is yours is ours.
The fact of the matter is that the nature of the North-South relationship during the Kyivan era is an unclarified and highly debatable historical issue. The point here is not to decide which side is right but to demonstrate how the logic of asymmetrical relations has influenced each side to adopt a specific and often emotionally-charged position on what might seem to some to be a matter of esoteric interest. Not surprisingly, the representatives of the Ukrainians and Russians in this debate have generally been historians. And it is they who formulated our understanding of the earliest phase of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. It is a classic case of a asymmetrical relationship influencing our perception of the past.
WITHOUT RUSSIA
In the history of every asymmetrical relationship there is a point when a clear distinction is drawn between the two neighbors. Up to this point the possibility exists that the similarities between them or unifying forces on one side or the other will triumph and lead to the unification of two closely related neighbors into a single national whole. But after a certain point, this becomes no longer possible. In the case of the Americans and Canadians it was the Revolution of 1776 which led to an irreversible parting of the ways among the British colonies in North America. Thereafter, the Americans made at attempt at conquest in 1812 and laid a number of plans to takeover Canada but nothing came of this. The Germans and Austrians parted when the Habsburgs gave up their attempt to gain hegemony in the Germanics and turned their attention to their empire in Eastern Europe. Hitler united them briefly but they quickly drew apart after 1945.
The irrevocable parting of the ways between Ukrainians and Russians occurred over a very lengthy period - the four centuries that they lived apart, the former under the Lithuanians and Poles and the latter under the Khans of the
Golden Horde. During these centuries, the Ukrainians and Russians lived in two very different worlds. The former were exposed to the oligarchic rule of the szlachta and the influences of Europe. The latter adopted the absolutism of the Khans and lived in the self-righteous isolation of Orthodoxy. Indeed, one can argue that for the Ukrainians, their first experience in an asymmetrical relationship came during the period when they confronted the powerful political, social and cultural forces emanating from their western neighbors in Poland, not their eastern neighbors in Muscovy.
What was the essence of the relationship between Ukrainians and Muscovy during the period of Polish-Lithuanian rule in Ukraine? It was a limited and tenuous one. From the Ukrainian point of view, it rested on one element - Orthodoxy. Ukrainian Orthodox churchmen, reacting to the aggressiveness of Polish Catholicism, sought to maintain ties with the only Orthodox ruler, the tsar of Muscovy. The rest, of Ukrainian society, especially its quickly polonizing elite, largely ignored Muscovy. For their part, the Muscovite tsars; and their churchmen-propagandists exhibited somewhat more interest in Ukraine and, specifically, Kyiv. Their interest was mainly of an ideological nature. As Ivan III and his successors systematically developed the ideology of Russian absolutism and their special role as defenders of Orthodoxy, the tsars sbught, as do all rulers with imperial ambitions, to establish the antiquity of their claims to power. This made it necessary, for the Muscovite rulers to emphasize their dynastic links with the Varangian rulers of Kyiv (Ivan III also claimed that his dynastic roots reached back to ancient Rome). By extension, the tsars also claimed the right to rule in Kyiv. This, however, was not taken seriously either by the Ukrainians or the. Poles or even the Muscovites themselves. In short, the essence of the Ukrainian relationship prior to 1648 lay in Orthodoxy and its relevance and importance was limited to the small stratum of churchmen in Ukraine and Muscovy.
This single link, however, was an important one because it set a crucial precedent. Although the Ukrainians were beyond the political, economic and cultural impact of the Russian North, insofar as they were Orthodox, they recognized the special role of the distant tsar as the one and only defender of the Orthodox faith. This meant that Muscovy gained an advantage that it would maintain throughout the history of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. Muscovy, not Kyiv, would be identified with a Grand Concept - Orthodoxy - a concept that would give it a moral and ideological basis to claim the upper hand in its relations with the Ukrainians. Here we see the great advantage that the more powerful partner in an asymmetrical relationship usually has - the ability to develop grand concepts or ideas that attract, unify and rationalize not only its own people but also their weaker neighbors. Grand ideological concepts are frequently associated with power. And that means that they are the monopoly of the stronger partner in an asymmetrical relationship. Thus, even before Ukraine came under Russian rule, the ideological and psychological basis for a subordinate position in its relationship with Russia was already laid.
PEREIASLAV
In asymmetrical relationships the possibility of political unification of the stronger and weaker neighbors always exists. Indeed, it is surprising that unification does not occur more often since the power relations are so unbalanced. For example, in the case of Canada and the USA the fact that these two closely related countries did not merge into one often elicits surprise. The fact that Canada was part of the British Empire explains, to some extent, why unification did not occur. Nonetheless, there is general agreement that had the American really wanted to, they could have absorbed Canada. Apparently, they saw no pressing need to do so. This might mean that even when the opportunity to "unify" a weaker neighbor exists, it might not be always wise or necessary for the stronger partner to take advantage of it.
In the Russian-Ukrainian relationship matters took a very different course. The Russian Grand Idea, in every form it took, always demanded "unification". Orthodoxy played the essential rationale in the formulation of the Treaty of Periaslav in 1654. Khmelnytsky turned to the Tsar because he was the protector of the Orthodox. And the Tsar agreed to take the Ukrainians "under his High Hand" for the sake of Orthodoxy. There was, in 1654, no talk of fraternal ties or historical bonds. Thus, from the : outset, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship acquired an ideological rationale and for most of its existence a Grand Concept, based in the North, would serve to define it.
There was, however, a complication in this initial phase. All asymmetrical relationships encounter difficulties when the politically weaker partner considers itself to be culturally superior to the stronger partner. Frequently, this leads to attempts of the weaker partner to limit, alter of even sever ties with its dominant neighbor. Such was the case of the Poles and Finns in imperial Russia and of the Baits in the USSR. From the time of Khmelnytsky to the period of Mazepa, such was the case of the relationship between the Ukrainian elite - the Cossack starshyna in the Hetmanate - and the Russian tsar. During this period, the Ukrainian elite believed that, in terms of political and cultural values, that they were a part of the superior European culture (in its Polish variant) and Muscovy was not. Thus, while Orthodoxy initially led the Cossack elite to accept Muscovite overlordship, their Europeaness later prodded many of the starshyna to reject it.
It should be noted, however, that the Europeaness of the Cossack elite was of an old-fashioned type. Borrowed or adopted from the Polish sziachta, which served as a model for the starshyna well into fee 18th century, it rested, in political terms, of the concept of the rights and liberties of the feudal elite. The Polish sziachta even negotiated a contract - that highlight of European legal and political thought - called the Pacta Conventa with a newly elected king about the conditions under which he was to rule and about his obligation to respect the rights of the elite. One need only recall the Magna Carta in England to realize how deep-rooted and widespread such an arrangement was in Europe. It was, at the outset, in terms of such a contract that the Ukrainian elite viewed its relationship with the Tsar. Obviously, the absolutist tsars had a very different understanding of the relationship. These difference explain the constant turbulence and conflicts that marked Ukrainian-Russian relations in the more than fifty years after Pereiaslav.
The most decisive and dramatic expression of this conflict of views came during the hetmancy of Mazepa. The Ukrainian hetman, reflecting his own and the starshyna's great dissatisfaction with Peter's absolutism, sought to sever the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. Had Peter . 1 remained like his predecessors, a semi-oriental Muscovite tsar, the Hetman might have succeeded. But in transforming Muscovy into a modem European state (if not society). Peter adopted a more modern form of Europeanism than that espoused the Hetman and the Ukrainian elite. Not surprisingly, when Mazepa's old-fashioned; feudalist Europeanism confronted the modern European statism of Peter I, the Hetman lost - as did every feudal elite that attempted to oppose the rising absolutist state of the 18th century.
In terms of asymmetrical relations, Mazepa's defeat and Peter's successful modernization of Russia was of epochal importance: the one advantage - their cultural superiority - that the Ukrainians enjoyed in the relationship with Russia was gradually eliminated. Ukraine became not only a political but also cultural backwater. As a result, the basis for questioning Russian dominance in Ukraine disappeared.
EMPIRE
In the 18th and 19th centuries, Russian statesmen and ideologues, with the help of numerous Ukrainians, developed another highly attractive and impressive concept -the Imperial Idea. In essence, it argued that empire and specifically the well-organized imperial state was the most promising way to assure all levels of society and all regions of the empire with peace, security and progress. St. Petersburg replaced Moscow as the embodiment of this new Grand Concept.
What was the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship in this context? It became much more difficult to define because both the images of Russia and Ukraine became exceedingly vague and ill-defined. Identified with a huge and ever-expanding multinational empire, the Russians developed an imperial but not a national sense of identity. Ukraine, meanwhile, was transformed into an imperial province that seemed destined to lose its specific identity. At best, Ukrainians were consigned to be a regional variant of the identity that took form in the North.
The concept and reality of empire are always impressive. Russia, to its great benefit, identified completely with this imposing edifice. But as noted above, in doing so the Russians paid a heavy price: they had to avoid all attempts to develop an well-defined, ethnically-based sense of nationality because this would have pitted ethnic Russians against the other nationalities in the empire and raised the threat of disunity. Consequently, as Russia identified with an imposing imperial body, it lacked a national soul, that is, that sense of identity that only ethnic nationalism can develop.
An attempt to address this problem was the development of yet another Grand Concept - Pan Slavism. Messianic and far reaching, spiritually rooted and politically expedient, it fit well into the tradition of Russian political thinking. As usual, it placed Russia , now identified as the archi-type of Slavdom (which supposedly had more "soul" than the West Europeans), at the center of a movement of unification.
How did the Ukrainians react to these developments? First, we should establish which Ukrainians were in a position to react. For the vast majority of Ukrainians who were peasants such issues were irrelevant. The representatives of the Ukrainian identity, in the ,19th century were members of the small intelligentsia, especially those committed to the development of a Ukrainian national identity. Consequently, during this period the relationship between Russia and Ukraine took the concrete form of relations between the representatives of the Russian empire, that is, the vast bureaucracy and the spokesmen for the Ukrainian cause, that is. the tiny national intelligentsia. Although on the surface it appeared that the vaguely defined Ukrainian-Russian relationship was a non-confrontational and even complementary one and that the two poorly defined nations could be comfortably subsumed under the aegis of empire and Panslavism, the basis for confrontation was slowly building.
Although the majority, of educated Ukrainians felt some loyalty to the Russian imperial idea (more out of inertia than real commitment), the number of Ukrainian intelligentsia espousing the national idea steadily grew. Since every national idea is inherently opposed to every imperial idea, a confrontation between the Ukrainian national intelligentsia and the Russian imperial bureaucracy was unavoidable. The first conflict occurred in 1848 when Tsarist bureaucrats eliminated the Cyril-Methodian Brotherhood and arrested Shevchenko and his colleagues. Realizing that the small cohort of spokesmen for the Ukrainian national idea was too weak to carry on an open struggle, Kostomarov formulated what appeared to be a compromise solution. In his essay "Dve russkiye narodnosti" he proposed an approach to Russian-Ukrainian relations that was widely accepted well into the 20th century. While admitting that the two peoples had much in common - thus satisfying the demands of imperial loyalty and Panslavism - he noted that there were important differences in their history, culture and mentality. The Russians, as their empire proved, were clearly the more politically gifted of the two peoples. Therefore, Kostomarov proposed that they should continue to be the politically dominant partner in the relationship. However, in an echo of the Cossack period, he claimed that the average Ukrainian peasant, as the colorful Ukrainian folklore demonstrated, was culturally superior to his Russian counterpart. This was grounds for a clear distinctions between the two peoples. This juxtaposition of nation vs empire, intelligent vs bureaucrat, culture vs political power formed the essence of asymmetrical relationship that existed between Ukrainians and Russians in the pre-revolutionary period.
As is well known, the imperial bureaucracy did not accept Kostomarov's accommodating view of the relationship and, raising the slogan "one and indivisible Russia", it did its best to eliminate cultural distinctions between the two peoples. In doing so, the bureaucrats committed the classical mistake of the dominant partner in an asymmetrical relationship: they did not know when to stop. As a result, the imperial system stressed its superiority to the point when the weaker partner responded not with capitulation but with resistance.
THE SOVIET PERIOD
The 1917-1921 period both clarified and further confused the relationship between the Ukrainians and Russians. The emergence of the Central Rada, the UNR and the ZUNR made it clear that Ukrainians a) were a distinct nation and b) that at least of pat of them wanted their own state. Thus, the distinctions between the two people and their countries which had become somewhat hazy during the 19th century were now clearly drawn. Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no choice but to accept this fact (although the Whites, with characteristic inflexibility, refused to do so).
A major reason why Lenin, unlike most Russian politicians both on the Left and Right, accepted the existence of the Ukrainian nation was because he believed that national distinctions would soon become irrelevant. What would make it irrelevant would be, in his view, the next in the series of Grand Concepts that characterized Russian political thought: Com-munsim. As might be expected, the realization of this Grand Concept required Russian leadership.
As far as the Ukrainian-Russian relationship was concerned, Lenin's approach also greatly confused the issue. While the creation of the Ukrainian SSR, which he, for strictly tactical reasons, supported, institutionalized the distinction between Russians and Ukrainians, the concept of Proletarian Solidarity,, to which Lenin was earnestly and wholeheartedly committed, aimed at eliminating national distinctions. This was a fatal contradiction wich the Soviet system was never a.ble to resolve.
In quantitative terms, during the Soviet period the. Ukrainian-Russian relationship entered a new phase. Up to the 20th century, the Russian and Ukrainian masses had relatively little contact with each other. But especially after World War II, the relationship involved a massive and systematic interchange and intermingling of these two populations. As a result of political and socio-economic pressures, millions of Russians came to Ukraine and millions of Ukrainians migrated to Russia. The economies of the two republics became more intertwined and interdependent than ever. Along with this came the effort, initiated under Stalin and long guided by Suslov, to create a common Soviet culture and to turn national cultures into regional variations of the Soviet model. With the apparent triumph of Soviet Man concept it appeared that national distinctions, including the very idea of Russian-Ukrainian relations were becoming, as Lenin predicted, totally irrelevant.
Before this homogenizing process got underway, there was an important and, for Stalin and his colleagues, very disquieting episode, one that presaged future problems. In fact, it probably convinced them - to hasten .their efforts to impose Soviet uniformity on the multi-national conglomerate that was the USSR. Usually it is referred, to by that contradiction in terms-National Communism. In simplest terms, it may be described as the attempt in the 1920s by non-Russian Communists, notably Ukrainians and Tatars, to challenge the Russian monopoly on the Grand Concept of Communism. Ukrainians such as Skrypnyk, Khvyliovyi and Shumsky. were truly committed to Communism. However, they believed that each nation should be able to find its own specific road towards this goal. Consequently, they rejected Stalin's view that only the Russian approach to Communism was the universally valid one. In term's of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship this was the most audacious and important attempt by the Ukrainians to challenge the ideological asymmetry that had favored the Russians for centuries. Little wonder that Stalin and his successors were especially brutal in crushing all manifestations of National Communism in Ukraine.
Tne relationship between Russia and Ukraine during the Soviet era is a vast and complex topic that is almost impossible to treat briefly. But to bring this discussion to a logical conclusion, one should at least make an attempt. For the sake of analysis, Ukraine can be identified iwith Kyiv and Russia with Moscow. And the continuum in which they interacted was anchored, on one end, by federal-type relations and, on the other, by administrative-type relations. This is to say that Kyiv related to Moscow in formal terms as a federated entity and, in practical terms, as a hierarchically-subordinated administrative unit. But although Kyiv was clearly subordinated to Moscow, Ukraine had a clearly defined, quasi-state form and this meant that the relationship was of an inter- institutional character. No longer was Ukraine represented by a tiny feudal elite or vague, shifting conceptions of the intelligentsia. It was something large, concrete and well-defined.
Ironically, a useful way of describing the relationship that developed between Kyiv tod Moscow, especially during the Brezh-hev-Scherbitsky era, is to use the model of the modern capitalist corporate conglomerate. Like Ford or IBM, the Soviet Union was a huge, rigidly organized and highly disciplined system which spread acrosss many countries but still maintained remarkable uniformity. The "head office" was obviously located in Moscow while Kyiv was one of 14 "branch offices". Every ambitious regional manager or "apparatchik" dreamed of being called to the "head office" but this would occur only if he was successful in the "branch office". Although loyalty to the "head office" was a prerequisite for a manager's success, that did not mean that the interests of the head office and branch office were identical. Indeed, the interests of the center and the branches could diverge significantly. Or competition between branches for corporate resources could be intense. The essence of "corporate politics" was, therefore, to satisfy both the head-office and the branch office.
This analogy allows us to argue that the essence of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship during the Soviet period resembled an international corporate conglomerate where there is simultaneously co-operation and tension, subordination and autonomy between the head office (Moscow) and a branch office (Kyiv). This was also a system where the managers, both in center and the regions, appeared to be very similar and united but, nonetheless, were often inclined to go further than might be expected in defending the interests of their particular bailiwicks. To reiterate, one can argue that the asymmetry that exists between the head office and the branch office in a multinational corporation was Similar to the type of relationship that existed between Moscow and Kyiv in the final days of the USSR.
THE PRESENT
Today the relationship between Russia and Ukraine continues to be an asymmetrical. But it is, in many crucial ways, a radical departure from the past. Most obvious is the fact that the two countries relate to each other on the state- to-state level. This is a new type of relationship between them. Ukraine has finally achieved statehood, a goal that was doubted, criticized and repressed for generations. It is no longer a periphery or variant of some other, larger entity. Russia is no longer an imperial state (although it does vieW itself as a regional, power). In terms of our discussion, this fact has one crucial ramification: in losing its empire, Russia also lost the capacity to develop (3rand Concepts as it did in the past. This was dramatically demonstrated in Yeltsyn's fruitless effort to encourage the development of a new Russian Idea. WTiat impact does this have on the relationship with Ukraine? It means that one crucial aspect of the asymmetry between the two countries - the Russian monopoly on grand, unifying concepts -has disappeared. No longer can Russia claim to be something qualitatively greater than its neighbors. It certainly is larger and stronger. But this is a quantitative, not qualitative difference. Russia obviously has more resources than Ukraine just as USA has more resources than Canada. But Russia can no longer claim to be the embodiment of a greater or grander idea and use this as a argument for the subordination of its southern neighbor. In short the asymmetrical relationship between Ukraine and Russia has lost its specific and unique features; it has become much more like the other asymmetrical relationships in the world.
ЗМІСТ
Навчальний посібник з англійської мови 1
Ex.1 Listen and learn to pronounce the following words. 9
to be bounded with (to bound) - 9
to be ideal for the development of; 11
Ex. 4. Listen to the pronunciation of the following international words and try to guess their meanings: 11
Ex. 12. Disagree with the following statements and correct them as in the model. 18
Ex. 13. Give detailed answers to the following questions. 18
Ex. 14. Prove the statements given below. 20
TOPIC 2 KYIV 24
international words and 24
Ex. 14. Disagree with the following statements and correct them, using some phrases from the reminder: 29
THE MARIINSKYI PALACE 33
Ex. 2. Read the text and use the required tenses instead of the infinitives in brackets. 33
KHRESHCHATYK 33
THE KYIV-PECHERSKYI MONASTERY 36
Ex. 9. Translate into English: 38
a)names of professions and specialities: 38
b)names of educational establishments: 38
Ех. 10. In each sentence one word does not fit the meaning. From the first given bellow choose the right word. Try not to look through the text. 39
Ex. 11. Agree or disagree. 39
Fifth Century BC 44
First Century AD 44
Fifth Century AD 45
AD 988 45
Eleventh through Twelfth Century 45
Thirteenth Century 45
Sixteenth Century 46
Seventeenth Century 46
GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 49
CLIMATE AND NATURAL RESOURCES 49
BRIEF HISTORY 50
POLITICAL SYSTEM 54
ORTHODOX UKRAINE 65
PROBLEMS 65
GREEK CATHOLICS 66
ROME CATHOLICS 67
KYTVAN RUS 73
EMPIRE 76
THE SOVIET PERIOD 69
Підписано до друку 28.10.2008. Формат 60x84/16. Ум. др. арк. - 4,2. Обл.-вид. арк. - 3,8. Тираж - 1000 прим.
Друкарня СПД Щербенок С. Г. Свідоцтво ДП 126-р від 12.10.2004 вул. Рокоссовського, 5/3, м. Кривий Ріг, 50027