144 The law of agency.

(h) It may be terminated by the expiration of a fixed

period, when a definite period has been fixed, by the con-

tract estabUshing the agency, during which the agency is

to last.

(c) It may be terminated by the subject-matter of the

agency ceasing to exist.

Whether the determination of the subject-matter termi-

nates the agency or not, seems to depend upon whether the

parties, when making the contract of agency, contemplated

the continuance of the subject-matter as the foundation

of the employment or not — vide Rhodes v. Forwood (1870),

1 App. Cas. 256, and Turner V. Goldsmith (1891), 1

Q. B. D. 544, at pp. 138, 139, ante.

(d) It may be terminated by the death of either of the

parties, or by the incapacitating illness of the agent.

The authority is at once terminated by the death of

either the principal or the agent.

Wallace v. Cook (1804), 5 Esp. 116 ; here it was held

that it was illegal for an agent to pay money, under a

power of attorney, after the death of his principal.

Smout V. Ilhery (1842), 10 M. & W. 1 ; here a butcher,

who had been in the habit of supplying meat at the house

of a married man, continued to supply the wife after the

husband had gone abroad. The husband died abroad ; and

the butcher sought to recover from the wife for the meat

supplied between the date of the husband's death and the

receipt of the intelligence in England. It was held that

the wife was not liable, seeing that no personal liability

will attach to an agent who enters into a contract in igno-

rance of the death of his principal, even though the third

parties are also ignorant of tlie death.

Campanari v. Woodhurn (1854), 15 C. B. 400 ; here it

was lield that an agent's authority is revoked by the death

of the j)rincipal.

Pool V. Pool (1889), 58 L. J. Prob. 67; here it was held

tliiit the retainer of a solicitor was revoked by the death of

DETERMINATION OF AGENCY. 145

his client, and that he was not entitled to costs for items

Incurred subsequently to the death of such client, and before

he heard of the death.

It seems that no liability will attach to the estate of a

deceased principal upon contracts entered into by his agent,

after such principal's death.

Blades v. Free (1829), 9 B. & C. 167; here it was held

that the executors of a deceased were not liable for

necessaries supplied, after deceased's death, to a wife (or

mistress cohabiting as a reputed wife), even though the

persons supplying such necessaries had received no notice

of the death.

Farimo v. Wilson (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 744; here

Willes, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, said ;

"Generally speaking, contracts bind the executor or adminis-

trator, though not named. Where, however, personal con-

siderations are of the foundation of the contract, as in

cases of principal and agent and master and servant, the

death of either party puts an end to the relation ; and

in respect of service after death, the contract is dissolved,

unless there be a stipulation express or implied to the

contrary."

It is, however, possible, from an opinion expressed by

Brett, L.J., in the following case, that if the question were

to come before the Courts now, that they might attach a

liability to the estate of a deceased principal.

Drew V. Niinn (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 661. C. A.; here

Brett, L. J., said ; " Suppose that a person makes a repre-

sentation, which after his death is acted upon by another

in ignorance that his death has happened ; in my view,

the estate of the deceased will be bound to make good

the loss which may have occurred through acting upon

that representation. It is, however, unnecessary to decide

this point to-day."