1970S: Terrorism turns international

International terrorism became a prominent issue in the late 1960s, when hijacking became a favored tactic. In 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an El Al Flight. Twenty years later, the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, shocked the world.

The era also gave us our contemporary sense of terrorism as highly theatrical, symbolic acts of violence by organized groups with specific political grievances.

The bloody events at the 1972 Munich Olympics were politically motivated. Black September,a Palestinian group, kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes preparing to compete.Black September's political goal was negotiating the release of Palestinian prisoners. They used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause.

Munich radically changed the United States' handling of terrorism: "The terms counterterrorism and international terrorism formally entered the Washington political lexicon," according to counterterrorism expert Timothy Naftali.

Terrorists also took advantage of the black market in Soviet-produced light weaponry, such as AK-47 assault rifles created in the wake of the Soviet Union's 1989 collapse. Most terrorist groups justified violence with a deep belief in the necessity and justice of their cause.

Terrorism in the United States also emerged. Groups such as the Weathermen grew out of the non-violent group Students for a Democratic Society. They turned to violent tactics, from rioting to setting off bombs, to protest the Vietnam War.

1990S: The Twenty First Century: Religious Terrorism and Beyond

Religiously motivated terrorism is considered the most alarming terrorist threat today. Groups that justify their violence on Islamic grounds- Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah—come to mind first. But Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and other religions have given rise to their own forms of militant extremism.

In the view of religion scholar Karen Armstrong this turn represents terrorists' departure from any real religious precepts. Muhammad Atta, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, and "the Egyptian hijacker who was driving the first plane, was a near alcoholic and was drinking vodka before he boarded the aircraft." Alcohol would be strictly off limits for a highly observant Muslim.

Atta, and perhaps many others, are not simply orthodox believers turned violent, but rather violent extremists who manipulate religious concepts for their own purposes.

The evolution of terrorism

Terrorism is continually changing. While at the surface it remains "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear…" it is rapidly becoming the predominant strategic tool of our adversaries. As terrorism evolves into the principal irregular warfare strategy of the 21st century, it is adapting to changes in the world socio-political environment. Some of these changes facilitate the abilities of terrorists to operate, procure funding, and develop new capabilities. Other changes are gradually moving terrorism into a different relationship with the world at large.

In order to put these changes into context, it will be necessary to look at the historical evolution of terrorism, with each succeeding evolution building upon techniques pioneered by others. This evolution is driven by ongoing developments in the nature of conflict and international relations. It is also necessary to consider some of the possible causes of future conflicts, in order to understand the actors and their motivations. Finally, we examine how terrorism will be integrated into this evolution of conflict, and what that will mean for U.S. military forces.

When describing the evolution of terrorism and the use of terror through history, it is essential to remember that forms of society and government in the past were significantly different than they are today. Modern nation-states did not exist in their present form until 1648 (Treaty of Westphalia), and the state's monopoly on warfare, or inter-state violence, is even more recent. The lack of central governments made it impossible to use terror as a method of affecting a political change, as there was no single dominant political authority. Also, the absence of central authority meant that the game of warfare was open to many more players. Instead of national armies, a variety of non-sovereign nobility, mercenaries, leaders of religious factions, or mercantile companies participated in warfare. Their involvement in warfare was considered to be perfectly legitimate. This is in contrast to the modern era, where nations go to war, but private participation is actually illegal.

Early Theories of Terrorism

Early practitioners of terrorism, such as the Zealots and the Assassins did not leave any particular philosophy or doctrine on their use of terrorism. With the exception of spectacular failures such as Guy Fawkes' religiously inspired attempt to assassinate King James I and both Houses of Parliament in England, terrorism did not separate itself or progress beyond the normal practices of warfare at that time. As political systems became more sophisticated, and political authority was viewed as less of a divine gift and more as a social construct, new ideas about political conflict developed.

The period of warfare and political conflict that embroiled Europe after the French Revolution provided inspiration for political theorists during the early 1800s. Several important theories of social revolution developed during this time (see text box on the next page for summaries of the key revolutionary thinkers). The link between revolutionary violence and terror was developed early on. Revolutionary theories rejected the possibility of reforming the system and demanded its destruction. This extremism laid the groundwork for the use of unconstrained violence for political ends.

Two ideologies that embraced violent social change were Marxism, which evolved into communism, and anarchism. Both were utopian; they held that putting their theories into practice could produce ideal societies. Both advocated the complete destruction of the existing system. Both acknowledged that violence outside the accepted bounds of warfare and rebellion would be necessary. Communism focused on economic class warfare, and assumed seizure of state power by the working class (proletariat) until the state was no longer needed, and eventually disposed of. Anarchism advocated more or less immediate rejection of all forms of governance. The anarchist's belief was that after the state is completely destroyed, nothing will be required to replace it, and people could live and interact without governmental coercion. In the short term, communism's acceptance of the need for organization and an interim coercive state made it the more successful of the two ideologies. Anarchism survived into the modern era and retains attraction for violent extremists to this day.

20th Century Evolution of Terrorism

In the early years of the 20th Century nationalism and revolutionary political ideologies were the principal developmental forces acting upon terrorism. When the Treaty of Versailles redrew the map of Europe after World War I by breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire and creating new nations, it acknowledged the principle of self-determination for nationalities and ethnic groups. This encouraged minorities and ethnicities not receiving recognition to campaign for independence or autonomy. However, in many cases self-determination was limited to European nations and ethnic groups and denied others, especially the colonial possessions of the major European powers, creating bitterness and setting the stage for the long conflicts of the anti-colonial period.

In particular, Arab nationalists felt that they had been betrayed. Believing they were promised post-war independence, they were doubly disappointed; first when the French and British were given authority over their lands; and then especially when the British allowed Zionist immigration into Palestine in keeping with a promise contained in the Balfour Declaration.

Since the end of World War II, terrorism has accelerated its development into a major component of contemporary conflict. Primarily in use immediately after the war as a subordinate element of anti-colonial insurgencies, it expanded beyond that role. In the service of various ideologies and aspirations, terrorism sometimes supplanted other forms of conflict completely. It also became a far-reaching weapon capable of effects no less global than the intercontinental bomber or missile. It has also proven to be a significant tool of diplomacy and international power for states inclined to use it.

The seemingly quick results and shocking immediacy of terrorism made some consider it as a short cut to victory. Small revolutionary groups not willing to invest the time and resources to organize political activity would rely on the "propaganda of the deed" to energize mass action. This suggested that a tiny core of activists could topple any government through the use of terror alone. The result of this belief by revolutionaries in developed countries was the isolation of the terrorists from the population they claimed to represent, and the adoption of the Leninist concept of the "vanguard of revolution" by tiny groups of disaffected revolutionaries. In less developed countries small groups of foreign revolutionaries such as Che Guevara arrived from outside the country, expecting to immediately energize revolutionary action by their presence.

Future trends of terrorism

As a conflict method that has survived and evolved through several millennia to flourish in the modern information age, terrorism continues to adapt to meet the challenges of emerging forms of conflict, and exploit developments in technology and society. Terrorism has demonstrated increasing abilities to adapt to counter-terrorism measures and political failure. Terrorists are developing new capabilities of attack and improving the efficiency of existing methods. Additionally, terrorist groups have shown significant progress in escaping from a subordinate role in nation-state conflicts, and becoming prominent as international influences in their own right. They are becoming more integrated with other sub-state entities, such as criminal organizations and legitimately chartered corporations, and are gradually assuming a measure of control and identity with national governments.

Adaptive Capabilities of Terror Groups

Terrorists have shown the ability to adapt to the techniques and methods of counter-terror agencies and intelligence organizations over the long term. The decentralization of the network form of organization is an example of this. Adopted to reduce the disruption caused by the loss of key links in a chain of command, a network organization also complicates the tasks of security forces, and reduces predictability of operations.

Terrorists have also been quick to use new technologies, and adapt existing ones to their uses. The debate over privacy of computer data was largely spurred by the specter of terrorists planning and communicating with encrypted data beyond law enforcement's ability to intercept or decode this data. To exchange information, terrorists have exploited disposable cellular phones, over the counter long-distance calling cards, Internet cafes, and other means of anonymous communications. Embedding information in digital pictures and graphics is another innovation employed to enable the clandestine global communication that modern terrorists require.

Terrorists have also demonstrated significant resiliency after disruption by counter-terrorist action. Some groups have redefined themselves after being defeated or being forced into dormancy. The Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminosa) lost its leadership cadre and founding leader to counter-terrorism efforts by the Peruvian government in 1993. The immediate result was severe degradation in the operational capabilities of the group. However, the Shining Path has returned to rural operations and organization in order to reconstitute itself. Although not the threat that it was, the group remains in being, and could exploit further unrest or governmental weakness in Peru to continue its renewal.

In Italy, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rossi) gradually lapsed into inactivity due to governmental action and a changing political situation. However, a decade after the supposed demise of the Red Brigades, a new group called the Anti-Capitalist Nuclei emerged exhibiting a continuity of symbols, styles of communiqués, and potentially some personnel from the original Red Brigade organization. This ability to perpetuate ideology and symbology during a significant period of dormancy, and re-emerge under favorable conditions demonstrates the durability of terrorism as a threat to modern societies.

Increasing Capabilities of Terrorists

Terrorists are improving their sophistication and abilities in virtually all aspects of their operations and support. The aggressive use of modern technology for information management, communication and intelligence has increased the efficiency of these activities. Weapons technology has become more increasingly available, and the purchasing power of terrorist organizations is on the rise. The ready availability of both technology and trained personnel to operate it for any client with sufficient cash allows the well-funded terrorist to equal or exceed the sophistication of governmental counter-measures.

Likewise, due to the increase in information outlets, and competition with increasing numbers of other messages, terrorism now requires a greatly increased amount of violence or novelty to attract the attention it requires. The tendency of major media to compete for ratings and the subsequent revenue realized from increases in their audience size and share produces pressures on terrorists to increase the impact and violence of their actions to take advantage of this sensationalism.

Today, most experts believe that certain parts of the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan are turning out to be the main power centers for terrorism. Decades of lawlessness and corruption have seen Islamic terrorist groups fill the power vaccum in this region and continue to turn out an alarming number of religiously motivated terrorists.

Motives

All terrorist acts are motivated by two things:

• Social and political injustice: People choose terrorism when they are trying to right what they perceive to be a social or political or historical wrong—when they have been stripped of their land or rights, or denied these.

• The belief that violence or its threat will be effective, and usher in change. Another way of saying this is: the belief that violent means justify the ends. Many terrorists in history said sincerely that they chose violence after long deliberation, because they felt they had no choice.

This explanation of the causes of terrorism may be difficult to swallow. It sounds too simple, or too theoretical. However, if you look at any group that is widely understood as a terrorist group, you will find these two elements are basic to their story.

• Zionists who bombed British targets in 1930s mandate Palestine felt they must do so in order to create a Jewish state.

• The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombed English targets in the 1980s to make the point that they felt their land was colonized by British imperialists.

• In the 1960s and 1970s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine felt that armed attacks in Israel were a justifiable response to the usurpation of their land.

• Osama bin Laden's declaration of war on American interests in the 1990s stemmed from his belief that U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia represented an abomination to the kind of Islamic state he believed should exist in the Arabian peninsula.

• Uighur separatists in China today feel that Chinese religious repression (the Uighur Chinese are Muslims) justifies their terrorist tactics.

• In some cases, people choose terrorist tactics based on a cause whose righteousness they believe in to the exclusion of nearly all else. Abortion clinic bombers in the 1990s and groups such as the Animal Liberation Front believe zealously in their causes.

People who choose terrorist tactics are also persuaded that violence, or the threat of violence, is effective.

There is some question about who actually 'chooses' terrorism, and it may be unfair to think of young recruits, such as some suicide bombers today, who are seduced by cult-like methods of indoctrination as completely culpable for their choices.

It is necessary to ask a Better Question: What Conditions Are Favorable for Terrorism?

In fact, the question, "what causes terrorism?" is not quite the right question to be asking, because we will never be able to answer it. We cannot say that the presence of one factor provokes terrorism in the same way that we can say with scientific certainty that certain toxins cause diseases.

If you listen closely to the explanations that are usually given as answers to the question, "What is terrorism?" you will find that they actually answer the question: "What are the conditions in which terrorism is most likely to take place?" Sometimes these conditions have to do with the people who become terrorists (they are described as having certain psychological traits, like 'narcissistic rage') and some conditions have to do with the circumstances they live in (a poor society; a formerly colonized society, for example).

Although many people today believe that that religious fanaticism "causes" terrorism, it isn't true. It may be true that religious fanaticism creates conditions that are favorable for terrorism. But we know that religious zealotry does not 'cause' terrorism because there are many religious fanatics who do not choose terrorism or any form of violence. So there must also be other conditions that in combination provoke some people to see terrorism as an effective way of creating change in their world.

There are two more reasons why asking, "What conditions create a favorable climate for terrorism?" is better than asking about causes The first is, it makes it easy to remember that there are always at least several conditions. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it is a specific kind of political violence committed by people who do not have legitimate army at their disposal. A second reason that has been useful for me, as I ask questions about terrorism, is that thinking in terms of 'conditions' helps me remember that people have a choice about whether to use violence.

There is nothing inside any person nor in their circumstances that sends them—like a monopoly piece headed directly to "Go"—directly to terrorism. Instead, there are certain conditions, some of which make violence against civilians seem like a reasonable, and even necessary option. Despite this, and some of the deeply unforgivable circumstances that foster terrorism, people always have the free will to seek another course of action.

Goals of terrorists

Ideology and motivation will influence the objectives of terrorist operations, especially regarding the casualty rate. Groups with secular ideologies and non-religious goals will often attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence to achieve a specific political aim. This often requires them to keep casualties at the minimum amount necessary to attain the objective. This is both to avoid a backlash that might severely damage the organization, and also maintain the appearance of a rational group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks they reduce the risk of undermining external political and economic support. Groups that comprise a "wing" of an insurgency, or are affiliated with aboveground, sometimes legitimate, political organizations often operate under these constraints. The tensions caused by balancing these considerations are often a prime factor in the development of splinter groups and internal factions within these organizations.

In contrast, religiously oriented and millenarian groups typically attempt to inflict as many casualties as possible. Because of the apocalyptic frame of reference they use, loss of life is irrelevant, and more casualties are better. Losses among their co-religionists are of little account, because such casualties will reap the benefits of the afterlife. Likewise, non-believers, whether they are the intended target or collateral damage, deserve death, and killing them may be considered a moral duty. The Kenyan bombing against the U.S. Embassy in 1998 inflicted casualties on the local inhabitants in proportion to U.S. personnel of over twenty to one killed, and an even greater disparity in the proportion of wounded (over 5000 Kenyans were wounded by the blast; 95% of total casualties were non-American ). Fear of backlash rarely concerns these groups, as it is often one of their goals to provoke overreaction by their enemies, and hopefully widen the conflict.

The type of target selected will often reflect motivations and ideologies. For groups professing secular political or social motivations, their targets are highly symbolic of authority; government offices, banks, national airlines, and multinational corporations with direct relation to the established order. Likewise, they conduct attacks on representative individuals whom they associate with economic exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While religious groups also use much of this symbolism, there is a trend to connect it to greater physical devastation. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals, such as missionaries, and religious activities, such as worship services, to the targeting equation.

Another common form of symbolism utilized in terrorist targeting is striking on particular anniversaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike to commemorate battles won or lost during a conventional struggle, whereas religious groups may strike to mark particularly appropriate observances. Many groups will attempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations, or the executions or deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. Likewise, striking on days of particular significance to the enemy can also provide the required impact. Since there are more events than operations, assessment of the likelihood of an attack on a commemorative date is only useful when analyzed against the operational pattern of a particular group or specific members of a group's leadership cadre.

The Intent of Terrorist Groups

A terrorist group commits acts of violence to:

• Produce widesrpead fear

• Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause by attracting the attention of the media

• Harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that the the government overreacts and appears repressive

• Steal or extort money and equipment, especially weapons and ammunition vital to the operation of their group

• Destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create doubt that the government can provide for and protect its citizens

• Discourage foreign investments, tourism, or assistance programs that can affect the target country’s economy and support of the government in power

• Influence government decisions, legislation, or other critical decisions

• Free prisoners

• Satisfy vengeance

• Turn the tide in a guerrilla war by forcing government security forces to concentrate their efforts in urban areas. This allows the terrorist group to establish itself among the local populace in rural areas.

Causes of terrorism:

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence against civilians to draw attention to an issue. Those searching for the causes of terrorism -why this tactic would be selected, and in what circumstances- approach the phenomenon in different ways. Some see it as an independent phenomenon, while others view it as one tactic in a larger strategy. Some seek to understand what makes an individual choose terrorism, while others look at it at the level of a group.

Political

Terrorism was originally theorized in the context of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, a form of organized political violence by a non-state army or group. Individuals, abortion clinic bombers, or groups, like the Vietcong in the 1960s, can be understood as choosing terrorism because they don't like the current organization of society and they want to change it.

Left-wing revolutionary groups have included the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Brigade in Italy, and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) terrorist guerrillas in Peru. Bomb attacks in Italy in 1980 and the UK in 1999 have been attributed to right-wing elements.

Distinctions between political and ethnic terrorism are not clear cut, and some separatist groups are influenced by, or receive support from, the left, despite being nationalists. Terrorism in an outlying region or colony is often assumed to be separatist in its logic, though for instance ‘loyalist’ terrorists have been opposed to the exclusion of Northern Ireland from the UK.

Left-wing political terrorism has, on occasion, provoked retaliation by right-wing paramilitaries seeking to defend the status quo. This has occurred, for example, in Colombia, with the activities of the leftist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN; National Liberation Army) leading to terrorist atrocities by the rightist United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).

In modern Western societies, terrorism is also increasingly associated with vehemently anti-government populist and ultra-right militias, particularly in the USA, driven by a nihilist brand of fanaticism.

Ethnic

Terrorist acts are sometimes carried out by an ethnic majority targeting a minority ruling class, such as in South Africa, the former Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe), and Palestine. Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation and anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia are both examples of an ethnic majority opposing colonial rule. Terrorist organizations that represent the interests of an ethnic group in a particular region, for example the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) extremists in northwest Spain and the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka, are often separatist (though they may also be anti-separatist).

Terrorists representing ethnic groups or peoples have included Palestinians (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), Kurdish, Kosovan Albanian, and Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland.

Terrorist acts are sometimes carried out by an ethnic majority targeting a minority ruling class, such as in South Africa, the former Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe), and Palestine. Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation and anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia are both examples of an ethnic majority opposing colonial rule. Terrorist organizations that represent the interests of an ethnic group in a particular region, for example the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) extremists in northwest Spain and the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka, are often separatist (though they may also be anti-separatist).

Strategic

Saying that a group has a strategic cause for using terrorism is another way of saying that terrorism isn't a random or crazy choice, but is chosen as a tactic in service of a larger goal. Hamas, for example, uses terrorist tactics, but not out of a random desire to fire rockets at Israeli Jewish civilians. Instead, they seek to leverage violence (and cease fires) in order to gain specific concessions related to their goals vis-a-vis Israel and Fatah. Terrorism is typically described as a strategy of the weak seeking to gain advantge against stronger armies or political powers.

Psychological (Individual)

Research into the psychological causes that take the individual as their focus began in the 1970s. It had its roots in the 19th century, when criminologists began to look for the psychological causes of criminals. Although this area of inquiry is couched in academically neutral terms, it can disguise the pre-existing view that terrorists are "deviants." There is a substantial body of theory that now concludes that individual terrorists are no more or less likely to have abnormal pathology. (See below the continuation).

Group Psychology / Sociological

Sociological and social psychology views of terrorism make the case that groups, not individuals, are the best way to explain social phenomena such as terrorism. These ideas, which are still gaining traction, are congruent with the late-20th century trend toward seeing society and organizations in terms of networks of individuals. This view also shares common ground with studies of authoritarianism and cult behavior that examine how individuals come to identify so strongly with a group that they lose individual agency.

Socio-Economic

Socio-economic explanations of terrorism suggest that various forms of deprivation drive people to terrorism, or that they are more susceptible to recruitment by organizations using terrorist tactics. Poverty, lack of education or lack of political freedom are a few examples. There is suggestive evidence on both sides of the argument. Comparisons of different conclusions are often very confusing because they don't distinguish between individuals and societies, and they pay little attention to the nuances of how people perceive injustice or deprivation, regardless of their material circumstances.

Religious

Career terrorism experts began to argue in the 1990s that a new form of terrorism fueled by religious fervor was on the rise. They pointed to organizations such as Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo (a Japanese cult) and Christian identity groups. Religious ideas, such as martyrdom, and Armageddon, were seen as particularly dangerous. However, as thoughtful studies and commentators have repeatedly pointed out, such groups use selectively interpret and exploit religious concepts and texts to support terrorism. Religions themselves do not "cause" terrorism.

Islamic fundamentalism is a key stimulus of terrorist activity in the early 21st century, centred in Asia and the Middle East, but at times with a global reach, as highlighted on 11 September 2001 with the terrorist destruction of New York's World Trade Center. Osama bin Laden, whose al-Qaeda network has links with other Islamic terrorist groups, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, is regarded as one of the key masterminds behind current Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. His primary target is the USA, with a key goal being removal of US military forces from the Gulf area. Bin Laden is said to represent a new breed of ‘stateless’ terrorist. In Algeria, the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) and Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS) have been behind more than a decade of bloody unrest, punctuated by terrorist atrocities

Systematic violence used to press a single-issue, such as anti-abortionism or animal rights, cause can also be seen as terrorism. In many instances of terrorist actions these motivations overlap.

Personal psychological causes to become a terrorist

The psychological causes of terrorism have been a topic of interest to researchers since the 1970s, when they began trying to create psychological profiles of terrorists. Their task has been an uphill battle, since most terrorists are not available for psychological testing. Nevertheless, some relatively major studies have been produced.

Overall, the results of this handful of studies are inconclusive. It only takes a little poking to see that researchers in different periods are working with different definitions of terrorism. Also, until recently there hasn't been much attention paid to the different roles that people play in a terrorist group. People who found, lead, or drive a group forward intellectually or strategically are likely to be different sorts than those that follow. In the first studies, you can also see shadows of similar studies of criminals generally, as well as a view that has held sway since Victorian times of violent criminals as social deviants.