Case study

Background to the incident

A 30,000 deadweight tons bulk carrier was time chartered into a service carrying to carry bulk grain from North America to Europe. The time charterers sub-chartered the vessel on a time charter basis to carry steel and containers Westbound across the Atlantic.

Under the sub-charter the vessel loaded in one Northern European port:

• steel coils in holds 1,2,3 and 5

• in hold number 4 a mix of twenty-eight 20 foot and 40 foot containers were loaded in a stack in the hatch square.

On passing Lands End, at the extreme Western tip of England, at 2000 hrs.the vessel started to encounter a Westerly swell coming in from the Atlantic. The vessel started to roll and pitch. At 2130 hrs there was a loud crashing sound. The master was called to the bridge. The third mate and chief officer were sent to investigate. In number 4 hold they found that the stack of containers had fallen over to starboard. Two large pieces of machinery parts from some containers were moving violently between the collapsed stack and crashing into the ships side.

Upon reporting the situation to the master, fearing for the safety of ship and cargo, the decision was taken to divert to the port of Cork, on the South coast of Ireland, as a port of refuge. A note of protest was lodged and General Average declared upon arrival Cork.

Because of lack of suitable facilities in Cork, the collapsed stack and loose machinery parts were secured and the vessel proceeded to Liverpool where suitable cranes and labour was available to remove the collapsed containers and their contents.

G.A. adjusters were appointed and G.A. security was obtained from cargo interests. The offloading and remedial steps to get the containerised cargo reconditioned and put back on board took three weeks. General Average expenditure amounted to a figure close to U.S. $400,000. Particular Average damage to the cargo was quantified at more than U.S. $1,500,000.

A number of the individual cargo owners presented their damage and loss claims to the shipowner, as carrier under the bills of lading, and also challenged their obligation to contribute to the General Average expenditure.

Consideration of relevant evidence

Expert surveyors were appointed in Liverpool to oversee the removal of the collapsed stow of containers, the reconditioning of the cargo and the reloading where possible. They re-coded and quantified the extent of damage to individual containers and their contents. The surveyors also conducted an investigation to try and establish why the stack had collapsed. Their written reports were backed up with numerous photographs.

Maritime solicitors were instructed to interview the master, and other ship staff, and to generally work alongside the surveyors to investigate the reason why the stack collapsed.

The surveyors established that the containers had been loaded into a stack with almost no securing. There was no securing of any description to the tank top of the hold. There were no twist locks or bridging pieces to lock the containers together. The only securing were four chains at each end of the stack, each with a breaking strain of 20 tonnes. The chains connected the top most corner of the upper most container to the bottom corner casting of the lower most container at the extreme ends of the stack. The total stack weight was in the region of 500 tonnes.

From interviews with the master and chief officer (C/ O) it transpired that:

• Both the master and C/O were very experienced bulk carrier people.

• Neither the master or C/O had ever carried containers before.

• Neither the master or C/O had ever been involved in a serious incident previously.

• They were both concerned about the adequacy of the lashings and securing of the container stack at the load-port.

• A sub-charterers supercargo insisted that he had been loading containers into bulk carriers in this manner for 12 years and had never encountered a problem.

• The super-cargo’s claim was apparently confirmed by the stevedore foreman.

• Although unhappy with the situation the master conceded to the apparent superior knowledge of the super-cargo and sailed.

Outcome

From an analysis of all the evidence it was agreed by the P&I Clubs involved, and their respective members, that:

• The vessel was probably unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage on account of the inadequate stowage and securing of the containers in hold number 4.

• The seaworthiness of the vessel was probably compromised on account of the lack of experience of the master and C/O with the carriage of containers.

• The sub-charterers were complicit in the inadequate stowage and securing of the containers through the actions of their super-cargo and appointed stevedores.

• The head charterers had to accept some responsibility towards the shipowners under the terms of the head charterparty on account of the activities of their sub-charterers.

An agreement was therefore reached to settle the cargo claims on the best possible terms out of court and also to concede any G.A. contributions that were being withheld by cargo interests.

Both the master and the chief officer were so badly affected by the incident that neither of them returned to their seagoing career.