Annex to Article 66

1.A list of conciliators consisting of qualified jurists shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. To this end, every State which is a Member of the United Nations or a party to the present Convention shall be invited to nominate two conciliators, and the names of the persons so nominated shall constitute the list. The term of a conciliator, including that of any conciliator nominated to fill a casual vacancy, shall be five years and may be renewed. A conciliator whose term expires shall continue to fulfil any function for which he shall have been chosen under the following paragraph.

2.When a request has been made to the Secretary-General under article 66, the Secretary-General shall bring the dispute before a conciliation commission constituted as follows:

The State or States constituting one of the parties to the dispute shall appoint:

(a)one conciliator of the nationality of that State or of one of those States, who may or may not be chosen from the list referred to in paragraph 1; and

(b)one conciliator not of the nationality of that State or of any of those States, who shall be chosen from the list.

The State or States constituting the other party to the dispute shall appoint two conciliators in the same way. The four conciliators chosen by the parties shall be appointed within sixty days following the date on which the Secretary-General receives the request.

The four conciliators shall, within sixty days following the date of the last of their own appointments, appoint a fifth conciliator chosen from the list, who shall be chairman.

If the appointment of the chairman or of any of the other conciliators has not been made within the period prescribed above for such appointment, it shall be made by the Secretary-General within sixty days following the expiry of that period. The appointment of the chairman may be made by the Secretary-General either from the list or from the membership of the International Law Commission. Any

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of the periods within which appointments must be made may be extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute.

Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.

3.The Conciliation Commission shall decide its own procedure. The Commission, with the consent of the parties to the dispute, may invite any party to the treaty to submit to it its views orally or in writing. Decisions and recommendations of the Commission shall be made by a majority vote of the five members.

4.The Commission may draw the attention of the parties to the dispute to any measures which might facilitate an amicable settlement.

5.The Commission shall hear the parties, examine the claims and objections, and make proposals to the parties with a view to reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute.

6.The Commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. Its report shall be deposited with the Secretary-General and transmitted to the parties to the dispute. The report of the Commission, including any conclusions stated therein regarding the facts or questions of law, shall not be binding upon the parties and it shall have no other character than that of recommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute.

7.The Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with such assistance and facilities as it may require. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the United Nations.

ANNEXE

1.Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies dresse et tient une liste de conciliateurs composée de juristes qualifiés. A cette fin, tout Etat Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ou Partie à la présente Convention est invité à désigner deux conciliateurs et les noms des personnes ainsi désignées composeront la liste. La désignation des conciliateurs, y compris ceux qui sont désignés pour remplir une vacance fortuite, est faite pour une période de cinq ans renouvelable. A l’expiration de la période pour laquelle ils auront été désignés, les conciliateurs continueront à exercer les fonctions pour lesquelles ils auront été choisis conformément au paragraphe suivant.

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2.Lorsqu’une demande est soumise au Secrétaire général conformément à l’article 66, le Secrétaire général porte le di érend devant une commission de conciliation composée comme suit.

L’Etat ou les Etats constituant une des Parties au di érend nomment:

a)Un conciliateur de la nationalité de cet Etat ou de l’un de ces Etats, choisi ou non sur la liste visée au paragraphe 1 ; et

b)Un conciliateur n’ayant pas la nationalité de cet Etat ou de l’un de ces Etats, choisi sur la liste.

L’Etat ou les Etats constituant l’autre Partie au di érend nomment deux conciliateurs de la même manière. Les quatre conciliateurs choisis par les Parties doivent être nommés dans un délai de soixante jours à compter de la date à laquelle le Secrétaire général reçoit la demande.

Dans les soixante jours qui suivent la dernière nomination, les quatre conciliateurs en nomment un cinquième, choisi sur la liste, qui sera président.

Si la nomination du président ou de l’un quelconque des autres conciliateurs n’intervient pas dans le délai prescrit ci-dessus pour cette nomination, elle sera faite par le Secrétaire général dans les soixante jours qui suivent l’expiration de ce délai. Le Secrétaire général peut désigner comme président soit l’une des personnes inscrites sur la liste, soit un des membres de la Commission du droit international. L’un quelconque des délais pour lesquels les nominations doivent être faites peut être prorogé par accord des Parties au di érend.

Toute vacance doit être remplie de la façon spécifiée pour la nomination initiale.

3.La Commission de conciliation arrête elle-même sa procédure. La Commission, avec le consentement des Parties au di érend, peut inviter toute Partie au traité à lui soumettre ses vues oralement ou par écrit. Les décisions et les recommandations de la Commission sont adoptées à la majorité des voix de ses cinq membres.

4.La Commission peut signaler à l’attention des Parties au di érend toute mesure susceptible de faciliter un règlement amiable.

5.La Commission entend les Parties, examine les prétentions et les objections et fait des propositions aux Parties en vue de les aider à parvenir à un règlement amiable du di érend.

6.La Commission fait rapport dans les douze mois qui suivent sa constitution. Son rapport est déposé auprès du Secrétaire général et communiqué aux parties au di érend. Le rapport de la Commission, y compris toutes conclusions y figurant sur les faits ou sur les points de droit, ne lie pas les Parties et n’est rien de plus que l’énoncé de recommandations soumises à l’examen des parties en vue de faciliter un règlement amiable du di érend.

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7.Le Secrétaire général fournit à la Commission l’assistance et les facilités dont elle peut avoir besoin. Les dépenses de la Commission sont supportées par l’Organisation des Nations Unies.

ANHANG

1.Der Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen erstellt und führt ein Verzeichnis qualifizierter Juristen als Vermittler. Zu diesem Zweck wird jeder Staat, der Mitglied der Vereinten Nationen oder Vertragspartei dieses Übereinkommens ist, ersucht, zwei Vermittler zu ernennen; die Namen der so Ernannten bilden das Verzeichnis. Die Vermittler, einschließlich der zur zeitweiligen Stellvertretung berufenen, werden für fünf Jahre ernannt; die Ernennung kann erneuert werden. Nach Ablauf der zeit, für welche die Vermittler ernannt worden sind, nehmen diese weiterhin die Aufgaben wahr, für die sie nach Absatz 2 ausgewählt wurden.

2.Ist nach Artikel 66 ein Antrag beim Generalsekretär gestellt worden, so legt dieser die Streitigkeit einer Vergleichskommission vor, die sich wie folgt zusammensetzt:

Der Staat oder die Staaten, die eine der Streitparteien bilden, bestellen:

a)einen Vermittler mit der Staatsangehörigkeit dieses Staates oder eines dieser Staaten, der aus dem in Absatz 1 genannten Verzeichnis ausgewählt werden kann, sowie

b)einen Vermittler, der nicht die Staatsangehörigkeit dieses Staates oder eines dieser Staaten besitzt und der aus dem Verzeichnis auszuwählen ist.

Der oder die Staaten, welche die andere Streitpartei bilden, bestellen in derselben Weise zwei Vermittler. Die von den Parteien ausgewählten vier Vermittler sind innerhalb von sechzig Tagen zu bestellen, nachdem der Antrag beim Generalsekretär eingegangen ist.

Die vier Vermittler bestellen innerhalb von sechzig Tagen, nachdem der letzte von ihnen bestellt wurde, einen fünften Vermittler zum Vorsitzenden, der aus dem Verzeichnis auszuwählen ist.

Wird der Vorsitzende oder ein anderer Vermittler nicht innerhalb der oben hiefür vorgeschriebenen Frist bestellt, so wird er innerhalb von sechzig Tagen nach Ablauf der genannten Frist vom Generalsekretär bestellt. Der Generalsekretär kann eine der im Verzeichnis eingetragenen Personen oder ein Mitglied der Völkerrechtskommission zum Vorsitzenden ernennen. Sämtliche Fristen, innerhalb derer die Bestellungen vorzunehmen sind, können durch Vereinbarung zwischen den Streitparteien verlängert werden.

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Wird die Stelle eines Vermittlers frei, so ist sie nach dem für die ursprüngliche Bestellung vorgeschriebenen Verfahren zu besetzen.

3.Die Vergleichskommission beschliesst ihr Verfahren. Mit Zustimmung der Streitparteien kann die Kommission jede Vertragspartei einladen, ihr ihre Ansichten schriftlich oder mündlich darzulegen. Entscheidungen und Empfehlungen der Kommission bedürfen der Mehrheit der fünf Mitglieder.

4.Die Kommission kann den Streitparteien Maßnahmen aufzeigen, die eine gütliche Beilegung erleichtern könnten.

5.Die Kommission hört die Parteien, prüft die Ansprüche und Einwendungen und macht den Parteien Vorschläge mit dem Ziel einer gütlichen Beilegung der Streitigkeit.

6.Die Kommission erstattet innerhalb von zwölf Monaten nach ihrer Einsetzung Bericht. Der Bericht wird an den Generalsekretär gerichtet und den Streitparteien übermittelt. Der Bericht der Kommission, einschließlich der darin niedergelegten Schlussfolgerungen über Tatsachen oder in Rechtsfragen, bindet die Parteien nicht und hat nur den Charakter von Empfehlungen, die den Parteien zur Prüfung vorgelegt werden, um eine gütliche Beilegung der Streitigkeit zu erleichtern.

7.Der Generalsekretär gewährt der Kommission jede Unterstützung und stellt ihr alle Einrichtungen zur Verfügung, derer sie bedarf. Die Kosten der Kommission werden von den Vereinten Nationen getragen.

Materials: see the materials mentioned in Article 66.

Selected Literature (in addition to the literature mentioned in Articles 65 and 66, q.v.): M.J. Aznar-Gómez, Annexe, in: Corten/Klein (eds.) 2881 .

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		CONTENTS
			Paras.
A. History ................................................................................................			1
B. Interpretation of the Annex ............................................................			2
1.	Scope ................................................................................................		2
2.	List of Conciliators (Para. 1) .............................................................		3
3.	Setting Up the Conciliation Commission (Para. 2) ...........................		6
	a)	Role of States Parties ...................................................................	7
	b)	Role of the UN Secretary-General ...............................................	11
4.	Procedure (Para. 3) ...........................................................................		13
5.	Amicable Settlement (Paras. 4–5) .....................................................		15
6.	Conciliation Commission’s Report (Para. 6) .....................................		16
7.	Assistance and Facilities (Para. 7) ......................................................		19

C.Reservations (see Article 66, N. 11)

A. HISTORY
At the Vienna Conference in 1968/1969 States could not agree on a compul-	1
sory procedure for the settlement of disputes under Part V of the Conven-
tion. Article 66 and its Annex together with a Resolution Relating to Article
66 and the Annex (q.v.) were adopted as part of a package deal to overcome
the deadlock (Article 66, N. 1).
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE ANNEX
1. Scope
The Annex sets up a system of conciliation to be undertaken by a Com-	2
mission of fi ve Conciliators.1 Its proposals are not binding, but require
acceptance by the parties (N. 18).2 The Annex constitutes an integral part of,
and complements, the procedure in Article 66, para. (b) (q.v., N. 10) which
is open to “any one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application
or the interpretation of any of the other articles in Part V of the present

1 See generally, R.L. Bindschedler, Conciliation and Mediation, EPIL 1 (1992) 721 .

2Reflecting the basic rule of conciliation embodied in Article XXIII of the 1899 First Hague Convention, and Article XLIV of the 1907 First Hague Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Rosenne, Developments 316.

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Convention”, i.e., mainly under Articles 46–52 and 54–63 (Article 66, N. 10). This procedure must be distinguished from the procedure for disputes on jus cogens in Article 66, para. (a) (q.v., N. 6–9), leading to arbitration or a decision of the Court.

The Annex, like Articles 65–68, does not constitute jus cogens, and the parties are free to agree to di erent procedures under di erent conditions (Article 65, N. 22)—i.e., no longer within the framework of the Annex.3

2. List of Conciliators (Para. 1)

3The Annex in its para. 1 contemplates a list of conciliators consisting of qualified jurists which shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secre- tary-General of the United Nations.4 It transpires from the UN SecretaryGeneral’s list of conciliators that a large number of the original nominations of conciliators have not been renewed.5

4Para. 1 addresses all States, whether or not a Member of the United Nations or a party to the present Convention. Thus, every State shall be invited to nominate two conciliators, and the names of the persons so nominated shall constitute the list (italics added).

5Para. 1 further regulates the terms of o ce of the conciliators. In particular, the term of a conciliator, including that of any conciliator nominated to fill a casual vacancy, shall be five years and may be renewed. A conciliator whose term expires shall continue to fulfill any function for which he shall have been chosen under the following paragraph.

3. Setting Up the Conciliation Commission (Para. 2)

6The Annex does not provide for a permanent Conciliation Commission. Rather, a new Commission is set up whenever a request has been made to the Secretary-General under Article 66, in particular its para. (b) (q.v., N. 10). Then, the Secretary-General shall bring the dispute before a Conciliation Commission which is to be constituted as follows.

a) Role of States Parties

7Para. 2 enables the States parties to the dispute themselves to set up the Conciliation Commission, each party appointing a priori two conciliators.

3 Rosenne, ibid. 315.

4T he concept of a pre-established list is not new, being found in the arrangements of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Rosenne, Developments 313.

5Source: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the UN Secretary-General (ST/LEG/SER. E/. . .).

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These two conciliators (or at least one of the two) are drawn from within the list (N. 3–5) and, if necessary, from outside. Strict equality is maintained, providing for a certain closeness between the parties, the dispute and the Commission.6

In particular, the State or States constituting one of the parties to the dispute shall appoint: one conciliator of the nationality of that State or of one of those States, who may or may not be chosen from the list referred to in paragraph 1 (subpara. 2[a]); and one conciliator not of the nationality of that State or of any of those States, who shall be chosen from the list (subpara. 2[b]). Incidentally, it follows here that a “State party” in the Annex and in Articles 65–67 may comprise one or more States.

Similarly, the State or States constituting the other party to the dispute shall appoint two conciliators in the same way.

As a time-limit, para. 2 provides that the four conciliators chosen by the	8
parties shall be appointed within sixty days following the date on which
the Secretary-General receives the request.
Once the four conciliators have been determined, the Chairman of the Com-	9
mission shall be appointed as follows: the four conciliators shall, within sixty
days following the date of the last of their own appointments, appoint a
fifth conciliator chosen from the list (N. 3–5), who shall be chairman.
Finally, any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial	10
appointment.
b) Role of the UN Secretary-General
Para. 2 foresees the role of the UN Secretary-General to avoid a stalemate	11
caused by one of the parties procrastinating.7 Thus, if the appointment

of the chairman or of any of the other conciliators has not been made within the period prescribed above for such appointment, it shall be made by the Secretary-General within sixty days following the expiry of that period. Of course, there is always the possibility (N. 2) that any of the

6Bindschedler of the Swiss delegation criticised the possibility of choosing conciliators from outside the list, OR 1969 CoW 269, para. 16. Thus, “experience showed that any conciliator . . . appointed by one of the parties to a dispute almost invariably espoused the cause of that party; nationality had little or no influence. He had knowledge of hundreds of cases of conciliation and arbitration and only knew of two in which a conciliator or an arbitrator had voted against the country appointing him. In such circumstances, it would inevitably be the fifth member of the proposed conciliation commission which would decide on the dispute”. To this, Blix of the Swedish delegation replied at ibid. 272 f, para. 49, that “the chairman [of the Conciliation Commission] did not deliver judgment, but merely acted as the central member of a group which must co-operate to have any chance

of success”.

7 Rozakis, Concept 179.

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periods within which appointments must be made may be extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute.

12As regards the candidates, para. 2 provides that the appointment of the chairman may be made by the Secretary-General either from the list (N. 3–5) or from the membership of the International Law Commission.

Rosenne has pointed out that the qualifications required for ILC members do not necessarily correspond with those required for chairmanship of a Conciliation Commission. Moreover, it is not clear to him whether the term “membership” refers solely to actual members of the ILC when the appointment has to be made, or also to retired ILC members.8 In respect of the latter point, however, it is respectfully submitted that para. 2, when referring to an ILC-member (“un des membres”), means exactly that, i.e., a present rather than a past member.

4. Procedure (Para. 3)

13Para. 3 provides that the Conciliation Commission shall decide its own procedure. This should include a procedure on provisional measures in order to avoid irreparable damage.9 Obviously, the procedure must ensure strict equality between the parties to the dispute and provide for the basic guarantees of a fair hearing, thereby approaching the standards of a judicial procedure.10

In particular, the Commission shall hear the parties and examine the claims and objections (para. 5).11 It follows from para. 6 (N. 17) that the Commission may establish the facts and examine the law.12 According to para. 3, all decisions and recommendations of the Commission shall be made by a majority vote of the five members, i.e., by three members.13

The conciliators are not limited to relying on existing international law, but may also make their conclusions ex aequo et bono. Such proposals appear particularly suitable to disputes involving delicate political issues—arising for instance out of the clausula rebus sic stantibus (Article 62, q.v.).14

14Para. 3 envisages in particular that the Commission may invite any party to the treaty to submit to it its views orally or in writing. However, this requires the consent of the parties to the dispute.

Four conclusions may be drawn from the above: (i) States parties to the dispute must agree on other treaty parties participating in the proceedings; (ii) States beyond the

8 Developments 313.

9 See the statement in Vienna by the Dutch delegation, OR 1969 CoW 304, para. 53.

10Kearney, AJIL 64 (1970) 554; Elias, RC 134 (1971 III) 404.

11T he term “objections” corresponds with the term employed in Article 65, para. 2 (q.v., N. 14); see Rosenne, Developments 316.

12Kearney, AJIL 64 (1970) 554.

13Capotorti, RC 134 (1971 III) 581.

14R.L. Bindschedler, Conciliation and Mediation, EPIL 1 (1992) 722.

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circle of treaty parties (e.g., other States parties to the Convention) may not be invited; (iii) other States parties to the treaty need themselves not be parties to the Convention; and (iv) even if the States parties so request, it remains within the discretion of the Conciliation Commission—as master of the proceedings—whether or not to hear these further States.15

5. Amicable Settlement (Paras. 4–5)
According to para. 4, the Commission may draw the attention of the par-	15
ties to the dispute to any measures which might facilitate an amicable
settlement. The latter constitutes a noble task for any body aiming at resolving
a dispute.16 Para. 4 is complemented by para. 5 which envisages, inter alia,
an active role by the Conciliation Commission, namely that it shall make
proposals to the parties with a view to reaching an amicable settlement
of the dispute.
6. Conciliation Commission’s Report (Para. 6)
Para. 6 relates to the findings of the Conciliation Commission. Thus, the	16
Commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. Its
report shall be deposited with the Secretary-General and transmitted to
the parties to the dispute.17 (These functions are independent of Article 77,
N. 11.) The report is final; unless the parties otherwise agree (N. 1), there
remains no other means of settlement of disputes which a party may unilater-
ally employ. Para. 6 does not address the question whether or not the Report
should be made public.18
Para. 6 leaves the content of the report completely open, in particular,	17
whether or not it will include any conclusions regarding the facts or
questions of law.
Most importantly, the report of the Commission shall not be binding	18
upon the parties and it shall have no other character than that of recom-

mendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute.19 However, even if not binding, the Commission’s authoritative and well-reasoned report may serve

15On this, see Rosenne, Developments 315.

16T his was considered “self-evident” in Vienna by Yasseen, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, OR 1969 Plenary 133.

17T he Secretary-General does not receive the Commission’s Report in exercise of his depositary functions according to Article 77 (q.v.), Rosenne Developments 316.

18But see Capotorti, RC 134 (1971 III) 581.

19For Kearney, AJIL 64 (1070) 553 f, the emphasis in para 6 on the non-binding nature of the report “may have been influenced . . . also by the cultural antipathy to formal adjudication that is a feature of a number of Asian and African societies”.

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as a solid term of reference in any subsequent diplomatic arrangement and as a “strong weapon” in the hands of the party most favoured by it.20 The parties may agree to be bound by the report.

If, however, the Commission finds that the claim of the applying party is unfounded, then pacta sunt servanda, and the treaty continues in force (Article 66, N. 8).21

7. Assistance and Facilities (Para. 7)

19According to para. 7, the Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with such assistance and facilities as it may require. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the United Nations. In this respect, the Conference in Vienna adopted a separate Resolution to Article 66 and the Annex (q.v., N. 2), seeking approval from the UN General Assembly.

C. RESERVATIONS

(see Article 66, N. 11)

20Rozakis, Concept 181; Fischer/Köck N. 278 (“gewisser moralischer Druck”); Capotorti, RC 134 (1971 III) 581 (“exercer une influence considérable”). But see Sinclair, Vienna Convention 233 (“a report favourable to the State having asserted a ground of invalidity or termination would prima facie justify that State in going ahead with the measure proposed”).

21Kearney, AJIL 64 (1970) 555; Ch. de Visscher, Cours général de droit international public, RC 136 (1972 II) 93 (“la présomption de la validité du traité subsistera”).

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