Question of the Stationing of u.N.E.F. On Both Sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line

87. Another point having significance with respect to the undertakings of Egypt is the question of the stationing of U.N.E.F. on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. The Secretary General, in his report on 24 January 1957 to the General Assembly (ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Document A-3512), suggested that the force should have units stationed also on the Israel side of the armistice demarcation line. In particular, he suggested that units of the force should at least be stationed in the El Auja demilitarized zone. (Article VIII of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement provides, inter alia, that an area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in the article, shall be demilitarized and that both Egyptian and Israel armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom. The article further provides that on the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila which had been occupied by the armed forces of Israel.) He indicated that if El Auja were demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and units of U.N.E.F. were stationed there, a condition of reciprocity would be the Egyptian assurance that Egyptian forces would not take up positions in the area in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Document A-3512, paras. 15-22.) However, Israel forces were never withdrawn from El Auja and U.N.E.F. was not accepted at any point on the Israel side of the line.

88. Following the Secretary General's report, the General Assembly on 2 February 1957 adopted Resolution 1125 (XI), in which it noted the report with appreciation and considered:

'... that, after withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area.'

89. On 11 February 1957, the Secretary General stated in a report to the General Assembly that, in the light of the implication of Israel's question concerning the stationing of U.N.E.F. at Shann el-Sheikh (see paragraph 84 above), he 'considered it important ... to learn whether Israel itself, in principle, consents to a stationing of U.N.E.F. units on its territory in implementation of the functions established for the force in the basic decisions and noted in Resolution 1125 (XI), where it was indicated that the force should be placed "on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line." ' (Ibid., Document A-3527, para. 5.) No affirmative response was ever received from Israel. In fact, already on 7 November 1956 the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion, in a speech to the Knesset, stated, inter alia, 'On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory or in any of the territories occupied by her.' In a note to correspondents of 12 April 1957 a 'United Nations spokesman' stated:

'Final arrangements for the U.N.E.F. will have to wait for the response of the Government of Israel to the request by the General Assembly that the force be deployed also on the Israeli side of the armistice demarcation line.'

90. In a report dated 9 October 1957 to the 12th session of the General Assembly (ibid., Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, Document A-3694, para. 15), the Secretary General stated:

'Resolution 1125 (XI) calls for placing the Force "on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line", but no stationing of U.N.E.F. on the Israel side has occurred to date through lack of consent by Israel.'

91. In the light of Israel's persistent refusal to consent to the stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on its side of the line in spite of General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 and the efforts of the Secretary General, it is even less possible to consider that Egypt's 'good faith' declaration made in November 1956 could constitute a limitation of its rights with respect to the continued stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on Egyptian territory in accordance with the Resolution of 2 February 1957.

92. The representative of Israel stated at the 592nd meeting of the General Assembly, on 23 November 1956:

'If we were to accept one of the proposals made here - namely that the force should separate Egyptian and Israel troops for as long as Egypt thought it convenient and should then be withdrawn on Egypt's unilateral request - we would reach a reduction to absurdity. Egypt would then be in a position to build up, behind the screen of this force, its full military preparations and, when it felt that those military preparations had reached their desired climax, to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Force and to stand again in close contact and proximity with the territory of Israel. This reduction to absurdity proves how impossible it is to accept in any matter affecting the composition or the functions of the force the policies of the Egyptian Government as the sole or even the decisive criterion.' (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 592nd meeting, para. 131.)

93. The answer to this problem which is to be found in Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 is not in the form of a binding commitment by Egypt which the record shows was never given, but in the proposal that the force should be stationed on both sides of the line. Israel in the exercise of its sovereign right did not give its consent to the stationing of U.N.E.F. on its territory and Egypt did not forgo its sovereign right to withdraw its consent at any time.