The 'Good Faith' Aide-Mémoire of 20 November 1956

71. There remains to be examined whether any commitments were made by Egypt which would limit its pre-existing right to withdraw its consent at any time that it chose to do so. The only basis for asserting such limitation could be the so-called 'good faith' aide-mémoire which was set out as an annex to a report of the Secretary General submitted to the General Assembly on 20 November 1956.

72. The Secretary General himself did not offer any interpretation of the 'good faith' aide-mémoire to the General Assembly or make any statement questioning the remarks made by the Foreign Minister of Egypt in the General Assembly the following week (see paragraph 74 below). It would appear, however, that in an exchange of cables lie had sought to obtain the express acknowledgement from Egypt that its consent to the presence of the force would not be withdrawn before the force had completed its task. Egypt did not accept this interpretation but held to the view that if its consent was no longer maintained the force should be withdrawn. Subsequent discussions between Mr. Hammarskjold and President Nasser resulted in the 'good faith' aide-mémoire.

73. An interpretative account of these negotiations made by Mr. Hammarskjold in a personal and private paper entitled 'aide-mémoire,' dated 5 August 1957, some eight and a half months after the discussions, has recently been made public by a private person who has a copy. It is understood that Mr. Hammarskjold often prepared private notes concerning significant events under the heading 'aide-mémoire.' This memorandum is not in any official record of the United Nations nor is it in any of the official files. The General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. and the Government of Egypt were not informed of its contents or existence. It is not an official paper and has no standing beyond being a purely private memorandum of unknown purpose or value, in which Secretary General Hammarskjold seems to record his own impressions and interpretations of his discussions with President Nasser. This paper, therefore, cannot affect in any way the basis for the presence of U.N.E.F. on the soil of the United Arab Republic as set out in the official documents, much less supersede those documents.

Position of Egypt

74. It seems clear that Egypt did not understand the 'good faith' aide-mémoire to involve any limitation on its right to withdraw its consent to the continued stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on its territory. The Foreign Minister of Egypt, speaking in the General Assembly on 27 November 1956, one week after the publication of the 'good faith' aide-mémoire and three days following its approval by the General Assembly, said:

'We still believe that the General Assembly Resolution of 7 November 1956 still stands, together with its endorsement of the principle that the General Assembl y could not request the United Nations Emergency Force to be stationed or to operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of the country. This is the proper basis on which we believe, together with the overwhelming majority of this Assembly, that the United Nations Emergency Force could be stationed or could operate in Egypt. It is the only basis on which Egypt has given its consent in this respect.' (Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 597th meeting, para. 48.)

He then added:

'... as must be abundantly clear, this force has gone to Egypt to help Egypt, with Egypt's consent; and no one here or elsewhere can reasonably or fairly say that a fire brigade, after putting out a fire, would be entitled or expected to claim the right of deciding not to leave the house.' (Ibid., para. 50.)