- •We’re then going to look at moves in both Western and Eastern Europe towards détente in the period
- •I will finally offer some conclusions.
- •Post-Cuba these pressures became stronger
- •There have been critical voices debating how real the thaw was or not
- •Still in general it was good that the Test Ban Treaty had been concluded – moves away from the idea of general ‘hot’ war between the two sides
- •De Gaulle’s policies linked to other Western European criticism of the cold war status quo
- •One final Western European policy which moved towards détente was the policy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt often called Ostpolitik (or Eastern policy)
- •Europe very important in the move towards détente then
- •A major breakthrough in ussr-Soviet relations came with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968
- •Whilst there were moves towards détente during this period there were also other important international events which limited these moves
- •If the Soviets moved away from good behaviour they were to be punished – this policy would be used to great effect with the Soviets but also with the Chinese, we will have a look at that a bit later.
- •From July 1963 the Soviets and the Chinese decided not to set a date for future relations – Sino-Soviet split
- •Mao’s cultural revolution from 1965-9 further increased the difference between the two powers –
- •In July 1971 it was announced that Richard Nixon would be visiting China – from a position of enmity to normalisation of diplomatic relations within a couple of years
- •Moscow summit – May 1972
De Gaulle’s policies linked to other Western European criticism of the cold war status quo
In the 1960s there had been strong disagreements within NATO. Britain found it hard, although not as hard as the French, to support American policy in Vietnam and they had been annoyed by disagreements over the financing of NATO troops in West Germany. Britain shouldered a lot of the cost regarding these troops and they argued that West Germany as a now wealthy country should support more of the cost.
Issues such as this (when combined with the moves of De Gaulle) made West Europeans question aspects of US dominance in Europe and move towards détente).
One clear example of this was the Harmel report of the end of 1966 for the NATO council of Ministers – Pierre Harmel was the Prime Minister of Belgium at the time and his report argued the case for détente
The report put forward two main policies: 1)the importance of strong Military security
2)Détente (only regarding western security) – NATO should provide the basis with which multilateral talks could be achieved with the Warsaw Pact
The report thus argued that Détente was a long-term policy to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement -= peaceful order in Europe to be achieved, shows they were willing to think about peace!
One final Western European policy which moved towards détente was the policy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt often called Ostpolitik (or Eastern policy)
-Between 1948 and 1961 we have seen how the German problem had been one of the central issues of the Cold War. West Germany would not recognise East Germany and the East had condemned the economic and military resuscitation of the East. A crucial central role in this division was the West German - Hallstein document – where they would not have any diplomatic relations with states that recognised East Germany.
However the building of the wall stablised East-West relations in August 1961 and from the middle of the 1960s a more favourable attitude arose in West Germany From 1966 onwards the West start to develop a policy of rapprochement towards the Soviet Bloc – West Germany began to worry about being isolated in the world.
Policy arose of Ostpolitik – proposed the abandoning of the Hallstein document, opening up trade, offering agreements which included the mutual renunciation of force.
The then (in 1966) Social Democratic foreign minister Willy Brandt argued for the gradual relaxation of tension with the East, instead of confrontation.
In 1967 and 1968 he established diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania
In 1969 Brandt became chancellor and signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (we will talk about it later) – stopped fears in the East of West German nuclear weapons.
He then made moves towards Moscow, in August 1970 Brandt signs treaty with USSR, renounces the use of force, increased financial and commercial ties and accepted the inviability of Europe’s borders (important due to the post-war border changes in Central Europe).
Brandt wouldn’t recognise East Germany but in December 1970 he recognised Post-war Poland’s boundaries (stops German revanchism) and kneels at the feet of the Warsaw Jewish memorial.
Finally in September 1971 he was able to sign a treaty with the four occupying powers of Germany – confirmed the status quo – and West German access to West Berlin. Dramatic advance on situation in 1961.
On the Eastern side there were also moves towards détente
The Hungarian revolution and crackdown of it had not defeated completely diversity in the Eastern bloc. Soviets wanted to crackdown completely but felt they couldn’t. So you had a mixture of diversity and Stalinism (Hungary – goulash communism), Poland thaw from 1956 onwards.
General move away from conformism in the Eastern bloc in the 1960s (aided to an extent by the moves of Mao against the Soviet Union – another major power that Eastern Europe could reach out to)
Move away from the Soviet Union to an extent – from some of the most conformist members of the Eastern bloc. Enver Hoxha the Stalinist dictator of Albania criticised Kruschev in 1960, Chinese aid prevented a Soviet blockade in 1961. USSR severed relations in 1961, Albania remained a part of the Warsaw Pact until 1968 – small, poor, country – no real need for Soviet intervention.
Worse problems for the Soviets in Romania – larger, more strategically significant, Romania was authoritarian at home but followed an increasingly independent foreign policy, helped by departure of Soviet troops in 1958. George Gheorghieu-Dej opposed Soviet policy in Cuba in 1963
Also opposition to the Soviet economic integration organisation Comecon. His successor Nicolae Ceauşescu took power in 1965 and moved further away from the Soviet Union, Eastern equivalent of Charles De Gaulle, assertive foreign policy, recognises West Germany, didn’t support the invasion of Cz/SK, moves outside of Warsaw Pact command structure – but stays in the Warsaw pact. So on both sides of the border were claims for a relaxation of the cold war – move away from USA and USSR dominance.
In Hungary there was also a move away from some of the strictness of the Stalinist years – this was highlighted byt the new head of the Hungarian Communist party under Janosz Kadar allows an element of private enterprise from 1963 onwards, in 1968 he introduced the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary where an element of competition and decentralisation was introduced.
One final important move for European détente was the fall of Kruschev in October 1964. Kruschev, had been overly confrontational in Berlin and Cuba, was replaced replaced as first Secretary of the Communist party by Leonid Brezhnev who was a very different figure. Brezhnev was cautious and unadventurous and he sought to share power with other leading Soviet politicians. The classic example of this is Brezhnev working with Alexei Kosygin (the Chairman of the Council of Ministers) Brezhnev and Kosygin aimed at peaceful coexistence and aimed to avoid US-Soviet confrontation. With B at the head the dangers of US-Soviet clashes were a lot less prevalent. He also supported détente in Europe.
In the late 1960s there was a general move towards détente as we have seen in Europe then, in 1969 – the Warsaw pact calls for Pan European security system, NATO seeks further cultural and information exchanges across the iron curtain, 1970 Warsaw pact says US and USSR could sit in on the talks NATO eventually agreed to a European Security conference