- •Contents
- •The big de-rating of 2018: what next?
- •16% median returns in year after de-rating
- •P/E has recouped ~30% of fall, ~40% of industry returns reversed
- •S&P 500 target of 3200, on EPS +7% in '19
- •S&P EPS forecast +7% in 2019 to $175, +4.3% in 2020
- •De-rating exceeded rise in rates, late cycle discount
- •Framing upside and downside using scenario analysis
- •Upside scenarios: de-escalation and US structural divergence
- •Downside scenarios: trade escalation, US recession, CBs behind curve
- •De-rating vs. key themes/drivers: what's priced?
- •At a style/factor level: quality, momentum and growth should lead at this stage, but they are not cheap
- •Sector, industry and style recommendations
- •Style and factor views: prefer quality, large over small, momentum+ growth over value strategically but tactically look for laggards
- •Stock baskets to capitalize on key themes
- •Market returns in perspective: what does history tells us?
- •Late cycle returns have been sizeable
- •ISM peak to midpoint (~52.5): ~9% type returns
- •ISM is a guidepost for sector and style investing
- •Leadership persists, losers lose big, dispersion rises
- •How is this cycle different? Fundamental drivers can persist
- •Protectionist pendulum is swinging
- •Leverage has shifted: watch small corporates
- •Consumer savings rate > prior cycle highs
- •Investment % of US GDP is below average
- •Margins are high, but productivity is not
- •No repatriation tax, dividends can jump
- •Financial conditions supportive: cycles end when rates > nominal GDP
- •Key themes: how to invest for 2019?
- •Respect the cycle: ISM as a guidepost for rotations
- •Margins will diverge: where are the relative opportunities?
- •Dividend growth to rise: look for high DPS growth, low payouts
- •Trade risks remain: account for potential impacts
- •Momentum persists: look for sustainable growth
- •Quality and FCF: should perform through cycle
- •C-Speak proprietary signal: where has corporate sentiment shifted?
- •Basket 2: High momentum + growth
- •Basket 3: Low momentum and slowing growth
- •Basket 4: Dividend growth upside
vk.com/id446425943
Market returns in perspective: what does history tells us?
Many investors have certain preconceived notions around equity returns, but history tells us some important insights. We try to use those insights to think about market returns for the year ahead.
10%+ returns have happened 60% of the time, while >10% declines have happened just 7% of the time.
Mid-single-digit returns happen 15% of the time (11/72 yrs). As growth slows, it is tempting to forecast mid-single digit returns, but it doesn't usually happen.
Earnings for a given year and that year's return have ZERO correlation; returns are 41% correlated to the earnings growth in the following year though. Returns are 77% correlated with changes in the multiple; part is anticipating next year's earnings growth (35% correlation to P/E changes).
Late cycle returns have been considerable; 29% average returns after curve hits zero. Since inflation has become less of an issue, the average S&P 500 return has been 15% when the ISM has gone from a peak to a mid-trough (52.5).
Leadership persists in terms of sectors and also stocks; in particular, losers tend to lose big. Accordingly, dispersion tends to rise at this phase of the cycle.
Figure 25: S&P 500 total returns by year
60% |
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10%+ returns have happened 60% of the time |
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50% |
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40% |
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30% |
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2-9% returns are |
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20% |
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rare |
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10% |
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0% |
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-10% |
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-20% |
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Brown = recession year |
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-30% |
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-40% |
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-50% |
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1954 |
1958 |
1995 |
1975 |
1997 |
1950 |
1980 |
2013 |
1985 |
1989 |
1955 |
1991 |
2003 |
1998 |
1961 |
2009 |
1967 |
1976 |
1951 |
1996 |
1963 |
1983 |
1982 |
2017 |
1999 |
1972 |
1952 |
1979 |
1986 |
1949 |
1964 |
1988 |
2012 |
2006 |
2010 |
1971 |
2014 |
1965 |
1959 |
2016 |
1968 |
2004 |
1993 |
1992 |
1956 |
1978 |
1984 |
2007 |
1948 |
1987 |
2005 |
1947 |
1970 |
2018 |
2011 |
2015 |
1994 |
1960 |
1953 |
1990 |
1981 |
1977 |
1969 |
1962 |
2000 |
1966 |
1957 |
2001 |
1973 |
2002 |
1974 |
2008 |
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Source: Haver, Bloomberg, UBS |
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Figure 26: S&P 500 annual returns and earnings growth |
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Figure 27: S&P 500 returns and changes in the P/E |
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45% |
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Y = S&P 500 annual returns |
45% |
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y = 0.59x + 0.07 |
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X = S&P 500 EPS annual growth |
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R² = 0.59 |
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30% |
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30% |
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15% |
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15% |
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0% |
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0% |
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-15% |
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y = -0.02x + 0.09 |
-15% |
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R² = 0.00 |
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Y = S&P 500 annual returns |
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-30% |
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ZERO correlation for |
-30% |
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annual returns and |
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X = S&P 500 P/E annual % change |
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-45% |
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EPS growth |
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-45% |
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-20% |
0% |
20% |
40% |
60% |
-45% |
-30% |
-15% |
0% |
15% |
30% |
45% |
60% |
Source: IBES, FactSet, Haver, Bloomberg, UBS |
Source: IBES, FactSet, Haver, Bloomberg, UBS |
US Equity Strategy 13 November 2018 |
17 |
vk.com/id446425943
Late cycle returns have been sizeable
It has been over nine years since the end of the 2008-09 recession and investors are becoming more focused on what the later stages of the business cycle will entail for equity markets. In particular, as the Fed raises rates and the curve gets closer to inverting, investors are thinking about recession risks on the horizon. We use the point at which the 10-2y spread hits zero to assess "late cycle" developments, which happened in Apr-68, Mar-73, Aug-78, Dec-88, May-98 and Dec-05.
As the UST curve is still flattening, we would point out that the S&P 500 has rallied an average of 15% in the 12 months before the 10-2y hits zero. S&P 500 returns have averaged 29% from the point that the curve inverts to the subsequent equity peak, which can be as early as 5 days and as late as 27 months from the inversion. Recessions on average start 21 months after inversion, with a range of 9-34 months. From a worst case perspective, S&P 500 drawdowns have been down 2343% from the point of inversion, though the S&P 500 never fell below inversion levels through 1978-1982 and 1988-1991.
Figure 28: US Treasury curve inversions and S&P 500 performance
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US 10yr minus US short term rates (2yr, 1yr) |
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S&P 500 total return index (log, rhs) |
10000 |
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2.5 |
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1.5 |
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1000 |
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0.5 |
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-0.5 |
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100 |
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-1.5 |
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-2.5 |
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10 |
61 |
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71 |
76 |
81 |
86 |
91 |
96 |
01 |
06 |
11 |
16 |
Source: Haver, UBS Note: UST 10yr minus UST 1yr from 1961 to March 1976 and UST 10yr minus UST 2yr after March 1976.
Figure 29: S&P 500 returns are high before curve inverts… Figure 30: ...and after the curve inverts
35% |
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12mon to inversion |
33.2% |
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30% |
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25% |
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20% |
Average return ~15% |
18.2% |
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15% |
12.3% |
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13.2% |
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10% |
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7.5% |
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6.8% |
5% |
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0% |
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68-Apr-11 |
73-Mar-09 |
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78-Aug-17 |
88-Dec-13 |
98-May-25 |
05-Dec-26 |
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Inversion date -- >
Source: Haver, UBS
60% |
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Inversion date to S&P 500 TR peak |
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50.3% |
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50% |
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40.9% |
41.0% |
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40% |
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30% |
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Average ~ 29% |
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27.6% |
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20% |
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14.7% |
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10% |
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1.1% |
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0% |
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68-Apr-11 |
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73-Mar-09 |
78-Aug-17 |
88-Dec-13 |
98-May-25 |
05-Dec-26 |
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Inversion date -- >
Source: Haver, UBS
US Equity Strategy 13 November 2018 |
18 |
vk.com/id446425943
ISM peak to midpoint (~52.5): ~9% type returns
We use the ISM manufacturing index as a guidepost to assess how equities behave through different phases of the economic cycle. We divide the cycle into 4 phases using the median ISM level (~52.5) as the midpoint: 1) ISM trough to mid-peak (avg 9mo), 2) mid-peak to peak (17mo), 3) peak to mid-trough (14mo), and 4) mid-trough to trough (12mo). For purposes of our analysis we assume that the ISM has peaked and we are in the phase of solid but slowing growth. We find that the cycles have been very different since 1983-84, after inflation normalized and services became a more important part of the economy.
S&P 500 returns have been 9% (median) when the ISM is high and falling.
During the period when the ISM has gone from a peak to a mid-trough, the S&P 500 has averaged 13% returns in the instances since 1983 (9% median); that compares to an average 14% decline prior to 1983 when manufacturing was more important for the economy. Average monthly returns have been over 6% annualized using months when the ISM was high but falling. Looking through the cycle, the average S&P return from the peak in the ISM to the subsequent trough in the S&P 500 has been +2% with a wide range since 1983 (-2% for all episodes), suggesting that the balance of risks at this stage is still tilted positive.
Market usually peaks when ISM <50; Aug-18 peak points to Oct-20 trough.
The average timing of ISM cycles would have pointed to a peak ISM in Feb-18 (that was it) but tax stimulus likely lengthened cycle by 6m+ (Aug peak). Tariffs have been a headwind since then. Average timing in the ISM cycle would have pointed to a mid-trough in April 2019 and a trough in April 2020. Assuming the tax cut shifted the US cycle out 6m, the mid-trough would be Oct 2019 and trough in Oct 2020. However, later cycle fiscal stimulus and tariffs are likely impacting the timing and magnitude of the cycle, making it choppier with higher two-sided risk.
We use two approaches to calculate average sector and IG performance through the different phases of the ISM cycle: 1) returns from point to point; and 2) returns conditional on the ISM level and change over a 3m period (annualized). We have data since 1955 but focus on returns since 1983. For the most part, the conclusions for sector and IG performance are the same using the point-to-point and conditional 3m return approach, but we use the average of the two methods to de-emphasize the differences. We do find the ISM high/falling phase has more disparity in sector/IG returns between the two, implying other factors are key.
Figure 31: S&P 500 performance through ISM cycles
66
62
58
54
50
46
42
38
Mid
Trough
ISM mfg. average around the cycle
S&P 500 perf since 1984 (rhs, indexed) |
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156 |
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S&P 500 perf from 1955 to 1984 (rhs, indexed) |
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148 |
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140 |
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132 |
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124 |
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116 |
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108 |
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100 |
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92 |
Trough |
Mid |
ISM |
Mid |
Trough |
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peak |
Peak |
trough |
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Source: Institute for Supply Management, Haver, UBS
US Equity Strategy 13 November 2018 |
19 |
vk.com/id446425943
Figure 32: S&P 500 returns from the ISM peak to mid trough (52.5)
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% -10% -20% -30% -40%
S&P 500 annualized performance
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Inflation more of an issue, |
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ISM peak to mid trough |
Average = 13% |
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more a mfg economy |
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Median = 9% |
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services more important |
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05/59 12/61 |
11/68 01/73 07/78 12/83 12/87 11/94 07/97 11/99 05/04 02/11 08/14 |
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to |
to |
to |
to |
to |
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to |
to |
to |
to |
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to |
to |
to |
02/61 |
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11/70 01/75 05/82 05/85 01/91 01/96 12/98 10/01 12/08 11/12 01/16 |
ISM peak to trough dates
Source: Haver, FactSet, UBS
Figure 33: ISM manufacturing index has been a good indicator of market cycles
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ISM mfg. |
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Peak |
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Mid trough |
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Trough |
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Mid peak |
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Both |
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70 |
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65 |
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55 |
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40 |
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35 |
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30 |
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25 |
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55 |
58 |
61 |
64 |
67 |
70 |
73 |
76 |
79 |
82 |
85 |
88 |
91 |
94 |
97 |
00 |
03 |
06 |
09 |
12 |
15 |
18 |
Source: Institute for Supply Management, Haver, UBS
ISM is a guidepost for sector and style investing
Healthcare, Tech & Utilities have outperformed during the ISM high/falling phase, Materials the big underperformer, others mixed. We have been largely positioned for solid but slowing growth, overweight Tech and Healthcare which have typically done well at this phase of the cycle. Utilities have also outperformed on average through the ISM high/falling phase. On the other hand, Materials have underperformed an average of 10% annualized during this stage. Relative performance of other sectors such as Financials, Industrials, Consumer and Energy has been more mixed with average in line relative returns.
At the industry group level, Autos and Semis have been big underperformers at this stage of the cycle, while Pharma/Biotech, Media and Tech hardware have been notable outperformers.
We take a more detailed look at sector, industry and factor performance through the phases of the cycle in the strategy section of the piece, particularly as it relates to recent performance and the reset in valuations.
US Equity Strategy 13 November 2018 |
20 |
vk.com/id446425943
Figure 34: Sector relative returns through the phases of the ISM cycle (total returns vs. S&P 500, annualized)
Low and rising ISM |
High and rising ISM |
High and falling ISM |
Low and falling ISM |
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-20% -10% 0% 10% |
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% |
-10%-5% 0% 5% 10% |
-10% 0% 10% 20% |
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Source: Haver, FactSet, UBS
Figure 35: Industry group relative returns through the phases of the ISM cycle (total returns vs. S&P 500, annualized)
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Low and rising ISM |
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High and rising ISM |
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High and falling ISM |
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15% |
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15% |
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Source: Haver, FactSet, UBS
US Equity Strategy 13 November 2018 |
22 |