Jankowitcz D. - Easy Guide to Repertory Grids (2004)(en)

APPENDIX 2 269

EE: No . . . oh well, I suppose there’s education: AB and MN had a very good schooling, conventionally, while ST wasn’t ‘academic’, left school early, and has had a tough time of it. And before you ask, by ‘good schooling’ I mean something like the old grammar schools, as distinct from a big, inner-city comprehensive.

1	AB	CD	GH	KL	MN	OP	QR	ST	5
Reserved, hold back	[2	[1	4	3	2	5	3	2	Friendly and
till they’re introduced									approachable
									Outgoing, will
									approach others first
Makes an effort to be	4	2	1	5	1	3	4	3	Makes no special
fit and healthy: active;									effort to look after
swim, gym (personal									themselves
trainer type!)
Independent,	1	2	2	5	[1	[1	3	4	A conformist, group-
self-sufficient									dependent, ‘of’ a group
									as well as ‘in’ a group
No siblings	2	3	[1	[1	1	5	2	4	Many siblings
Best friends BEST	[	[							Don’t get on with
FRIENDS									DON’T GET ON WITH
On the same	1	3	1	5	4	1	3	2	More difficult to
wavelength, react									predict ___
similarly, more
predictable ___
Easy/a good laugh	2	5	1	4	4	1	3	2	Have to be careful
									round them
Same background as	1	2	2	5	4	2	4	3	Different background
myself
Honest, reliable,	1	3	1	5	3	2	3	2	Secretive, pull the
dependable Open and									wool over your eyes
emotionally honest									re feelings
Good schooling, like	[1	3	1	2	[1	4	2	5	Weaker schooling: big,
an old grammar school									inner-city comp.

ER: That’s fine. And the ratings? [fills them in as EE reports them.] This has been a very detailed session and we’ve both worked very hard! Finally, my usual catch-all question. Working with friends, three at a time mostly, is a very effective way of identifying people’s constructs, but it is an unusual way of talking about friendships, and I’d hate to have the technique get in the way of the meaning! And so, let me ask you: looking at these people as a group, is there any construct that is crying out for expression but hasn’t yet had an opportunity to be spoken, because the way we were going about it got in its way?

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EE: No. Looking at them carefully, I have to say . . . nothing else occurs to me.

ER: That’s fine. And now, just one last thing. I’m going to cover over the ratings, and ask you to make an overall assessment of these eight people. Overall, summarising it all, and as a general feeling: how would you rate each of them on a scale that goes from ‘best friends’ = ‘1’, to ‘don’t get on with’ = ‘5’? . . . Many thanks!

The final grid is shown below.

1	AB	CD	GH	KL	MN	OP	QR	ST	5
Reserved, hold back	[2	[1	4	3	2	5	3	2	Friendly and
till they’re introduced									approachable
									Outgoing, will
									approach others first
Makes an effort to be	4	2	1	5	1	3	4	3	Makes no special
fit and healthy: active;									effort to look after
swim, gym (personal									themselves
trainer type!)
Independent, self-	1	2	2	5	[1	[1	3	4	A conformist, group-
sufficient									dependent, ‘of’ a
									group as well as ‘in’
									a group
No siblings	2	3	[1	[1	1	5	2	4	Many siblings
Best friends BEST	[	[							Don’t get on with
FRIENDS									DON’T GET ON
									WITH
On the same wave-	1	3	1	5	4	1	3	2	More difficult to
length, react similarly,									predict ___
more predictable ___
Easy/a good laugh	2	5	1	4	4	1	3	2	Have to be careful
									round them
Same background as	1	2	2	5	4	2	4	3	Different background
myself
Honest, reliable,	1	3	1	5	3	2	3	2	Secretive, pull the
dependable Open and									wool over your eyes
emotionally honest									re feelings
Good schooling, like	[1	3	1	2	[1	4	2	5	Weaker schooling:
an old grammar school									inner-city comp.
BEST FRIENDS	1	2	1	5	4	1	3	2	DON’T GET ON
									WITH

APPENDIX 3

ELEMENT % SIMILARITY SCORES

Number of constructs in grid

Sum of diffs	10	9	8	7	6	5	4
40	0
39	2.50
38	5.00
37	7.50
36	10.00	0
35	12.50	2.78
34	15.00	5.56
33	17.50	89.33
32	20.00	11.11	0
31	22.50	13.89	3.13
30	25.00	16.67	6.25
29	27.50	19.44	9.38
28	30.00	22.22	12.50	0
27	32.50	25.00	15.63	3.57
26	35.00	27.78	18.75	7.14
25	37.50	30.56	21.88	10.71
24	40.00	33.33	25.00	14.29	0
23	42.50	36.11	28.13	17.86	4.17
22	45.00	38.89	31.25	21.43	8.33
21	47.50	41.67	34.38	25.00	12.50
20	50.00	44.44	37.50	28.57	16.67	0
19	52.50	47.22	40.63	32.14	20.83	5.00
18	55.00	55.00	43.75	35.71	25.00	10.00
17	57.50	52.78	46.88	39.29	29.17	15.00
16	60.00	55.56	50.00	42.86	33.33	20.00	0
15	62.50	58.33	53.13	46.43	37.50	25.00	6.25
14	65.00	61.11	56.25	50.00	41.67	30.00	12.50
13	67.50	63.89	59.38	53.57	45.83	35.00	18.75
12	70.00	66.67	62.50	57.14	50.00	40.00	25.00
11	72.50	69.44	65.63	60.71	54.17	45.00	31.25
10	75.00	72.22	68.75	64.29	58.33	50.00	37.50
9	77.50	75.00	71.88	67.86	62.50	55.00	43.75
8	80.00	77.78	75.00	71.43	66.67	60.00	50.00
7	82.50	80.56	78.13	75.00	70.83	65.00	56.25
6	85.00	83.33	81.25	78.57	75.00	70.00	62.50
5	87.50	86.11	84.38	82.14	79.17	75.00	68.75
4	90.00	88.89	87.50	85.71	83.33	80.00	75.00
3	92.50	91.67	90.63	89.29	87.50	85.00	81.25
2	95.00	94.44	93.75	92.86	91.67	90.00	87.50
1	97.50	97.22	96.88	96.43	95.83	95.00	93.75
0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

APPENDIX 4

CONSTRUCT % SIMILARITY SCORES

No. of elements in grid

Sum of diffs.	10	9	8	7	6	5	4
40	7100.00
39	795.00
38	790.00
37	785.00
36	780.00	7100.00
35	775.00	794.44
34	770.00	788.89
33	765.00	783.33
32	760.00	777.78	7100.00
31	755.00	772.22	793.75
30	750.00	766.67	787.50
29	745.00	761.11	781.25
28	740.00	755.56	775.00	7100.00
27	735.00	750.00	768.75	792.86
26	730.00	744.44	762.50	785.71
25	725.00	738.89	756.25	778.57
24	720.00	733.33	750.00	771.43	7100.00
23	715.00	727.78	743.75	764.29	791.67
22	710.00	722.22	737.50	757.14	783.33
21	75.00	716.67	731.25	750.00	775.00
20	0.00	711.11	725.00	742.86	766.67	7100.00
19	5.00	75.56	718.75	735.71	758.33	790.00
18	10.00	0.00	712.50	728.57	750.00	780.00
17	15.00	5.56	76.25	721.43	741.67	770.00
16	20.00	11.11	0.00	714.29	733.33	760.00	7100.00
15	25.00	16.67	6.25	77.14	725.00	750.00	787.50
14	30.00	22.22	12.50	0.00	716.67	740.00	775.00
13	35.00	27.78	18.75	7.14	78.33	730.00	762.50
12	40.00	33.33	25.00	14.29	0.00	720.00	750.00
11	45.00	38.89	31.25	21.43	8.33	710.00	737.50
10	50.00	44.44	37.50	28.57	16.67	0.00	725.00
9	55.00	50.00	43.75	35.71	25.00	10.00	712.50
8	60.00	55.56	50.00	42.86	33.33	20.00	0.00
7	65.00	61.11	56.25	50.00	41.67	30.00	12.50
6	70.00	66.67	62.50	57.14	50.00	40.00	25.00
5	75.00	72.22	68.75	64.29	58.33	50.00	37.50
4	80.00	77.78	75.00	71.43	66.67	60.00	50.00
3	85.00	83.33	81.25	78.57	75.00	70.00	62.50
2	90.00	88.89	87.50	85.71	83.33	80.00	75.00
1	95.00	94.44	93.75	92.86	91.67	90.00	87.50
0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

APPENDIX 5

EXTRACTS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF A

RESISTANCE-TO-CHANGE SESSION

See the procedure shown in Section 8.1.3. Table 8.4 shows the successive comparisons made in following that procedure, and Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show the result. It’s the kind of process to expect when you do Exercise 8.3. The interviewER’s and interviewEE’s utterances are labelled ‘ER’ and ‘EE’, respectively.

ER: So now we know some of your personal values: the ones which you draw on in construing this topic. Let’s see how you prioritise them. Yes, they’re all personal beliefs, important to you . . . but some are more strongly held than others. I’d like to explore with you which ones are bedrock, and which are, you know, important but less fundamental. Let’s start with your first pair of values:

Life and hope	–	Hopelessness and despair
and
Personal moral responsibility	–	Criminal irresponsibility

Now, I want you to imagine that I’m taking you away to a beautiful tropical island, somewhere in the south Pacific: somewhere where you’ll spend the rest of your days. Actually, there are two possible islands. On the first one, you’ll live as part of a society where there is ‘life and hope’, but at the cost of ‘criminal irresponsibility’. Shall I leave you to live there? Or shall we sail on to the second island, where you can live a life of complete ‘personal moral responsibility’, but you will certainly encounter great ‘hopelessness and despair’. Which will you choose?

EE: No, sorry! I want life and hope and personal moral responsibility. Not the other stuff!

ER: I’m sure you do! But this choice is a tough one, and you have to take it! Either ‘life and hope’, but having to put up with ‘criminal irresponsibility’, or you can have the ‘personal responsibility’ you want, but there’s a price: ‘hopelessness and despair’. Which is it to be?

274 THE EASY GUIDE TO REPERTORY GRIDS

EE: Aww. Well, I have to have hope. I couldn’t bear to live out my days in utter despair.

ER: And you agree to put up with a level of irresponsibility you see as criminal?

EE: Yes, if I must, I must. If I have hope, I can always trust that things might change . . .

ER: Okay: that’s a preference for life and hope [places a ‘yes’ against personal value A]. Now here’s another possibility. Suppose the choice was a different one, involving your two values

Life and hope – Hopelessness and despair

and

Progress – Stagnation

You can live out your days with a feeling of ‘life and hope’, but in a society in which there is stagnation; or you can choose ‘progress’, but at the cost of ‘hopelessness and despair’. Which would you prefer?

EE: Oh. The first one sounds impossibly frustrating: what’s the point of living a life in which all your hopes result in nothing but stagnation? If I can make progress I can’t be hopeless and despairing all of the time! Yes, I’ll take the second option.

ER: Right: that’s your third personal value, progress, preferred over your first, life and hope, despite the costs attached [places a ‘yes’ against personal value B]. Now we compare the first and the fourth. This time your choice is as follows. On your first island, you would have all the ‘life and hope’ you wanted, but at the cost of ‘pain and suffering’. Alternatively, you could live a life lacking all suffering: a life of ‘pleasure and enjoyment’, but there would be ‘hopelessness and despair’ to put up with. Which would you choose?

EE: Well, I guess I would put up with pain and suffering. It’s possible to take your mind off your troubles if you have a sense of hope.

ER: Ah, hold on . . . that’s a choice of ‘life and hope’ rather than ‘pleasure and enjoyment’?

EE: That’s right.

ER: [places a ‘yes’ against personal value A]. Now, what about the following? You can have ‘life and hope’, but the cost is a disordered society: you live in ‘chaos’, and are a part of it. Alternatively, you have all the ‘order’ that you might crave, but at the cost of ‘hopelessness and despair’. Which is it to be? Remember, for the rest of your days . . .

APPENDIX 5 275

EE: Order is important to me . . . There again, it would be a rather sterile existence, order amidst hopelessness and despair. No, I think I prefer ‘life and hope’ at the cost of ‘chaos’. While there’s hope, there’s some sort of life!

ER: [Another ‘yes’ is placed against personal value A, ‘life and hope’. So far, this value has been preferred three times, with just one occasion on which another value was preferred to it.] And finally, with this personal value. Your choice is ‘life and hope’, but the cost you have to pay is that you’re ‘alienated from other people’. Or, you can have all the ‘sensibility and affiliation’ with other people that your heart might desire, but you experience ‘hopelessness and despair’.

EE: That’s awful. Can I skip this one?

ER: No, I’m afraid you can’t! It has to be one or the other.

EE: But it’s a contradiction! How can I have any sort of hope if I’m alienated from other people? It’s an impossible combination! Sorry, but I can’t.

ER: My heart goes out to you! Look on it this way, though. Can you imagine hope with alienation, at all?

EE: No. People matter to me. There would be no hope whatsoever if we were alienated.

ER: And can you imagine any circumstances in which sensibility and affiliation could be combined with hopelessness and despair?

EE: Well, yes, I suppose I could. I would cling on to other people as a way of handling the despair.

ER: So you have to have sensibility and affiliation . . . you’re resigned to giving up hope?

EE: I suppose so.

ER: [places a tick against personal value F, ‘sensibility and affiliation’]. Now, the choice changes slightly. We’re going to examine your second personal value, and see how it compares against the others.

Personal moral responsibility – Criminal irresponsibility

compared, firstly, with

Progress – Stagnation

That gives us this sort of choice. Option one. You live out a life of ‘personal moral responsibility’ but at a cost of ‘stagnation’. Alternatively, option two: you live in circumstances in which ‘progress’ is possible and, indeed, occurs, but where people are ‘criminally irresponsible’, and you get sucked into it too. Which will you choose?

276 THE EASY GUIDE TO REPERTORY GRIDS

EE: Well, no, personal moral responsibility matters. ‘Progress’ is a problematic notion sometimes. There are times when one can live with a bit of stagnation if one can avoid irresponsibility. Yes: it has to be the first option.

ER: [places a ‘yes’ against personal value B, ‘personal moral responsibility’]. And the second comparison with this personal value, ‘personal moral responsibility’ at the cost of ‘pain and suffering’, or ‘criminal irresponsibility’ but you live a life of ‘pleasure and enjoyment’.

EE: I must sound very puritan to you . . . but this one’s easy. Irresponsible pleasure is tempting . . . but no, the choice is personal moral responsibility even though there may be some pain attached.

ER: [marks personal value B, ‘personal moral responsibility’, with a tick, and continues]. Okay. Though we’re still working with your second personal value, we’ve made a lot of comparisons already, and when we’ve finished this one, we’ll be halfway done. This time it’s ‘personal moral responsibility’ at the cost of ‘chaos’, or ‘stability and order’ but you have to put up with ‘criminal irresponsibility’ . . .

And so it continues. Notice how, having completed the first five comparisons (‘life and hope’ against all the rest), you don’t have to make any further comparison that includes ‘life and hope’ when you’re focusing on any of the other personal values. All of them have already been compared with ‘life and hope’.

When you’ve finished all the comparisons, add up the ‘yes’ responses against each personal value as in Table 8.5, and write them down in order, as in Table 8.6.

You’ll find that, as your interviewees get used to the task, and find ways of thinking about the circumstances in which they are asked to make a choice, they can adjust . . . trim . . . alter the ways they think about the personal values, compromising them to a greater or smaller degree. And that is the point of this procedure, of course. There are some personal values which are very resistant to change. Your interviewee will not budge! And there are others which are . . . more malleable. Notice, though, that this is a relative issue. All of the values you’re working with have been identified as personal values in the laddering exercise which precedes the present forced-choice procedure.

APPENDIX 6

THE FORMAL CONTENT OF KELLY’S PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY

Table A6.1 summarises the basic assertions of the theory (Kelly, 1952/1991). The corollaries are presented in a different order than Kelly’s, but in his own words. I then provide a brief comment or gloss on each one.

Table A6.1 The fundamental postulate and the corollaries

Fundamental	A person’s processes
postulate	are psychologically
	channelised by the ways
	in which he anticipates
	events.
Construction	A person anticipates
corollary	events by construing
	their replications.
Dichotomy	A person’s construct
corollary	system is composed of
	a finite number of
	dichotomous constructs.
Range corollary	A construct is convenient
	for the anticipation of a
	finite range of events only.

The world out there is real; the world in here is equally real. Psychologically, people operate by building internal representations of the phenomena they experience. They do so in order actively to predict what will happen next. This activity has the same epistemological status as the activity of the ‘scientist’ when s/he seeks to understand and explain nature. People develop these internal representations by recognising regularities and recurring patterns in their experience, which they represent internally by means of contrasts called ‘constructs’.

Constructs are reference axes, not concepts; so, to understand someone’s meaning, you need to know ‘both ends’, that is, the implicit pole as well as the expressed pole, of the construct. Thus, ‘good’ as opposed to ‘inadequate’ expresses a different meaning to ‘good’ as opposed to ‘evil’. Unlike a concept, which applies to everything it encompasses, a construct is limited to a focus of convenience found useful by the person using it. It’s not used for all things in all circumstances.

(continued)

278 THE EASY GUIDE TO REPERTORY GRIDS

Table A6.1 (Continued)

Modulation	The variation in a
corollary	person’s construction
	system is limited by the
	permeability of the
	constructs within whose
	range of convenience the
	variants lie.
Organisation	Each person characteristi-
corollary	cally evolves for his
	convenience in anticipating
	events, a construction
	system embracing ordinal
	relationships between
	constructs.
Fragmentation	A person may successively
corollary	employ a variety of con-
	struction systems which
	are inferentially
	incompatible with each
	other.
Experience	A person’s construction
corollary	system varies as he
	successively construes the
	replications of events.

Choice	A person chooses for
corollary	himself that alternative
	in a dichotomised
	construct through which
	he anticipates the
	greatest possibility for
	the elaboration of his
	system.
Individuality	People differ from each
corollary	other in their construction
	of events.

Some constructs are more permeable (can accommodate many new events within their range of convenience); for example, ‘good–bad’. Others are less permeable (apply to only a few); for example, ‘fluorescent–incandescent’.

Regarded as a data structure, the internal representations we call constructs are organised as a hierarchic system. Some constructs are more central and have the nature of personal values, subsuming other, more specific constructs.

While there is a tendency towards consistency between different parts of the system – especially between core constructs (personal values) and their subordinate constructs – this consistency isn’t total; it may vary according to circumstances and events as the individual interprets them. Constructs represent ‘working hypotheses’ about what will happen next. If they, or their implications, aren’t effective in prediction, they are open to amendment in the light of those events, though people differ in the extent to which they are prepared to make, or even notice, a possible need for, such amendment.

We often express preferences for one pole of each construct as opposed to another. If the whole system is to be effective in anticipating events, it makes sense for us to develop a preference which allows us to ‘grow’ the system in a way which increases the accuracy of our predictions and anticipations.

Different people develop their own meanings – their own constructs – for the same events, and this is what gives them their individuality and distinct personhood.

(continued)