- •Plates
- •Maps
- •Notes on contributors
- •Acknowledgements
- •Note on the text
- •Abbreviations in notes and bibliography
- •archive collections and volumes of laws
- •journals
- •other abbreviations
- •Chronology
- •Introduction
- •1 Russia as empire and periphery
- •2 Managing empire: tsarist nationalities policy
- •Nationalities before Peter
- •Ukraine under Catherine
- •Partitions of Poland
- •Jewish question
- •Nicholas I
- •Expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia
- •Baltic Provinces and Finland
- •Central Asia and Muslims
- •The Caucasus
- •The 1905 Revolution and after
- •First World War
- •3 Geographies of imperial identity
- •Introduction
- •Russia as a European empire
- •Russia as an anti-European empire
- •Russia as a national empire
- •4 Russian culture in the eighteenth century
- •Russia and the West: ‘catching up’
- •The reign of Peter I (1682–1725)
- •From Catherine I to Peter III: 1725–1762
- •Catherine the Great: 1762–1796
- •Conclusion
- •5 Russian culture: 1801–1917
- •Russian culture comes of age
- •Russian culture under Alexander II (1855–1881)
- •Russian culture under Alexander III (1881–1894)
- •Russian Culture Under Nicholas II (1894–1917)
- •6 Russian political thought, 1700–1917
- •From Muscovy to the Early Enlightenment: the problem of resistance to ungodly rulers
- •Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment: civic virtue, absolutism and liberty
- •In the French Revolution’s shadow: conservatism, constitutionalism and republicanism
- •National identity, representative government and the market
- •7 Russia and the legacy of 1812
- •Russian culture and society before 1812
- •The 1812 war and Russian nationalism
- •The war and Russian political culture
- •1812 and the problem of social stability
- •The legacy of the war
- •8 Ukrainians and Poles
- •9 The Jews
- •The pre-partition period
- •Early encounters
- •Into the whirlwind
- •10 Islam in the Russian Empire
- •11 The elites
- •12 The groups between: raznochintsy, intelligentsia, professionals
- •13 Nizhnii Novgorod in the nineteenth century: portrait of a city
- •Topography
- •Rhythms
- •People
- •Administration and institutions
- •Civic and cultural life
- •14 Russian Orthodoxy: Church, people and politics in Imperial Russia
- •Institutionalising Orthodoxy
- •The clergy
- •Episcopate
- •Monastic (‘black’) clergy
- •Secular (‘white’) clergy
- •Believers
- •Worldly teachings: from ‘reciprocity’ to social Orthodoxy
- •Orthodoxy in the Russian prerevolution
- •15 Women, the family and public life
- •The Petrine revolution and its consequences
- •Outside the circle of privilege
- •The reform era
- •1905 and after
- •16 Gender and the legal order in Imperial Russia
- •Noblewomen, inheritance, and the control of property
- •Gender conventions and the law of property in the eighteenth century
- •Transactions between husband and wife
- •Unlimited obedience: women and family law
- •Gender in criminal law
- •Conclusion
- •17 Law, the judicial system and the legal profession
- •Reform
- •The reformed judicial system and the peasants
- •Justice and empire
- •The reform of the reform
- •The justice system as a substitute constitution
- •18 Peasants and agriculture
- •19 The Russian economy and banking system
- •Introduction
- •The Catherine system
- •The era of Great Reforms
- •The policy of forced industrial development
- •Financial and commercial policy at the beginning of the twentieth century
- •Conclusion
- •20 Central government
- •Introduction
- •Subordinate organs (podchinennye organy)
- •Ministerial government
- •Supreme organs (Verkhovnye organy)
- •Autocrat and autocracy
- •Post 1905
- •Modernisation from above
- •21 Provincial and local government
- •Introduction
- •The Centre and the provinces
- •The operation of local administration
- •Corporate institutions
- •‘All-estate’ institutions
- •A local bureaucracy?
- •Epilogue
- •23 Peter the Great and the Northern War
- •24 Russian foreign policy, 1725–1815
- •Era of palace revolutions
- •Catherine II
- •The metamorphosis of the 1790s
- •Alexander I
- •Conclusion
- •25 The imperial army
- •Understanding Russian military success, 1700–1825
- •Accounting for Russian military failure, 1854–1917
- •Conclusion: the World War
- •26 Russian foreign policy: 1815–1917
- •From Holy Alliance to Crimean isolation
- •Recueillement
- •Decline and fall
- •The character of tsarist diplomacy
- •27 The navy in 1900: imperialism, technology and class war
- •28 The reign of Alexander II: a watershed?
- •The reasons and preconditions for the abolition of serfdom
- •The programme and conception of the reformers, the legislation of 19 February 1861 and the other Great Reforms
- •Legislation and life: the fate of the Great Reforms and the fate of the reformers
- •29 Russian workers and revolution
- •30 Police and revolutionaries
- •31 War and revolution, 1914–1917
- •The proximate causes of February 1917
- •Relative economic backwardness as a cause?
- •The Petrograd garrison and its mutiny
- •The army command and the February Revolution
- •The formation of the Progressive Bloc and the Provisional Government
- •Bibliography
2
Managing empire: tsarist nationalities policy
theodore r. weeks
Almost from its inception, Russia has been a multinational state. Long before anyone spoke of the ‘Russian Empire’ (Rossiiskaia Imperiia), a designation that dates from the latter part of Peter I’s reign, a variety of ethnic groups lived in territories claimed by the Muscovite tsar. However, the very concepts of nations and nationality, now considered a central element of human identity, were largely absent in Imperial Russia, at least until the later nineteenth century. Rather, religion played a far more central role in defining what was ‘foreign’ than language or ‘ethnicity,’ a slippery concept at best. The role of the Orthodox religion (Pravoslavie) for Russian identity cannot be overstated. Thus a ‘Catholic Russian’ or ‘Muslim Russian’ even today are conceptually difficult for many Russians to accept.
In Russian – unlike English – one can differentiate between Russian as a cultural-ethnic category (russkii) and Russian as a political-geographical designation (rossiiskii). In practice, however, the distinction was never made consistently in the imperial period, not even by officials who should have known better. Even more inconsistent, perhaps, is the use of the term ‘Russification’ both at the time and in subsequent historiography. The Russian Empire did not ‘embrace diversity’ – such an idea would have seemed absurd to the tsars and their servitors. They took for granted the predominance of Russian culture (including language) and the Russian Orthodox religion within the empire. But Imperial Russia also lacked the resources and even will to carry out consistent and activist programmes of national assimilation or ‘ethnic cleansing’ whether through education or more violent methods. Tsarist ‘nationalities policy’ was not, in fact, one single policy. Rather, there were very different measures taken in, say, the Caucasus, Poland or Central Asia, at different times. Typically an activist, often violent period in which non-Russians would be actively persecuted would be followed by years in which a more passive, though seldom benevolent policy was followed.
27
Empire
Nationalities before Peter
When Peter the Great came to the throne, the Russian Empire already stretched from the White Sea and Pskov in the west all the way to the Pacific Ocean. While some small Finnic tribes lived in Muscovite territory from an early date, the real beginning of Russia as a multinational empire can be dated rather precisely in the years 1552–6. At this point Ivan IV (‘the terrible’) seized the Volga khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, bringing at a stroke thousands of Muslim Tatars under Muscovite rule. The conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan also opened the way for further Russian expansion to the east, into Siberia. On the whole, Moscow allowed the Tatar elite to retain its status and property demanding, however, loyalty to the Russian centre. Only in the eighteenth century did Peter and, with less consistency, his successors press Muslim landowners to accept Russian Orthodoxy or give up their estates. Here again the key issue was not ethnicity or national culture but religion. The baptised Tatar landowners did not soon give up their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness.
Having gained power over the Volga Muslim khanates but stymied in their attempts to seize territory to the west and south, the natural direction of expansion lay to the east. To be sure, Russian traders – in particular the Stroganov family – had even earlier ventured beyond the Urals, but consistent exploration leading to permanent territorial claims began only in the late sixteenth century. Conquest of Siberia is usually connected with the Stroganov family and in particular the Cossack commander in their employ, Ermak, who helped defeat the Muslim overlords of western Siberia in the 1580s, opening the way to Russian conquest of the entire sparsely-populated expanse of territory between the Ural mountains and the Pacific. The city of Tobolsk was founded in 1587, Tomsk in 1604 and Okhotsk on the Pacific Ocean in 1648. Russian expansion over this huge area proceeded slowly but without encountering serious obstacles. The local peoples, a hugely various collection of linguistic, cultural and religious groups, were seldom in a position to oppose the better-armed and organised Russians. Nor did Russian rule particularly impinge on their everyday lives. On the whole, Moscow had no particular interest in direct rule, but was ruthless in enforcing a tribute paid in furs, the yasak. Certain groups, most notably the nomadic Kalmyks, did oppose accepting Muscovite rule (and the yasak), but their raids could not prevent the steady Russian march to the east over the seventeenth century. This process of territorial expansion was capped by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689,
28
Managing empire: tsarist nationalities policy
which set down the Sino-Russian border that would not change for nearly two centuries.1
Expansion in the eighteenth century and nationality
Conquest of the Baltic under Peter
Peter the Great was the true founder of the Russian Empire. Indeed, it was he who insisted on a change in the Russian state’s nomenclature to Rossiiskaia Imperiia, a change only gradually accepted by the other European powers. More important than the name change were territorial gains. After his crushing victory over Charles X of Sweden at Poltava (summer 1709), the fate of Sweden’s erstwhile Baltic provinces was sealed. In the course of the following year the region from Riga to Vyborg (Viipuri) came under Russian rule. Peter was careful not to alienate the ruling classes in this strategic area. The cities of Riga and Reval (Tallinn) retained their customary privileges, including the use of German language and a great deal of autonomy. Similarly the Livonian nobility (of mainly German ethnicity) continued to exercise its traditional rights and even gained back considerable lands previously lost to the Swedish crown. Religious freedom was guaranteed, though Orthodox churches were also introduced. Thus the transfer of sovereign power from Stockholm to St Petersburg changed little in the everyday workings of these provinces. The mainly German nobility and middle class continued to exercise almost total control over the economy and social life of the region, also profiting from the opening of the Russian market to their agricultural products. Furthermore, the Baltic German nobility was to play an inordinately important role as officers, officials and ambassadors of the Russian Empire. Typically for the age, the peasant masses of Estonian and Latvian ethnicity did not play a role in St Petersburg’s political calculations.
Peter’s victory at Poltava also sealed the fate of Ukraine as an independent entity. The Ukrainian leader Mazepa’s alliance with the Swedes spelled his downfall; in the eighteenth century Russia tightened its grip on left-bank
1The best overview of Russia as a multinational state is A. Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (New York: Pearson Education, 2001). On Russia’s ‘first (minority)
nationalities’ – primary among them the Volga Tatars – see A. Kappeler, Russlands erste Nationalitaten:¨ das Zarenreich und die Volker¨ der Mittleren Wolga vom 1 6. bis 1 9. Jahrhundert (Cologne: Bohlau¨ 1982). The struggles of the Kalmyks against the expanding Muscovite/Russian state are explored in Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1 600–1 91 7 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
29
Empire
(east of the Dnieper) Ukraine which it had gained in the Treaty of Andrusovo (1654). However, significant territories of present-day Ukraine remained under Ottoman and Polish rule until later in the century.
Ukraine under Catherine
Catherine the Great (reigned 1762–96) continued Peter’s work of imperial expansion. During her reign the empire expanded to the Black Sea in the south and the Vistula river in the west, taking over territory relinquished by two declining states, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Russian military victories on land and sea forced the Sultan to agree to the Treaty of Kuc¨¸uk¨ Kaynarca early in 1774. The terms of this treaty gave Russia a foothold on the Black Sea (between the Dniester and Bug rivers); two decades later Russian rule extended over the entire northern Black Sea littoral from the Dniester eastward. This territory was sparsely populated and the government quickly put in place programmes to entice new settlers to what they called ‘New Russia’. On the site of a Turkish fort called Yeni Dunai (‘New World’) the city of Odessa was founded in 1794, soon to become one of the most ethnically mixed and cosmopolitan cities in the empire.
Partitions of Poland
Even more than the conquest of Ottoman territories, Catherine’s legacy has been marked by her participation in the dismemberment of Poland. For Poles, the German-born Russian empress represents a despised and much reviled figure. In his Books of the Polish Pilgrimage the national poet Adam Mickiewicz described her as ‘The most debauched of women, a shameless Venus proclaiming herself a pure virgin.’ Catherine did not initiate the actual partitions – that role belonged to King Frederick II (‘the Great’) of Prussia. But certainly Catherine did everything she could to contribute to the weakening of the Polish state which resulted in its ultimate demise in 1795. In the three partitions, Russia gained considerable territories in what is now Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. Unlike Prussia and Austria, Russia did not take over ethnically Polish territory in the partitions. However, in the vast eastern lands of the erstwhile Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the nobility (szlachta to use the Polish term) was generally Polish by language and culture, and Catholic in religion. The peasantry was Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian by ethnicity, and Catholic, Orthodox or Uniate by religion. Thus, with the partitions, Russia took on not one, but several potential ‘national problems’, leaving aside for a moment the most troubling one of all: the Jewish question.
30