- •Plates
- •Maps
- •Notes on contributors
- •Acknowledgements
- •Note on the text
- •Abbreviations in notes and bibliography
- •archive collections and volumes of laws
- •journals
- •other abbreviations
- •Chronology
- •Introduction
- •1 Russia as empire and periphery
- •2 Managing empire: tsarist nationalities policy
- •Nationalities before Peter
- •Ukraine under Catherine
- •Partitions of Poland
- •Jewish question
- •Nicholas I
- •Expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia
- •Baltic Provinces and Finland
- •Central Asia and Muslims
- •The Caucasus
- •The 1905 Revolution and after
- •First World War
- •3 Geographies of imperial identity
- •Introduction
- •Russia as a European empire
- •Russia as an anti-European empire
- •Russia as a national empire
- •4 Russian culture in the eighteenth century
- •Russia and the West: ‘catching up’
- •The reign of Peter I (1682–1725)
- •From Catherine I to Peter III: 1725–1762
- •Catherine the Great: 1762–1796
- •Conclusion
- •5 Russian culture: 1801–1917
- •Russian culture comes of age
- •Russian culture under Alexander II (1855–1881)
- •Russian culture under Alexander III (1881–1894)
- •Russian Culture Under Nicholas II (1894–1917)
- •6 Russian political thought, 1700–1917
- •From Muscovy to the Early Enlightenment: the problem of resistance to ungodly rulers
- •Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment: civic virtue, absolutism and liberty
- •In the French Revolution’s shadow: conservatism, constitutionalism and republicanism
- •National identity, representative government and the market
- •7 Russia and the legacy of 1812
- •Russian culture and society before 1812
- •The 1812 war and Russian nationalism
- •The war and Russian political culture
- •1812 and the problem of social stability
- •The legacy of the war
- •8 Ukrainians and Poles
- •9 The Jews
- •The pre-partition period
- •Early encounters
- •Into the whirlwind
- •10 Islam in the Russian Empire
- •11 The elites
- •12 The groups between: raznochintsy, intelligentsia, professionals
- •13 Nizhnii Novgorod in the nineteenth century: portrait of a city
- •Topography
- •Rhythms
- •People
- •Administration and institutions
- •Civic and cultural life
- •14 Russian Orthodoxy: Church, people and politics in Imperial Russia
- •Institutionalising Orthodoxy
- •The clergy
- •Episcopate
- •Monastic (‘black’) clergy
- •Secular (‘white’) clergy
- •Believers
- •Worldly teachings: from ‘reciprocity’ to social Orthodoxy
- •Orthodoxy in the Russian prerevolution
- •15 Women, the family and public life
- •The Petrine revolution and its consequences
- •Outside the circle of privilege
- •The reform era
- •1905 and after
- •16 Gender and the legal order in Imperial Russia
- •Noblewomen, inheritance, and the control of property
- •Gender conventions and the law of property in the eighteenth century
- •Transactions between husband and wife
- •Unlimited obedience: women and family law
- •Gender in criminal law
- •Conclusion
- •17 Law, the judicial system and the legal profession
- •Reform
- •The reformed judicial system and the peasants
- •Justice and empire
- •The reform of the reform
- •The justice system as a substitute constitution
- •18 Peasants and agriculture
- •19 The Russian economy and banking system
- •Introduction
- •The Catherine system
- •The era of Great Reforms
- •The policy of forced industrial development
- •Financial and commercial policy at the beginning of the twentieth century
- •Conclusion
- •20 Central government
- •Introduction
- •Subordinate organs (podchinennye organy)
- •Ministerial government
- •Supreme organs (Verkhovnye organy)
- •Autocrat and autocracy
- •Post 1905
- •Modernisation from above
- •21 Provincial and local government
- •Introduction
- •The Centre and the provinces
- •The operation of local administration
- •Corporate institutions
- •‘All-estate’ institutions
- •A local bureaucracy?
- •Epilogue
- •23 Peter the Great and the Northern War
- •24 Russian foreign policy, 1725–1815
- •Era of palace revolutions
- •Catherine II
- •The metamorphosis of the 1790s
- •Alexander I
- •Conclusion
- •25 The imperial army
- •Understanding Russian military success, 1700–1825
- •Accounting for Russian military failure, 1854–1917
- •Conclusion: the World War
- •26 Russian foreign policy: 1815–1917
- •From Holy Alliance to Crimean isolation
- •Recueillement
- •Decline and fall
- •The character of tsarist diplomacy
- •27 The navy in 1900: imperialism, technology and class war
- •28 The reign of Alexander II: a watershed?
- •The reasons and preconditions for the abolition of serfdom
- •The programme and conception of the reformers, the legislation of 19 February 1861 and the other Great Reforms
- •Legislation and life: the fate of the Great Reforms and the fate of the reformers
- •29 Russian workers and revolution
- •30 Police and revolutionaries
- •31 War and revolution, 1914–1917
- •The proximate causes of February 1917
- •Relative economic backwardness as a cause?
- •The Petrograd garrison and its mutiny
- •The army command and the February Revolution
- •The formation of the Progressive Bloc and the Provisional Government
- •Bibliography
Foreign policy and the armed forces
indemnity of 700,000,000 francs and provided an allied army of occupation of 150,000 men supported by France for a period of three to five years.
The treaties of Vienna (9 June 1815) largely ratified the provisions of the preceding treaties with one large exception. By this date, however, Alexander had succumbed, contrary to the stipulations of Kalisch and Toeplitz, to Czartoryski’s blandishments on the future of Poland. His wish to restore the Kingdom of Poland under his own auspices and to compensate Prussia for its consequent Polish sacrifices in the Kingdom of Saxony nearly provoked a war with Austria, Britain and France. Alexander compromised, chiefly at the expense of Prussia in Saxony, and peace was made.
Conclusion
One of the grand ironies of the history of Russian foreign policy related here is that foreign-born Catherine exerted herself in foreign affairs for strictly Russian interests, while native-born Paul and Alexander extended Russian protection to the interests of the continent as a whole. This fact is a product of the revolution in foreign-policy outlook that took place in Russia in the 1790s.22
In the murky record of Russian foreign-policy programmes and ideas, it is sometimes customary to identify two relatively distinct camps or lobbies. One is known variously as Russian, national, or Eastern; the other, as German, European, or Western.23 These terms are so poorly documented, especially before the latter part of the nineteenth century, as to make generalisation about them a bit hazardous. Somehow, however, the first party is semi-isolationist. It is sometimes associated with the term svoboda ruk – carte-blanche more
22One of the most striking documents on the virtues of Russian foreign policy as well as the continuity of it between 1796 and 1856 was the long instruction for Tsarevich Alexander Nikolaevich composed in 1838 by Nesselrode’s assistant, Baron E. P. von Brunnow, an assistant to Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode, ‘Aperc¸u des principales transactions du Cabinet de Russie sous les regnes` de Catherine II, Paul I et Alexander I.’ Sbornik russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, 148 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1867–1916), vol. XXXI, pp. 197–416. It is a frank condemnation of the acquisitiveness of Catherine and an endorsement of the moral qualities of the policies of Paul and Alexander. At the other end of the political spectrum of the age was the outlook of Viscount Castlereagh and the British policy that he represented: ‘When the Territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed [Great Britain] can interfere with effect, but She is the last Government in Europe, which can be expected, or can venture to commit Herself on any question of an abstract Character. . . . We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the System of Europe, but this Country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution’ (P. Langford, Modern British Foreign Policy: The Eighteenth Century,
1 688–1 81 5 (New York: St Martin’s, 1976), p. 238).
23For a brief exposition, see Alfred J. Rieber, ‘Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy’, in Ragsdale and Ponomarev, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 351–2.
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Russian foreign policy, 1725–1815
or less.24 Catherine’s policy, whether in the heyday of Panin or in that of the Greek Project, while first in alliance with Prussia and later with Austria, appears to have used these alliances to divide central Europe, and sometimes all of Europe, against itself in order to leave Russia a free hand in imperial enterprise. Her heavily European involvement in the Armed Neutrality of 1780 served this purpose. The policy of Paul and Alexander, on the other hand, one of congress and concert, was distinctly Europhile. They wished to make of Russia the arbiter of the peace of Europe. Some day we may understand these categories, and the way in which they expressed Russian interests, better than we do today. For the moment, they must remain merely intriguing.
If the European extensions of the foreign policy of Paul and Alexander had more benign consequences for the continent than West Europeans realised,25 their consequences for Russia were less fortunate. As Russian foreign policy adopted a distinctly Europhile outlook, domestic policy just as distinctly repudiated it. Thus the burden of foreign policy increased, while the strength of the empire that supported it succumbed to obsolescence such as to be in the long run unequal to the challenge of supporting the ambitiously conservative task of preserving social and political peace on a continent in the throes of the multiple revolutions of the nineteenth century. The long-term consequences were seen in the First World War. The policy that was good for Europe in 1815 also raised Russia to the pinnacle of its imperial power, but it was in the long run fatal for the empire.
24The most prominent use of the term svoboda ruk is in V. G. Sirotkin, Duel’ dvukh diplomatii (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), but the authors of the first of five projected volumes to appear in a new and unprecedentedly authoritative history of Russian foreign policy also rely heavily on it (in my opinion excessively and without defining it properly): O. V. Orlik (ed.), Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: pervaia polovina XIX veka (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), pp. 27–135 passim.
25This is the argument of Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1 7 63 – 1 848 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).
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