JPM_Europe Year Ahead 2019_watermark
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Mislav Matejka, CFA |
Europe Equity Research |
(44-20) 7134-9741 |
03 December 2018 |
mislav.matejka@jpmorgan.com |
|
ECB president Draghi’s eight year term at the helm of the central bank ends in October 2019. As yet there is very little visibility on who his replacement might be.
Although it might seem reasonable to expect a German candidate to succeed Draghi—after all since 1999 we have had a Dutch, a French and an Italian president—the talk is that the Germans would prefer the presidency of the European Commission rather than the presidency of the ECB. It is important who replaces Draghi. Although ECB decisions are made by the 25 member governing council, the direction of the central bank is driven by the executive board and the president. Draghi was instrumental in developing the OMT instrument and in the central bank moving into asset purchases.
The outlook for politics
The political landscape in the region looks very uncertain as we look into 2019. The German political landscape has been changed dramatically by the collapse in support for the CDU/CSU and SPD in recent state elections. Merkel’s decision to step down as CDU party leader later this year marks the beginning of the end of the Merkel era, which has dominated German and Euro area politics since 2005. Although in principle Merkel can stay on as Chancellor until 2021, this may not happen. However, it would be difficult to replace her as Chancellor without an early election. Even aside from the pressure on Merkel from within her own party, the current coalition could collapse due to the SPD pulling out. A key date will be next September when the coalition treaty has scheduled a mid-term progress evaluation.
In addition to national fiscal developments, there is also the European Parliamentary elections next May. Populists are looking to do well, and indeed they are likely to. Excluding the UK, populist MEPs will likely go from 19.2% of the total in 2014 to 26.0% next year (Table 7). Many populists hope that a surge in support in the parliamentary elections will help to start moving the EU in a different direction. However this seems unlikely. Populists are not a coherent group, and even if they were they remain in a minority. And also, the direction of the EU is not set in the parliament but in the European Council. Populists would have to do a lot better in national parliamentary elections to dominate the Council.
Table 7: The evolution of populist seats in the European Parliament
|
|
Populist Seats |
Proportion of EP |
|||
|
2009 |
2014 |
2019' |
2009 |
2014 |
2019' |
Germany |
0 |
8 |
15 |
0.00 |
1.07 |
2.13 |
France |
8 |
27 |
31 |
1.09 |
3.60 |
4.40 |
UK |
15 |
24 |
N/A |
2.04 |
3.20 |
N/A |
Italy |
9 |
22 |
45 |
1.22 |
2.93 |
6.38 |
Spain |
0 |
5 |
10 |
0.00 |
0.67 |
1.42 |
Poland |
15 |
22 |
24 |
2.04 |
2.93 |
3.40 |
Romania |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Netherlands |
4 |
4 |
10 |
0.54 |
0.53 |
1.42 |
Belgium |
2 |
1 |
3 |
0.27 |
0.13 |
0.43 |
Czech republic |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.28 |
Greece |
5 |
12 |
7 |
0.68 |
1.60 |
0.99 |
Hungary |
14 |
12 |
12 |
1.90 |
1.60 |
1.70 |
Portugal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Bulgaria |
2 |
1 |
2 |
0.27 |
0.13 |
0.28 |
Sweden |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0.00 |
0.27 |
0.57 |
Austria |
2 |
4 |
5 |
0.27 |
0.53 |
0.71 |
Denmark |
3 |
5 |
3 |
0.41 |
0.67 |
0.43 |
Finland |
1 |
2 |
1 |
0.14 |
0.27 |
0.14 |
Slovakia |
1 |
0 |
3 |
0.14 |
0.00 |
0.43 |
Ireland |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Lithuania |
2 |
2 |
1 |
0.27 |
0.27 |
0.14 |
Latvia |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0.14 |
0.13 |
0.28 |
Slovenia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Cyprus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Estonia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.14 |
Luxembourg |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Malta |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
0.00 |
Croatia |
N/A |
0 |
2 |
N/A |
0.00 |
0.28 |
Total |
84 |
154 |
183 |
11.41 |
20.51 |
25.96 |
Total ex. UK |
69 |
130 |
183 |
10.39 |
19.17 |
25.96 |
Source: European Parliament, Domestic polling agencies, J.P. Morgan '2019 numbers are forecasts based on domestic polls
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Mislav Matejka, CFA (44-20) 7134-9741
mislav.matejka@jpmorgan.com
Gianluca SalfordAC
(44-20) 7134-1692 gianluca.salford@jpmorgan.com
Aditya Chordia
(44-20) 7134-2132 aditya.x.chordia@jpmorgan.com
This is an extract taken from ‘Global Fixed Income Markets 2019 Outlook: Aging but healthy cycle, synchronised normalization, short duration’, published on 21 November 2018
We forecast 10Y Bunds around 1.0% by year-end and tighter intra-EMU spreads
Europe Equity Research
03 December 2018
Euro Area Rates Outlook
2018 was a very disappointing year for the Euro area, with macro and political upsets unsurprisingly leaving German yields stuck in a range and intra-EMU spreads wider
The hurdle for 2019 to deliver something better is low
We forecast 10Y Bunds around 1.0% by year-end and tighter intra-EMU spreads
The forecast strikes a balance between optimistic baseline scenarios for most of the drivers and risks tilted to the downside
The key calls are on longevity of the US cycle, macro developments in the Euro area and the end game for the Italian government
End of net QE, change in personnel at the ECB, other political events should be less crucial
We recommend shorts in 10Y+ Germany, 2s/10s Germany and/or 3s/10s France steepeners to express a bearish duration view
Intra-EMU spreads should be traded tactically in 1H19
We recommend positive carry directionality-hedged 5s/10s or 5s/30s steepeners in Italy
Country-wise, we favour Portugal, Ireland as well as Austria and Finland
Euro area inflation: we advise longs only in 2H19 due to soft core inflation profile
Will 2019 be better than 2018? The hurdle is low
It might be unfair to say that 2018 was an unmitigated disaster for the Euro area but the list of positives only contains labour market developments (unemployment rate and wages measures). Other activity indicators showed a steady decline in real GDP growth and core inflation. Moreover, politics provided market unfriendly surprises, starting from of course Italian politics but also including loss of popularity for mainstream parties in Germany and France, and a change in government in Spain. It is, therefore, not surprising to see 10Y Bunds yields close to 35bp.
Our outlook for 2019 incorporates the expectation that some of the drivers that haunted us this year will take a more positive turn (Exhibits 1 & 2). We forecast 10Y Bund yields at 1.0% by the end of 2019 (0.65% by mid-year) and 10Y ItalyGermany spread at 225bp (but still at 300bp by the middle of the year). At year-end, our 10Y Bund forecast is 36bp higher than the forwards and 10Y Italy-Germany 124bp tighter.
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Mislav Matejka, CFA |
Europe Equity Research |
(44-20) 7134-9741 |
03 December 2018 |
mislav.matejka@jpmorgan.com |
|
Exhibit 1: We expect the ECB to start tightening in 2019 and the market to expect more beyond next year, leading to higher rates
J.P. Morgan interest rate forecast; German benchmarks unless otherwise stated; %
|
19-Nov |
1Q19 |
2Q19 |
3Q19 |
4Q19 |
4Q19 v s. |
|
fw d (bp) |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2Y |
-0.59 |
-0.50 |
-0.45 |
-0.30 |
-0.15 |
21 |
5Y |
-0.22 |
-0.05 |
0.05 |
0.30 |
0.45 |
39 |
10Y |
0.37 |
0.55 |
0.65 |
0.90 |
1.00 |
36 |
30Y |
1.04 |
1.20 |
1.25 |
1.40 |
1.45 |
33 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2s/10s (bp) |
96 |
105 |
110 |
120 |
115 |
15 |
10s/30s (bp) |
67 |
65 |
60 |
50 |
45 |
-3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exhibit 2: Pressure on Italy-Germany spreads to remain wide in the near term but to fade in 2H19 under the baseline scenario
J.P. Morgan forecast of 10Y EMU curve-adjusted spread to Germany*; bp
|
19-Nov |
1Q19 |
2Q19 |
3Q19 |
4Q19 |
4Q19 |
|
v s. fw d |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
28 |
25 |
25 |
20 |
20 |
-10 |
Belgium |
48 |
50 |
45 |
40 |
35 |
-17 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finland |
27 |
30 |
25 |
20 |
20 |
-8 |
France |
38 |
40 |
35 |
30 |
30 |
-11 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland |
66 |
55 |
50 |
45 |
45 |
-26 |
Italy |
319 |
325 |
300 |
240 |
225 |
-124 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands |
15 |
15 |
15 |
10 |
10 |
-6 |
Portugal |
159 |
150 |
145 |
130 |
115 |
-61 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spain |
128 |
120 |
115 |
110 |
100 |
-42 |
Wtd. peri. spread** |
242 |
243 |
225 |
187 |
174 |
-91 |
*Adjusted for maturity mismatch by taking the difference in maturity matched swap spreads.
**Weighted peripheral spread computed against Germany for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (weighted by the size of their outstanding bond market).
Timing-wise, it is very possible that the first few months of 2019 might not deliver much joy to our medium-term views, with the only positives coming from an expected rebound in activity, a smooth transition from net QE to reinvestments and an agreement on Brexit. The views should gain more traction later in the year as the ECB lays the ground for rates tightening, as core inflation drifts up and as the balance of risk in Italy shifts to positive.
Our trading themes are:
Shorts in 10Y+ Germany, 2s/10s Germany and/or 3s/10s France steepeners to express a bearish duration view
Intra-EMU spreads should be traded tactically in 1H19 on expectation of sideways move
We recommend positive carry directionality-hedged steepeners in Italy initially and plan to move to intra-EMU tighteners later in the year
Country-wise, we favour Portugal, Ireland, respectively, on lack of political pressure and on valuations/Brexit respite, as well as Austria and Finland when compared to France and Germany
In the next few sections, we first discuss the main drivers of our call, followed by analysis of the German curve and intra-EMU spreads. We close with a separate section on Euro inflation-linked markets.
Drivers of our forecast
Exhibit 3 shows a summary of our thoughts on the most important market drivers in 2019 and implications for Euro area markets.
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Mislav Matejka, CFA |
Europe Equity Research |
(44-20) 7134-9741 |
03 December 2018 |
mislav.matejka@jpmorgan.com |
|
Exhibit 3: A peculiar outlook: fairly sanguine baseline scenarios everywhere but most risks are tilted to the downside
J.P. Morgan views on market drivers for 2019 and their market implications;
Driver |
Baseline view |
Baseline impact |
Risk skew |
Activ ity |
Strong bounce in 4Q18, solid 2019 |
Higher German y ields/tighter intra- |
Limited dow nside risk to grow th forecast |
|
|
EMU spreads |
|
Inflation |
Core inflation rises to 1.4% by y ear end; solid w age |
Higher German yields (later in the |
Some dow nside risk that transmission from |
|
data |
y ear) |
w age to prices is delay ed further |
|
|
|
|
ECB monetary policy |
ECB hikes tw ice to bring depo to 0% by y ear end; |
Higher German y ields |
Significant risk of less hawkish ECB reaction |
|
change in ECB personnel with limited consequences |
|
function |
ECB: end of net QE |
Modestly higher Bund y ields; intra-EMU spreads more |
Modestly higher EGB y ields |
Risk of higher German y ields and/or w ider intra- |
|
v olatile |
|
EMU spreads |
|
|
|
|
Politics: Italy |
Cautious policy actions in 1H19; more market friendly |
Higher German y ields/tighter intra- |
Risk of unpredictable policy making |
|
gov ernment by the end of 2019 |
EMU spreads (later in the y ear) |
|
Politics: Other Euro area |
No significant change to the status quo |
Higher German y ields/tighter intra- |
Highest risks of market-unfriendly |
|
|
EMU spreads |
dev elopments in Spain |
|
|
|
|
Technicals |
Mostly stable ratings in 2019 |
Modest |
Dow nside for Italy if the macro outlook |
|
|
|
deteriorates |
Ex ternal factors: Brex it |
Withdraw al agreement ev entually signed off |
Higher German y ields/tighter intra- |
Ov erall negative impact on no deal a lot more |
|
|
EMU spreads |
pow erful than positive impact of Brexit |
|
|
|
delay /second referendum |
|
|
|
|
Ex ternal factors: US |
US economy slow s, temporary w obbles are likely, but |
Higher German y ields/tighter intra- |
Risks that markets w ill be more nervous about |
aged economic cy cle |
ov erall concerns about recession are not increasing |
EMU spreads |
end of US cy cle |
Ex ternal factors: US- |
Third round of tariff on US imports from China; negativ e |
Modestly low er German yields/w ider |
Risk of less aggressive action |
China trade tensions |
impact on Chinese grow th contained |
intra-EMU spreads |
|
|
|
|
|
Activity: solid 2019 after a disappointing but not horrible 2018
This is a key call for EGBs. We believe that Euro area growth will resume abovepotential pace after the 3Q18 weakness, itself mostly driven by one-off-factors. Therefore, we forecast a strong rebound in 4Q18 (2.5%) and a solid 2019 with around 2% annualised quarterly GDP prints. Our 2019 GDP forecast is two tenths higher than consensus (1.9% vs. 1.7%) (Exhibit 4). We see limited downside risks to our 2019 activity outlook as we have already downgraded significantly the forecast for Italy.1 Consistent with this forecast the unemployment rate should continue to march lower, although at a slower pace compared to previous years.
Inflation: building blocks for higher core inflation in place
Euro area core inflation has been stuck in a fairly tight range over the past few years and has been one of the main factors keeping a lid on Bund yields. We believe that the building blocks of a pick-up in core inflation are more solid than in the past due to the reduction in the unemployment rate and increasingly evident wage pressures. However, given our expectation of the Euro area price Phillips curve flatter for longer to reflect the recent disappointment in the data,2 we expect core inflation to move broadly sideways until the summer of 2019 and then start moving gradually higher (Exhibit 5). The risk remains slightly to the downside if the transmission from wage to prices is delayed further.
1See Italy Sleepwalking into anemic 2019 growth, M. Protopapa, 8 November 2018.
2See Euro area Phillips curve Flatter for longer, R. Brun-Aguerre, 9 November 2018.
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Mislav Matejka, CFA |
Europe Equity Research |
(44-20) 7134-9741 |
03 December 2018 |
mislav.matejka@jpmorgan.com |
|
Spread Targets and Positioning
In Table 1 below we set out our spread and return forecasts across the various segments of European credit markets for 2019. Our trading themes for the coming year are as follows:
CSPP eligible bonds will stay expensive.
Long-dated, higher-rated assets offer value.
Continue to trade up in rating.
Position for compression in Financials, with Subordinated Financials being the most attractive higher beta asset.
Fundamentals and technicals favour decompression in Non-Financials.
Europe is cheap to US.
Table 1: 2019 European Credit Spread and Return Forecasts
Asset |
Index (Metric) |
Current Spread |
YE Forecast |
Change |
Total Return |
Investment Grade Bonds (EUR) |
iBoxx EUR Corp (Govt) |
142 |
160 |
+18 |
|
Investment Grade Bonds (GBP) |
iBoxx GBP Corp (Govt) |
164 |
180 |
+16 |
|
High Yield Bonds (EUR) |
iBoxx HY Non-Fin (Govt) |
417 |
500 |
+83 |
2.0% |
Investment Grade CDS (EUR) |
iTraxx Main |
70 |
85 |
+15 |
|
Investment Grade Financials CDS (EUR) |
iTraxx Sen Fin |
90 |
110 |
+20 |
|
High Yield CDS (EUR) |
iTraxx Crossover |
265* |
335 |
+70 |
|
Leveraged Loans |
S&P LCD ELLI |
|
|
|
2.5% |
Source: J P. Morgan. Spreads as at 12th November 2018. *Excluding AST M
CSPP eligible bonds will stay expensive
In our view, the end of the ECB CSPP is largely priced in, with spreads having already risen by 45bp this year (Figure 7). That said, it is notable that the differential between eligible and ineligible credit actually remains near the historical wides at 20bp, having traded largely flat for the past year (Figure 8).
However, in our view, this gap is likely to prove persistent for three reasons. First, the central bank will still own 20% of the eligible universe, which is naturally causing investors to be underweight the asset class compared with the benchmark. As a result, we think that they are hesitant to further reduce their exposure, which means there are relatively few marginal sellers.
Second, ineligible bonds are mostly from UK, US and EM issuers, and so traded 5 - 10bp wide to eligible bonds even before the asset purchase program started. In our view, UK assets should probably carry an even larger premium now considering the alarming risk of a ‘no deal’ Brexit scenario.
Finally, we think that the market has to discount the possibility that the central bank will have to restart quantitative easing if the economy is not actually ready to function without stimulus. It is perfectly imaginable that the slowdown in 3Q18 GDP growth to 0.6% q/q saar proves to be more persistent than our base case, or that the Italian political crisis spills over into a broader periphery funding crunch. Put simply, we think that eligible bonds have an embedded ‘CSPP put’, as the program is likely to be restarted in the next recession.
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