abramova-naselenie_afriki

First of all, noteworthy is the increase in the proportion of young people, women and children in migration flows. For example, the proportion of youth (persons under 25 years) in the total number of African migrants exceeds 25%, while the proportion of women exceeds 30%, which suggests the feminization of migration.

The length of stay of migrants in countries of employment has also increased: it is now 10 years in the EU and more than 20 years in Germany.

There is also a growing migration of scientists and highly skilled workers. The "brain drain" from African countries annually exceeds 200,000 people. The total annual costs of this process are close to 50–60 billion dollars.

Migration with an aim to obtain professional education and training is also increasing. Such training is organized by the EU member states in order to penetrate EU markets with the help of cadres trained by them.

The scale of individual migration of professionals and businessmen is also increasing. A new category of business immigrants - investors from North African countries (mostly Libyans, Tunisians and Egyptians) – has emerged.

The monograph examined the overall economic impact of migration from Africa and demonstrated it effect on wages, welfare, labour market, production volumes, taxes and government spending in donor countries and recipient countries.

The assessments of the impact of immigration on economic growth are ambiguous. Most studies indicate that the impact of immigration on growth is positive. For example, in the EU an increase in the level of net migration by 1% leads to an increase in growth rates by 0.1%. A population increase of 1% owing to immigration can lead to an increase in GDP by 1.15%. While creating added value in host countries, the immigrants also are consuming goods and services. The resulting ripple effect ultimately contributes to economic growth. Some immigrants invest in own businesses, which makes a positive impact on the economy.

Average wages in host countries are decreasing due to the influx of migrants. As a result, the penetration of labour markets by a large

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number of unskilled workers and their employment in those sectors, in which national work forces prefer not to work, maintain low wages (especially in case of employing illegal migrants).

Immigration levels affect the volume of tax revenues and public expenditures. Tax revenues grow at the expense of qualified professionals, as they have higher incomes and do not require public spending on their education. However, the majority of unskilled workers need government support, which increases public spending in recipient countries. The status of illegal immigrants keeps them from using social security benefits and welfare payments, so government spending on them is insignificant.

Migration affects the labour markets of labour exporting countries. Under adverse economic circumstances and when unemployment in African countries grows labour migration can to a certain extent solve the problem of employment and reduce social tensions in society.

Re-emigration of workers who received high qualifications abroad can contribute to GDP growth in a donor country. Studies conducted by the International Labour Organization in labour exporting countries suggest that immigrants are more ready for new activities and take an active part in the development of new forms of economy. In some North African countries, for example, returning migrants have managed to grow new crops and to introduce new production methods. Labour shortages caused by emigration can stimulate positive technological changes, including better use of manpower and other resources.

At the same time, the "brain drain" has negative consequences for a donor country, which not only loses its scientific potential, but also has to replace emigrants by making additional investment in education and training.

At present the share of the African continent in the total amount of official remittances is relatively small and amounts to 15%, while the share of sub-Saharan Africa is only 5%. The main recipients of remittances are countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Lesotho, Senegal and Mauritius. Remittances constitute a significant part of GDP in many countries. In particular this

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applies to Lesotho (23%), Cape Verde (13.5%), Burkina Faso (6%) and Benin (4.5%). The African continent on the whole received about 42 billion money transfers in 2009. Given the fact that the banking system in African countries is not sufficiently developed, much of these remittances are received through unofficial channels. The preference given to unofficial money transfers is also due to the high cost of official transfers, which sometimes is 10-15% of the total amount of a remittance. According to the World Bank experts, the amount of unofficial remittances to African countries is 2– 3 times the amount of funds transferred through official channels. In a country such as Uganda, for example, the share of official remittances is only 20% of all funds sent into the country by emigrants. In many African countries remittances play a significant role in social life. For millions of poor African families remittances make up nearly half of all cash income that they spend on improving housing conditions, on consumer goods, as well as on investments in setting up their own, primarily construction, businesses, as well as education and health.

The monograph analyzes the main features of the identity crisis of immigrants and native population and the possibility of overcoming this crisis on the basis of public policy on integration. It is concluded that the global financial crisis that erupted in the autumn of 2008 and transformed into an economic crisis dramatically changed the situation on the global labour market. It is not ruled out that the crisis could lead to a significant relative and even absolute reduction in international migration and to changes in the structure and direction of migration flows in the upcoming few years, thus affecting the socio-economic situation in Africa, the EU and Russia. The realistic assessment of contemporary migration processes between the South and the North, which is presented in this monograph, makes it possible to predict the results of the upcoming expansion in the reception of immigrants, so that the structure of immigration is the most adequate to the needs of the economy and society as a whole.

In the monograph the role of human capital in national development strategies of Africa has been researched. The global qualita-

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tive and quantitative transformation of human capital was revealed, which had manifested itself in the shift of its numerical growth towards Asia and Africa. Demographic, social, and educational components of human capital have been studied. The necessity of use if international cooperation on the global scale and with African countries in the spheres of employment, education, and health were proved. It was shown on factual material accumulated during the field studies that human capital has direct bearing to social factors of force in individual states. In the countries with human values in focus societies are more consolidated. They play a more powerful role on the world arena compared with the states with atomized and non self-organized societies. The lack of definite social police leads to increased unemployment, lower standard of living, increased social and political tensions and finally to criminal economy.

The author came to the conclusion that the problem of human capital formation acquires particular importance at turning points of human development, connected with the changes of models of global development on the one hand, and process of globalization on the other. Such situation is relevant to Russia and Africa today.

The former only recently had been a leading country from the point of view of national wealth and human potential is now facing the decrease in population and widespread poverty. Africa, on the contrary, is the global leader in rates of population growth among all the continents. It cannot secure the adequate conditions for the development of its human potential.

The author came to the conclusion that Africa’s and Russia’s development vectors have to be oriented towards maximizing and optimal use of the social component. Such an approach will allow to increase the competitiveness of real production, which globally depends on the supply of human capital. Both Russia and Africa as net raw materials exporters have to use excessive profits of monopolies for stimulating entrepreneurship in the hi-tech spheres, for the increase of scientific and technical potential, education and healthcare as well as for the effective increase of the standard of living of the population. This will allow both of them to occupy an honorable place in the global division of labor.

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