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consistent set of beliefs (Cornman 1977, p. 295).35 Since in the absence of a foundationalist solution to the regress problem, Rescher’s method for identifying ‘practical criteria’ cannot break the process of epistemic regress.36

Vicious circularity

Coherentists could answer the charge that the coherence standard is ambiguous by claiming that epistemic beliefs, like all other beliefs, are justified within the coherence system. This gives rise to the fourth objection, that the coherence theory must adopt a circular argument.37 Coherentists would be guilty of circular reasoning if, on the one hand, the justification of epistemic beliefs depends on whether these beliefs increase the system’s coherence while, on the other hand, the same beliefs are used to define and measure coherence.

In coherence theories individual beliefs are justified if they increase the degree of system coherence. The charge of circularity applies only if this relationship is reversed—that is, if the coherence of the system is determined by the status of a belief’s justification. Coherence theories appear to avoid this reversal by separating the judgement of justification from the judgement of what constitutes coherence. The difficulty in the case of epistemic beliefs is that this separation is not possible. The beliefs that are being justified are beliefs about the standard of coherence. In this more complex case it appears that a thoroughly consistent coherence approach must ultimately include circular arguments.

A problematic view of truth

As an epistemological theory, the coherence strategy is useful only if it justifies beliefs that are true. The final objection to the coherence theory is that there are no necessary reasons why internal coherence produces true beliefs about an external world.

It is often assumed that beliefs are true when they correspond to reality. Philosophers refer to this approach as a correspondence theory of truth. In addition to its common-sense appeal, Rorty characterizes this view as ‘the philosophical urge’. It is the feeling that true assertions and actions must ‘“correspond” to something apart from what people are saying and doing’ (Rorty 1979, p. 179). Coherentists such as Rescher and BonJour have suggested that the coherence theory of justification be combined with a correspondence view of truth because coherence theories cannot by themselves provide an adequate definition of truth (Rescher 1973, p. 23; 1979, p. 66; BonJour 1985, p. 88).38

In correspondence theories, beliefs are true when a specific relation exists between an object and a subject’s belief about the object. This relationship is one of ‘agreement’ between either a subject and an object or between a belief and something else which does not depend on the belief for its existence. Because of this agreement, the correspondence theory is often called a ‘picture theory’ of truth. Beliefs which correspond to objects are beliefs which faithfully reproduce the

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objects in such a way that a successful comparison can be made between the belief’s original object and the reproduction.

Correspondence can also be thought of as a confrontation. If I act on the false belief that the door before me is open, I am (perhaps painfully) confronted with the fact that it is not. I directly confront reality with my belief by comparing ‘the facts’ with my belief. If I then claim that the door is closed, the correspondence theorist would explain that this belief is true because it corresponds to the fact that the door is closed.

Coherentists who claim that beliefs are true because they correspond to reality must demonstrate why an internal relationship between beliefs is reason enough to believe there is an external relation between the belief and the world. For Rescher and BonJour, this relationship exists because the coherence theory requires observahional or empirical inputs (Rescher 1979, p. 102). BonJour, for example, states that:

the basic metaheory requires observational or empirical inputs (Rescher 1979, p. 102). BonJour, for example, states that: the basic metajustificatory argument for such a coherence theory is that the best explanation for this sort of prima facie improbable agreement between large numbers of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is that they are

so caused as to truly reflect external reality. (BonJour 1985, p. 138)

The problem with this approach is that it forces empirical inputs to perform a role which the coherence theory cannot justify.

Since all inputs are, at best, only candidates for inclusion in the cognitive system, they cannot act as independent sources to test whether the system is ‘getting it right’. As Rescher points out, we not only reject theories because they do not fit the data, we also, ‘(and not infrequently) [proceed] conversely as well, rejecting data because they do not fit our accepted theories’ (Rescher 1979, p. 83). Even though the source of cognitively spontaneous beliefs may be an independent world, inputs are always subject to a test that is based on the coherence of all beliefs, empirical and non-empirical. The inclusion of empirical inputs does not guarantee that the belief system will ‘correspond’ with an external world.

The inability to appeal directly to the ‘facts of reality’ leads Rescher to suggest that: ‘Room must be made for the operation of the theory-external controls of a factor that is essentially disjoint from the purely cognitive realm— to wit, pragmatic efficacy’ (Rescher 1979, p. 100). However, standards of pragmatic efficacy cannot solve the regress problem because they presuppose an understanding of what it means for a belief to ‘work’. Pragmatic considerations are clearly one aspect of coherence but they are not external controls that allow us to get outside the cognitive system.39

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A HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH TO RATIONALITY

AND JUSTIFICATION

Despite the advantages of the coherence approach, economists and RE agents cannot rely on it to avoid the problem of relativism, because coherence theories have not solved the problem of epistemic regress. Of the five objections raised against the coherence theory only the first has been answered in any satisfactory way. The concept of spontaneous inputs suggested by BonJour and others allows empirical inputs to enter the cognitive system and assists in determining the coherence of the system. However, these inputs cannot correct the remaining defects. They do not, for example, provide a means for choosing between competing systems or of identifying the proper coherence standards. It appears that the only way to address these problems is by introducing coherence metacriteria that create further difficulties. There is no way for the coherentist to avoid circular reasoning and at the same time use the coherence standard to justify the meta-criteria. This difficulty has led some to suggest that foundationalistlike approaches be used to defend the coherence theory. Unfortunately, coherentists have been no more successful in justifying coherence metacriteria than foundationalists have been in justifying basic beliefs.

An alternative epistemological approach is Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which does not rely on ‘external’ standards to justify beliefs. For Gadamer, it would be impossible to apply such criteria because there is no vantage point from which the totality of a cognitive structure can be evaluated. The reason why this internal position cannot be overcome is that cognitive systems are not restricted to the beliefs of autonomous individuals. Rather, cognitive systems are part of the culture that individuals participate in. From this perspective, epistemic justifications must be from ‘within’ an inter-subjective shared cognitive process. The shared contexts of languages and traditions provide a social network in which beliefs are formed and evaluated. Gadamer notes that ‘we always stand within tradition, and this is no objectifying process, i.e., we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us’(Gadamer 1975, p. 250),

As participants in a cultural tradition we often implicitly rely on beliefs which might be termed ‘spontaneous conceptual inputs’.40 Just as coherence theorists have shown that empirical inputs are essential, Gadamer’s analysis has expanded the class of cognitively spontaneous inputs to include epistemic beliefs. (By epistemic beliefs I mean to include beliefs such as those that make a coherence standard of justification meaningful, or beliefs that could be identified as coherence meta-criteria.)

Gadamer often describes these and other cognitive inputs as ‘prejudices’ or prejudgements. It should be emphasized that these beliefs are inputs and not the product of a purely subjective process. By prejudices he does not mean subjective judgements that are produced by autonomous individuals isolated from tradition, or beliefs that are arbitrarily related to reality. The generation of inputs

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is not controlled according to ‘a “procedure” or a method, which the interpreter must of himself bring to bear’, instead they are given to the individual (Gadamer 1975, p. 263). The beliefs which Gadamer refers to as given are not the same as the foundationalist’s set of basic beliefs, but are instead similar to empirical beliefs in coherence theories.41 They are spontaneous in the sense that they happen to us through our use of language. As a group they cannot be ignored, but individual inputs can be challenged and rejected.

Spontaneous epistemic beliefs provide the common base or ground rules for what participants in a linguistic community will accept as common sense and persuasive argumentation. These beliefs are the presuppositions or prejudgements that make understanding possible. From the perspective of coherence theory they provide a context in which all beliefs, including coherence criteria, are interpreted, evaluated, and justified. Rather than representing obstacles to justification, prejudgements are essential inputs to the process of forming true beliefs. They include the tacit assumptions that lie behind the way we frame problems and ask questions. Even the most formalistic of scientific investigations must rely on prejudices such as these. Gadamer observes that:

Whoever wants to understand something already brings along something that anticipatorily joins him with what he wants to understand—a sustaining agreement…. This includes as well the practice of any truly vital science. It, too, is never a simple application of knowledge and methods to an arbitrary object. Only one who stands within a given science has questions posed for him. How much the problems, thought experiences, needs, and hopes proper to an age also mirror the direction of interest of science and research is common knowledge for any historian of science.

(Gadamer 1981, p. 136)

The regress of justification stops when epistemic inputs are used to justify a belief. Because they are inputs in the conceptual system there is no way to get beyond or ‘behind’ them. We inevitably reach a point in defending our beliefs when we say our belief is justified because of what it means to justify a belief. Rather than relying on the coherentist method of employing an explicit metacriterion, epistemic inputs provide a linguistic context in which concepts such as justification are understood. It is within this context that the regress of justifications terminates. The solution to the problem of what justifies a belief is much the same as that provided by coherentists. The answer is that the belief adds to the coherence of the entire system of beliefs. If we then question the standard used to measure coherence we can report that it is a standard that has ‘worked’ for us in the past. Of course, this pragmatic defence must itself be justified within the context provided by prejudgements, because the meaning of success must be considered.42

Many philosophers and economists have thought of the pragmatic standard of ‘success’ as a standard that eliminates the need for presuppositions. Gadamer