Scotland

Scotland has stronger feelings than Wales about its overbearing neighbour, yet it was never conquered by England. But English attacks were so bad that in 1320 the Scottish clergy declared: 'For as long as even one hundred of us remain alive, we shall never consent to subject ourselves to the dominion of the English.' Scottish nationalism was born. In fact, when the English Queen Elizabeth I died childless in 1603, the Scottish king James VI inherited the English throne. London was politically and economically more powerful than Edinburgh, and he and his successors ruled from London, effectively becoming English. In 1707 England and Scotland were formally united as Great Britain. The government in London insisted on this union for political reasons, and the Scots could not refuse for economic reasons. The Scottish Parliament was suspended, and the new Parliament of Great Britain assembled in Westminster.

After 1707 Scotland kept three distinctive institutions: its own legal and education systems and its own church, or 'Kirk', the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. All three are important symbols of national identity. In part they reflect Scotland's closer relationship to continental Europe. Scottish law is discussed in Chapter 4. The Scottish universities were closer to the European model, and still have a four- rather than three-year undergraduate course.

However, the most important of Scotland's distinctive institutions is the Kirk, which is closely identified with national feeling. This is because of its role in national life since the Reformation in the late sixteenth century. The Kirk at that time insisted that all adults in Scotland should be literate, so as to read the Bible themselves. This laid the foundations for strong educational and democratic traditions. The head of the Kirk, or Moderator, is still elected by the General Assembly each year. The Kirk never allowed the monarch to interfere in the life of the Kirk or to become its head as happened in England. Even in a secular age, the Kirk remains an important focus for national feeling. Approximately 20 per cent of Scots are practising members of the Church of Scotland.

The thought of England unites Scotland, but the image of Scotland as one nation can be misleading. Scotland 'has no unity except upon the map' the nineteenth-century Scottish novelist, Robert Louis Stevenson, wrote. 'Two languages, many dialects, innumerable forms of piety, and countless local patriotisms and prejudices,' he continued, 'part us among ourselves more widely than the extreme east and west of that great continent of America.'

Even allowing for some exaggeration, there indeed is a big cultural as well as geographical divide between the Lowlands and Highlands. The Lowlanders are thought of as quiet, moral and hard-working, the Highlanders as exuberant, carefree and unreliable. If there is some truth in this, it is to be seen in another division, that between Scotland's two great and rival cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow. In the words of one writer, 'For all her elegance and lofty-mindedness, Edinburgh is a reserved, plain, cautious and thrifty city. She is more Lowland, in these respects, than Highland. Glasgow is ... an expansive, extravagant, romantic, less tight-laced city.' Edinburgh thrives as Scotland's capital, as the venue for the world-famous festival, and because it is the most handsome city in Britain. Glasgow, despite its exuberant spirit, struggles with high unemployment, poor health and low morale.

As in Wales, there has long been resentment at the concentration of political power in London and the sense of economic neglect. To offset this feeling, the government in Whitehall established a Scottish Office in 1885. From 1945 education, health, agriculture, roads, transport, planning, housing and public order were handled within the Scottish Office. From 1945 onwards the Scots saw the giants of their economy, particularly shipbuilding on the River Clyde, disappear. In 1913 Clyde shipbuilding employed 60,000 men. Today the industry barely exists. The closure of Scottish shipyards, coal mines and steel mills, and the consequent high levels of unemployment in Scotland are, in the popular view closely associated with London government. By 1979 60 per cent of Scots in manufacturing were working for English, American, Japanese or other foreign-owned enterprises. The Scots were especially hard hit by Thatcher's economic restructuring. In the years 1979-81 alone, there was a fall of 11 per cent in Scottish industrial production, and a 20 per cent drop in manufacturing jobs. Two steel mills, Gartcosh and Ravenscraig, the 'flagships' of Scottish industry, were closed in 1986 and 1992 with a loss of at least 11,000 jobs. For Scots these closures symbolised the attitude of an ultra-English Conservative government.

During the 1980s and the 1990s Scotland's economy changed and partly revived. Scotland could boast one of the largest electronics industry concentrations in Western Europe. Whisky distilleries in the north east accounted for 20 per cent of Scottish manufactured exports. There are 100,000 jobs in North Sea oil. Edinburgh has become the fourth financial centre of Europe, with important fund management and insurance services.

Yet the new service industries could not help those who had worked in the old heavy industries. One consequence of the 'progressive loss of morale' has been a worse state of health in Scotland and a higher rate of heart disease, smoking, alcohol and drug abuse than elsewhere in Britain. Another consequence was emigration which has been a long-standing feature. Throughout the nineteenth century the Highland chiefs allowed the communal clan lands to be cleared of people. Between 1871 and 1901 half a million Scots emigrated. Other highlanders moved to Glasgow. Emigration still offsets natural increase. The population has remained static at 5.1 million in the decade 1986-96.

The Highlands, the greater part of Scotland, are now largely deserted. Once the Highlands were stripped of their inhabitants, the great landowners set aside their estates for sport: the hunting of deer. Most great landowners do not live on their estates, and many neither live in Scotland nor are Scottish. The reality of day-to-day life in the Highlands stands in cruel contrast with the tourist picture of jolly kilted Highlanders playing bagpipes or participating in Highland Games.

By the 1960s there were fewer than 300,000 people living in this large area which, in the words of one Highland land expert, John McEwen, 'suits absentee landlordism admirably'. Since the 1960s the Highland population has grown by about 50,000 people. The question of who owns Scotland has become a national issue. McEwen found that no official land register had been made in Scotland since the nineteenth century. In 1977, at the age of 90 and after much obstruction by landowners, he published his research which showed that of Scotland's 19 million acres (7.6 million hectares) only 2.5 million acres belonged to the state, and only 4.5 million acres were in private estates of 1,000 acres or less. Two-thirds of all Scotland, 12 million acres, was in private estates of over 1,000 acres in size. Half of Scotland is still owned by only 500 people, some of whom are actually Scots, but most of whom are absentee land lords Dismay at the progressive integration with England has led to growing cultural expression. Gaelic, still spoken by about 70,000 people chiefly in the Hebrides, has attracted the interest of a growing number of students. Between 1986 and 1996 Gaelic-medium schools increased from two to 50. Ironically the Gaelic revival is partly the result of enthusiastic incoming English families. Pride in the Scots dialect of English is also expressed in the translation of the Bible into Broad Scots - part of a resurgence of Scottish identity against the authority wielded by Standard English. Scottish political feeling has also grown since 1945. In the late 1960s the Scottish National Party (SNP) began to attract serious support, and in 1 974 won 11 of Scotland's 71 seats. Yet in 1 979 Scotland failed to vote decisively for devolution, 32.9 per cent in favour (less than the required 40 per cent), 30.8 per cent against. Margaret Thatcher and John Major were consistently hostile to devolution, unlike their predecessor, Edward Heath, who had proposed devolution in 1968. The facts speak for themselves. In 1955 Conservatives won 36 of the then 71 Scottish seats in the Commons, the last time they had a Scottish majority. In the 1979 election the Conservatives won 23 seats, but declined dramatically thereafter. In 1987 they kept only 10, compared with Labour's 50 Scottish seats. Scots deeply resented being governed by a party unable to attract even one-sixth of the Scottish vote. In 1989 50 Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, leading churchmen and other community leaders met, significantly, in the Church of Scotland's General Assembly buildings in Edinburgh. Here they unanimously signed a 'Claim of Right' to a parliament of their own. In 1997 the Conservatives lost every seat in Scotland. The Scottish National Party won six seats, but attracted 22 per cent of the national vote. The Liberal Democrats took 10 seats but with only 13 per cent of the vote, and Labour took the remaining 56 seats.

Even after their defeat, the Conservatives opposed devolution for Scotland, warning that it would weaken the Union. Whether this turns out to be true or not, Scots did not like being 'lectured' by the English. Of the 62 per cent of the electorate who voted in the devolution referendum in September 1997, 75 per cent voted in favour of a Scottish parliament, and 63 per cent favoured this new parliament enjoying tax raising powers.

The new Scottish parliament will have 73 directly elected members (by the FPTP system) and 56 additional members elected by proportional representation on an electoral district basis. The higher proportion of additional members will make this parliament more representative of public opinion than the Welsh Assembly. This should weaken the dominance of the leading party and, ironically in view of its opposition to devolution, it should give the Conservatives a chance to recover in Scotland. If proportional representation works in Scotland, it will make its introduction into the rest of the United Kingdom more likely. In the meantime, the Scots and Welsh will continue to be represented in Westminster.

The Scottish parliament will be able to make binding laws without seeking permission from Westminster except in areas retained by Westminster: the UK constitution; foreign policy; border control; defence and national security; monetary and fiscal affairs, and common markets; and employment and social security. Scotland will have its own first minister and executive, formed from the leading party in its parliament. There is therefore the distinct prospect of Scotland being governed by one political party while the United Kingdom is governed by another.

Finally, there is one more possible influence that Scotland may have on constitutional development. The basis of the English constitution, as explained in Chapter 2, is the unlimited sovereignty and legal powers of the Crown in Parliament. This was the result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, before the formal 1707 union with Scotland. In Scotland sovereignty resided in the community, in the will of the people. This was the great democratic achievement of the Kirk. The Scots have never been as fond of the Crown as the English have. If the British people decide they need a Bill of Rights, it is possible that Scotland's constitutional view may prove as influential as the English one of the Crown in Parliament.