- •Содержание
- •Сравнительный анализ имеющихся учебных методических и научных материалов по теории общественного выбора
- •Характеристика учебников
- •Анализ хрестоматий
- •Сравнительный анализ курсов по теории общественного выбора
- •Краткий анализ научной литературы
- •Приложения Приложение 1. Структура учебников по теории общественного выбора
- •Приложение 2. Хрестоматии по теории общественного выбора
- •Приложение 3. Курсы по теории общественного выбора 90-х годов
- •Новые направления современных исследований по теории общественного выбора: обоснование концепции и структуры курса
- •Введение
- •Логика и структура курса
- •Предмет, метод и эволюция теорий общественного выбора
- •Общественный выбор в условиях прямой демократии
- •Общественный выбор в условиях представительной демократии
- •Экономика бюрократии
- •Политическая экономия и общественная политика
- •Экономическая теория конституции
- •Заключение
- •Учебная программа курса
- •Описание курса, требования к базовой подготовке студентов
- •Цель курса
- •Структура курса
- •Программа курса
- •Раздел 1. Предмет, метод и эволюция теорий общественного выбора
- •Тема 1. Общественный выбор; методологические и теоретические предпосылки анализа.
- •Литература
- •Тема 2. Базовые понятия
- •Литература
- •Тема 3. Становление и развитие предмета и метода теории общественного выбора
- •Литература
- •Раздел 2 Общественный выбор в условиях прямой демократии
- •Тема 4. Общественный выбор в условиях прямой демократии: правило единогласия и правило большинства
- •Литература
- •Тема 5. Общественный выбор в условиях прямой демократии. Альтернативы правилу большинства.
- •Литература
- •Раздел 3. Общественный выбор в условиях представительной демократии
- •Тема 6. Общественный выбор в условиях представительной демократии: политическая конкуренция.
- •Литература
- •Тема 7. Общественный выбор в условиях представительной демократии: правительство и коалиции в парламенте.
- •Литература
- •Тема 8. Политические системы. Разделение власти. Проблемы федерализма.
- •Литература.
- •Раздел 4. Экономика бюрократии
- •Тема 9. Экономика бюрократии
- •Литература.
- •Раздел 5. Политическая экономия и общественная политика.
- •Тема 10. Политическая экономия и общественная политика. Административный ресурс.
- •Литература
- •Тема 11. Политический деловой цикл и его особенности в современной росии.
- •Литература.
- •Раздел 6. Экономическая теория конституции
- •Тема 12. Конституционная экономика.
- •Литература.
- •Классические работы. Хрестоматии. Учебники.
- •Специальная литература к отдельным разделам.
- •Раздел 1. Предмет, метод и эволюция теорий общественного выбора
- •Раздел 2. Общественный выбор в условиях прямой демократии
- •2.1. Основы коллективного выбора
- •2.2 Выбор правил голосования
- •2.3. Правило большинства
- •2.4. Правило большинства и правило единогласия
- •2.5. Альтернативы правила большинства
- •2.6. Теория клубов
- •3.1 Двухпартийная конкуренция
- •3.2. Политическая конкуренция
- •3.3 Многопартийные системы
- •3.4. Теорема Эрроу о невозможности
- •3.5. Федерализм и общественный выбор
- •3.6. Манипулирование голосованием
- •3.7. Политические системы
- •Раздел 4.Экономика бюрократии.
- •4.1. Поиск политической ренты
- •4.2. Размеры правительства
- •4.3. Парадокс либерализма
- •Раздел 5. Политическая экономия и общественная политика.
- •5.1 Административный ресурс
- •5.2 Политический деловой цикл
- •5.3 Электоральный цикл: роль сми
- •Раздел 6. Экономическая теория конституции
- •6.1 Конституциональная экономика
- •6.2 Парадокс либерализма
- •Базы данных Журналы по теории общественного выбора
- •Научные центры по изучению теории общественного выбора
- •Прочие организации
- •Политические партии
- •Информационные агентства и сми
- •Социологические службы
- •Информация по регионам России
- •Библиотеки
- •Методы организации обучения и оценки знаний
- •Методы организации обучения
- •Методы оценки знаний
Приложения Приложение 1. Структура учебников по теории общественного выбора
1.1. David B. Johnson Public Choice. An Introduction to the New Political Economy (1991)
Introduction
Economics: The Study of Choice Behavior
The Private Market
The Political Market and Public Goods
Voting, Rational Abstention, and Rational Ignorance
The Will of the People
Proportional Representation
Other Preference Indicators
Political Parties
The Bureaucracy
Intertemporal Resource Allocation
Rent Seeking
Constitutional Economics
Market Comparisons
1.2. Joe B. Stevens The Economics of Collective Choice (1993)
Introduction
Efficiency and Equity as Reasons for Collective Action
Markets: Will They Be Efficient?
Markets: Will They Be Fair?
Voluntary Solution to Market Failure
Direct (Participatory) Government
Legislative Government: Part 1
Legislative Government: Part 2
Administrative Government: Part 1
Administrative Government: Part 2
Federated Government
1.3. Randall G. Holcombe The Economics Foundation of the Government(1994)
Introduction
The Economic Theory of Rights
Governments and Constitutions
A Model of Rights and Government
Distinction between Clubs and Governments
Government as Monopolist
Institutions and Exchange
Constitutional Evolution
Competition in Politics
The Concept of Agreement
Positive and Normative Theories of Government
Political Ethics and Public Policy
Conclusion
1.4. Patrick J. Gunning Understanding Democracy: An Introduction to Public Choice (1996)
Preface
1: The Field of Public Choice
2: Market or Government?
3: The Market Economy, Public Goods, and Market Failure
4: Politicians and the Constitution
5: Constitutional Protection Against External Costs and Costs of Power Abuse
6: Methods of Electing Legislators
7: Voting and Elections: Some Simple Ideas
8: More on Voting and Elections
9: Inefficiency of Majority Rule
10: Vote Trading and Efficiency
11: The Legislature
12: Political Parties and Pressure Groups
13: Democracy and Bureaucracy: Some History
14: Inefficiency of Bureaucracy
15: Improvements and Reforms
16: Rent Seeking
17: Privatization by Liquidating a Bureau
18: Other Forms of Privatization
1.5. Paddy McNutt The Economics of Public Choice (1-st ed. 1996, 2-nd ed. 2002)
An Overview
A Moral Public Choice Set
Social Choice and Voting
The Political Economy of Voting
The Growth of Government
Bureaucracy and Government Output
Classic Rent-Seeking
Legal Barriers to Entry and Compensation
Economic Analysis of Clubs
The Anarchy of Legitimacy
The Conspiracy of Equality
Global Political Economy
1.6 Dennis C. Mueller .Public Choice II, (1989, 1995)
Introduction
Part I. Origins of the State
The reason for collective choice – allocative efficiency
Allocative efficiency or redistribution
Part II. Public Choice in a direct democracy
The choice of voting rule
Majority rule - positive properties
Majority rule – normative properties
Simple alternative to majority rule
Complicated alternative to majority rule
Exit, voice, and disloyalty
Part III. Public Choice in a representative democracy
Two-party competition – deterministic voting
Two-party competition – probabilistic voting
Multiparty systems
Rent seeking
The supply of government output
Part IV. Applications
Political competition and macroeconomic performance
The logic of collective action and macroeconomic performance
The size of government
The paradox of voting
Part V. Normative Public Choice
Real-valued social welfare functions
Axiomatic social welfare functions
A just social contract
Utilitarian contracts
Part V. Normative and Positive Theories of Public Choice Compared
Redistribution
Allocation, redistribution, and public choice
1.7 Dennis C. Mueller .Public Choice III, (2003)
Introduction
Part I. Origins of the State
The reason for collective choice – allocative efficiency
The reason for collective choice – redistribution
Part II. Public Choice in a direct democracy
The choice of voting rule
Majority rule – positive properties
Majority rule – normative properties
Simple alternative to majority rule
Complicated alternative to majority rule
Exit, voice, and disloyalty
Part III. Public Choice in a representative democracy
Federalism
Two-party competition – deterministic voting
Two-party competition – probabilistic voting
Multiparty systems
The paradox of voting
Rent seeking
Bureaucracy
Legislatures and bureaucracies
Dictatorship
Part IV. Applications and testing
Political competition and macroeconomic performance
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying
The size of government
Government size and economic performance
Part V. Normative Public Choice
Social welfare function
The impossibility of a social ordering
A just social contract
The constitution as a utilitarian contract
Liberal rights and social choices
Part VI. What have we learned?
Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
Allocation, redistribution, and public choice
1.8. Denis C. Mueller Constitutional Democracy (1996)
I. The Problems
Democracy in America
Democracy in the Other Part of the World
II. The Constitutional Perspectives.
The Constitutional Premise
Why have Government
The Nature of a Constitution
III. Institutions to Reveal and Advance a Community’s Interests
Federalism
Direct Democracy
Representative Democracy: Proportional Representation
Representative Democracy: Two-Party Government
The Two Party System of Representation Compared
The Parliamentary Voting Rule
IV. Institutions to Constrain Government
The Referendum
Bicameralism
Rights
The Market and the State
Redistribution
The Executive Branch
Dictatorship
The Judiciary
V. Getting Started
Citizenship
The Constitutional Convention
VI. Coming to an End
Epilogue
1.9. Allan Drazen Political Economy in Macroeconomics (2000)
Part I. Basic Issues and tools of analysis
What is a Political Economy?
Economic Models for Political Analysis
Decisionmaking Mechanism
Part II. Commitment, credibility, and reputation
The Time Consistency Problem
Law Institutions, and Delegated Authority
Credibility and Reputation
Part III. Heterogeneity and connflicting interests
Elections and changes in Policymakers
Redistribution
Public Goods
Inaction, Delay, and Crisis
Part IV. Application to policy issues
Factor Accumulations and Growth
The International Economy
Economic Reform and transition
The Size of Government and the Number of Nations
1.10. Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaning Economic Policy (2000)
General Introduction
I. Tools of Political Economics
Preferences and Institutions
Electoral Competition
Agency
Partisan Politicians
II. Redistributive Politics
General-Interest Politics
Special-Interest Politics
III. Comparative Politics
Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition
Institutions and Accountability
Political Regimes
IV. Dynamic Politics
Dynamic Policy Problems
Capital Taxation
Public Debt
Growth
V. Monetary Politics
Credibility of Monetary Policy
Electoral Cycles
Institutions and Incentives
International Policy Coordination
What Next?