Приложение 3. Курсы по теории общественного выбора 90-х годов

3.1. Joe McGarrirty (GMU)

Section one: Basic Theory

1. Introduction and Econometrics Review

2. Constitutional Political Economy

3. Voting

   1. The Rationality of voting

   2. Majority Rule

   3. Median voter

   4. Cycles

   5. Proportional representation

   6. Preference indications: Logrolling and exit & voice

   7. Political parties

Section two: The interest group theory of government

4. The Interest group theory

5. Interest groups

6. Case studies

7. The role of institutions in promoting wealth transfers

8. Congress' wealth transfers and the principle agent

   1. Bureaucracy

   2. Special topic: competing bureaucracies

9. The Role of the executive in the wealth transfer process

10. Congressional wealth transfers

11. Rent Seeking

12. Explanations for congressional votes that can not be explained by the interest group theory

    1. Ideology

    2. Legislator Investment

3.2. Peter Boettke (GMU)

1. Introduction to the course

2. The Public Choice paradigm

3. A Public choice analysis of voting

4. Alternative institutions of voting

5. Representative Democracy

6. Bureaucratic Decision-Making

7. Rent-seeking Theory and Evidence

8. Spring Break

9. The Growth of Government

10. Industry Studies of Regulation

11. Public Choice and Macroeconomics

12. Normative Public Choice

13. Comparative Political Economy

3.3. Bryan Caplan (GMU)

1: Public Goods, Externalities, and Comparative Institutions

2: The Logic of Collective Action

3: The Median Voter Model

4: Rational Ignorance and the "Miracle of Aggregation"

5: Efficiency and Bargaining

6: Basics of Public Opinion and Voter Motivation

7: Empirical Accuracy of the Median Voter Model

8: Division of Powers, Special Interests, and Rent-Seeking

9: Political Competition and Political Collusion

10-11: Wittman's Myth of Democratic Failure

12: Expressive Voting

13: Systematic Bias Versus the Miracle of Aggregation

14-15: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Markets

3.4. Francisco C. Rodríguez (UMD)

Theory of Public Choice I:

Growth, Distribution and Politics1. The Median Voter Model

0. Introduction to the study of political economy

Part I: Visions of Politics

1. The Median Voter Model

2. Special Interests, Political Contributions and Asymmetries in political power.

3. Endogenous Property Rights

4. Endogenous Preferences and Ideology

Part II: Visions of Growth

5. Steady State Growth Theory

6. Endogenous Growtha.

AK and Spillover Modelsb.

Human Capitalc.

Diffusion and Innovation

7. Scale Effects and Size of Market

8. International Trade and Economic Growth

9. Natural Resources and Economic Growth

10. Institutions, Development and Growth

11. The Empirical Convergence Debates

12. Productivity and Technological Change

Part III: Inequality and Redistribution

13. Theories of the Formation of Inequality

14. Exploitation

15. Theories of Justice

16. Why is there Redistribution?

Part IV: The Political Economy of Growth: The Long Run

16. Inequality and Growth in the Median Voter Model

17. Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking

18. Growth with Endogenous Property Rights

19. Inefficient Government and Corruption

Part V: The Political Economy of Growth: The Short and Medium Runs

20. Stabilization

21. Trade Policy and Trade Liberalization

22. Policies for Human Capital Accumulation

3.5. Denis Muller (Vienna University)

1. Reasons for Collective Choice2. The Choice of Voting Rule

3. Majority Rule

4. Majority Rule and Unanimity Rule

5. Complicated Alternatives to Majority Rule

6. Two-Party Competition

7. Candidate Competition and Campaign Contributions

8. Multiparty Systems

9. Rent Seeking

10. The Size of Government

11. Arrow Impossibility Theorems

12. The Liberal Paradox

13. Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Public Choice

3.6. Roger Cogleton (GMU)

1. Introduction: Positive Theories of the State: On Overview

2. Property Rights, Coordination Problem and Economic Growth

3. Politics in Modern Democracies

4. Welfare Economics: An Overview of Normative Theories for Policy Analysis

5. Application: Externalities and Pure Public Goods

6. Application: Environmental Externalities

7. Application: Poverty Programs

8. Application: Health Insurance

9. On the Efficiency of Public and Private Production

10. Application: Energy Conservation

11. Application: International Trade and Rent Seeking

12. Taxation, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Choices

13. Summary and Overview

3.7. Mark Crain (GMU)

1. Overview: Objective, Grade, Hints

Part I: Government and Economic Perfomance

2. The Rise and Decline of Nations

3. Enforcement Mechanisms and Political Agreements

4. Innovations in the Statees

5. Cultural Determinants of Institutions and Growth

Part II: Legislatures as Firms

6. Approaches to the Organization of Legislatures

7. Reputation and Credibility in Politics: Possible Solutions to the Time-Inconsistency Problem

8. Determinants of Policy: Ideology vs. Economic Interests

Part III: Electoral Institutions and Political Competition

9. Problems in Measuring Competitiveness

10. Campaign Finance, the Image Industry and Determinants of Electoral Outcomes

11. The Politics of Machines: Ballot Technology and Configuration

3.8. Robert Tollison (GMU)

1. Overview of Course

2. The Demand for Legislation

   1. The Theory of Economic Regulation

   2. The Theory of Economic Deregulation

   3. The Role of Institutions in Promoting Durable Wealth Transfers

   4. A Short Course on the Theory of Rent Seeking

3. The Production and Supply of Wealth Transters

   1. Wealth Transfers and the Characteristics of Legislatures

   2. Wealth Transfers and the Characteristics of Legislators

   3. The Role of the Executive in the Wealth-Transfer Process

4. Reduced-Form Models of the Demand and Supply of Legislation

   1. The Role of Ideology in Voting

   2. Public Choice and the Federalists

   3. Voters

   4. Committees

   5. Agency Oversight

   6. Heterogeneous Firms

   7. Campaign Finance

   8. Districting

3.9. Richard E Wagner (GMU)

1. Welfare economics and the theory of the state

2. Voting rules, preference revelation, and resource allocation

3. Political competition, interest groups and legislation

4. Bureaucracy and public production

5. Federalism and competitive governments

6. Public choice and constitutional order

7. Tax policy and interest group competition

8. Political and Partisan business cycle theory

9. Public debt, fiscal policy, and public choice

10. Economic efficiency and the social production of rules

11. Trade protection and rent seeking

12. Public Choice and International Order

3.10. Leonid Polishchuk (NES)

1. Предмет политической экономии

2. Политические ограничения: как обуздать "Левиафана"

3. Экономический анализ избирательной системы

4. Разделение властей: экономическая роль сдержек и противовесов

5. Границы государства в экономике

6. Стимулы государственных чиновников

7. Лоббирование и патронаж

8. Политэкономия бездействия

9. Политэкономия реформ

10. Децентрализация государства

11. Основы правового государства

3.11. J. Buchanan and Victor Vanberg (GMU)

1. The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy

2. The Reason of Rules I: Personal Rules

3. The Individualist Foundation of Constitutional Order

4. The Reason of Rules II: Social Rules

5. Structure Induced Behavior in Politics and Markets

6. Rules in Markets and Organizations

7. Competitive Federalism and National Sovereignty

8. Constitutional Choice and Cultural Evolution

9. Constitutions and Economic Development

10. Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice