Приложение 2. Хрестоматии по теории общественного выбора

2.1. Readings in Public Sector Economics. Ed. by S.Baker, C.Elliot. D.C. Health and Company, 1990.

Section I: Perspectives on Economics and the Public Sector

Section II: Economics of Externalities

Section III: Economics of Public Goods

Public Goods as a Market Failure

Public Goods Issues

Distributional Equity

Section IV: Economics of the Political Process

Collective Decision Making

Public Decision Rules

Public Expenditure Issues

Section V: Economics of Taxation

Optimal Taxation

Tax Reform

Section VI: Economics of Fiscal Federalism

2.2. Public Goods and Market Failures. A Critical Examinations. Ed. by Tyler Cowen. New Brunswick and London Transaction Publishers. 1992

Introduction

1. Public Goods and Externalities Old and New Perspectives. T.Cowen

Section I: The Theory of Market Failure

2. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. P.A.Smuelson

3. The Anatomy of Market Failure. F.M.Bator

Section II: Developments in the Theory of Markets

4. Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Critique of Public Goods Theory. K.D.Goldin

5. Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule? E.R.Brubaker

6. The Private Production of Public Goods. H.Demsetz

7. The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights. H.Demsetz

8. State-of-Nature Theory and the Rise of Social Institutions. A.Shotter

9. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure. C.M.Tebout

10. An Economic Theory of Clubs. J.M.Buchanan

11. The Problem of Externality. C.J.Dahlman

Section III: Case Studies

12. The Problem of Cooperation. R.Axelrod

13. The Lighthouse in Economics. R.H.Coase

14. The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation. S.N.S. Cheuhg

15. Fire Protection. R.W. Poole, Jr.

16. Leisure and Recreational Services. R.W. Poole, Jr.

17. Private Solutions to Cinservation Problems. R.J.Smith

18. The Private Supply of Education: Some Historical Evidence. J.High, J.Ellig

2.3. Perspectives on Public Choice: А Handbook, Ed. by Dennis C. Mueller, 1997

1 Public choice in perspective, D.C. Mueller

Part I. The need for the forms of cooperation

2 Economic theories of the state, R.Hardin

3 Neither markets nor states: Linking transformation processes in collective action arenas, E.Ostrom, J.Walker

4 The political economy of federalism, R.P. Inman, D.L.Rubinfeld

5 The public choice of international organizations, B.S.Frey

6 Constitutional public choice, D.C. Mueller

Part II. Voting rules and preference aggregation

7 Cycling and majority rule, J.M.Enelow

8 Majority rule, D.W.Rae, E.Shickler

9 Group choice and individual judgments, H.Peyton Young

10 Some paradoxes of preference aggregation, P.K.Pattanaik

11 Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities, T.N.Tideman

Part III. Electoral politics

12 The spatial analysis of elections and committees: Four decades of research, P.C.Ordeshook

13 Multiparty electoral politics, N.Shofield

14 Interest groups: Money, information, and influence, D.Austen-Smith

15 Logrolling, T.Stratmann

16 Political business cycle, M.Paldam

Part IV. Individual behavior and collective action

17 When is it rational to vote, J.H.Aldrich

18 Voting behavior, M.P.Fiorina

19 Public choice experiments, E.Hoffman

Part V. Public choice in action

20 Modern bureaucratic theory, R.Wintrobe

21 The positive theory of public bureaucracy, T.M.Moe

22 The political economy of taxation, W.Hettich, S.L.Winer

23 Rent seeking, R.D.Tollison

24 Endogenous protection: The empirical evidence, S.P.Mage

25 Why does government's share of national income grow?An assessment of the recent literature on the U.S. experience, C.M.Holsey, T.E.Borcherding

2.2. The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Ed. by W. Shughrat II and L. Rarrolini. Cheltenhain.2001

Part I. Methodology

1 The old and new public choice: Chicago versus Virginia. W.C.Mitchell

2 Property rights: private and political institutions. L. de Alessi

3 The logic of collective action. O.Azfar

4 Social choice theory. M.J.G.Cain

Part II. The constitutional framework

5 Constitutional choice. G.Brennan, A,Hamilton

6 Monarchies, hereditary and non-hereditary. G.Tallock

7 The anatomy of political representation: direct democracy, parliamentary democracy, and representative democracy. T.R. Sass

Part III. Institutional mechanism of collective choice

8 Institutions, durability, and the value of political transactions. W.M.Crain

9 Voting. M.C.Munger

10 On legislatures and legislative efficiency wages. R.E. McCormick, C.S.Turner

11 Bureaucracy. W.A.Niskanen

12 Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance. K.H. Chang, R.J.P. de Figueiredo,Jr., B.R.Weingast

13 The judiciary. G.M.Anderson

14 Money. K.B.Grier

15 Ideology. P.H.Rubin

16 Clubs and club goods. G.M.Anderson, W.F.Shughart, R.D.Tollison

Part IV. Public Choice perspectives on government and the economy

17 The interest-group theory of government. R.B.Eklund,Jr., R.D.Tollison

18 Rent seeking and rent extraction. F.S.McChesney

19 Public choice and public finance. R.G.Halcombe

20 Politics and the macro economy. R.E.Wagner

21 Monetary policy. M.Toma

22 The politics of government growth. R.D.Congleton

23 Is trust in government compatible with trustworthy government? D.R.Lee, J.R.Clark

Part V. The Public Choice revolution

24 Public choice as an experimental science. L.R.Anderson

25 The public choice approach to economic history. R.E.Ekelund,Jr., A.B.Davidson

26 Law and economics. B.L.Benson

27 Public choice and the environment. B.Yandle

28 Institutions, policy, and economic growth. G.W.Scully

29 Public choice and economic growth. R.G.Halcombe

30 The international economy in public choice perspective. C.K.Rowley