- •Preface
- •Contents
- •About the Authors
- •Introduction
- •1.1 Conducting Business in Germany
- •1.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •1.1.2 Economic Background
- •1.1.3 Core Features of the German Legal System
- •1.1.3.1 Hierarchy of Norms and Constitutional Framework
- •1.1.3.2 Predominance of Federal Law
- •1.1.3.3 Distinction Between Public and Private Law
- •1.2 Key Aspects of German Business Law
- •1.2.1 Codified Rules and Judge-made Law
- •1.2.1.1 German Law as a Civil Law System
- •1.2.1.2 Importance of Judge-Made Law
- •1.2.1.3 Interpretation of Statutes
- •1.2.2 Increasing Importance of European Law
- •1.2.2.1 European Legal Instruments
- •1.2.2.2 Supremacy of European Law
- •1.2.2.3 Fundamental Freedoms
- •1.2.3 (Re-)current Issues in Corporate Law
- •1.3 The Legal Framework for Business Organizations in Germany
- •1.3.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •1.3.2 Options for Conducting Business in Germany
- •1.3.2.1 Establishing a Branch Office
- •1.3.2.2 Overview of Various Forms of Business Organizations
- •1.4 A Brief Introduction into German Insolvency Law
- •1.4.1 Objectives of German Insolvency Law
- •1.4.2 Reasons for Opening Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.2.1 Illiquidity
- •1.4.2.2 Over-indebtedness
- •1.4.2.3 Imminent Illiquidity
- •1.4.3 Insolvency Proceedings—Steps and Options
- •1.4.3.1 Petition to Open Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.3.2 Preliminary Proceedings
- •1.4.3.3 Regular Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.3.4 Reorganization Proceedings
- •References
- •Stock Corporation (AG)
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •2.1.2 Characteristics of the AG
- •2.1.3 Advantages of the AG
- •2.1.4 Disadvantages of the AG
- •2.2 Internal Organization
- •2.2.1 Governance Structure and Bodies of the AG
- •2.2.2.1 Composition and Appointment
- •2.2.2.2 Functions and Responsibilities of the Management Board
- •2.2.3.1 Composition and Appointment
- •2.2.3.2 Functions and Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board
- •2.2.5.1 Sphere of Competence of the Stockholders’ Meeting
- •2.2.5.2 Decision-Making Procedure
- •2.2.5.3 Minority Rights of Stockholders
- •2.3 The Capital of the AG
- •2.3.1 Equity and Capital Structure
- •2.3.1.1 Internal Financing
- •2.3.1.2 External Financing
- •2.3.1.3 Determining the Right Capital Structure
- •2.3.2 Share Capital of the Stock Corporation
- •2.3.2.1 Types of Stock
- •2.3.3 Capital Increases
- •2.3.3.1 Ordinary Capital Increase Against Contributions
- •2.3.3.2 Contingent Capital Increase
- •2.3.3.3 Capital Increase from Authorized Capital
- •2.3.3.4 Capital Increase from Retained Earnings
- •2.3.4 Capital Reductions
- •2.3.4.1 Ordinary Capital Reduction
- •2.3.4.2 Simplified Capital Reduction
- •2.3.4.3 Capital Reduction by Way of Redemption of Stocks
- •2.3.5 Capital Preservation
- •2.4 Formation, Dissolution and Liquidation of the AG
- •2.4.1 Formation
- •2.4.2 Dissolution and Liquidation
- •2.4.2.1 Dissolution
- •2.4.2.2 Liquidation
- •2.5 Employee Participation
- •2.5.1 Collective Bargaining and the Role of Labor Unions
- •2.5.2 Shop-Level Co-determination
- •2.5.3 Board-Level Co-determination
- •2.5.3.1 Coal and Steel Co-determination Act of 1951
- •2.5.3.2 One-Third Co-determination Act of 2004
- •2.5.3.3 Co-determination Act of 1976
- •2.6 Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.1 Introduction
- •2.6.1.1 Objectives of Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.1.2 Sources of German Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.2 Prohibition of Insider Trading
- •2.6.3 Publication of Inside Information
- •2.6.4 Share Ownership Notification Rules
- •References
- •Limited Liability Company (GmbH)
- •3.1 Introduction
- •3.1.1 Characteristics of the GmbH
- •3.1.2 The Lasting Success of the GmbH—A Historical Overview
- •3.1.4 Advantages of the GmbH as a Business Vehicle
- •3.2 Formation
- •3.2.1 Regular Formation Procedure
- •3.2.2 Simplified Formation Procedure
- •3.3 Internal Organization
- •3.3.1 Shareholders’ Meeting (Gesellschafterversammlung)
- •3.3.2 Managing Director (Geschäftsführer)
- •3.3.3 Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat)
- •3.4 Duties and Liability Risks of the Managing Director
- •3.4.1 Duties and Responsibilities of the Managing Director
- •3.4.1.1 Formation and Raising of the Share Capital
- •3.4.1.2 Preservation of the Share Capital
- •3.4.1.3 Accounting Duties
- •3.4.1.4 Duty to Prepare and Submit the Annual Accounts
- •3.4.1.5 Duty to File Petition for Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings
- •3.4.1.6 Calling of the Shareholders’ Meeting
- •3.4.1.7 Duty of Disclosure towards the Shareholders
- •3.4.1.8 Duties Arising in Connection with Entries in the Commercial Register
- •3.4.1.9 Duties Related to Social Security and Taxes
- •3.4.1.10 Information on the Business Letterhead
- •3.4.1.11 Other Duties
- •3.4.2 Liability Risks of Managing Directors
- •3.4.2.1 Liability to the Company
- •3.4.2.2 Liability to the Shareholders
- •3.4.2.3 Liability to Creditors of the GmbH
- •3.4.2.4 Liability for Violations of Competition Laws by the GmbH
- •3.4.2.5 Personal Liability under Tort Law
- •3.4.2.6 Liability to Tax Authorities and Social Insurance Agencies
- •3.4.3 Joint Responsibility/Joint and Several Liability
- •3.4.4 Statute of Limitations
- •3.4.5 Summary—Managerial Duties and Liability Risks
- •3.5 Shareholders’ Liability
- •3.5.1 Statutory Provisions Stipulating Personal Liability
- •3.5.2 Piercing the Corporate Veil
- •3.6 Protection of Minority Shareholders
- •3.6.1 Articles of Association—General Issues
- •3.6.2 Clauses to Protect Minority Shareholders
- •3.6.2.1 Need for Supplementary Protection
- •3.6.2.2 Overview of the Minority Protection Rules for GmbH Shareholders
- •3.6.2.3 Minority Protection Through Clauses in the Articles of Association
- •3.7 Dissolution and Liquidation
- •References
- •Corporate Acquisitions in Germany
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •4.2 Types of Transaction
- •4.2.1 Share Deal
- •4.2.2 Asset Deal
- •4.3 Typical Steps in the Acquisition Process
- •4.3.1 Auction Process
- •4.3.1.1 Initial Phase
- •4.3.1.2 Information Memorandum
- •4.3.1.3 Due Diligence
- •4.3.2 Negotiations with One Bidder Only
- •4.3.3 Key Elements of the Share Sale and Transfer Agreement
- •4.3.3.1 Purchase Price
- •4.3.3.2 Warranties and Indemnities
- •4.3.3.3 Covenants
- •4.3.4 Completion of the Transaction (Closing)
- •4.3.5 Post-Closing Integration/Restructuring
- •4.4 Specific Problems
- •4.4.1 Financing
- •4.4.2 Merger Control Issues
- •4.4.3 Other Regulatory Matters
- •4.5 Introduction to Public Takeovers
- •4.5.1 Scope of the Public Takeover Act
- •4.5.2 Requirements for the Bidding Process
- •4.5.2.1 Mandatory Offer
- •4.5.2.2 Offer Document
- •4.5.2.3 Financing the Bid
- •4.5.2.4 Time Limits and Procedures for Notifying BaFin
- •4.5.3 Evaluation of the Bid by the Target Company
- •4.5.4.1 Types of Consideration
- •4.5.4.2 Determination of the Offer Price/Consideration
- •4.5.5 Duty of Neutrality and Defence Measures
- •4.5.6 Role of BaFin
- •4.6 Squeeze-out of Minority Stockholders
- •4.6.1 Overview
- •4.6.2 Steps of the Squeeze-out Procedure
- •Cross-Border Corporate Activities
- •5.1 Cross-Border Transfer of Corporate Seat and Applicable Law
- •5.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.1.2 Introduction
- •5.1.3 German Conflict-of-Law Rules for Corporations
- •5.1.4 The Decisions of the European Court of Justice
- •5.1.4.1 The Segers Decision (1986)
- •5.1.4.2 The Daily Mail Decision (1988)
- •5.1.4.3 The Centros Decision (1999)
- •5.1.4.4 The Überseering Decision (2002)
- •5.1.4.5 The Inspire Art Decision (2003)
- •5.1.4.6 The Cartesio Decision (2008)
- •5.1.5 Status-quo of German Conflict-of-Laws Rules for Companies
- •5.1.6 Legislative Proposals
- •5.1.6.1 Connecting Factors
- •5.1.6.2 Scope of Application
- •5.1.6.3 Expected Consequences for Corporate Mobility
- •5.1.7 Competition of Corporate Forms—GmbH vs. Limited
- •5.1.7.1 Competition of Corporate Laws—Some Comments
- •5.1.7.2 Check List—Advantages and Disadvantages of a UK Ltd. Compared to a German GmbH
- •5.2 The European Company (SE)
- •5.2.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.2.2 General Background
- •5.2.3 Formation of the European Company
- •5.2.4 Corporate Governance in the SE
- •5.2.5 Employee Participation in the SE
- •5.2.6 Possible Use of the SE
- •5.2.6.1 Cross-Border Merger of Companies by Using SE
- •5.2.6.2 Reorganization of the European Organizational Structure
- •5.2.6.3 Change in the Corporate Governance Structure
- •5.2.6.4 Cross-Border Transfer of Corporate Seat
- •5.3 The European Private Company (SPE)
- •5.3.1 The Commission Proposal on the Statute for a SPE
- •5.3.2 Controversial Issues
- •5.4 The EU Cross-Border Mergers Directive and Its Implementation in Germany
- •5.4.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.4.2 General Background
- •5.4.3 Implementation in Germany
- •5.4.4 Essential Steps in a Cross-Border Merger Proceeding
- •5.4.5 The SEVIC Decision of the ECJ
- •5.5 International Joint Ventures—A Check List for Relevant Issues
- •5.5.1 Commercial Background for Establishing a Joint Venture
- •5.5.2 Outline of Key Issues for Establishing a Joint Venture
- •References
- •Supplementary Materials
- •6.1 Convenience Translations
- •Further Translations
- •6.2 Examples of Corporate Documents
- •6.2.1 Articles of Association of a GmbH
- •6.2.2 Rules of Procedure for the Management Board of a GmbH
- •Selected Literature on German, International and Comparative Issues of Business Law
- •Index
80 |
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3 Limited Liability Company (GmbH) |
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3.4 Duties and Liability Risks of the Managing Director |
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94 |
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3.4.1 Duties and Responsibilities of the Managing Director |
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94 |
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3.4.2 Liability Risks of Managing Directors . . . . |
. . . . . . . . . . . |
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98 |
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3.4.3 Joint Responsibility/ Joint and Several Liability |
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102 |
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3.4.4 |
Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
. . . . . . . . . . . |
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103 |
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3.4.5 Summary—Managerial Duties and Liability Risks |
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103 |
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3.5 |
Shareholders’Liability |
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103 |
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3.5.1 Statutory Provisions Stipulating Personal Liability |
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104 |
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3.5.2 |
Piercing the Corporate Veil . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
. . . . . . . . . . . |
. . |
105 |
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3.6 Protection of Minority Shareholders |
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107 |
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3.6.1 |
Articles of Association—General Issues |
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107 |
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3.6.2 Clauses to Protect Minority Shareholders |
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108 |
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3.7 |
Dissolution and Liquidation |
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113 |
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References |
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113 |
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Characteristics of the GmbH
The German limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH) is a highly flexible corporate form ideally suited for medium-sized closelyheld enterprises, as well as for use within group structures.
The GmbH may be established by one or more natural or juristic persons. As a corporation (Körperschaft) the GmbH is a legal entity separate from its shareholders. Once the GmbH is registered with the Commercial Register—upon which the company comes into legal existence—and the share capital has been paid in, the shareholders may not be held liable for any obligation of the GmbH.1
The required statutory minimum share capital is EUR 25,000. There is no maximum amount. In an effort to maintain the GmbH’s as an attractive business vehicle against increasing competition from other corporate forms in the European Union (and, in particular the Limited Liability Company from the UK), the German legislator has, however, introduced a new ‘subspecies’of the GmbH, the entrepreneurial company (Unternehmergesellschaft, UG) which may be founded with a share capital of only EUR 1.00.2
In practice, no share certificates are issued and the shares of a GmbH are not publicly traded on the stock exchange. Instead, GmbH shares may be transferred by way of assignment in form of a notarial deed.Alist of the shareholders has to be filed with the Commercial Register and is subject to public inspection.
1 There are very few exceptions to this rule; see infra, Sect. 3.5.
2 Of course, the correct abbreviation would be UG (haftungsbeschränkt) (entrepreneurial company (limited in liability)). Section 5a para 1 GmbHG expressly demands that the addition ‘haftungsbeschränkt’ be used at all times when conducting business, intended to be a warning signal for third parties. However, for the sake of readability we will hereinafter use the less unwieldy ‘UG’.
3.1 Introduction |
81 |
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The GmbH must have at least one managing director (Geschäftsführer) who manages the company and represents it in and out of court. In contrast to a German AG, however, the shareholders’ meeting is considered the principal decisionmaking authority: The shareholders’ meeting may give binding instructions to the managing director even as to specific issues of day-to-day management. There is no general requirement for a GmbH to establish a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat); however, the GmbH must establish a supervisory board if the company is subject to mandatory German co-determination rules which require that representatives of the workforce become members of the supervisory board. Furthermore, the shareholders may voluntarily stipulate a supervisory board in the articles of association (Gesellschaftsvertrag).
3.1.2 The Lasting Success of the GmbH—A Historical Overview
In Germany, the limited liability company is traditionally subject to specific regulation in form of the Act on German Limited Liability Companies (GmbH-Gesetz, GmbHG). This Act was passed in 1892 in order to fill the regulatory gap between the GermanAG (as the classic corporate form for large enterprises) on the one hand, and business associations like civil law partnerships (BGB-Gesellschaften) or commercial law partnerships (OHG, KG), on the other hand. The GmbH is typically designed for medium sized companies with a limited number of shareholders (in contrast to theAG) and with shares not being publicly traded.
As the most frequent company form in Germany, the GmbH has long been a success story, and other countries have adopted the German legislative model, enacting legal frameworks similar to the German GmbHG (e.g. Austria in 1906, England in 1907, France in 1925, Luxembourg in 1933, Belgium in 1935, Italy in 1942, Greece in 1955, and The Netherlands in 19713). In Germany, the legal framework of the GmbH has been subject to numerous amendments by the legislator and has also been supplemented frequently by judge-made law. Thus, although the GmbH faces increasing competition from similar company forms from other European Member States, it still remains by far the most popular corporate form in Germany (Fig. 3.1).
3.1.3 Recent Developments:
Reform of the Statutory Framework in 2008
The continuing success of the GmbH as a business vehicle is greatly due to constant legislative efforts to adapt its legal framework to the ever-changing economic circumstances. In recent times, the most significant reform has been the ‘Act on the Modernization of the Limited Liability Company Law and the Prevention of
3 See Beurskens and Noack 2008, p. 1070.
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3 Limited Liability Company (GmbH) |
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Limited liability company (GmbH) |
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1016443 |
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Limited commercial partnership (KG) |
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236554 |
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Registered sole proprietor (eK) |
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176836 |
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General commercial partnership (oHG) |
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27422 |
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Branches of foreign companies (e.g. Ltd.) |
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19534 |
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Stock corporation (AG) |
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17583 |
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Limited partnership by shares (KGaA) |
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236 |
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Societas europaea (SE) |
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116 |
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400000 |
800000 |
1200000 |
Fig. 3.1 Registered companies in Germany as of 1 January 2010. (Figures according to Kornblum 2010)
Abuses’ (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen, MoMiG), enacted in 2008.
As its name suggests, the MoMiG aimed at abolishing certain abusive forms of the GmbH (e.g. fraudulently damaging creditors) as well as introducing various new features. This was done in order to keep the GmbH an attractive business vehicle for entrepreneurs given the increasing competition of company forms within the EU.4 The reform of the statutory framework included, inter alia, the following important amendments:
•Simplifying and Accelerating the Formation and Registration process: In order to achieve this goal, the formation procedure has been deregulated considerably. Among other steps, the requirement to obtain a governmental approval prior to registration with the Commercial Register (Handelsregister) in specific formation scenarios (e.g. forming a GmbH with a business purpose requiring a public license) has been waived. Furthermore, the legislature provided for an option to establish a GmbH by using a standard template form. Thus, the establishment can be achieved more quickly and less expensively because in standard scenarios some notarial costs can be saved.
•Alternative Business Form: In the competition of European corporate forms (following the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the famous Centros case) the German legislature felt the need to improve the options for entrepreneurs regarding the comparatively high statutory minimum capital required to establish a German GmbH. But instead of simply reducing the statutory minimum capital from EUR 25,000 to EUR 10,000 (as was discussed during the legislative debates) or even to EUR 1.00, which would approximate the le gal requirements for a private Limited Liability Company formed in England or Wales—the German legislature introduced a third, alternative option: The introduction of a new ‘entry-level’ GmbH subtype: the so-called entrepreneurial company (Unternehmergesellschaft, UG). Such an UG can be formed without complying with the minimum capital provisions applicable to a ‘standard’ GmbH, but is subject to certain other restrictions. Furthermore, by increasing
4 For a discussion of this development see infra, Sect. 5.1.
3.1 Introduction |
83 |
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the capital to at least EUR 25,000 an UG may, in the course of its existence, be changed to the ‘standard’GmbH.
•Facilitating Share Purchases: To facilitate share purchases, the legislature has introduced a mechanism for bona fide acquisitions of shares from someone who is not the true owner of the shares. The company must file a list of shareholders with the Commercial Register, which is subject to public inspection. In regards to the GmbH, only a shareholder actually registered in this list will be considered a shareholder. The acquisition of shares from a person listed in this list will be considered valid even if such person has not been the correct shareholder for more than three years, or the incorrectness of the list is attributable to the real owner of the shares. Thus, for practical purposes, a potential buyer can rely on the list of shareholders for acquisition purposes if no objection has been raised to an incorrect entry on the list for the last three years.
•SimplificationofCapitalPreservationRules:UntiltheMoMiGenteredintoforce in 2008, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) took a rather extensive line of interpretation of the capital preservation rules for the GmbH. According to this view, any payment of the company to a shareholder reducing its statutory capital was prohibited, regardless of whether or not the payment was compensated by the company (e.g. by acquiring a fully recoverable claim of (re-)payment, vollwertiger Gegenanspruch). Due to this rather formalistic interpretation of the capital preservation rules by the BGH and the lower courts, the ability of a GmbH to extend loans to shareholders was restricted considerably. In practice, this was considered a major obstacle for corporate group financing, e.g. for so-called ‘upstream loans’ and also for cash pooling agreements. Under the MoMiG the legislature has now returned to the so-called balance sheet approach: payments made by the company to a shareholder are admissible if they are—from a balance-sheet point of view—fully covered by a claim for repayment. Thus, the GmbH may extend loans to a shareholder if the shareholder can objectively be expected to repay the loan. Accordingly, the MoMiG permits intra-group payments made by the GmbH pursuant to a domination agreement or a profit and loss absorption agreement, as well as upstream security provided in favor of a shareholder.
•Facilitating Shareholder Loans: Prior to the MoMiG reform, loans and other contributions by shareholders were treated as quasi-equity. Thus, they were pro hibited from being repaid if they were given or retained in a crisis of the GmbH, i.e. in a situation in which the company would have been unable to obtain a loan from other creditors at regular market conditions. However, these strict rules had an adverse effect on corporate group financing. Through the MoMiG, the legis lature has now considerably relaxed the former case-law regime by clarifying the scope of the statutory provisions: The company may grant shareholder loans at any time; the former distinction between equity-replacing and regular loans has been abolished.5 However, in the interest of outside creditors, shareholder
5 Loans of a minority shareholder who holds up to 10% of the shares and is not a director are not affected. Furthermore, there is no subordination of loans if the lender acquires shares of the company while it is already in financial distress as a means of restructuring the entity.