- •Preface
- •Contents
- •About the Authors
- •Introduction
- •1.1 Conducting Business in Germany
- •1.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •1.1.2 Economic Background
- •1.1.3 Core Features of the German Legal System
- •1.1.3.1 Hierarchy of Norms and Constitutional Framework
- •1.1.3.2 Predominance of Federal Law
- •1.1.3.3 Distinction Between Public and Private Law
- •1.2 Key Aspects of German Business Law
- •1.2.1 Codified Rules and Judge-made Law
- •1.2.1.1 German Law as a Civil Law System
- •1.2.1.2 Importance of Judge-Made Law
- •1.2.1.3 Interpretation of Statutes
- •1.2.2 Increasing Importance of European Law
- •1.2.2.1 European Legal Instruments
- •1.2.2.2 Supremacy of European Law
- •1.2.2.3 Fundamental Freedoms
- •1.2.3 (Re-)current Issues in Corporate Law
- •1.3 The Legal Framework for Business Organizations in Germany
- •1.3.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •1.3.2 Options for Conducting Business in Germany
- •1.3.2.1 Establishing a Branch Office
- •1.3.2.2 Overview of Various Forms of Business Organizations
- •1.4 A Brief Introduction into German Insolvency Law
- •1.4.1 Objectives of German Insolvency Law
- •1.4.2 Reasons for Opening Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.2.1 Illiquidity
- •1.4.2.2 Over-indebtedness
- •1.4.2.3 Imminent Illiquidity
- •1.4.3 Insolvency Proceedings—Steps and Options
- •1.4.3.1 Petition to Open Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.3.2 Preliminary Proceedings
- •1.4.3.3 Regular Insolvency Proceedings
- •1.4.3.4 Reorganization Proceedings
- •References
- •Stock Corporation (AG)
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •2.1.2 Characteristics of the AG
- •2.1.3 Advantages of the AG
- •2.1.4 Disadvantages of the AG
- •2.2 Internal Organization
- •2.2.1 Governance Structure and Bodies of the AG
- •2.2.2.1 Composition and Appointment
- •2.2.2.2 Functions and Responsibilities of the Management Board
- •2.2.3.1 Composition and Appointment
- •2.2.3.2 Functions and Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board
- •2.2.5.1 Sphere of Competence of the Stockholders’ Meeting
- •2.2.5.2 Decision-Making Procedure
- •2.2.5.3 Minority Rights of Stockholders
- •2.3 The Capital of the AG
- •2.3.1 Equity and Capital Structure
- •2.3.1.1 Internal Financing
- •2.3.1.2 External Financing
- •2.3.1.3 Determining the Right Capital Structure
- •2.3.2 Share Capital of the Stock Corporation
- •2.3.2.1 Types of Stock
- •2.3.3 Capital Increases
- •2.3.3.1 Ordinary Capital Increase Against Contributions
- •2.3.3.2 Contingent Capital Increase
- •2.3.3.3 Capital Increase from Authorized Capital
- •2.3.3.4 Capital Increase from Retained Earnings
- •2.3.4 Capital Reductions
- •2.3.4.1 Ordinary Capital Reduction
- •2.3.4.2 Simplified Capital Reduction
- •2.3.4.3 Capital Reduction by Way of Redemption of Stocks
- •2.3.5 Capital Preservation
- •2.4 Formation, Dissolution and Liquidation of the AG
- •2.4.1 Formation
- •2.4.2 Dissolution and Liquidation
- •2.4.2.1 Dissolution
- •2.4.2.2 Liquidation
- •2.5 Employee Participation
- •2.5.1 Collective Bargaining and the Role of Labor Unions
- •2.5.2 Shop-Level Co-determination
- •2.5.3 Board-Level Co-determination
- •2.5.3.1 Coal and Steel Co-determination Act of 1951
- •2.5.3.2 One-Third Co-determination Act of 2004
- •2.5.3.3 Co-determination Act of 1976
- •2.6 Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.1 Introduction
- •2.6.1.1 Objectives of Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.1.2 Sources of German Capital Markets Law
- •2.6.2 Prohibition of Insider Trading
- •2.6.3 Publication of Inside Information
- •2.6.4 Share Ownership Notification Rules
- •References
- •Limited Liability Company (GmbH)
- •3.1 Introduction
- •3.1.1 Characteristics of the GmbH
- •3.1.2 The Lasting Success of the GmbH—A Historical Overview
- •3.1.4 Advantages of the GmbH as a Business Vehicle
- •3.2 Formation
- •3.2.1 Regular Formation Procedure
- •3.2.2 Simplified Formation Procedure
- •3.3 Internal Organization
- •3.3.1 Shareholders’ Meeting (Gesellschafterversammlung)
- •3.3.2 Managing Director (Geschäftsführer)
- •3.3.3 Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat)
- •3.4 Duties and Liability Risks of the Managing Director
- •3.4.1 Duties and Responsibilities of the Managing Director
- •3.4.1.1 Formation and Raising of the Share Capital
- •3.4.1.2 Preservation of the Share Capital
- •3.4.1.3 Accounting Duties
- •3.4.1.4 Duty to Prepare and Submit the Annual Accounts
- •3.4.1.5 Duty to File Petition for Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings
- •3.4.1.6 Calling of the Shareholders’ Meeting
- •3.4.1.7 Duty of Disclosure towards the Shareholders
- •3.4.1.8 Duties Arising in Connection with Entries in the Commercial Register
- •3.4.1.9 Duties Related to Social Security and Taxes
- •3.4.1.10 Information on the Business Letterhead
- •3.4.1.11 Other Duties
- •3.4.2 Liability Risks of Managing Directors
- •3.4.2.1 Liability to the Company
- •3.4.2.2 Liability to the Shareholders
- •3.4.2.3 Liability to Creditors of the GmbH
- •3.4.2.4 Liability for Violations of Competition Laws by the GmbH
- •3.4.2.5 Personal Liability under Tort Law
- •3.4.2.6 Liability to Tax Authorities and Social Insurance Agencies
- •3.4.3 Joint Responsibility/Joint and Several Liability
- •3.4.4 Statute of Limitations
- •3.4.5 Summary—Managerial Duties and Liability Risks
- •3.5 Shareholders’ Liability
- •3.5.1 Statutory Provisions Stipulating Personal Liability
- •3.5.2 Piercing the Corporate Veil
- •3.6 Protection of Minority Shareholders
- •3.6.1 Articles of Association—General Issues
- •3.6.2 Clauses to Protect Minority Shareholders
- •3.6.2.1 Need for Supplementary Protection
- •3.6.2.2 Overview of the Minority Protection Rules for GmbH Shareholders
- •3.6.2.3 Minority Protection Through Clauses in the Articles of Association
- •3.7 Dissolution and Liquidation
- •References
- •Corporate Acquisitions in Germany
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •4.2 Types of Transaction
- •4.2.1 Share Deal
- •4.2.2 Asset Deal
- •4.3 Typical Steps in the Acquisition Process
- •4.3.1 Auction Process
- •4.3.1.1 Initial Phase
- •4.3.1.2 Information Memorandum
- •4.3.1.3 Due Diligence
- •4.3.2 Negotiations with One Bidder Only
- •4.3.3 Key Elements of the Share Sale and Transfer Agreement
- •4.3.3.1 Purchase Price
- •4.3.3.2 Warranties and Indemnities
- •4.3.3.3 Covenants
- •4.3.4 Completion of the Transaction (Closing)
- •4.3.5 Post-Closing Integration/Restructuring
- •4.4 Specific Problems
- •4.4.1 Financing
- •4.4.2 Merger Control Issues
- •4.4.3 Other Regulatory Matters
- •4.5 Introduction to Public Takeovers
- •4.5.1 Scope of the Public Takeover Act
- •4.5.2 Requirements for the Bidding Process
- •4.5.2.1 Mandatory Offer
- •4.5.2.2 Offer Document
- •4.5.2.3 Financing the Bid
- •4.5.2.4 Time Limits and Procedures for Notifying BaFin
- •4.5.3 Evaluation of the Bid by the Target Company
- •4.5.4.1 Types of Consideration
- •4.5.4.2 Determination of the Offer Price/Consideration
- •4.5.5 Duty of Neutrality and Defence Measures
- •4.5.6 Role of BaFin
- •4.6 Squeeze-out of Minority Stockholders
- •4.6.1 Overview
- •4.6.2 Steps of the Squeeze-out Procedure
- •Cross-Border Corporate Activities
- •5.1 Cross-Border Transfer of Corporate Seat and Applicable Law
- •5.1.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.1.2 Introduction
- •5.1.3 German Conflict-of-Law Rules for Corporations
- •5.1.4 The Decisions of the European Court of Justice
- •5.1.4.1 The Segers Decision (1986)
- •5.1.4.2 The Daily Mail Decision (1988)
- •5.1.4.3 The Centros Decision (1999)
- •5.1.4.4 The Überseering Decision (2002)
- •5.1.4.5 The Inspire Art Decision (2003)
- •5.1.4.6 The Cartesio Decision (2008)
- •5.1.5 Status-quo of German Conflict-of-Laws Rules for Companies
- •5.1.6 Legislative Proposals
- •5.1.6.1 Connecting Factors
- •5.1.6.2 Scope of Application
- •5.1.6.3 Expected Consequences for Corporate Mobility
- •5.1.7 Competition of Corporate Forms—GmbH vs. Limited
- •5.1.7.1 Competition of Corporate Laws—Some Comments
- •5.1.7.2 Check List—Advantages and Disadvantages of a UK Ltd. Compared to a German GmbH
- •5.2 The European Company (SE)
- •5.2.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.2.2 General Background
- •5.2.3 Formation of the European Company
- •5.2.4 Corporate Governance in the SE
- •5.2.5 Employee Participation in the SE
- •5.2.6 Possible Use of the SE
- •5.2.6.1 Cross-Border Merger of Companies by Using SE
- •5.2.6.2 Reorganization of the European Organizational Structure
- •5.2.6.3 Change in the Corporate Governance Structure
- •5.2.6.4 Cross-Border Transfer of Corporate Seat
- •5.3 The European Private Company (SPE)
- •5.3.1 The Commission Proposal on the Statute for a SPE
- •5.3.2 Controversial Issues
- •5.4 The EU Cross-Border Mergers Directive and Its Implementation in Germany
- •5.4.1 Case Study
- •Case Study
- •5.4.2 General Background
- •5.4.3 Implementation in Germany
- •5.4.4 Essential Steps in a Cross-Border Merger Proceeding
- •5.4.5 The SEVIC Decision of the ECJ
- •5.5 International Joint Ventures—A Check List for Relevant Issues
- •5.5.1 Commercial Background for Establishing a Joint Venture
- •5.5.2 Outline of Key Issues for Establishing a Joint Venture
- •References
- •Supplementary Materials
- •6.1 Convenience Translations
- •Further Translations
- •6.2 Examples of Corporate Documents
- •6.2.1 Articles of Association of a GmbH
- •6.2.2 Rules of Procedure for the Management Board of a GmbH
- •Selected Literature on German, International and Comparative Issues of Business Law
- •Index
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person breaches its obligations under the Public Takeover Act, BaFin may impose sanctions, including fines of up to one million Euro.31
Any decisions made by BaFin may be challenged by way of an appeals procedure under administrative law. An appeals committee (Widerspruchsausschuss) will decide on objections against decisions of BaFin. These decisions of the appeals committee are subject to appeal (Beschwerde) to the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) in Frankfurt am Main.32
4.6 Squeeze-out of Minority Stockholders
At the same time as the Public Takeover Act entered into force (January 2002), a new rule on the squeeze-out of minority stockholders was introduced. This rule has not, however, been incorporated into the Public Takeover Act, but has been implemented in theAktG. Therefore, it applies to all stock corporations whether publicly listed or not. In addition, a squeeze-out of minority stockholders does not require a public bid in advance.
However, when implementing the EU Takeover Directive, Germany has also introduced a new takeover-related squeeze-out procedure which will be briefly described in Sect. 4.6.3 below.
4.6.1 Overview
Secs. 327a–327f of theAktG provide for a procedure for the squeeze-out of minority stockholders in return for cash compensation in the event that a stockholder holds at least 95% of the target company’s share capital (‘principal stockholder’). The target company must be a stock corporation or a partnership limited by shares incorporated in Germany. The shares of the target company do not need to be listed on a stock exchange.
The principal stockholder must provide a written report to the general meeting of the stockholders explaining the requirements for the squeeze-out and the fairness of the cash compensation. Moreover, a fairness opinion regarding the proposed cash compensation is required from independent auditors who will be appointed by a court upon application of the principal stockholder. The amount of the cash compensation may be subject to court review in a specific proceeding pursuant to the Spruchverfahrensgesetz (Appraisal ProceedingsAct).
31 See Secs. 60, 61 Public TakeoverAct.
32 The Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main has exclusive jurisdiction in this subject matter for the whole of Germany.
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4.6.2 Steps of the Squeeze-out Procedure
The squeeze-out procedure comprises the following steps:
•The principal stockholder determines the amount of cash compensation, which usually requires a valuation of the target by an independent auditor (such auditor to be appointed by the competent court upon application by the principal stockholder).
•Prior to the stockholders’ meeting which will decide on the squeeze-out, the principal stockholder must provide the management board of the target with a declaration from a bank stating that the bank guarantees the fulfilment of the principal stockholder’s obligation to pay the cash compensation to the minority stockholders.
•The principal stockholder must provide the stockholders’ meeting of the target company with a written report explaining the pre-conditions for the transfer of shares to the principal stockholder (such report also to be reviewed by the expert auditor). Moreover, it must explain and substantiate the appropriateness of the cash compensation.
•As from the time of convening the stockholders’ meeting, the following documents must be on display at the business premises of the target for inspection by the stockholders of the target company:
−Draft of the share transfer resolution;
−Annual accounts and management reports for the last three financial years;
−Above-mentioned report of the principal stockholder;
−Above-mentioned review by the expert auditor.
•Each stockholder must, upon request, be provided with a copy of the abovementioned documents without undue delay and free of charge.
•The resolution of the stockholders’ meeting requires a majority vote of at least three-quarters of the share capital represented at the passing of the resolution.
•The management board of the target company must apply for registration of the transfer resolution in the Commercial Register. Such application requires notarization.
•If no action to set aside the transfer resolution (Anfechtungsklage) has been filed within one month of the adoption of the resolution, the management board of the target company must notify the Commercial Register thereof in a so-called ‘negative declaration’ (Negativerklärung). Based on such declaration the transfer resolution will be entered into the Commercial Register and the stocks automatically transferred to the principal stockholder.
•Following the registration of the transfer resolution in the Commercial Register, the cash compensation must be paid to the minority stockholder by the principal stockholder.
A minority stockholder has the right to have the appropriateness of the cash compensation reviewed by a court in a specific appraisal proceeding (Spruchverfahren). Such procedure may also be initiated if the principal stockholder has not offered, or has not properly offered, any cash compensation and an action to set aside the transfer resolution based thereon has not been commenced within the avoidance period,
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has been withdrawn, or has been conclusively rejected. The application for such procedure may only be filed within three months of the registration of the transfer resolution in the Commercial Register.
4.6.3 The Takeover-Related Squeeze-out Procedure
as an Alternative
In addition to the general squeeze-out rules under theAktG described above, a new takeover-related squeeze-out procedure has been introduced implementing Art. 15 of the EU Takeover Directive.33 If, following its bid, a bidder holds at least 95% of the target company’s voting rights, the bidder will be able to acquire the remaining shares at a fair price. In order to achieve this, the bidder may apply for a squeeze-out of the minority stockholders in return for compensation within three months of the end of the period allowed for acceptance of the offer. In contrast to the squeeze-out procedure under the AktG, no stockholders’ resolution is necessary. The takeoverrelated squeeze-out becomes effective upon the court decision which will be binding on all remaining stockholders of the target company.
33 See Secs. 93 et seq. Public TakeoverAct.