- •§ 1.Syn Synopsis to Chapter 1: preliminary definitions 4
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268 § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •§ 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •§ 1.3 N1 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •§ 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •§ 1.5 Formal and Informal Contracts
- •§ 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •§ 1.7 Void Contracts
- •§ 1.8 Unenforceable Contracts
- •§ 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •§ 1.10 ''Bargain'' as a Contractual Expression
- •§ 1.11 Offer Defined
- •§ 1.12 Simultaneous Expressions of Assent: Contracts Without Offer and Acceptance
- •§ 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •§ 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •§ 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •§ 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •§ 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •§ 1.18 N1 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •[A] Implied Assumpsit
- •[B] Indebitatus or General Assumpsit
- •[C] Special Assumpsit
- •§ 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •§ 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •[A] Quasi Contract as a Source of Primary Rights
- •[B] Quasi Contract as a Remedial Device for Unwinding Failed Agreements
- •§ 1.21 General Contract Law, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. [a] General contract law and the Restatements
- •[B] The Uniform Commercial Code.
- •[C] The United Nations Convention
- •§ 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •§ 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Supp. To § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.3 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •Supp. To § 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •Supp. To § 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.7 Void Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.11 Offer Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •Supp. To § 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •Supp. To § 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •Supp. To § 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •Supp. To § 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.18 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •Supp. To § 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •Supp. To § 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •Supp. To § 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Part I formation of contracts topic a offer and acceptance chapter 2 offers; creation and duration of power of acceptance
- •§ 2.1 Preliminary Negotiation
- •§ 2.2 Preliminary Communications Compared to Offers-Interpretation
- •§ 2.3 Request for an Offer Is Not an Offer-Auctions and Solicited Offers
- •§ 2.4 N1 Offer by Publication or Advertisement
- •§ 2.5 Quotation of Prices; Estimates
- •§ 2.6 Authority or Instructions to an Agent
- •§ 2.7 N1 Offers at the Supermarket or Self-Service Shop
- •§ 2.8 Partial Agreements-Agreements to Agree and Agreements to Negotiate
- •§ 2.9 Formal Document Contemplated by the Parties
- •§ 2.10 What Constitutes a Written Contract-There May Be a Series of Communications
- •§ 2.11 Delivery of a Document as the Final Expression of Assent
- •§ 2.12 Printed Terms on Billheads, Letterheads, Receipts, Baggage Checks, etc.
- •§ 2.13 Intention to Affect Legal Relations-Social Engagements, Gentlemen's Agreements, Jests and Sham Agreements
- •§ 2.14 Duration of Power of Acceptance Created by an Offer
- •§ 2.15 Missed Deadlines in Option Contracts
- •§ 2.16 Reasonable Time for Acceptance
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer
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- •§ 2.18 Offers Are Usually Revocable
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- •§ 2.19 Notice of Revocation Necessary
- •39 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.20 Revocation Otherwise Than by Direct Notice
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- •§ 2.21 Revocation of General Offer by Publication
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- •§ 2.22 Irrevocable Offers-Meaning of ''Irrevocable''
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- •§ 2.23 Options Created by a Conditional Contract or Covenant
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- •§ 2.24 Contract to Keep an Offer Open
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- •§ 2.25 Effect of the Rule Against Enhancement of Damages
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- •§ 2.26 Offers Made Irrevocable by Statute and Public Policy
- •46 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.27 Deposits to Be Forfeited in Case of Revocation
- •47 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.28 Irrevocable Offers Under Seal
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- •§ 2.29 Revocation After Part Performance or Tender by the Offeree
- •49 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.30 Real Estate Brokerage and Other Agency Cases
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- •§ 2.31 N1 Effect of Action in Reliance That Is Not Part Performance
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- •§ 2.32 N1 Part Performance and the Indifferent Offer
- •52 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.33 When a Standing Offer of a Series of Separate Contracts Is Irrevocable
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- •§ 2.34 Effect of Death or Insanity on Power of Acceptance
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- •§ 3.2 In a Bargaining Transaction, Only the Offeree Has Power to Accept
- •81 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.3 Assignment of Power by an Option Holder-Irrevocable Offers
- •82 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.4 Motive With Which Offeree Renders Performance
- •83 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.5 Knowledge of Offer as a Pre-requisite to Acceptance
- •84 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.6 Knowledge of the Offer After Part Performance Already Rendered
- •Illustration 1
- •85 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.7 Acceptance ''Subject to Approval'' by a Third Party
- •86 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.8 Acceptance by Overt Act
- •87 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.9 Unilateral Contract-Acceptance by Beginning Requested Performance
- •88 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.10 Acceptance of a Published Offer of a Reward for Action or Contest Prize
- •89 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.11 When the Words ''I Accept Your Offer'' Would Be Ineffective
- •90 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.12 Acceptance by Forbearance From Action
- •91 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.13 When Notice of Acceptance Is Necessary
- •92 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.14 Notice as a Requisite of Guaranty and Letters of Credit
- •93 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.15 Notice as a Condition Distinguished From Notice as an Acceptance
- •94 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.16 Offer of a Promise, Requesting Non-promissory Action in Return
- •95 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.17 Offer of an ''Act'' for a Promise
- •96 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.18 Silence as a Mode of Acceptance
- •97 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.19 Can Offeror Make Silence Operate as Acceptance?
- •98 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.20 Belated or Conditional Acceptance Followed by Offeror's Silence
- •99 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.21 Silence Plus Additional Circumstances
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- •§ 3.22 Multiple Acceptances
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- •§ 3.23 Alternative Modes of Acceptance
- •102 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.24 Acceptance by Post
- •103 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.25 Acceptance by Telephone or Other Electronic Means
- •104 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.26 Withdrawal of a Letter of Acceptance From the Mails
- •105 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.27 Acceptance by Telegraph-When Operative
- •106 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.28 Acceptance Must Manifest Assent and Be Unconditional
- •107 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.29 An Acceptance May Be Unconditional Even Though the Acceptor Makes a Conditional Promise
- •108 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.30 Acceptance Not Conditional, Even Though Grumbling or Accompanied by a Request or by a New Offer
- •109 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.31 Subsequent Erroneous Interpretation Does Not Make an Acceptance Conditional
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- •§ 3.32 Attempts by the Offeree to Restate in the Acceptance the Terms of the Offer
- •111 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.33 Attempts by the Offeree to State in the Acceptance the Legal Operation of the Agreement
- •112 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.34 Mode of Acceptance Can Be Prescribed by the Offeror
- •113 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.35 Counter-Offers and Their Effect
- •114 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.36 Power to Accept an Offer Is Terminated by a Counter-Offer or Conditional Acceptance
- •115 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.37 Conditional Acceptances and Counter-Offers Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations Convention
- •116 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.38 A Counter-Offer or Rejection by One Who Has a ''Binding Option'' or an Irrevocable Offer Does Not Terminate the Power of Acceptance
- •117 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.39 Power of Acceptance Not Terminated by a Counter-Offer if Either Offeror or Offeree So Prescribes
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- •§ 3.40 Inquiries and Separate Offers Distinguished From Counter-Offers
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- •§ 3.41 Effect of Rejection of an Offer
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- •§ 4.2 Time of Performance Indefinite-Promises of ''Permanent'' Employment-At Will Employment
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- •§ 4.3 Indefiniteness of Price or Terms of Payment-Money as a Commodity
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- •§ 4.4 Agreed Methods of Determining the Price or Amount
- •154 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.5 N1 Reasonable Price-Quasi-Contractual Remedy After Performance
- •155 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.6 Uncertainty of Subject Matter to Be Exchanged for Price; Requirements and Output Contracts
- •156 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.7 Effect of Subsequent Verbal Clarification or Action by the Parties
- •157 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.8 Subsequent Action May Create a Quasi Contract
- •158 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.9 Mistake-Difficulty and Complexity of the Subject
- •159 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.10 Mistake as to the Words Used, or as to the Meaning Given to Words and Expressions
- •160 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.11 Mistake in Transmission of Messages
- •161 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.12 Objective and Subjective Theories
- •162 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.13 Mutual Assent-''Meeting of the Minds''
- •163 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.14 Auction Sales-Offers to Sell and to Buy
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Corbin on Contracts
Copyright 2007, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
PART I FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
TOPIC A OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
CHAPTER 3 ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF OFFER
1-3 Corbin on Contracts § 3.22
§ 3.22 Multiple Acceptances
[Go To Supp]
An offer may be so made as to empower a single offeree to accept many times, or to empower many offerees to accept. In the former case, the resulting series of contracts between the two parties may be either unilateral or bilateral, and may be wholly independent of each other or may be related in some way to each other. In the latter case, the contracts resulting from separate acceptances by different offerees will usually be quite separate and independent contracts.n1
Continuing guaranties are common illustrations of the former. ''In consideration of your discounting bills of exchange for Davies and Company, we hereby guarantee for the period of one year the prompt payment of all such bills to the extent of $3,000.'' The discounting of each bill as it is presented is a separate acceptance of this offer, each one creating a new unilateral contract with the guarantor. After each discount, the offer would be converted into a unilateral contract as to that particular bill,n2 but it would remain revocable by notice with respect to subsequent bills.n3
A letter of credit may be addressed to a single offeree, or to any bank or banker, or to whom it may concern. ''To the X Filling Station: If A should ask you to supply gasoline from time to time during the next twelve months, please supply it on thirty days credit. I guarantee payment of A's debts so contracted, not exceeding a total of $2000.''n4 This can be accepted by X by selling gasoline to A many times, but can be accepted by no one else. Here, too, the resulting contracts would all be unilateral and independent of each other. Such a letter of credit, however, may be addressed to any and all filling stations, or to any one of a particular line of stations, just as a traveller's letter of credit is usually addressed to a large number of specified correspondents.
There are also standing offers to manufacture and sell specified kinds of goods at stated prices, in quantities to be fixed by the buyer. ''The Racine Company hereby agrees with F. Hopkins to furnish, during the life of the patent, castings for the patented Hopkins gate, for forty cents per set.'' A succession of orders sent in by Hopkins for specified reasonable numbers of sets of castings would make a series of separate bilateral contracts.n5
A standing offer to pay a specified commission for such orders for goods as the offeree might from time to time solicit and send in, or to pay an agent a stated sum per acre for obtaining oil and gas leases within a designated territory, is accepted repeatedly by sending in orders and negotiating leases. Such acceptances make a series of unilateral contracts; but the offer remains revocable by notice to the agent.n6
A single offer may be made to many separate persons and may require acceptance by all. In Hartman v. Lauchli,n7 two persons promised a conveyance of land if the creditors of a corporation would all agree to an extension of time for payment of their claims. One hundred-sixty-five creditors promptly sent acceptances. One hundred-thirty-six creditors, representing about one third of the debts, did not send acceptances. The corporation became bankrupt. The promise to convey was not enforceable. Not only was the offeror not yet bound, but also the promise of each creditor who had signed was conditional on assent by all the other creditors. The offer requested and required just such conditional promises.
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Contracts LawTypes of ContractsGuaranty ContractsContracts LawTypes of ContractsGeneral OverviewBanking LawBonds, Guarantees & Letters of CreditLetters of CreditContracts LawTypes of ContractsBilateral ContractsContracts LawTypes of ContractsUnilateral ContractsGeneral Overview
FOOTNOTES:
(n1)Footnote 1. Illustrations exist in cases holding that one making a charitable subscription is contracting with all the other subscribers, or that all who make entry into a race, contract with all the others that they will obey the rules of the race, or that an agent in contracting with a principal may also be contracting with all other similar agents.
See § 198, Charitable subscriptions.
N.Y. - Kessler v. A.W. Haile Motor Co., 127 Misc. 413, 217 N.Y.S. 182 (1926) .
Eng. -The Satanita, [1895] P. 255, [1897] A.C. 59; McCannell v. Mabee Maclaren Motors Ltd., 36 B.C. 369 (1926).
In the case of In re Field's Will, 15 Misc.2d 950, 181 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1959) , modified, 11 A.D.2d 774, 204 N.Y.S.2d 947 , a donor subscribed $125,000 toward a specified building, conditional on the raising of $1,000,000 by a certain date, and another $125,000 conditional on the raising of $2,000,000 by a second date. The first condition was fulfilled, and the second condition also if a $750,000 pledge could be counted as part of the required amount. The court held the pledge, considered as collectible, could be considered as part of the amount raised.
In a later proceeding, In re Field's Will, 11 A.D.2d 774, 204 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1960) , the Appellate Division ordered payment of the second $125,000 subscription, holding that the decedent subscriber's own conduct had estopped him (and his executors) from asserting that the condition of his subscription had not been fulfilled.
(n2)Footnote 2. Superior Wire & Paper Products, Ltd. v. Talcott Tool & Machine, Inc., 184 Conn. 10, 441 A.2d 43 (1981) . Talcott bought wire from Superior and resold it to its customers. After its debt rose to $137,500, Superior discussed payment with George Roy, an officer. A few days later Superior received guaranties signed by George Roy, Alan Roy, and Roy Machinery & Sales, Inc. A few months later steel prices fell precipitously. Talcott stopped paying, and notified Superior it was having complaints of defects in Superior's steel wire. The trial judge found a lack of proof of defects and gave Superior judgment against Talcott and the guarantors. The latter appealed, claiming no consideration for their guaranties. Held, affirmed. The court cited, among other authorities, §§ 3.22 and 206, to support its view that there was good consideration in Superior's shipments whether at the time or subsequent to the guaranties.
(n3)Footnote 3.
Eng. -Offord v. Davies, 12 C.B. (N.S.) 748 (1862).
The following are similar continuing guaranty cases:
Conn. - Hartford-Aetna Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 92 Conn. 643, 103 A. 845 (1918) ; Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147, 34 A. 1025 (1895) ; Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27 (1867) . But in White v. Reed, 15 Conn. 457 (1843) , a guaranty offer was held to create but a single power of acceptance.
Fla. -In Frell v. Dumont-Florida, Inc., 114 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1959) the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, extended a ''line of credit not to exceed $10,000'' to a dealer, and the defendant promised to ''guarantee payment of any and all credit granted.'' The court held that this was a continuing guaranty that did not terminate with the first credits up to $10,000 but included later credits so long as the total amount unpaid did not exceed $10,000. Gibbs v. American Nat'l Bank, 155 So.2d 651 (Fla. App. 1963) , cert. dismissed, 170 So.2d 821 (1964) , is similar to Frell.
Ga. - Roberson v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 88 Ga.App. 271, 76 S.E.2d 522 (1953), is an example of a written continuing guaranty of loans to be made to a third party, accepted several times by the making of such loans as requested.
La. - Bonura v. Christiana Brothers Poultry Co., 336 So.2d 881 (La.App.1976) , writ ref'd, 339 So. 2d 26 , application not considered 339 So. 2d 26 . An offer of continuing guaranty of the credit of a corporate debtor was made in 1961 by corporate officers and in response thereto the plaintiff continued to deal with the corporation. In 1973, the corporation became insolvent and plaintiff claimed under the guaranty. The claim was upheld despite the guarantors' claim that a reasonable time had passed. The plaintiff had continuously supplied goods during this twelve-year period. The fact that one of the guarantors had left the business in 1967 made no difference, according to the court. His alleged oral revocation was ineffective under Louisiana law inasmuch as the written guaranty provided that it continued until receipt of a written revocation.
On the general subject of the termination of offers to guaranties by changed conditions, see § 2.20 above.
Mo. - Hoffman v. Franklin County Merc. Bank, 666 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.App.1984) .
N.J. - Grob v. Gross, 83 N.J.L. 430, 84 A. 1064 (1912) . This subject matter is treated in detail in § 2.33.
(n4)Footnote 4.
Ala. - Consolidated Portrait & Frame Co. v. Barnett, 165 Ala. 655, 51 So. 936 (1910) .
Mass. - Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smookler, 282 Mass. 361, 185 N.E. 13 (1933) .
(n5)Footnote 5.
Wis. - Hopkins v. Racine Malleable & Wrought Iron Co., 137 Wis. 583, 119 N.W. 301 (1909) .
Eng. -Great Northern R. Co. v. Witham, L.R. 9 C.P. 16 (1873).
See, also, McGarrigle v. Green, 76 Conn. 398, 56 A. 609 (1904) , agreement between A and B whereby the latter promised to manufacture for A all the hats which he might order construed as mere offer by B inviting series of contracts. A was held to be under no duty to send in orders.
Mo. - Merit Specialties Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718 (1951) .
In Jordan v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473, 35 A. 521 (1896) , an offer in the form of fourteen separate orders for goods, each specifying the type of goods and the dates of delivery and payment, was held, on acceptance, to create a single contract for the delivery of all the goods ordered.
In Christie, Lowe & Heyworth v. Patton, 148 Ala. 324, 42 So. 614 (1906) , defendant wrote: ''We will put on our work any number of teams you care to furnish ... and will pay ... three dollars.'' After plaintiff had furnished a varying number of teams, he was notified to send no more. This was no breach of legal duty.
(n6)Footnote 6.
U.S. - Hazlewood v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 268 Fed. 829 (5th Cir.1920) .
Conn. - Strang v. Witkowski, 138 Conn. 94, 82 A.2d 624 (1951) , standing promise to pay a commission of 5% on all orders sent in.
Arnold Joerns Co. v. Roberts, 16 Wis.2d 333, 114 N.W.2d 416 (1962) , oral promise by defendant, with no time limit, to pay a commission to plaintiff for sending ''prospects'' to defendant who should thereafter purchase property or employ defendant to build a house. Plaintiff sent several such prospects and was paid; it then sent 3 more prospects for whom defendant built houses, and defendant refused payment. It is immaterial that plaintiff made no promise to procure or to seek ''prospects.'' The defendant made a continuing offer, and a separate unilateral contract resulted each time the plaintiff sent a ''prospect'' who bought or built. No such contract when made was within the statute of frauds, either as for a sale of land or as incapable of performance within one year. The plaintiff's power would continue until he received notice of revocation.
(n7)Footnote 7. 194 F.2d 787 (8th Cir.1952) , cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978, 72 S.Ct. 1074, 96 L.Ed. 1370 .