- •§ 1.Syn Synopsis to Chapter 1: preliminary definitions 4
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268 § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •§ 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •§ 1.3 N1 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •§ 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •§ 1.5 Formal and Informal Contracts
- •§ 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •§ 1.7 Void Contracts
- •§ 1.8 Unenforceable Contracts
- •§ 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •§ 1.10 ''Bargain'' as a Contractual Expression
- •§ 1.11 Offer Defined
- •§ 1.12 Simultaneous Expressions of Assent: Contracts Without Offer and Acceptance
- •§ 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •§ 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •§ 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •§ 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •§ 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •§ 1.18 N1 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •[A] Implied Assumpsit
- •[B] Indebitatus or General Assumpsit
- •[C] Special Assumpsit
- •§ 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •§ 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •[A] Quasi Contract as a Source of Primary Rights
- •[B] Quasi Contract as a Remedial Device for Unwinding Failed Agreements
- •§ 1.21 General Contract Law, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. [a] General contract law and the Restatements
- •[B] The Uniform Commercial Code.
- •[C] The United Nations Convention
- •§ 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •§ 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Supp. To § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.3 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •Supp. To § 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •Supp. To § 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.7 Void Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.11 Offer Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •Supp. To § 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •Supp. To § 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •Supp. To § 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •Supp. To § 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.18 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •Supp. To § 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •Supp. To § 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •Supp. To § 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Part I formation of contracts topic a offer and acceptance chapter 2 offers; creation and duration of power of acceptance
- •§ 2.1 Preliminary Negotiation
- •§ 2.2 Preliminary Communications Compared to Offers-Interpretation
- •§ 2.3 Request for an Offer Is Not an Offer-Auctions and Solicited Offers
- •§ 2.4 N1 Offer by Publication or Advertisement
- •§ 2.5 Quotation of Prices; Estimates
- •§ 2.6 Authority or Instructions to an Agent
- •§ 2.7 N1 Offers at the Supermarket or Self-Service Shop
- •§ 2.8 Partial Agreements-Agreements to Agree and Agreements to Negotiate
- •§ 2.9 Formal Document Contemplated by the Parties
- •§ 2.10 What Constitutes a Written Contract-There May Be a Series of Communications
- •§ 2.11 Delivery of a Document as the Final Expression of Assent
- •§ 2.12 Printed Terms on Billheads, Letterheads, Receipts, Baggage Checks, etc.
- •§ 2.13 Intention to Affect Legal Relations-Social Engagements, Gentlemen's Agreements, Jests and Sham Agreements
- •§ 2.14 Duration of Power of Acceptance Created by an Offer
- •§ 2.15 Missed Deadlines in Option Contracts
- •§ 2.16 Reasonable Time for Acceptance
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer
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- •§ 2.18 Offers Are Usually Revocable
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- •§ 2.19 Notice of Revocation Necessary
- •39 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.20 Revocation Otherwise Than by Direct Notice
- •40 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.21 Revocation of General Offer by Publication
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- •§ 2.22 Irrevocable Offers-Meaning of ''Irrevocable''
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- •§ 2.23 Options Created by a Conditional Contract or Covenant
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- •§ 2.24 Contract to Keep an Offer Open
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- •§ 2.25 Effect of the Rule Against Enhancement of Damages
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- •§ 2.26 Offers Made Irrevocable by Statute and Public Policy
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- •§ 2.27 Deposits to Be Forfeited in Case of Revocation
- •47 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.28 Irrevocable Offers Under Seal
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- •§ 2.29 Revocation After Part Performance or Tender by the Offeree
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- •§ 2.30 Real Estate Brokerage and Other Agency Cases
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- •§ 2.31 N1 Effect of Action in Reliance That Is Not Part Performance
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- •§ 2.32 N1 Part Performance and the Indifferent Offer
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- •§ 2.33 When a Standing Offer of a Series of Separate Contracts Is Irrevocable
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- •§ 2.34 Effect of Death or Insanity on Power of Acceptance
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- •§ 3.2 In a Bargaining Transaction, Only the Offeree Has Power to Accept
- •81 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.3 Assignment of Power by an Option Holder-Irrevocable Offers
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- •§ 3.4 Motive With Which Offeree Renders Performance
- •83 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.5 Knowledge of Offer as a Pre-requisite to Acceptance
- •84 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.6 Knowledge of the Offer After Part Performance Already Rendered
- •Illustration 1
- •85 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.7 Acceptance ''Subject to Approval'' by a Third Party
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- •§ 3.8 Acceptance by Overt Act
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- •§ 3.9 Unilateral Contract-Acceptance by Beginning Requested Performance
- •88 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.10 Acceptance of a Published Offer of a Reward for Action or Contest Prize
- •89 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.11 When the Words ''I Accept Your Offer'' Would Be Ineffective
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- •§ 3.12 Acceptance by Forbearance From Action
- •91 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.13 When Notice of Acceptance Is Necessary
- •92 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.14 Notice as a Requisite of Guaranty and Letters of Credit
- •93 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.15 Notice as a Condition Distinguished From Notice as an Acceptance
- •94 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.16 Offer of a Promise, Requesting Non-promissory Action in Return
- •95 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.17 Offer of an ''Act'' for a Promise
- •96 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.18 Silence as a Mode of Acceptance
- •97 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.19 Can Offeror Make Silence Operate as Acceptance?
- •98 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.20 Belated or Conditional Acceptance Followed by Offeror's Silence
- •99 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.21 Silence Plus Additional Circumstances
- •100 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.22 Multiple Acceptances
- •101 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.23 Alternative Modes of Acceptance
- •102 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.24 Acceptance by Post
- •103 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.25 Acceptance by Telephone or Other Electronic Means
- •104 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.26 Withdrawal of a Letter of Acceptance From the Mails
- •105 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.27 Acceptance by Telegraph-When Operative
- •106 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.28 Acceptance Must Manifest Assent and Be Unconditional
- •107 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.29 An Acceptance May Be Unconditional Even Though the Acceptor Makes a Conditional Promise
- •108 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.30 Acceptance Not Conditional, Even Though Grumbling or Accompanied by a Request or by a New Offer
- •109 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.31 Subsequent Erroneous Interpretation Does Not Make an Acceptance Conditional
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- •§ 3.32 Attempts by the Offeree to Restate in the Acceptance the Terms of the Offer
- •111 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.33 Attempts by the Offeree to State in the Acceptance the Legal Operation of the Agreement
- •112 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.34 Mode of Acceptance Can Be Prescribed by the Offeror
- •113 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.35 Counter-Offers and Their Effect
- •114 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.36 Power to Accept an Offer Is Terminated by a Counter-Offer or Conditional Acceptance
- •115 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.37 Conditional Acceptances and Counter-Offers Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations Convention
- •116 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.38 A Counter-Offer or Rejection by One Who Has a ''Binding Option'' or an Irrevocable Offer Does Not Terminate the Power of Acceptance
- •117 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.39 Power of Acceptance Not Terminated by a Counter-Offer if Either Offeror or Offeree So Prescribes
- •118 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.40 Inquiries and Separate Offers Distinguished From Counter-Offers
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- •§ 3.41 Effect of Rejection of an Offer
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- •§ 4.2 Time of Performance Indefinite-Promises of ''Permanent'' Employment-At Will Employment
- •152 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.3 Indefiniteness of Price or Terms of Payment-Money as a Commodity
- •153 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.4 Agreed Methods of Determining the Price or Amount
- •154 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.5 N1 Reasonable Price-Quasi-Contractual Remedy After Performance
- •155 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.6 Uncertainty of Subject Matter to Be Exchanged for Price; Requirements and Output Contracts
- •156 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.7 Effect of Subsequent Verbal Clarification or Action by the Parties
- •157 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.8 Subsequent Action May Create a Quasi Contract
- •158 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.9 Mistake-Difficulty and Complexity of the Subject
- •159 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.10 Mistake as to the Words Used, or as to the Meaning Given to Words and Expressions
- •160 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.11 Mistake in Transmission of Messages
- •161 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.12 Objective and Subjective Theories
- •162 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.13 Mutual Assent-''Meeting of the Minds''
- •163 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.14 Auction Sales-Offers to Sell and to Buy
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Corbin on Contracts
Copyright 2007, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
PART I FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
TOPIC A OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Supp. To CHAPTER 2 OFFERS: CREATION AND DURATION OF POWER OF ACCEPTANCE
1-2 Corbin on Contracts Supp. to § 2.30
Supp. to § 2.30 Real Estate Brokerage and Other Agency Cases
[Go To Main]
(A) The following case is noteworthy:
(1) Podolsky & Assocs. L.P. v. Discipio, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 697 N.E.2d 840 (1998) . Affirming trial court's granting judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff broker on breach of contract claims, but using the case to explain that Illinois's duty of good faith and fair dealing entitles brokers to a commission if the broker shows that its principal intentionally delayed forming a contract for sale to avoid paying a commission. The court also noted that a principal's failure to notify the broker of a possible buyer would, under the terms of the agreement in this case, be a failure to perform, i.e., a breach, not an anticipatory repudiation.
(B) The following case cites this section:
Mapes, d/b/a Reata Realty v. City Council of the City of Walsenburg, a Colorado municipal corporation, (2006) . Mapes, a real estate broker, entered into an open listing contract with the City for the sale of a ranch owned by the City. The contract provided for a listing price of $506,000, an earnest money deposit of $10,000 and a six percent sales commission. Shortly after entry of the agreement, Mapes found a buyer who made an offer of $510,000, with an earnest money deposit of $10,000 and no contingencies. Six weeks later, however, the City entered into a contract to sell the property to another party. Mapes filed suit to recover his sales commission. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss and Mapes appealed. The appellate court noted that the document evidenced an ''open listing'' standardized form that had been approved by the Colorado Real Estate Commission. The court cited Corbin's analysis that an open listing is an offer for a unilateral contract creating in the broker the power of acceptance by procuring a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms proposed by the owner. The broker earns a commission by finding a ready, willing, and able purchaser before other agents or the owner find such a purchaser, and before the owner revokes the offer. Paragraph 1 of the contract stated that a ''Broker Sale'' occurred when either (1) the property was sold by Mapes during the listing period, or (2) Mapes procured a buyer during the period who was ready, willing and able to 'complete the sale' as proposed by the City. The court concluded that the provision evidenced the general rule that a real estate broker was entitled to receive a commission when he had procured for his client a party able to enter into the contract on the terms stated. Mapes alleged facts in his complaint that if true would entitle him to a commission under the unambiguous terms of the contract. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Supplement to Notes in Main Volume
34. Jameson Realty Group v. Kostner, 286 Ill. Dec. 431, 813 N.E.2d 1124 (App. Ct. 2004) . The defendant agreed to give the plaintiff an exclusive one-year agency to sell condominium units for a commission of five percent. A liquidated damages clause provided that the plaintiff would receive this commission if its authority was revoked or if the property was withdrawn from the market during the period of the agency. Five and one-half months later after four units had been sold and thirteen remained unsold, the defendant terminated the agreement. The circuit court found the clause to be enforceable. On appeal, the instant court recognized that, assuming the usual requirements as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 356 are met, such clauses are generally enforced in contracts for the purchase and sale of real estate. It found no precedent in Illinois, however, for the enforcement of such clauses in real estate brokerage contracts. Following case law in other jurisdictions, the court concluded that, though real estate contracts involve the exchange of property, while real estate brokerage agreements are contracts for services, there was no reason to treat a liquidated damages clause in such a contract differently. The court found the instant clause to be clear and unambiguous. The defendant had argued that it failed to specify the dollar amount of damages, but the court pointed to a list of asking prices for each unit that was explicitly referenced in the agreement and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 5 percent of the asking prices. The defendant claimed that the damages set forth in the clause did not bear any relationship to the damages that might be sustained since it assumed that the plaintiff would have succeeded in selling all of the units during the contract period and would, therefore, receive a ''windfall'' if the clause were enforced. The instant court disagreed in holding that the clause simply provided the plaintiff with what it would have received had it been afforded an opportunity to sell all of the units. The defendant's ''windfall'' argument supported the validity of the clause in the court's view since it demonstrated the uncertainty in calculating damages at the time the contract was formed. The court upheld the circuit court's decision that the clause was enforceable.