4. Grounding, Stranding and Foundering;

“Grounding” is a deliberate contact by a ship with the bottom while the ship is moored ar anchored as a result of the water level dropping;

“Stranding” is a contact by a ship with the bottom which prevents her from moving. Stranding is normally an involuntary act but it also occurs when a ship is intentionally run ashore to avoid a greater peril

“Foundering” is the sinking of a vessel – possibly following the striking of an object

CASE STUDY

Case study -1. Grounding

A 12,500 gt general cargo ship was proceeding fully loaded through the Aegean Sea toward the Suez Canal. Full sea speed was 15 knots. A passage plan had been prepared and approved, the master’s standing orders had been read and signed by all deck officers and the master had written up his night order book on the evening in question which had also been signed by the third officer and the second officer. In his night orders the master had reminded his navigating officers to: “Maintain the courses and follow the passage plan and to call him if in doubt or if required”.

During the midnight to 0400 hrs watch the vessel was to pass between two groups of islands with a channel some 8 miles wide. At about 0200 hrs the second officer – who was the officer of the watch and who was accompanied by a look out – became aware of a significant number of lights on the starboard bow. His radar was detecting a number of small echoes at a distance of 7 miles. By 0210 hrs the lights were starting to become clearer and the second officer determined that they were small sailing vessels and appeared to be crossing very slowly from starboard to port. He thought they were probably a flotilla of yachts or maybe a yacht race sailing between the two islands. At 0215 hrs the second officer altered course 30 degrees to starboard which put all of the sailing vessels on his port bow. He continued to monitor the sailing vessels and was satisfied that they were passing clear.

At 0235 hrs he was just about to start bring the vessel back around to her original course line when he heard the echo sounder alarm. On checking the echo sounder it was showing ten metres below the keel and reducing. The ship started to vibrate and shudder. He immediately put the lookout onto hand steering and ordered hard to port at the same time putting the engines on dead slow and then stop. At this time the vessel was felt to be bumping along the bottom. The master arrived on the bridge, having been awakened by the vibrations — he noticed that the speed according to the GPS was zero. The vessel had run aground on an off-lying shoal.

General Emergency stations were called and the chief officer led a party to sound around the tanks and bilges on deck and the chief engineer to check the engine room. It was confirmed that the hull appeared to be intact.

Upon investigation it transpired that the second officer had put a position on the navigation chart at 0200 hrs but had neither put a position on the chart nor consulted the chart during the period he was altering course to pass the sailing vessels – up to the grounding shortly after 0235 hrs. He confirmed that he was monitoring his distance off the island on his starboard side using the radar and didn’t intend getting any closer than 1V2 miles. However, he had not appreciated or rather he had forgotten about the off-lying shoal area. Indeed it was the same second officer who had prepared the passage plan and had actually highlighted the shoal area in order to draw the attention of the officer of the watch to its existence.

A salvage tug and lightering barges were engaged. A little over 2000 tons of cargo were offloaded onto barges before the ship refloated and was safely pulled clear of the shoal area. Following an inspection it was confirmed that there was no serious damage to the ships hull, propeller, rudder or machinery.

The salvage / general average expenses to lighten and refloat the vessel came to US$2,000,000 of which cargo interests’ contribution was to be US$1,200,000.

Cargo interests refused to make their contribution alleging that there had been a breach of the contract of carriage by the ship owner / carrier. Specifically cargo interests alleged that the ship was not seaworthy and the carrier had failed to exercise due diligence at the commencement of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy in that they did not have an adequate safety management system in place in respect of the navigation of the vessel and that the master and second officer were both negligent and incompetent.