THE BRITISH EMPIRE

1850–1914

The building of the British Empire spanned several centuries and resulted in the world’s most extensive concentration of military and economic power. It was also unplanned empire, evolving from the efforts of semiautonomous traders, religious refugees, soldiers, and administrators, with no early central direction. This complex creation was rooted in territorial growth, international politics, and domestic political change many years prior to 1850.

The beginnings of the empire were not auspicious. In the 16th century the dominant empires were Spain and Portugal. English ships and sailors conducted raids, and only late in the century were there plans and attempts to make colonial settlements. As the senior empires began to decline in the 17th century, opportunities for English settlement grew in North America, the West Indies, West Africa, and the Far East. Although the Dutch Wars of that century had not gone in England’s favor, the alliance of 1689 neutralized another major imperial adversary. The victories over France at the beginning of the 18th century signaled a dominant theme of that period, and the ultimate winner was Britain.

The one major setback in America was in fact offset. Strong trade ties with the new United States were rebuilt after 1783, while colonial expansion continued in Canada, Australia, and India. Indeed, the period from 1815 to 1850, once regarded as a time of “anticolonialism,” saw the continued growth of imperial power. That came from conquests (Ceylon, 1802; the Cape Colony, 1806; British Guiana, 1814; Malta, 1814; Nepal, 1816; Burma, 1824–52; the Straits Settlements [Penang, Malacca, and Singapore], 1826; the Falkland Islands, 1841; Hong Kong, 1842); from extensions of former holdings (Sierra Leone, 1807; Van Dieman’s Land, 1825; Western Australia, 1826; New Zealand, 1840; Zanzibar, 1841; British Columbia, 1849); and from treaty arrangements (Argentina, 1825). The free traders and government critics such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham did indeed regard formal colonies as expensive and unprofitable. Nevertheless, the momentum of expanding free trade assured that the imperial network would grow, if in a bewildering variety of connections (direct rule, trading company government, alliance with native rulers, self-governing colonies, and trade treaties).

This growth was fostered by a set of favorable conditions. First, there was no major European war for a century (1815–1914). Only the Crimean War

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(1854–56) broke this long peace, and that was an isolated struggle between an Anglo-French alliance and Russia over the future of the declining Ottoman Turkish Empire; it had very little effect outside the Black Sea region and eastern Europe. A second factor was the absence of competition: Spain and Portugal had receded, the French had been restrained, and other potential competitors were either too weak (the United States, Russia, Prussia) or were themselves in decline (Turkey, China). Third was what contemporary British observers thought mattered most: the ingenuity and drive of British imperialists. Their ships, finances, factories, and, most of all, free trade policies did give them an extraordinary advantage. With the world’s most powerful economy, it would have been difficult not to enjoy several generations of unrivaled imperial success.

The economic good news was an important antidote to domestic political difficulty. After 1815 the monarchy had fallen in public esteem, domestic political violence had escalated, and there were serious social problems. George III had suffered a loss of mental capacity, and a regency was declared in 1810. His son Prince George had married Princess Caroline (1795), but he had also had a long-term affair (and a secret marriage in 1785) with Maria Fitzherbert, a Roman Catholic. When he was crowned as George IV in 1820, his estranged wife returned, demanding her conjugal rights and recognition as queen. This led to a divorce trial, accompanied by riots on Caroline’s behalf—in all, a most unseemly affair. George had no heirs, and his brother William succeeded him as William IV (1830–37). A former naval officer, he had held the post of lord high admiral, but his private life was awkward. He had 10 illegitimate children by his longtime mistress, but his marriage to a German princess had produced only two daughters who died in infancy. Thus, at his death the crown passed to the daughter of another brother, the duke of Kent, who had died in 1836. The 17-year-old Princess Victoria became queen in 1837. This diminutive and homely woman restored the image and the stature of the crown as a symbol of sovereignty. But it was not within her power to reactivate royal power in full form. Parliament now governed the country subject to very limited royal authority. The sovereign was the formal head of the empire, and very real power and considerable executive influence were wielded in her name. But the men and measures lacked coherent organization.

There was a certain ambivalence about the government’s role in the management of the imperial enterprise. At one level this was consistent with the general attitude of relaxing trade regulation and removing barriers to commerce. Colonial affairs were nominally under the secretary of state for the colonies—a post that had been abolished in frustration in 1782 but restored in 1812. The clerks of that office were not expected to engage in grand strategy, but that did not prevent others from doing so. The following are just a few examples of the ad hoc process of developing colonial policy in the early 19th century.

Most administrators in India in the 18th and early 19th centuries had recognized the value of native culture. But by the 1830s, reformers led by Thomas Macaulay argued for India’s “reformation.” They envisioned the transfer of English law and institutions to the subcontinent. By the 1850s, British viceroys in India were trying to introduce systems of land, taxation, and education on

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an English model. This was not just cultural imperialism: its basis was also the belief that such a reformed society would be more open to the goods produced by British manufacturers.

On the other side of the globe, in British North America, there had been a rebellion in 1838. A commission was created to investigate the circumstances, and in 1839, under John Lambton, Lord Durham, this body proposed that Britain should pursue a policy of “responsible government”—that is, granting limited autonomy to the several provinces. In 1848 Nova Scotia and the Province of Canada were given this status, as were Prince Edward Island in 1851, Newfoundland in 1854, and New Brunswick in 1855.

In the 1830s in Australia, the colonial statesman Edward Wakefield championed what he called “systematic colonization,” a deliberate policy to regulate entry of immigrants. He wanted to balance the ratio of male and female settlers and otherwise stimulate and control the population and land use of new areas. As a pioneer in Australia and a leader of the New Zealand Company, he was a major figure in the early settlement of those colonies.

These examples indicate some of the sources—all of them outside the official colonial establishment—of policy development in the colonies. While many British colonial officials seemed uninterested in planning the Colonies’ future, there were plenty of substitutes willing to do the job. The nature of Britain’s industrial and commercial strength assured that there would be those who would step in to try to manage the direction of its development. In that regard one of the most interesting entrepreneurs was Prince Albert, Queen Victoria’s husband and chief planner of an event that symbolized the new age: the Great Exhibition of 1851.

WORKSHOP OF THE WORLD

Prince Albert was the major force behind “The Great Exhibition of the Industrial Works of All Nations,” an event loaded with symbolism and packed with material evidence of progress. There actually was a long continental tradition of exhibitions, but this was the first and greatest of its kind for Britain. The giant trade show attracted exhibits from many countries, but it was meant primarily to showcase British manufactures and scientific progress. There were over 100,000 exhibits housed in a giant “Crystal Palace,” which covered 26 acres in Hyde Park in the center of London. More than 200 designs for the structure had been submitted, and there was some controversy over the selection of the winning entry: Joseph Paxton, the head gardener for the duke of Devonshire, was known for the great conservatory he had designed on the duke’s estate. Built of iron frames and glass panels, the Crystal Palace was to be more than 1,800 feet long and was itself a symbol of the modern mechanical skills of the nation. One announced object of the event was to engage interest in the working class. In the end, some 6 million people visited the exhibition, many of them coming by way of railroad excursions, with fares ranging from one shilling to three guineas (63 shillings). The prince’s plan was a great success, as it reflected the awesome power of Britain’s industry, trade, and capital in the mid-19th century.

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Britain was the sole true industrial power in 1851. Two-fifths of the work-	The Crystal Palace
force was engaged in industry, a figure well beyond that of other countries.	during the Great
There was continued growth (in real terms) up to 1914, though rates varied	Exhibition, London,
widely. By the end of the period, Britain was still the industrial leader, but her	1851–1852 (Library
lead had dwindled to a very slim margin. Economic historians argue over	of Congress)
whether there was a “Great Depression” in the British economy in the last quar-
ter of the 19th century. All that is certain is that some sectors of the industrial
economy performed more poorly than others. Textiles had been a leading sec-
tor, but they faltered at the end of the century. Other areas, such as mining and
metal manufacture were stronger, but all of them faced growing international
competition after 1870. In 1851 the country was absorbing the effects of the first
railway boom—trackage had just passed the 6,000-mile mark. That would con-
tinue to grow, nearing 19,000 miles in 1900. That industry saw its income grow
in the same period from £12.7 million to £101 million. While the basic indus-
trial sectors showed signs of healthy growth, one danger sign at the end of the
century was Britain’s slow development in more modern areas of industry such
as chemicals and electricity.
British trade dominance was a second key area. Between 1840 and 1860,
British trade doubled in value. This growth rate was not an aberration: the
country carried about a fourth of the world’s goods in the 1860s, and Britain’s
dominance of trade in manufactured goods continued into the 1890s. The basic
pattern of British trade showed exports being led by manufactured goods (85
percent), while imports were led by raw materials (over 60 percent) and food-
stuffs (over 30 percent).
As for markets, Britain’s trade with Europe remained strong (40 percent in
the 1870s, and growing), and while trade with the western hemisphere declined,
that in the East and Africa grew. By the 1890s about 28 percent of world trade

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was with the empire. Yet in the 1890s Britain had more trade with Belgium than with all of Africa. The value of colonial markets was not just seen in current terms: to have them under control was to deny them to competitors, and their nurture was expected to produce results over the longer term.

In terms of value, Britain’s imports began to outgrow exports; in fact, by the 1890s imports were 50 percent higher, but the difference was masked by the earnings from “invisible exports”—the profits from investment and shipping and banking. However, in the years before 1914, all trade figures improved: imports and exports increased, trade was more often in balance, and foreign investment began to rise rapidly. Trade with the colonies increased to about 35 percent of the total, and investment levels there rose to 42 percent.

The expanding role of British capital was impressive. Foreign investment grew five times between the 1850s and the 1890s. In the years 1900–14, total foreign investment went from £45 million to £200 million. Besides investment, British companies dominated international trade in brokerage, insurance, and banking. The profits from these “invisible exports” were becoming essential to keep trade in balance. This sector became ever more important as the “workshop of the world” found itself in competition with others by 1914.

A look at different areas of industry shows how the British were still successful but encountering a new era of competition as the 20th century began. In cotton textiles, employment reached a peak (646,000) in 1911. But British industry had not adopted many recent technical improvements, because continuing strong demand for her products gave little incentive to do so. Coal output had doubled between 1870 and 1900; the peak year was 1913, by which time one-third of production was destined for export. But output per man was declining, and many old seams were wearing out. British steelmakers produced more than all of Europe combined in 1879, but by the mid-1890s, even though Britain’s production was still increasing, she had been surpassed by the United States and Germany. At the turn of the century, shipbuilding was in a period of rapid change in design and engineering. Strong markets for ships were increasing demand, creating a risk of excess capacity.

Meanwhile, in some newer industrial areas, Britain was not dominant. Germany became a leader in the chemical industry, particularly in dyestuffs, solvents, and pharmaceuticals. Use of the new power source of electricity was another area where Britain lagged. Early systems of electric lighting and telephones were run by U.S. companies in Britain. In motor vehicles, France did pioneering work in internal combustion engines, Germany’s Daimler was building vehicles by 1885, and Britain had some obstacles, like the infamous “red flag” law. Railroads wanted to stem competition from steam carriages, so a law required any powered vehicle to have someone walk in front of it with a red flag. This was repealed at the beginning of the 20th century, and by 1914 Britain had some 265,000 vehicles, produced by nearly 200 small manufacturers in the automobile business. Clearly the competitive situation was entirely different from the early days of the Industrial Age.

The “workshop of the world” held its own until 1914, but its rivals were growing and multiplying. Britain had built a system in which it had to sell a

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large surplus production, and it had to import massive quantities of raw materials and food to keep its factories working. Its colonial markets became an ever more important part of that system. But since Britain had flooded the colonies and other parts of the world with a prodigious export of people, that did not seem to be a problem.

DIASPORA

In the century before 1914, some 22.6 million people left the British Isles for other parts of the world. Why they left, how they traveled, where they landed, and what they took in their baggage are all important clues to the meaning of this phenomenon for Britain, for the empire, and for the world. Emigration did not follow a simple pattern. The numbers rose in the 1830s, jumped sharply in the late ’40s and early ’50s due to famine in Ireland, declined in the late ’50s, and rose sharply again after 1870. Peak years came between 1907 and 1912. Overseas migration was mainly triggered by poverty, by the promise of a better life, and by the prospect of employment, either in the colonial service or in the varied missions of churchmen, explorers, and adventurers.

The movement of poor emigrants was an organized effort from early in the process. For many years the authorities had transported convicts, first to North America or the West Indies, later to Australia and Van Dieman’s Land, and even later to Tasmania, an island off Australia, used for a convict settlement in the early 19th century. Scottish clearances in the early 19th century were planned efforts to depopulate parts of that country for sheep farming, which resulted in many thousands of people emigrating to Canada. Numerous societies fostered emigration (the British and Colonial Emigration Society, the Colonial Emigration Society); many of them were local or specialized (the British Women’s Emigration Association, the Salvation Army Emigration Department). Paupers were an attractive cargo, especially to the ratepayer and parish overseer. By 1840 the government had set up the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission, which sent out over 330,000 emigrants over the next 30 years. That same body was also involved in large movements of workers from India and China to other parts of the empire where laborers were needed. On another level, the social worker Thomas Barnardo organized the emigration of orphans, many to Canada, beginning in 1882. His workers were able to help over 100,000 in this process.

Another dimension was colonial recruiting. In the 1850s Australia had the Highlands and Islands Emigration Society working to attract new settlers. Other colonies published notices, including offers of cheap land and other inducements. It is important to note that emigration from anywhere but a major seaport also involved some inland movement in the British Isles—for example, the Irish departing via Liverpool or the numbers of British emigrants leaving via London.

Traveling overseas was long and difficult, and it was expensive, even for the passengers in steerage. A passenger was required to pay a fare (if not subsidized) and usually to provide his or her own food—no mean task for journeys which might take anywhere from five to 10 weeks. The early stages of the trade treated

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them as so much cargo. Numerous examples of accidents and widespread fraud led to Parliament’s adoption of the Passenger Acts, which were designed to protect the unwary traveler. The Colonial Land and Emigration Commission was instrumental in preparing some of the more effective legislation, and by about 1870 the colonies themselves began to regulate immigration.

Travelers were divided by destination. In the 19th century about 25 percent of British and Irish emigrants headed for the United States. The proportion among the Irish was substantial. It is estimated that prior to 1921, some 7 million migrated from Ireland to the United States. Other favored destinations for settlers or business-minded emigrants were Canada and Australia. Missionaries headed for Africa, soldiers and civil servants for India. There were also important internal flows within the British Isles and between India, China, etc., and expanding frontier sites in Africa and North America.

The “baggage” of immigrants involved much more than their often meager possessions. Figuratively, their belongings included British “civilization”—reli- gion, values and ideals, and institutions. One popular theory in the 19th century was championed by Sir Charles Dilke, whose Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries in 1866 and 1867 (1868) argued that the emigrant and colonist carried an imprint of British civilization, and their settlements, including the United States, were therefore extensions of British society and culture. This of course was not obvious to Irish emigrants, who, it may be assumed, were not happy to be perceived as repositories of anything British. Indeed, many of their communities and customs and cultural features rejected British influence in any form. It does remain a fact, however, that the governments, laws, courts, and jury systems they took with them were copies of the English or British originals. The language they spoke was the same; their worship was the same; and their literature, music, and other entertainment belonged to their original communities.

The great diaspora of British and Irish folk in the 19th century did many things: it rescued some from lives of poverty, peopled large areas, confirmed ties between Britain and the colonies, and brought a mobile workforce to places where it was needed. Lastly, in contrast to the thesis of “Greater Britain,” it may have stimulated the desire for colonial independence.

PAX BRITANNICA

Britain enjoyed unchallenged imperial power for most of the 19th century. The British navy was by far the world’s strongest; in 1815 there were over 200 battleships and 800 other vessels. In 1817 Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh set forth the policy of maintaining a fleet that matched the power of the world’s next two largest navies. This “two-power” standard would be official policy until sometime after it was no longer feasible (ca. 1910). Britain’s army, on the other hand, was small by European standards, though a large (mainly native) army was deployed in India.

Beside its obvious importance in the colonies, political leaders knew that imperial power was a major factor in domestic and foreign affairs. All British

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political leaders were imperialists, though their perspectives varied. In 1850 political parties were in a state of flux. After the repeal of the corn laws in 1846, Robert Peel had been deposed as Tory leader and there was a fluid period of party realignment, which only clarified in the later 1860s with the emergence of new Liberal and Conservative Parties.

In this intermediate period, the country was prospering as never before, displaying its wealth in the Great Exhibition, but struggling to address problems of maldistribution of that wealth. The first item on the Liberal agenda, however, was free trade and laissez faire. William Gladstone’s budgets, from 1853 onward, fulfilled these pledges by reducing expenditures. In so doing, the task of redressing social ills was made harder. Cities and slums could only grow. The population, which was 50 percent urban in 1851, saw that share increase to 80 percent by 1901. Original industrial cities such as Manchester and Birmingham sprouted satellite towns. The railroads that facilitated movement of people and goods added their share to the grime and vapor. Workers were bound to be attracted to unions, and a minority to the more extreme protests of socialism, in spite of the fact that living standards for many were increasing in the second half of the century. Workers’ wages were falling, but not as fast as prices. This might satisfy the economist, but the worker was bound to feel threatened whenever his or her employer cut wages. This contributed to rapid growth of unions, which by the end of the century included many unskilled workers. Studies by Booth and Rowntree in the last years of the century found levels of poverty as high as 30 percent, while the other 70 percent were in many cases doing very well. Trade union growth continued into the next century, helping along the formation of the Labour Party, a new organization committed to advancing of workers’ interests.

Many more of those workers had gained the right to vote by the end of the 19th century. While the People’s Charter had been rejected in 1848, the debate on its proposals went on. In 1872 the secret ballot was granted, and in 1867 and 1884 the franchise was widened to include 70 percent of men. The great Liberal of the 1850s and ’60s, Lord Palmerston, had opposed reform—but mainly because Tories were unable to win elections in those years. This explains why reform came in a bill proposed by Tory leader Benjamin Disraeli in 1867. The urban worker was enfranchised, and while he did not show his appreciation in the first election after the act (1868), the Tories did win in 1874, and they became the dominant party after 1881. They had begun to strengthen their party’s organization by forming a union of local conservative groups in 1867 and a central office for the party in 1870. The Liberals’ loss in 1874 inspired Radical leader Joseph Chamberlain to bring in stronger party organization in Birmingham. A National Liberal Federation was set up in 1877, but the real shaper of Liberal fortunes was William Ewart Gladstone. He introduced a new style of campaigning, making speaking tours and using an electoral platform to focus voters’ attention. In the elections of 1876 and 1880, many of the issues Gladstone addressed were imperial ones. However, his government in the 1880s was a series of imperial failures, for example, in southern Africa and the Sudan.

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The Liberals, having lost their dominance, became a more progressive party in the 1890s, reaching out toward a wider working-class electorate. Their positions on home rule, social reform, and higher taxes on the wealthy were oddly linked to a segment of the party which had favored imperial growth. A portion of that group of Liberal imperialists helped the Conservatives under Lord Salisbury and Arthur Balfour stay in power for most of the period 1885–1902. With Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office during that time, they championed strong imperial policies. Other Liberals who remained in the party (Lord Rosebery, Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, Herbert Asquith) were also strong advocates of empire who fought with the more advanced social reformers in the party during the Boer War (1899–1902).

The British position in foreign affairs naturally was linked to the empire. Because of growing global strength, British leaders were content to withdraw from continental involvements. They preferred to act on the principle of the balance of power. Britain reserved the right to intervene in European affairs to redress a perceived imbalance—for example, negotiating Belgian neutrality in 1839 and intervening in the Crimea in 1854. In fact, by the end of the 19th century, Lord Salisbury had coined the phrase “splendid isolation” to describe British aloofness from diplomatic commitments. Other states could easily interpret this as proof of typical British arrogance or deviousness.

In the mid-century, a dominant policy theme was Cobdenite liberalism; peace and trade were seen as interdependent. Thus, in 1860 the Cobden-Cheva- lier treaty between Britain and France agreed to reduce tariffs and promote peaceful relations. Yet by the 1870s there was talk of a “new imperialism”—a more aggressive, conscious effort to advance the size and strength of the empire. This was clearly popular with the new working-class voters. Disraeli had been an early beneficiary of this policy, and as prime minister he gained popularity by unilateral acts to extend influence, for example, by buying shares in the Suez Canal (1875) and by creating the title “Empress of India” for Queen Victoria (1876).

After Disraeli died in 1881, Lord Salisbury succeeded him as Tory leader. About the same time, the “scramble for Africa” began, with many European countries trying to carve out some holdings there, both as a matter of prestige and for (elusive) economic benefit. A similar process soon began in Asia, particularly aimed at China. Also in the 1880s, there was the beginning of a feeling of insecurity about British naval power. First there was a stir when the French began building new ships. Then, in the later 1890s, Germany passed a naval law directing the expansion of the high seas fleet, a move clearly aimed at challenging British supremacy. Britain responded by building the new type of battleship known as Dreadnoughts (1906) and adding to that class of very expensive vessel over the next few years. By this time the cost of competing in this manner had escalated, and it became a major political issue.

Meanwhile the diplomatic picture had changed. After Britain’s struggles in the Boer War, there was a general shift in European attitudes. German support for the Boers and general hostility to Britain’s exertion of power in South Africa were both cause for concern. The policy of isolation was also being challenged

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on other imperial fronts: Russia’s presence in the Far East was a reason why Britain broke its ban on alliances in 1902 and signed an agreement with Japan. A showdown in Africa with France led to a diplomatic truce known as the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Further efforts to resolve tension in and around Afghanistan, plus the mounting tensions in Europe, brought an entente with Russia in 1907. Thus imperial tensions, on top of a dawning sense of relative weakness, contributed directly to a fundamental modification of British foreign policy. In these same years, Britain began to realize that her conduct in colonial affairs faced new and difficult challenges for which she would have to fashion new responses.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

The empire’s colonial subjects expressed their hostility to British control in escalating fashion in the later 19th century, first in isolated outbreaks and later moving toward systematic colonial nationalism. The British government’s responses were signs of hardening British attitudes toward empire and of more belligerent moods between imperial powers. Time seemed to be running out on the Pax Britannica.

By the mid-19th century it was apparent that white-majority dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) were destined to gain more autonomy. But in colonies with nonwhite majorities, or in cases of conflict with nonwhite populations, British policy reflected the belief that these were “lesser breeds without the law.” A series of episodes in the third quarter of the century clearly demonstrated this.

The most serious insurrection occurred in India when native troops at a station near Delhi mutinied in 1857. They had been issued Enfield rifle cartridges which rumor said were treated with pork and beef fat—contriving at once to offend both the Hindu and Muslim soldier. A regiment had been severely disciplined for refusing to touch the cartridges, and shortly several bodies of troops mutinied, murdered their officers, and marched on Delhi. There they were joined by other disaffected troops. The mutiny spread, often resulting in the deaths of wives and children of British soldiers. There was too small and dispersed a garrison to strike back at once, but as reinforcements arrived over the summer, the British retaliated. They recaptured Delhi in September, other cities in the fall, and completed the reconquest in 1858. The British had ample support from other native troops—Sikhs, Gurkhas and Pathans—and most of the insurgency was concentrated in the north-central provinces. The violence and retribution were brutal on all sides. After the mutiny was suppressed, the East India Company lost its role in Indian government, and a separate cabinet level post of Secretary of State for India was created. The government recognized that the mutiny was the result of the British policy of attempting to convert the population to western customs, thus threatening to destroy native culture. While that policy was discontinued, British influence continued to be exerted through railroad construction, road building, irrigation, sanitation, and impartial administration of justice.

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The remains of In the West Indies a different sort of crisis brewed as the result of a differ- the Chutter Munzil ent sort of British intervention. Having imported slaves to build a bustling sugar Palace, Lucknow, plantation economy, the slave status had been abolished in 1833. This trans- destroyed by Indian formed the economy, as planters now had to deal with free laborers. In Jamaica mutineers in an many of those workers had left plantations and taken plots of land, which were uprising against later seized from them, causing riots. A rebellion there in 1865 was brutally British rule repressed, and the local assembly surrendered its powers to the Crown. Gov- (Hulton/Archive) ernor Edward Eyre was the focus of bitter controversy in Britain. He had proclaimed martial law and ordered the execution of 354 black insurgents. Angry liberals formed a committee to seek his prosecution, while others organized in

his defense. He was prosecuted but found not guilty.

In South Africa the British had been mainly interested in the Cape and the port facilities there. There was little interest in the ongoing frontier conflicts between white farmers (mostly Dutch, or Afrikaner) and their black tribal adver-

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saries. With the discovery of gold and diamonds in the 1860s, the situation changed. The British annexed the Afrikaner state of Transvaal in 1877, galvanizing a nationalist movement there. Actually the most dangerous enemy of the Transvaal was the Zulu kingdom of Cetewayo. His army was poised to attack, but the British commissioner delivered an ultimatum and then attacked. A British force was soundly beaten in January 1879 at Isandhlwana, with 800 killed. That day another British unit defeated the Zulus at Rorke’s Drift, and some months later, the Zulu army was destroyed at Ulundi. There was ample criticism over the handling of these conflicts, in addition to one unforeseen consequence. The British victory over the Zulus in 1879 only increased Boer nationalism. A rebellion was followed in 1881 by renewed Boer independence, and the Transvaal became rich in 1886 with the discovery of diamonds in the Witwatersrand.

In Afghanistan an uprising in Kabul led to the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British resident. Frederick, Lord Roberts occupied Kabul in August 1880 from where he led a force of 10,000 men on a forced march over the mountains to relieve the garrison at Kandahar, a journey of 320 miles in 23 days. The British installed a new native ruler under an arrangement that gave Britain control over the foreign affairs of Afghanistan.

In Egypt the British had been anxious about the Suez, especially since the opening of the canal there in 1869. The French had been involved in its construction, and the Khedive, the deputy of the Ottoman Turks, was the political authority for the region. He was deeply in debt, and in 1875 Disraeli authorized the purchase of 44 percent of the shares in the canal company. With this foot in the door, Britain joined with France in sorting out Egyptian finances and demanding a number of fiscal reforms. Those measures were an incentive to rebel nationalists, and the British and French decided to establish a protectorate. This only increased native hostility, and after France withdrew, Britain bombarded Alexandria and sent in troops.

One effect of British action in Egypt was to cause instability in the large area to the south, the Sudan. There a revolt was begun by a fanatical Muslim leader, the Mahdi. General Charles Gordon was sent to evacuate an Egyptian force in Khartoum, but he tried instead to hold the city, and he was killed in 1885. A decade later the British dispatched General Herbert Kitchener to retake the city, and he defeated the rebel forces and reestablished British authority (1898).

In the meantime, affairs at the other end of the continent were becoming critical. The Cape Colony under Cecil Rhodes was fomenting unrest with the Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The pretext was the denial of civil rights to foreigners (uitlanders) in the gold and diamond mines. The real cause probably had more to do with a plan to take over these lucrative assets. Rhodes already had built up the DeBeers Mining Corporation to a position of monopoly power, and he had equally ambitious political aims. In 1895, a Rhodes agent named Colonel Jameson led a raid across the border of Transvaal, but he was repelled. A period of protracted negotiation followed, ending in 1899 with an ultimatum from the Transvaal president Paul Kruger. War began in October that year. Initially the Boers had numerical superiority and better

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weapons; in addition, they were defending their own territory. As a result, they won early victories and besieged British forces in several towns. By 1900, with reinforcements and a change in command, the British turned the tide. But the Boers then resorted to guerilla warfare and prolonged the fighting for another 18 months. In that time, British leaders employed “concentration” camps for women and children, while they systematically destroyed Boer farms and crops. More than 20,000 died in the camps, about twice as many as the total losses in battle; Britain lost 5,800, the Boers 4,000. The war was a shock to all, even to imperialists: it cost over £220 million, brought humiliating defeats, and displayed serious military weaknesses. Furthermore, the camps and the campaigns aroused bitter controversy at home and created a more critical attitude toward empire.

Something similar came from Britain’s actions in China, an old established power but one which was terribly weak by modern standards. Along with other European states, the British had carved out port zones where they exercised a limited sovereignty and supervised a lucrative trade. The key commodity that Britain imported was opium from India. Wars were fought over this trade in the 1840–60 period, and later the European intrusions escalated, creating numerous grievances. These boiled over in 1899 with the organization of the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists”—known to the Europeans as the Boxers. Though the Boxers had troubled relations with the Chinese empress, they joined in a raid on the Peking legations in 1900. An international army was sent to relieve the legations, and the episode provoked even more foreign intervention.

The European powers realized that their normal response to incidents such as this was likely to bring down the dynasty, which could lead to China’s total collapse, causing untold conflict. Therefore they drew back from full use of their power, in fear of the consequences. In fact the world situation had progressed to the point where the unchecked use of imperial power was ever more likely to result in serious collisions. The Pax Britannica had clearly ended.