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Oil & gas sector capex

Renaissance Capital

20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Total oil & gas sector capex was down 1% YoY in dollar terms in 2018, according to Rosstat data and our estimates. Total capex of $57.3bn in 2018 was 41% below the peak 2011 level, mostly due to rouble depreciation and spending cuts by most companies. This is purely an estimate, because Rosstat has repeatedly altered the definition of energysector investment and the various categories it tracks within this category. We use data from Rosstat and the Ministry of Economic Development, adjusted by us to exclude capex on upstream gas. We combine the latter with other capex in the gas value chain, such as that undertaken on treatment, refining and transportation. Furthermore, capex by Transneft (including Transnefteprodukt) on crude oil and refined products transportation is sourced from Transneft’s consolidated IFRS financials. We note that the capex figures shown exclude funds spent on investment, including sizeable sums used for M&A in recent years.

Industry-wide capex decreased slightly by 1% in 2018

Figure 77: Oil & gas sector capex, $mn (unless otherwise stated)

 

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

Oil

23,824

32,424

40,129

34,598

47,159

47,450

54,813

61,594

49,893

33,408

29,343

38,051

33,629

-11.6%

Upstream

15,546

21,997

29,231

21,827

30,408

30,790

38,005

40,398

28,707

20,131

18,281

25,246

21,923

-13.2%

Refining

2,377

3,432

4,863

5,388

8,092

8,071

10,009

13,862

12,665

7,808

5,757

7,665

7,067

-7.8%

Transneft

5,338

6,371

6,035

7,383

8,659

8,589

6,799

7,334

8,520

5,470

5,305

5,140

4,639

-9.8%

Transnefteprodukt

563

624

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gas

16,242

19,418

24,199

18,664

27,085

50,358

36,939

30,115

26,017

16,015

15,666

19,675

23,637

20.1%

Total

40,066

51,841

64,327

53,262

74,244

97,808

91,752

91,709

75,910

49,424

45,009

57,726

57,266

-0.8%

Note: 2016,2017 are restated according to new Russian classification

Source: Rosstat and the Ministry of Economic Development for upstream and refining data, Transneft (and Transnefteprodukt) for transportation data, Gazprom and Renaissance Capital estimates for gas data

Upstream oil capex decreased by 13.2% YoY in 2018 driven by the 8% depreciation of the rouble during the year and the slowdown of domestic investments as a result of the OPEC+ output restrictions. Investments in greenfields continued to be supported by efforts on the part of the Russian government to stimulate oil output via reductions in MET and export duty rates, which now apply to an even higher number of oil fields (we discuss recent changes to the tax regime on pages 146-163).

Upstream oil capex decreased 13% YoY in 2018

Refining capex decreased by 7.8% in dollar terms in 2018 on the rouble depreciation (and was broadly flat in rouble terms), as the incremental increase based on the higher Gazprom Neft’s capital expenses on its second phase of Omsk and Moscow refineries modernisation compensated for the reductions in the capex of other VICs as their modernisation programme has mostly wound down. Refining capex in 2018 was 49% below the 2013 peak and we believe its level has now stabilised.

Refining capex decreased by 8% in 2018

Transneft’s consolidated 2018 capex (including Transnefteprodukt) was down by 9.8% YoY following the completion of most of its recent expansion projects for both crude and oil product pipelines.

We estimate that capex in the gas sector increased by 20.1% YoY in 2018, driven by Gazprom’s capex increase of 15% last year (excluding capex of Gazprom Neft and its power business) as Gazprom continued to invest in the construction of the Power of Siberia, Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream pipelines. We expect Gazprom’s dollar capex to decrease slightly YoY in 2019, driven by our expected reduction in transportation capex as its key pipeline construction projects are coming to an end. NOVATEK’s capex more than doubled in 2018.

The oil & gas sector achieved an all-time-high capex level in 2011. We believe the surge in capex over 2010-2011 and its subsequent decline over 2014-2017 to the current level was driven predominantly by the following factors:

Volatility in the RUB/$ exchange rate.

Transneft’s consolidated 2018 capex (including Transnefteprodukt) was down by 10% YoY

Gas sector capex was up by 20% in 2018

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Russian oil & gas

Improved oil & gas economics on the back of a more flexible tax regime, allowing for higher netbacks and free cash flow.

A major focus on greenfield development in 2007-2014, particularly in new production provinces such as East Siberia and the Caspian, with greenfield investments requiring less capex in recent years.

Accelerated spending on refinery upgrades in view of the introduction of new motor fuel standards.

Significant swings in European gas prices over the past 10 years and resulting changes to Gazprom’s capex plans, augmented by significant investments in

NOVATEK’s LNG programme.

Figure 78: Total capex by company, $mn (unless otherwise stated)

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

2019E

YoY

1Q18

1Q19

YoY

Oil companies

26,147

28,409

37,227

44,714

43,406

40,622

27,348

27,353

33,722

31,272

-7%

33,455

12%*

7,768

6,586

-15%

Rosneft

7,252

8,989

12,789

15,228

17,575

13,873

9,713

10,296

14,507

13,374

-8%

17,121

21%*

3,562

2,860

-20%

LUKOIL

5,156

5,423

6,589

9,366

10,964

11,397

6,224

5,027

6,295

5,866

-7%

5,876

0%

1,687

1,173

-30%

SurgutNG

4,292

3,880

4,943

5,068

4,911

4,335

3,068

3,006

3,243

2,725

-16%

3,380

24%

561

512

-9%

TNK-BP

2,596

2,625

5,250

5,630

Gazprom Neft

2,607

3,219

3,742

5,109

5,275

6,125

4,915

5,288

5,673

5,432

-4%

5,170

-5%

1,131

1,258

11%

Tatneft

2,812

2,572

1,800

1,635

1,783

1,629

1,516

1,427

1,457

1,560

7%

1,908

22%

352

293

-17%

Slavneft

844

1,209

1,263

1,151

1,435

1,585

735

814

1,010

1,118

11%

n.a.

n.a.

291

272

-7%

Russneft

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

536

507

420

164

266

442

393

-11%

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Bashneft

589

492

851

991

955

1,258

1,013

1,229

1,094

806

-26%

n.a.

n.a.

184

219

19%

Gazprom

20,816

30,296

55,373

42,158

39,234

31,393

21,953

20,056

25,795

28,612

11%

27,976

-2%

5,091

4,495

-12%

NOVATEK

512

745

1,122

1,266

1,813

1,515

727

463

635

1,437

126%

2,773

93%

187

651

247%

Transneft

7,383

8,659

8,589

6,799

7,334

8,520

5,470

5,305

5,140

4,639

-10%

4,488

-3%

1,100

1,002

-9%

Note: Surgutneftegas data include estimates.

Tatneft data include investments in the TANECO refinery.

Gazprom’s capex excludes Gazprom Neft’s capex.

LUKOIL and Gazprom Neft capex excludes international investments. Rosneft excludes Zohr investment and Bashneft. 2019 data are forecasts. *2019 YoY figures are adjusted on the capex of non-covered or consolidated companies

Source: Company data, Renaissance Capital estimates

Figure 79: Upstream capex by company, $mn (unless otherwise stated)

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

2019E

YoY

1Q18

1Q19

YoY

Oil companies

18,251

20,094

26,211

31,037

30,571

29,514

21,250

22,153

27,707

26,142

-6%

26,747

8%*

5,722

4,633

-19%

Rosneft

5,867

6,398

8,195

9,111

10,357

9,110

7,444

8,878

12,601

11,981

-5%

14,573

15%*

3,289

2,578

-22%

LUKOIL

3,855

3,911

5,132

7,085

8,325

8,533

4,770

4,234

5,408

4,765

-12%

4,783

0%

1,407

993

-29%

SurgutNG

3,388

3,280

4,110

4,518

4,590

4,128

2,852

2,643

2,894

2,969

3%

3,076

4%

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

TNK-BP

2,336

2,335

4,385

4,852

Gazprom Neft

2,021

2,430

2,401

2,924

4,520

5,017

4,166

3,660

3,839

3,631

-5%

3,573

-2%

735

764

4%

Tatneft

518

616

697

827

861

655

611

798

621

727

17%

742

2%

167

148

-12%

Slavneft

81

902

802

686

936

709

440

765

1,028

1,008

-2%

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Russneft

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

536

507

420

164

266

442

393

-11%

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Bashneft

184

222

490

498

475

943

802

908

874

669

-23%

n.a.

n.a.

123

152

23%

Gazprom

6,897

7,087

9,809

7,801

8,436

6,756

3,595

3,455

3,711

4,907

32%

5,247

7%

557

629

13%

NOVATEK

512

745

1,122

1,305

1,277

1,428

681

392

421

741

76%

1,429

93%

117

230

96%

Note: Surgutneftegas data include estimates.

Gazprom’s capex excludes Gazprom Neft’s capex.

LUKOIL and Gazprom Neft capex excludes international investments. Rosneft excludes Zohr investment and Bashneft. 2019 data are forecasts. 2019 data are forecasts.

*2019 YoY figures are adjusted for the capex of non-covered or consolidated companies

Source: Company data, Renaissance Capital estimates

Upstream oil capex is decreasing…

According to Rosstat and the Ministry of Economic Development data adjusted for the estimate of oil & gas services, Russian upstream capex decreased by 13% to $21.9bn in 2018. Data collected from annual and MD&A reports suggest that total upstream spending by major Russian oil VICs decreased by 6%, which is generally in line with the Rosstat figure (adjusted for upstream gas and Transneft capex). While upstream capex growth estimates may vary, the trend was certainly negative in 2018, with Tatneft and Surgutneftegas being the only VICs to increase their expenditures in Russia, which we attribute to the delays in greenfield projects start-ups and fewer investments in sustaining

2018 capex decreased driven by the less appetite for spending driven by OPEC+ deal

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Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

the brownfields production as a result of the OPEC+ deal. We note that in rouble terms the oil sector demonstrated positive growth of 1.5% in 2018, which is also supported by the flat YoY drilling statistics in 2018.

We estimate spending on drilling by Russian oil companies represents approximately 40% of their overall upstream capex, with the balance related to other items, principally access infrastructure for new fields and gathering and treating facilities.

For 2019, we forecast upstream capex for Russian oil companies to increase on average by 8% YoY adjusted for the capex of the non-covered companies (Figure 79). We forecast NOVATEK will see the fastest growth in capex (+93%) driven by its LNG strategy, while Rosneft will see its investments grow 15% as it launches a number of greenfields in 2019. We believe Tatneft, Surgutneftegas, and Gazprom will increase their capex by 2%, 4% and 7%, respectively, while LUKOIL should maintain capex at a flat level YoY. At the same time, we forecast lower YoY capex Gazprom Neft (-2%) in dollar terms.

We do not expect that higher estimated capex in 2019 marks the reversal in the overall upstream spending trends for Russian oils. Benefiting from substantial reserve base (with 25 years of proven reserves life) and the industry’s lowest development costs (Figure 41), there is no urgent need to ramp up capital expenditure, particularly as Russia has committed to production cuts under OPEC+ deal. At the same time, the industry is looking for new avenues of investments, if not to support actual production growth but to improve margins via focus on new tax advantaged production regions (Figure 134). The combination of high reserves, production constraints and international sanctions (see Appendix IV) will keep Russian oil producers focussed on FCF generation to reduce debt and support higher levels of redistribution of profits to their shareholders in form of dividends and buyback programmes, in our view.

In Figure 80 we provide a comparison between per-unit capex spending ($/boe) of international majors and Russian oil companies. Our analysis shows that the gap has narrowed considerably as international majors slashed their capex budgets significantly from 2016 in response to the oil price decline. Russian per boe capex declined by c. 14% in 2018, while international majors (represented by Exxon, Shell, BP, Chevron and Total) saw their per-unit capex rise 6% last year. Adjusted for changes in purchasing power parity (PPP), Russian oil companies were actually spending more than international majors per unit of output – $14.7/boe vs $13.3/boe in 2018.

We forecast 8% higher upstream capex in 2019

Figure 80: Upstream capex – Russian oils vs international oil majors, $/boe

 

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

International oil majors

7.7

7.5

9.2

11.9

12.8

17.5

15.4

16.8

22.6

23.4

29.0

26.2

21.4

14.7

12.6

13.3

Russia

2.5

2.7

2.5

4.4

6.1

8.2

6.0

8.2

8.2

10.0

10.6

7.5

5.2

4.6

6.3

5.4

PPP-adjusted

4.9

5.4

5.0

7.8

10.3

11.5

10.6

12.8

12.4

19.0

18.3

14.1

13.2

11.2

14.7

14.2

Exploration-adjusted

5.2

6.0

5.2

8.6

11.3

12.2

11.6

13.0

12.9

20.8

20.2

14.9

14.0

11.7

15.4

14.7

Source: Company data, Ministry of Energy, The Economist, Bloomberg, Renaissance Capital

…as well as refining capex

According to Rosstat and the Ministry of Economic Development, in 2018 capex in the

Refining capex lower

refining segment decreased by 7.8% YoY to $7,067mn, following c. 33% growth in 2017.

 

Based on Rosstat data, annual refining capex saw a 53% decline from the peak level of

 

$13.9bn in 2013, following a more than sixfold increase compared with 2005. The 2016

 

Rosstat statistics for the upstream sector appear to be in line with what the companies

 

reported, yet we believe that individual company data much better reflect actual spending

 

trends in the refining segment.

 

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As discussed in the Refining section, Russian oil VICs have been encouraged to speed up the modernisation of their refineries owing to new fuel standards, excise tax pressures and the re-balancing of export duties on crude and refined products, which makes heavy product exports unprofitable (or marginally profitable) for the majority of Russian refineries. The companies achieved substantial progress in their refinery modernisations, a process that has slowed down considerably over recent years due to a decline in refining margins.

A more than sixfold increase in refining capex (in 2005-2013) allowed Russian oil companies to overtake (during 2010-2015) their international peers in terms of per-unit of throughput capex (see Figure 81). However, in 2016, per barrel refining capex again turned below the level of international majors as Russian VICs all but completed their respective modernisation programmes. The PPP adjustment here is less appropriate, in our opinion, as refinery upgrades in Russia increasingly rely on foreign technology.

Figure 81: Refining capex – Russian oils vs international oil majors, $/bl

 

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

International oil majors

1.7

1.8

2.1

2.5

3.2

3.9

3.9

2.7

3.1

3.4

3.9

3.5

3.0

3.3

3.4

3.9

Russia

0.6

1.0

1.0

1.5

2.1

2.8

3.1

4.4

4.3

5.1

7.0

6.0

3.8

2.8

3.8

3.4

PPP-adjusted

1.3

2.0

1.9

2.6

3.5

4.0

5.5

6.9

6.5

9.7

12.0

11.3

9.6

6.9

8.7

8.9

Source: Company data, Ministry of Energy, The Economist, Bloomberg, Renaissance Capital

Transportation capex on the way down

Transneft, the crude and product pipeline operator, posted a 9% YoY decline in its 2018

Transportation capex to decelerate

capex to $4.8bn, following a 3% reduction in 2017. This was 46% below the peak level

 

reached in 2011 with the company’s lower capex reflecting the end of its mega-projects.

 

Today, Transneft operates a mix of pipelines, which include a legacy core of the system

 

constructed in the Soviet Union, prior to Transneft’s incorporation in 1993, with no new

 

pipelines having been built in 1993-1999. The company’s investment strategy since 1999

 

has focused on eliminating the capacity deficit that existed in the late 1990s, while

 

reducing dependency on transit states. This was achieved through the completion of two

 

Ukraine bypasses, in 2000 and 2001, as well as the construction of a new major pipeline

 

route to Primorsk (the Baltic Pipeline Systems, BPS).

 

Figure 82: Russia – Transneft crude oil pipelines

 

Primorsk

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ust-Luga

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Andreapol

 

Usa

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Zapolyarye

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moscow

Yaroslavl

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unecha

Nizhny Novgorod

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ryazan

Lazarevo

 

 

Purpe

 

Lensk

 

 

 

Surgut

 

 

Nikolskoye

 

Perm

 

Konda

 

Kuyumba

 

 

 

Samotlor

 

 

Klin

 

 

 

 

Aldan

 

Ufa

 

 

 

 

 

Novorossiysk

 

Tyumen

 

Parabel

 

Skovorodino

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Samara

Salavat

 

Yurgamysh

 

 

Bratsk

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tikhoretsk

 

 

 

 

Omsk

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tuapse

 

 

 

 

Tomsk

Aanzhero-

Tayshet

 

 

 

 

 

Sudzhensk

Irkutsk

Kozmino

 

Source: Transneft

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In the decade that followed Transneft’s incorporation, the main focus was on the diversification of its export routes, which culminated in the commissioning of the Phase 1 of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline in December 2009, estimated at a cost of $11.2bn. In 2010, Transneft focused on the second phase of the ESPO project – the Skovorodino-Kozmino pipeline and the port facility in Kozmino. In addition, the company constructed the BPS-2 pipeline (from Unecha to Ust-Luga), which complemented BPS (Yaroslavl-Primorsk) and reduced Russia’s dependence on oil transits via Belarus and potential transit tariff disputes. Both the BPS-2 and ESPO-2 pipelines were launched in 2012. In 2016 the company completed two other big projects – Zapolyarnoye-Purpe and Kuyumba-Taishet, leading to further capex reductions in 2017 and 2018. We expect capex to decline to maintenance levels of c. $4.0bn by 2020 as the company’s key expansion projects are completed. The company’s only major remaining project in oil transportation is the ESPO expansion and the construction of related links to Kozmino port and Komsomolsk refinery, scheduled for completion in 2019. Following an active investment programme over the past 12 years and the resulting significant increase in

Transneft’s overall capacity and flexibility, we now expect a relatively quiet phase in the company’s investment cycle.

We note that Transnefteprodukt – Russia’s product pipeline operator – has been consolidated in Transneft’s financials since 2008. Therefore, our capex estimates include expenditure related to Transnefteprodukt with two major projects recently completed. The $750mn South (Yug) product pipeline (Volgograd-Novorossiysk) was completed in 2018 ahead of its originally scheduled 2021 following the change in plans to connect Rosneft’s refineries in Syzran and Saratov. Simultaneously with the construction of the Yug pipeline, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port (NMTP) upgraded its terminal capacity at Sheshkaris to handle gasoil exports. A smaller $600mn Sever (North) project was completed in 2017 and resulted in the expansion of diesel export capacity to Primorsk port from 8.5mn tpa to 25mn tpa. There was also a similar-scale ($600mn) project to de-bottleneck and diversify product pipelines delivering gasoline, diesel and jet fuel into the Moscow region, completed in 2018.

Figure 83: Russia – refined product pipelines

Primorsk

Moscow

Ry azan

 

Penza

 

Ekaterinburg

 

Volgograd

Ufa

Ty umen

Nov orossiysk

Samara

 

 

Tikhoretsk

 

Omsk

 

 

 

Kemerov o

Source: Transneft

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Gas capex to level off in 2019

According to data from Rosstat and the Ministry of Energy, adjusted as necessary from Gazprom’s reports and accounts, we estimate that capex in the gas segment increased by 20% YoY to $23.6bn in 2018. We project that Gazprom accounted for around 89% of this estimated total, down from 90% in 2017.

The transportation segment accounted for 36% of Gazprom’s total capex in 2018 (excluding Gazprom Neft), on our estimates (up from 33% in 2017), whereas gas production capex represented 17% of the company’s total. The company’s major projects in the transportation segment were the Power of Siberia, Gruazovets-Vyborg (a feed for Nord Stream 2), as well as Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines. All of these pipeline projects are nearing completion, which is why we expect 16% lower transportation capex from Gazprom in 2019. A substantial amount continues to be allocated for the reconstruction and technical refurbishment of gas transportation facilities in order to improve the reliability of the UGSS.

In the area of gas production, capital spending increased by 32% in 2018 to $4.9bn. We expect gas production capex to increase further in 2019E – to $5.2bn, to support the company’s field development activities in East Siberia and Yamal, the regions of future gas production growth for Gazprom.

We expect that Gazprom’s total capex will moderate over the next three years with our estimate of 2% lower spend in 2019. The main reason for this is the scheduled completion in 2019 of main gas transmission system (GTS) expansion projects, with the construction of the Power of Siberia route and completion of scheduled Ukraine bypasses. Offsetting these reductions are a likely increase in spend on gas processing facilities, including the ongoing construction of a $15bn Amur gas processing plant (GPP, scheduled for completion in 2024) as well as a similarly expensive new GPP/LNG facility in Ust-Luga. Both projects will require further expansions of the Power of Siberia and BovanenkovoUkhta pipelines at a cost of $13bn between 2019-2021, we estimate. At present, Gazprom is funding these investments from its gas export profits, given low gas pipeline tariffs. We believe this status quo satisfies all major stakeholders, including the Russian government and the independent gas producers: if the GTS were independent from Gazprom today, it would have needed a much higher gas transportation tariff to fund its capex, in our view.

We estimate gas capex was up 20% in 2018 but the spend will level off in 2019

Gazprom’s capex likely to flatten over the next three years

Figure 84: Gazprom capex by segment, excluding Gazprom Neft, $mn (unless otherwise stated)

 

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019E

YoY

Total

6,223

3,905

5,571

19,974

25,505

18,146

27,159

52,062

44,965

46,296

37,043

21,953

20,056

25,795

28,612

27,976

-2.2%

Transport

411

586

760

7,737

9,971

7,601

13,991

30,780

22,743

14,764

13,530

6,870

6,070

8,547

10,198

8,577

-15.9%

Production of gas

5,812

3,319

4,811

7,263

9,009

6,897

7,087

9,809

9,205

9,954

7,972

3,595

3,455

3,711

4,907

5,247

6.9%

Refining

0

0

0

1,516

2,032

1,309

2,592

4,750

5,501

4,227

3,954

2,225

2,883

3,861

4,930

4,797

-2.7%

Distribution

0

0

0

1,529

1,399

856

1,237

1,744

1,972

2,255

1,178

1,215

1,154

1,532

932

912

-2.1%

Other

0

0

0

1,929

3,093

1,484

2,252

4,979

5,543

15,096

10,410

8,048

6,494

8,143

7,646

8,443

10.4%

NOVATEK’s capex increased by 126% to $1.4bn in 2018 following a 37% rise in 2017. We expect this will nearly double to 93% in 2019, driven by the company’s investments in its LNG strategy, including Arctic LNG 2 and the new LNG construction centre in Murmansk.

Source: Company data, Renaissance Capital estimates

NOVATEK’s capex increased by 126% in 2018 and will nearly double in 2019, we think

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Upstream capex by company

Renaissance Capital

20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Figure 85: Upstream capex by company, $mn

 

 

 

 

CDU-TEK data

 

 

 

 

Company data

 

 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019E

Rosneft*

6,619

6,639

7,097

8,478

8,351

10,709

10,063

7,670

8,878

12,601

11,981

14,573

LUKOIL

4,400

3,399

3,434

4,313

5,582

7,075

7,901

4,416

4,234

5,408

4,765

4,783

SurgutNG

3,739

3,405

3,600

5,409

4,715

5,217

4,577

3,153

2,643

2,894

2,969

3,076

Bashneft

454

246

253

304

189

297

840

600

908

874

669

n.a.

Gazprom Neft

868

604

769

611

785

778

682

520

3,660

3,839

3,631

3,573

Slavneft

241

81

902

802

686

936

709

440

765

1,028

1,008

n.a.

Tatneft

575

412

448

518

1,030

1,392

506

362

798

621

727

742

Russneft

262

117

272

540

503

605

331

190

266

442

393

n.a.

TNK-BP

1,963

1,666

2,860

3,824

4,328

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Oil companies

19,121

16,570

19,634

24,798

26,169

27,008

25,610

17,350

22,153

27,707

26,142

26,747

Note: Upstream capex estimate for 2018E includes only companies covered by Renaissance Capital. *Including Bashneft in 2019

Source: CDU TEK, Company data, InfoTEK, Neftyanaya Torgovlya, Renaissance Capital estimates

Figure 85 shows upstream capex by company as reported by NGV and Neftyanaya Torgovlya, which use CDU-TEK data as their source, and by the companies themselves. We note that upstream capex data are no longer published (2015 is the last year for which full-year data are available) after Rosneft stopped providing capex data to CDU-TEK. CDU-TEK data reflected expenditure estimates by Russian oil VICs, which they attribute to drilling, construction and other expenses related to the upstream segment. These figures as reported to the Ministry of Energy and state statistics agencies (Rosstat) may differ substantially from the consolidated expenditure figures reflected in IFRS financials and MD&A reports (Figure 85, rhs). We note that CDU-TEK data and company data do not match perfectly due to differences in methodologies. Numbers for Gazprom Neft differ the most, as data reported by CDU-TEK include only one subsidiary – Noyabrskneftegaz.

According to data reported by the companies in their IFRS financial statements/MD&As, upstream capex decreased by 5.6% in 2018. Rosneft continued to be the leader by absolute spending, with upstream capex of $12,650mn, of which $669mn is attributed to Bashneft, we estimate. Rosneft was followed by LUKOIL and Gazprom Neft, which spent $4,765mn and $3,631mn, respectively. In 2019 we expect companies in our coverage universe to increase total upstream capital investment by 8.1%, led by Rosneft increasing its capex by 15%, on our estimates.

Figure 86 illustrates that Gazprom Neft, Slavneft, Rosneft and LUKOIL had the largest upstream capex per unit of production (2018 upstream capex of $10.8/bl, $10.0/bl, $8.2/bl and $8.0/bl of crude oil and condensate production, respectively). Russneft was in fourth place with $7.6/bl, followed by Surgutneftegas with $6.7/bl. Bashneft and Tatneft were at the bottom of the list, with per-unit capex of $4.8/bl and $3.4/bl, respectively.

Figure 86: Upstream capex by company per unit of output, 2014-2018, $/bl of crude oil and condensate production

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

2017

 

2018

 

 

 

 

 

14.0

12.0

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0

Gazprom Neft

Slavneft

Rosneft

LUKOIL

Russneft

SurgutNG

Bashneft

2014-2015 figures are based on CDU-TEK data. Slavneft data include only Megionneftegas. Gazprom Neft data include only Noyabrskneftegas. 2016-2018 figures are based on company data.

Source: Ministry of Energy, InfoTEK, NGV, Neftyanaya Torgovlya, Company data, Renaissance Capital

In 2018, VICs decreased their upstream capex by 5.6%

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Exploration drilling

In 2018, exploration drilling volumes increased by 8% YoY to 1,067 km, following growths of 8% and 12% in 2017 and 2016, respectively.

Figure 87: Exploration drilling by company, km (unless otherwise stated)

Renaissance Capital

20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Exploration drilling volumes increased by 8% in 2018

 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

4M18

4M19

YoY

Rosneft

48.8

26.5

66.0

74.6

81.0

66.4

170.7

110.7

201.6

293.4

278.9

-5%

84.1

54.6

-35%

SurgutNG

169.2

182.8

221.8

216.3

222.3

215.0

202.7

206.4

197.3

201.8

211.5

5%

71.2

79.4

12%

LUKOIL

118.9

61.7

97.3

119.2

180.8

197.8

231.2

167.2

181.5

209.8

193.0

-8%

61.0

62.7

3%

Gazprom Neft

74.4

18.4

63.1

56.3

56.0

48.7

38.9

65.3

31.6

32.4

114.7

254%

19.0

29.5

55%

Bashneft

34.0

10.5

6.8

26.7

27.6

39.5

50.5

40.8

91.6

50.2

48.0

-4%

15.7

7.7

-51%

Tatneft

62.1

47.2

27.1

21.1

31.8

27.8

28.1

16.8

13.7

25.3

26.6

5%

1.5

6.4

327%

Slavneft

56.9

11.5

31.9

15.9

25.8

24.2

60.4

25.6

12.7

10.4

10.1

-3%

3.7

10.7

189%

Russneft

24.0

5.6

0.0

14.9

5.7

3.2

4.2

3.8

0.6

3.2

0.0

-100%

0.0

1.4

n.a.

TNK-BP

114.9

37.6

82.9

97.2

80.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

n.a.

0.0

0.0

n.a.

Russia

851.7

464.4

701.0

747.0

804.0

817.3

993.9

817.7

914.0

987.5

1,066.9

8%

292.3

316.8

8%

Source: Ministry of Energy, Interfax, InfoTEK, Renaissance Capital

Data for 4M19 suggest a further 8% increase YoY. Looking beyond the OPEC+ deal, large oil producers continue to focus on sustaining declining production at brownfields, and applying efforts to access previously undiscovered or unreachable reserves. By volume of exploration drilling in absolute and relative terms, Rosneft continues to hold the first place in exploration drilling, although its volumes were down 5% in 2018. Surgutneftegas increased its exploration drilling by 5% YoY, taking second place in terms of exploration footage from LUKOIL, which was down by 8% in 2018. Rosneft accounted for 26.1% of the sector total in 2018, while LUKOIL and Surgutneftegas accounted for 18.1% and 19.8%, respectively.

Gazprom Neft’s exploration drilling footage surged to 115 km in 2018 from 32 km in 2017 (+254% YoY), 103% above the five-year average. Tatneft marginally increased its drilling, by 5% to 26.6 km after an impressive increase of 85% in 2017. Bashneft decreased exploration drilling volumes by 4% in 2018 following a 45% decline in 2017. Slavneft reduced its exploration footage by 3% and Russneft reduced its exploration drilling to zero in 2018, according to CDU-TEK.

On a per-unit basis, Surgutneftegas maintained its leadership with 3.5 metres/kt of crude oil (+4% YoY), while Bashneft declined from its peak of 4.3 metres/kt in 2016 to 2.5 metres/kt in 2018. Gazprom Neft drilled 2.5 metres/kt of oil output, a 251% increase YoY, slightly above LUKOIL’s 2.4 metres/kt. Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company in terms of crude output, decreased 8% YoY (1.4 metres/kt). Tatneft marginally increased its per-unit- of-output exploration footage by 3% (to 0.9 metres/kt of output) while Slavneft increased by 1% (to 0.7 metres/kt of output).

Figure 88: 2014-2018 exploration drilling per unit of oil output (metres/kt)

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

2017

 

2018

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

SurgutNG

Bashneft Gazprom Neft LUKOIL

Rosneft

Tatneft

Slavneft

Russneft

Source: Ministry of Energy, Interfax, InfoTEK, Renaissance Capital

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Development drilling

Development drilling in Russia remained flat last year (27,635 km), following a 12% increase in 2017, maintaining the new post-Soviet record for the Russian oil & gas sector. Major integrated Russian oils drilled 25,141mn metres in 2018, which represents a 2% decrease YoY.

Renaissance Capital

20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

With 27.6mn development metres drilled in 2018, Russia maintained a new post-Soviet record, reached in 2017

Figure 89: Development drilling by company, km (unless otherwise stated)

 

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

4M18

4M19

YoY

Rosneft

3,016

3,690

4,301

6,029

5,248

6,986

9,446

11,954

12,026

1%

3,893

3,356

-13.8%

SurgutNG

4,208

4,530

4,687

4,944

4,103

4,329

4,500

4,687

4,846

3%

1,496

1,562

4.5%

LUKOIL

2,275

2,489

3,404

3,555

3,768

2,759

2,455

2,956

2,992

1%

1,048

917

-12.5%

Gazprom Neft

2,762

2,461

2,662

3,109

2,979

3,141

2,884

2,860

2,494

-13%

721

743

3.0%

Slavneft

941

781

663

1,010

1,105

1,316

1,654

1,421

1,477

4%

450

616

37.0%

Russneft

334

559

384

367

421

302

418

556

472

-15%

171

176

2.7%

Bashneft

234

121

53

109

298

438

473

394

426

8%

144

127

-11.4%

Tatneft

464

488

489

424

382

908

916

813

409

-50%

150

128

-15.0%

TNK-BP

1,636

1,890

1,657

0

0

0

0

0

0

n.a.

0

0

nm

Russia

16,506

17,995

19,734

20,840

19,777

22,065

24,680

27,648

27,635

0%

8,797

8,443

-4.0%

Source: Ministry of Energy, Interfax, InfoTEK, Renaissance Capital

Rosneft moved into first position after the acquisition of TNK-BP, increasing its development drilling volumes by a further 1% YoY to 12,026 km in 2018. Surgutneftegas was the second largest, with 4,846 km (+3% YoY). LUKOIL ranked third with 2,992 km (+1% YoY), followed by Gazprom Neft, which drilled 2,494 km (-13% YoY). Elsewhere, Slavneft and Bashneft increased annual development drilling footage by 4% and 8%, respectively, while, Tatneft and Russneft decreased it by 50% and 15%, respectively.

Rosneft leads the industry with a 1% increase in development drilling in 2018

Last year, Slavneft ranked as the leader in development drilling per unit of output (106.9 metres/kt, +8% YoY), followed by Surgutneftegas (79.6 metres/kt, up 3% YoY) and Russneft (66.3 metres/kt, down by 16% YoY). Rosneft and Gazprom Neft were fourth and fifth with 59.9 metres/kt (-2% YoY) and 54.2 metres/kt (-14% YoY). LUKOIL, Bashneft and Tatneft ranked at the bottom, with 36.4 metres (+1% YoY), 22.5 metres (+18%) and 13.8 (-51%) metres drilled per kt of oil output, respectively.

Figure 90: 2014-2018 development drilling per unit of oil output (metres/kt)

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

20.0

0.0

Slavneft SurgutNG Russneft Rosneft Gazprom LUKOIL Bashneft Tatneft Neft

Source: Ministry of Energy, Interfax, InfoTEK, Renaissance Capital

Slavneft has the highest drilling intensity per unit of output

It is visible from Figure 91 that oil wells in Russia are becoming more complex. The average drilling length has increased by 32% vs 2010. On a company-by-company basis, Tatneft has the shallowest wells with an average well length of just 0.9 km, while

Slavneft’s wells were the deepest – 7.3 km on average in 2018.

Russian wells are becoming longer and more complex

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Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Figure 91: Development drilling footage in 2010-2018 by company, km/well (unless otherwise stated)

 

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

YoY

Oil companies

3.0

3.0

3.3

3.8

3.7

4.1

4.1

4.0

4.0

2%

Slavneft

4.2

3.6

2.6

6.0

5.3

7.0

9.6

7.9

7.3

-8%

Rosneft

3.0

3.1

3.4

3.7

3.6

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.4

-3%

Gazprom Neft

3.5

3.0

3.5

4.4

3.8

4.4

4.1

4.1

4.3

4%

SurgutNG

3.5

3.2

3.5

3.9

3.9

4.0

3.9

4.2

3.8

-9%

LUKOIL

2.9

3.4

3.3

3.6

3.6

3.8

3.6

3.8

3.8

2%

Russneft

2.7

3.3

2.8

4.0

4.2

4.1

4.1

4.6

3.7

-20%

Bashneft

1.6

1.4

1.3

2.4

3.4

3.1

3.3

3.0

3.5

18%

Tatneft

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.6

2.9

1.9

1.0

0.9

-3%

TNK-BP

2.7

2.8

3.4

Source: Ministry of Energy, InfoTEK, Interfax, Renaissance Capital

Russian development drilling volumes decreased by 4.0% in 4M19 compared with 4M18.

Drilling volumes decreased in 4M19

Slavneft was the leader in terms of volume growth, increasing development drilling by

 

37%, followed by Surgutneftegas (+4.5%), Gazprom Neft (+3.0%) and Russneft (+2.7%).

 

Bashneft, LUKOIL and Rosneft decreased their development drilling footage by 11.4%,

 

12.5% and 13.8% in 4M19, respectively. Tatneft demonstrated a sharpest decline among

 

the oil companies – down 15% YoY.

 

Figure 92: Russian 4M19 development drilling volumes, metres (unless otherwise stated)

 

4M18

4M19

YoY

Oil companies

8,072

7,625

-5.5%

Rosneft

3,893

3,356

-13.8%

SurgutNG

1,496

1,562

4.5%

LUKOIL

1,048

917

-12.5%

Gazprom Neft

721

743

3.0%

Slavneft

450

616

37.0%

Russneft

171

176

2.7%

Tatneft

150

128

-15.0%

Bashneft

144

127

-11.4%

Russia total

8,797

8,443

-4.0%

Source: Ministry of Energy, Interfax, Renaissance Capital

Whereas increased drilling was a sizeable contributor to crude output growth in the earlier phase of Russia’s crude output revival (in 2000-2001), we have observed a lower correlation in the subsequent years. We see more focus on better and more technologically intensive wells that are capable of delivering higher flow rates. This means that pure well count is no longer a strong indicator of production trends, although the correlation does exist.

Over the past few years, Russia has successfully re-engineered traditional (Soviet) methods of hydrocarbon development through the use of best-in-class technologies and equipment. Although the ‘brownfield miracle’ of the past decade has fallen from the limelight (with the launch of several significant new greenfields recently), we believe it is far from over. Higher overall drilling footage helps to improve recovery rates, but new wells now also yield higher flow rates, as discussed below, with the resulting effect of improved efficiencies and performance.

Figure 93 summarises the relationship between drilling activity and non-M&A production volume growth. Among the large oil VICs, Rosneft, LUKOIL and Surgutneftegas increased their development drilling volumes over 2017-2018, achieving a positive production growth rates in 2018. Russneft increased its drilling volumes in 2017 more than it decreased it in 2018, increasing production by 1.4% in 2018. Tatneft reduced its development drilling at 2018 which didn’t affect its growth in production. A marginal rebound (+4%) in development drilling volumes by Slavneft in 2018 after a reduction of 14% in 2017 was not able to reverse a negative 3.4% decline in output. The growth in Gazprom Neft new greenfields was partially offset by the curbs in growth of the brownfields, while the company managed to achieve an overall increase in 2018 output

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Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

(+0.8%) despite lower drilling volumes. The 8% increase in Bashneft development drilling in 2018 was not enough to offset the change in the production at its Trebs & Titov field and a 17% lower drilling volumes in the previous year.

Figure 93: Drilling volume growth vs crude oil and condensate production growth

100.0%

80.0%

60.0%

40.0%

20.0%

0.0% -20.0% -40.0% -60.0%

2017 development drilling

2018 development drilling

2018 organic production (RHS)

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

-2.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

-4.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

-6.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

-8.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

-10.0%

Rosneft

Tatneft

Russneft

Gazprom SurgutNG

LUKOIL

Slavneft

Bashneft

 

 

 

Neft

 

 

 

Source: Ministry of Natural Resources, Rosnedra, Renaissance Capital

85