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Crude exports by market, company and direction

Crude exports by market

According to the Federal Customs Service, in 2018 Russia’s crude oil and condensate exports were up by 3.0% YoY to 260.1mnt (5.22mnb/d). Non-FSU exports increased by 3.1% while FSU exports increased by 1.5% YoY in 2018. Russian FSU crude exports are made primarily to Belarus, after deliveries to Ukraine and Kazakhstan decreased substantially in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

Figure 94: 2004-2018 Russian crude oil and condensate exports by market, mnt (unless otherwise stated)

Renaissance Capital

20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Russia’s crude oil exports were up 3.0% last year to 260.1mnt (5.22mnb/d)

 

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

% of total

Total

239.8

253.1

237.2

230.8

245.1

246.8

245.3

240.5

236.6

223.4

244.5

254.8

252.6

260.1

100%

Non-FSU

203.7

217.3

213.5

207.7

211.0

220.7

214.4

212.5

208.0

199.3

221.6

236.2

234.5

241.7

93%

FSU

36.1

35.7

23.7

23.1

34.1

26.1

30.8

28.0

28.7

24.1

22.9

18.6

18.1

18.4

7%

Belarus

18.8

20.4

5.3

11.8

21.4

12.9

19.1

21.1

20.7

23.3

22.6

18.4

18.1

18.3

7%

Kazakhstan

3.4

5.7

7.6

5.3

6.3

7.3

7.1

6.1

7.6

0.5

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0%

Ukraine

13.9

9.6

10.8

6.0

6.3

6.0

4.7

0.7

0.4

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0%

Note: FSU figures are supposedly net, excluding volumes temporarily shipped for processing, although this seems unlikely. Kazakhstan includes small volumes of other Central Asia deliveries.

Source: Federal Customs Service, RPI FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, InfoTEK, Argus, Interfax, Renaissance Capital

Non-FSU crude exports by company

Figure 95 shows the distribution of non-FSU crude deliveries over 2005-2018. These indicate that 43% of the country’s overall crude oil and condensate production was exported to non-FSU destinations, with Transneft carrying the bulk (81% of the exports) via its pipeline system. The use of routes bypassing Transneft (railways and seaports) accounted for 19% in 2018, up 3 ppts YoY and up from 15% in 2016, due to the 23% increased exports from Gazprom Neft’s Novy Port and Prirzlomnoye fields via the Murmansk floating storage facilities and other systems.

Figure 95: 2004-2018 non-FSU crude oil and condensate exports by company, mnt (unless otherwise stated)

43% of overall crude production exported to non-CIS markets; Transneft shipped 81% of this

 

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

% exported

Total exports from Russia

227.6

241.4

236.8

231.3

236.3

242.1

237.3

235.3

229.7

218.6

240.3

256.1

254.3

260.3

 

Oil transits through Transneft

23.9

24.1

23.3

23.6

25.4

21.4

22.8

22.8

21.7

19.3

18.7

19.9

19.7

18.6

 

Russia, total

203.7

217.3

213.5

207.7

211.0

220.7

214.4

212.5

208.0

199.3

221.6

236.2

234.5

241.7

43.5

Rail

14.8

26.6

13.9

12.4

12.4

13.0

0.8

1.8

0.4

0.4

0.4

2.3

1.9

1.5

0.3

Other bypassing systems

7.9

8.5

17.1

20.3

25.9

28.3

21.5

21.2

22.6

21.9

29.1

32.6

35.4

45.6

8.2

Transneft

181.1

182.2

182.4

175.1

172.7

179.4

192.2

189.5

184.9

177.0

192.1

201.2

197.2

194.6

35.0

Rosneft

28.4

30.3

34.7

36.9

38.1

44.7

59.0

60.3

92.2

92.1

97.5

101.0

101.6

106.7

53.2

SurgutNG

27.8

31.8

32.9

32.1

27.1

25.6

27.0

26.7

28.8

26.0

29.9

32.2

29.4

30.7

50.5

LUKOIL

33.9

37.6

35.3

28.1

24.0

27.9

23.8

24.6

20.3

19.3

22.6

21.9

21.0

20.5

24.9

Tatneft

12.2

10.3

11.7

14.7

15.9

16.3

15.6

11.9

11.4

8.5

10.4

12.0

14.3

11.2

37.8

Gazprom Neft

15.7

15.4

14.3

9.1

8.8

8.8

12.7

6.2

7.8

7.6

7.9

8.4

10.2

7.6

16.6

Russneft

5.9

5.7

5.0

4.9

4.6

5.3

5.5

5.3

4.5

2.8

2.5

2.3

2.3

2.3

32.6

Gazprom

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.5

2.7

Slavneft

4.9

6.0

5.1

11.5

10.4

7.3

5.4

7.2

2.9

2.4

2.6

1.1

2.2

0.4

3.2

Bashneft

4.4

5.3

4.4

3.4

1.9

3.2

3.6

4.5

4.1

4.9

5.4

6.0

0.2

0.0

0.0

TNK-BP

36.8

33.5

30.3

25.8

29.3

28.4

29.8

28.5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

YUKOS

1.9

0.0

0.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Non-integrated producers and JVs

8.6

5.8

8.2

8.4

12.5

11.4

9.4

13.7

12.3

12.9

0.0

15.8

15.5

14.6

18.4

Note: The rail (net) caption includes volumes coordinated by Transneft. Other bypassing infrastructure includes overland rail exports, rail deliveries from refineries to seaports, or alternative offloading points, river shipping, offshore Sakhalin production and proprietary sea terminal exports.

Source: Argus, RPI FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, InfoTEK, Interfax, Renaissance Capital

The company-by-company breakdown is only available for shipments carried by Transneft and a small element of bypassing deliveries, including railed volumes that are coordinated by Transneft, and exports from proprietary sea terminals. Most of the railed or barged (river) shipments to seaports are hard to identify on a company-by-company basis.

87

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Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019

Russian oil & gas

Figure 96: 2014-2018 non-FSU crude oil and condensate exports through Transneft by company, % of output

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Rosneft

SurgutNG

Tatneft

Russneft

LUKOIL Gazprom Neft Slavneft

Bashneft

Source: InfoTEK, Interfax, RPI’s FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, Company data, Argus, Renaissance Capital

Crude exports by direction

Non-FSU crude oil exports via Transneft’s sea terminals were down by 10.6% YoY in 2018, following a decline of 2.7% the previous year. This represented 47.8% of Russia’s total non-FSU exports for 2018. Exports via all four major exporting Russian seaports (Primorsk, Novorossiysk, Kozmino, Ust-Luga) demonstrated a negative dynamic in 2018, with Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk and Kozmino down 15.0%, 12.5%, 9.9% and 4.2% YoY, respectively. Exports from Kozmino were 30.4mnt – below the port’s capacity of 36mnt. Exports via Tuapse (Black Sea) were zero in 2018-2015 (0.6mnt in 2014). Russia fully stopped exports via Ukrainian Black Sea ports in 2011 (following the reversal of the Odessa-Brody pipeline in 2010 and expansion of Novorossiysk operations following

Transneft’s acquisition of a 25% stake in the port in 2011).

Figure 97: Non-FSU crude oil exports by direction, mnt (unless otherwise stated)

 

2015

% of total

2016

% of total

2017

% of total

2018

% of total

Sea terminals

132.3

55.1

142.9

55.8

139.0

54.7

124.3

47.8

Primorsk

45.1

18.8

50.6

19.7

44.0

17.3

38.5

14.8

Kozmino

30.4

12.7

31.8

12.4

31.7

12.5

30.4

11.7

Ust-Luga

26.8

11.2

30.1

11.7

32.7

12.9

27.8

10.7

Novorossiysk

30.0

12.5

30.4

11.9

30.7

12.1

27.6

10.6

Tuapse

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Druzhba

53.5

22.3

54.3

21.2

51.1

20.1

50.5

19.4

Germany

21.3

8.9

22.8

8.9

21.5

8.5

22.3

8.6

Poland

17.4

7.3

17.7

6.9

15.6

6.2

14.9

5.7

Slovakia

6.0

2.5

5.7

2.2

5.5

2.2

5.2

2.0

Hungary

4.9

2.0

4.7

1.8

4.4

1.7

4.1

1.6

Czech Republic

3.9

1.6

3.4

1.3

4.0

1.6

4.0

1.5

China

23.0

9.6

23.5

9.2

26.5

10.4

38.3

14.7

Railway and other

31.2

13.0

35.4

13.8

37.3

14.7

47.1

18.1

Total

239.9

100.0

256.1

100.0

253.9

100.0

260.3

100.0

Source: Transneft, Neftyanaya Torgovlya, Interfax, Renaissance Capital

Sea terminal exports continue to dominate, and now account for 48% of total non-FSU crude exports

Destinations along the Druzhba pipeline represented 19% of Russian non-CIS crude oil export shipments in 2018 (-1.1% YoY following -5.9% YoY decline in 2017). Exports generally, decreased, except for the Germany (+3.5%). Exports to China increased significantly to 38.3mnt, from 26.5mnt in 2017 (c. 74% of pipeline exports to China were shipped via the ESPO pipeline, and c. 26% via Kazakhstan transit). Exports to key Eastern European customers (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) decreased by 4.5% YoY in 2018 and 6.1% in 2017.

Refineries along the Druzhba pipeline are captive consumers and are not generally available (via transit) to Central Asian producers. Overall, there is finite demand along this pipeline route, which determines how much crude is shipped this way. There is significant spare capacity along the southern branch of Druzhba, although this will only become available if a Mediterranean outlet can be established.

Druzhba pipeline shipments account for 19%

88