- •Contents
- •Foreword
- •Industry snapshot
- •Industry snapshot
- •Reserves
- •Oil output
- •Oil output
- •Gas output
- •Gas output
- •Refining
- •Refining
- •Upstream
- •Upstream
- •Oil output
- •Gas output
- •New wells
- •Well-stock management
- •Well productivity
- •Reserves
- •Reserves
- •Oil reserves
- •Gas reserves
- •Reserve replacement
- •Reserve replacement
- •Refining
- •Refining
- •Capacity, throughput, utilisation
- •Light products yield
- •Complexity
- •Complexity
- •Modernisation plans
- •Capex
- •Capex
- •Oil & gas sector capex
- •Crude exports
- •Crude exports
- •Crude exports by market, company and direction
- •Russian crude exports in the FSU context
- •Crude export proceeds
- •Refined products exports
- •Refined products exports
- •Analysis by product
- •Gas balance
- •Gas balance
- •Domestic sales
- •UGSS balance
- •Appendix I: Reserves classifications
- •Appendix I: Reserves classifications
- •Russian reserves definitions
- •Western reserves definitions
- •Appendix II: Pricing
- •Appendix II: Pricing
- •Monthly pricing trends
- •International crude oil pricing
- •Domestic crude oil pricing
- •Domestic product pricing
- •International gas pricing
- •Domestic gas pricing
- •Gas tariffs
- •Appendix III: Regulation and tax
- •Appendix III: Regulation and tax
- •Regulatory overview
- •Licensing
- •Environmental protection
- •Oil and product transportation
- •Transportation costs
- •Typical crude export route costs
- •Volume and price controls for gas
- •Tax regime
- •Mineral Extraction Tax (MET)
- •Crude-export duty
- •Excess profits tax
- •Specific taxes applied to natural gas
- •Taxation of offshore projects – special treatment
- •Appendix IV: Sanctions
- •Appendix IV: Sanctions
- •Summary
- •Appendix V: Who’s Who
- •Appendix V: Who’s Who
- •Key policymakers
- •Company heads
- •Disclosures appendix
vk.com/id446425943
Crude exports by market, company and direction
Crude exports by market
According to the Federal Customs Service, in 2018 Russia’s crude oil and condensate exports were up by 3.0% YoY to 260.1mnt (5.22mnb/d). Non-FSU exports increased by 3.1% while FSU exports increased by 1.5% YoY in 2018. Russian FSU crude exports are made primarily to Belarus, after deliveries to Ukraine and Kazakhstan decreased substantially in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
Figure 94: 2004-2018 Russian crude oil and condensate exports by market, mnt (unless otherwise stated)
Renaissance Capital
20 June 2019
Russian oil & gas
Russia’s crude oil exports were up 3.0% last year to 260.1mnt (5.22mnb/d)
|
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
% of total |
Total |
239.8 |
253.1 |
237.2 |
230.8 |
245.1 |
246.8 |
245.3 |
240.5 |
236.6 |
223.4 |
244.5 |
254.8 |
252.6 |
260.1 |
100% |
Non-FSU |
203.7 |
217.3 |
213.5 |
207.7 |
211.0 |
220.7 |
214.4 |
212.5 |
208.0 |
199.3 |
221.6 |
236.2 |
234.5 |
241.7 |
93% |
FSU |
36.1 |
35.7 |
23.7 |
23.1 |
34.1 |
26.1 |
30.8 |
28.0 |
28.7 |
24.1 |
22.9 |
18.6 |
18.1 |
18.4 |
7% |
Belarus |
18.8 |
20.4 |
5.3 |
11.8 |
21.4 |
12.9 |
19.1 |
21.1 |
20.7 |
23.3 |
22.6 |
18.4 |
18.1 |
18.3 |
7% |
Kazakhstan |
3.4 |
5.7 |
7.6 |
5.3 |
6.3 |
7.3 |
7.1 |
6.1 |
7.6 |
0.5 |
0.2 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0% |
Ukraine |
13.9 |
9.6 |
10.8 |
6.0 |
6.3 |
6.0 |
4.7 |
0.7 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0% |
Note: FSU figures are supposedly net, excluding volumes temporarily shipped for processing, although this seems unlikely. Kazakhstan includes small volumes of other Central Asia deliveries.
Source: Federal Customs Service, RPI FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, InfoTEK, Argus, Interfax, Renaissance Capital
Non-FSU crude exports by company
Figure 95 shows the distribution of non-FSU crude deliveries over 2005-2018. These indicate that 43% of the country’s overall crude oil and condensate production was exported to non-FSU destinations, with Transneft carrying the bulk (81% of the exports) via its pipeline system. The use of routes bypassing Transneft (railways and seaports) accounted for 19% in 2018, up 3 ppts YoY and up from 15% in 2016, due to the 23% increased exports from Gazprom Neft’s Novy Port and Prirzlomnoye fields via the Murmansk floating storage facilities and other systems.
Figure 95: 2004-2018 non-FSU crude oil and condensate exports by company, mnt (unless otherwise stated)
43% of overall crude production exported to non-CIS markets; Transneft shipped 81% of this
|
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
% exported |
Total exports from Russia |
227.6 |
241.4 |
236.8 |
231.3 |
236.3 |
242.1 |
237.3 |
235.3 |
229.7 |
218.6 |
240.3 |
256.1 |
254.3 |
260.3 |
|
Oil transits through Transneft |
23.9 |
24.1 |
23.3 |
23.6 |
25.4 |
21.4 |
22.8 |
22.8 |
21.7 |
19.3 |
18.7 |
19.9 |
19.7 |
18.6 |
|
Russia, total |
203.7 |
217.3 |
213.5 |
207.7 |
211.0 |
220.7 |
214.4 |
212.5 |
208.0 |
199.3 |
221.6 |
236.2 |
234.5 |
241.7 |
43.5 |
Rail |
14.8 |
26.6 |
13.9 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
13.0 |
0.8 |
1.8 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
2.3 |
1.9 |
1.5 |
0.3 |
Other bypassing systems |
7.9 |
8.5 |
17.1 |
20.3 |
25.9 |
28.3 |
21.5 |
21.2 |
22.6 |
21.9 |
29.1 |
32.6 |
35.4 |
45.6 |
8.2 |
Transneft |
181.1 |
182.2 |
182.4 |
175.1 |
172.7 |
179.4 |
192.2 |
189.5 |
184.9 |
177.0 |
192.1 |
201.2 |
197.2 |
194.6 |
35.0 |
Rosneft |
28.4 |
30.3 |
34.7 |
36.9 |
38.1 |
44.7 |
59.0 |
60.3 |
92.2 |
92.1 |
97.5 |
101.0 |
101.6 |
106.7 |
53.2 |
SurgutNG |
27.8 |
31.8 |
32.9 |
32.1 |
27.1 |
25.6 |
27.0 |
26.7 |
28.8 |
26.0 |
29.9 |
32.2 |
29.4 |
30.7 |
50.5 |
LUKOIL |
33.9 |
37.6 |
35.3 |
28.1 |
24.0 |
27.9 |
23.8 |
24.6 |
20.3 |
19.3 |
22.6 |
21.9 |
21.0 |
20.5 |
24.9 |
Tatneft |
12.2 |
10.3 |
11.7 |
14.7 |
15.9 |
16.3 |
15.6 |
11.9 |
11.4 |
8.5 |
10.4 |
12.0 |
14.3 |
11.2 |
37.8 |
Gazprom Neft |
15.7 |
15.4 |
14.3 |
9.1 |
8.8 |
8.8 |
12.7 |
6.2 |
7.8 |
7.6 |
7.9 |
8.4 |
10.2 |
7.6 |
16.6 |
Russneft |
5.9 |
5.7 |
5.0 |
4.9 |
4.6 |
5.3 |
5.5 |
5.3 |
4.5 |
2.8 |
2.5 |
2.3 |
2.3 |
2.3 |
32.6 |
Gazprom |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.4 |
0.2 |
0.0 |
0.4 |
0.5 |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
2.7 |
Slavneft |
4.9 |
6.0 |
5.1 |
11.5 |
10.4 |
7.3 |
5.4 |
7.2 |
2.9 |
2.4 |
2.6 |
1.1 |
2.2 |
0.4 |
3.2 |
Bashneft |
4.4 |
5.3 |
4.4 |
3.4 |
1.9 |
3.2 |
3.6 |
4.5 |
4.1 |
4.9 |
5.4 |
6.0 |
0.2 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
TNK-BP |
36.8 |
33.5 |
30.3 |
25.8 |
29.3 |
28.4 |
29.8 |
28.5 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
YUKOS |
1.9 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Non-integrated producers and JVs |
8.6 |
5.8 |
8.2 |
8.4 |
12.5 |
11.4 |
9.4 |
13.7 |
12.3 |
12.9 |
0.0 |
15.8 |
15.5 |
14.6 |
18.4 |
Note: The rail (net) caption includes volumes coordinated by Transneft. Other bypassing infrastructure includes overland rail exports, rail deliveries from refineries to seaports, or alternative offloading points, river shipping, offshore Sakhalin production and proprietary sea terminal exports.
Source: Argus, RPI FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, InfoTEK, Interfax, Renaissance Capital
The company-by-company breakdown is only available for shipments carried by Transneft and a small element of bypassing deliveries, including railed volumes that are coordinated by Transneft, and exports from proprietary sea terminals. Most of the railed or barged (river) shipments to seaports are hard to identify on a company-by-company basis.
87
vk.com/id446425943
Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019
Russian oil & gas
Figure 96: 2014-2018 non-FSU crude oil and condensate exports through Transneft by company, % of output
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Rosneft |
SurgutNG |
Tatneft |
Russneft |
LUKOIL Gazprom Neft Slavneft |
Bashneft |
Source: InfoTEK, Interfax, RPI’s FSU Oil and Gas Statistics Yearbook, Company data, Argus, Renaissance Capital
Crude exports by direction
Non-FSU crude oil exports via Transneft’s sea terminals were down by 10.6% YoY in 2018, following a decline of 2.7% the previous year. This represented 47.8% of Russia’s total non-FSU exports for 2018. Exports via all four major exporting Russian seaports (Primorsk, Novorossiysk, Kozmino, Ust-Luga) demonstrated a negative dynamic in 2018, with Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk and Kozmino down 15.0%, 12.5%, 9.9% and 4.2% YoY, respectively. Exports from Kozmino were 30.4mnt – below the port’s capacity of 36mnt. Exports via Tuapse (Black Sea) were zero in 2018-2015 (0.6mnt in 2014). Russia fully stopped exports via Ukrainian Black Sea ports in 2011 (following the reversal of the Odessa-Brody pipeline in 2010 and expansion of Novorossiysk operations following
Transneft’s acquisition of a 25% stake in the port in 2011).
Figure 97: Non-FSU crude oil exports by direction, mnt (unless otherwise stated)
|
2015 |
% of total |
2016 |
% of total |
2017 |
% of total |
2018 |
% of total |
Sea terminals |
132.3 |
55.1 |
142.9 |
55.8 |
139.0 |
54.7 |
124.3 |
47.8 |
Primorsk |
45.1 |
18.8 |
50.6 |
19.7 |
44.0 |
17.3 |
38.5 |
14.8 |
Kozmino |
30.4 |
12.7 |
31.8 |
12.4 |
31.7 |
12.5 |
30.4 |
11.7 |
Ust-Luga |
26.8 |
11.2 |
30.1 |
11.7 |
32.7 |
12.9 |
27.8 |
10.7 |
Novorossiysk |
30.0 |
12.5 |
30.4 |
11.9 |
30.7 |
12.1 |
27.6 |
10.6 |
Tuapse |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
Druzhba |
53.5 |
22.3 |
54.3 |
21.2 |
51.1 |
20.1 |
50.5 |
19.4 |
Germany |
21.3 |
8.9 |
22.8 |
8.9 |
21.5 |
8.5 |
22.3 |
8.6 |
Poland |
17.4 |
7.3 |
17.7 |
6.9 |
15.6 |
6.2 |
14.9 |
5.7 |
Slovakia |
6.0 |
2.5 |
5.7 |
2.2 |
5.5 |
2.2 |
5.2 |
2.0 |
Hungary |
4.9 |
2.0 |
4.7 |
1.8 |
4.4 |
1.7 |
4.1 |
1.6 |
Czech Republic |
3.9 |
1.6 |
3.4 |
1.3 |
4.0 |
1.6 |
4.0 |
1.5 |
China |
23.0 |
9.6 |
23.5 |
9.2 |
26.5 |
10.4 |
38.3 |
14.7 |
Railway and other |
31.2 |
13.0 |
35.4 |
13.8 |
37.3 |
14.7 |
47.1 |
18.1 |
Total |
239.9 |
100.0 |
256.1 |
100.0 |
253.9 |
100.0 |
260.3 |
100.0 |
Source: Transneft, Neftyanaya Torgovlya, Interfax, Renaissance Capital
Sea terminal exports continue to dominate, and now account for 48% of total non-FSU crude exports
Destinations along the Druzhba pipeline represented 19% of Russian non-CIS crude oil export shipments in 2018 (-1.1% YoY following -5.9% YoY decline in 2017). Exports generally, decreased, except for the Germany (+3.5%). Exports to China increased significantly to 38.3mnt, from 26.5mnt in 2017 (c. 74% of pipeline exports to China were shipped via the ESPO pipeline, and c. 26% via Kazakhstan transit). Exports to key Eastern European customers (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) decreased by 4.5% YoY in 2018 and 6.1% in 2017.
Refineries along the Druzhba pipeline are captive consumers and are not generally available (via transit) to Central Asian producers. Overall, there is finite demand along this pipeline route, which determines how much crude is shipped this way. There is significant spare capacity along the southern branch of Druzhba, although this will only become available if a Mediterranean outlet can be established.
Druzhba pipeline shipments account for 19%
88