- •Contents
- •Foreword
- •Industry snapshot
- •Industry snapshot
- •Reserves
- •Oil output
- •Oil output
- •Gas output
- •Gas output
- •Refining
- •Refining
- •Upstream
- •Upstream
- •Oil output
- •Gas output
- •New wells
- •Well-stock management
- •Well productivity
- •Reserves
- •Reserves
- •Oil reserves
- •Gas reserves
- •Reserve replacement
- •Reserve replacement
- •Refining
- •Refining
- •Capacity, throughput, utilisation
- •Light products yield
- •Complexity
- •Complexity
- •Modernisation plans
- •Capex
- •Capex
- •Oil & gas sector capex
- •Crude exports
- •Crude exports
- •Crude exports by market, company and direction
- •Russian crude exports in the FSU context
- •Crude export proceeds
- •Refined products exports
- •Refined products exports
- •Analysis by product
- •Gas balance
- •Gas balance
- •Domestic sales
- •UGSS balance
- •Appendix I: Reserves classifications
- •Appendix I: Reserves classifications
- •Russian reserves definitions
- •Western reserves definitions
- •Appendix II: Pricing
- •Appendix II: Pricing
- •Monthly pricing trends
- •International crude oil pricing
- •Domestic crude oil pricing
- •Domestic product pricing
- •International gas pricing
- •Domestic gas pricing
- •Gas tariffs
- •Appendix III: Regulation and tax
- •Appendix III: Regulation and tax
- •Regulatory overview
- •Licensing
- •Environmental protection
- •Oil and product transportation
- •Transportation costs
- •Typical crude export route costs
- •Volume and price controls for gas
- •Tax regime
- •Mineral Extraction Tax (MET)
- •Crude-export duty
- •Excess profits tax
- •Specific taxes applied to natural gas
- •Taxation of offshore projects – special treatment
- •Appendix IV: Sanctions
- •Appendix IV: Sanctions
- •Summary
- •Appendix V: Who’s Who
- •Appendix V: Who’s Who
- •Key policymakers
- •Company heads
- •Disclosures appendix
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UGSS balance
Deciphering the gas balance in the UGSS is notoriously difficult. Gazprom repeatedly changing the breakdown hardly helps, but the reality is that flows in the system have become increasingly complex, including substantial volumes that are purchased by Gazprom or shipped on behalf of others.
Renaissance Capital
20 June 2019
Russian oil & gas
Deciphering the gas balance is challenging, given the growing role of non-Gazprom gas in the system
Figure 107 below summarises our best attempt at untangling this riddle.
Figure 107: 2003-2018 UGSS balance, bcm
|
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
Total gas transportation system inflow |
672 |
684 |
700 |
718 |
707 |
714 |
590 |
661 |
683 |
666 |
659 |
628 |
603 |
623 |
672 |
693 |
UGTS inflow |
622 |
635 |
647 |
661 |
655 |
669 |
552 |
614 |
631 |
615 |
621 |
589 |
574 |
574 |
623 |
639 |
Shipments of gas owned by Gazprom |
539 |
548 |
550 |
554 |
543 |
548 |
486 |
542 |
549 |
519 |
510 |
468 |
453 |
445 |
485 |
510 |
Shipments of gas owned by third parties |
83 |
88 |
97 |
107 |
112 |
122 |
67 |
73 |
82 |
96 |
111 |
121 |
122 |
129 |
138 |
129 |
Withdrawals from Russian UGSFs |
40 |
38 |
43 |
48 |
42 |
36 |
30 |
41 |
47 |
44 |
33 |
33 |
24 |
45 |
46 |
52 |
Decrease in GTS reserves |
10 |
11 |
10 |
9 |
10 |
9 |
7 |
6 |
5 |
7 |
6 |
6 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total gas transportation system outflow |
672 |
684 |
700 |
718 |
707 |
714 |
590 |
661 |
683 |
666 |
659 |
628 |
603 |
623 |
672 |
693 |
Pipeline deliveries to customers in Russia |
327 |
334 |
340 |
352 |
356 |
353 |
336 |
355 |
366 |
362 |
355 |
357 |
342 |
352 |
354 |
365 |
of which Gazprom's |
292 |
297 |
307 |
316 |
307 |
287 |
272 |
262 |
265 |
262 |
237 |
220 |
200 |
196 |
230 |
240 |
of which others |
36 |
36 |
33 |
36 |
49 |
66 |
64 |
93 |
100 |
101 |
118 |
137 |
143 |
156 |
124 |
125 |
Pipeline deliveries outside of Russia |
234 |
246 |
251 |
255 |
247 |
251 |
196 |
209 |
218 |
209 |
220 |
196 |
197 |
209 |
232 |
235 |
Europe |
135 |
149 |
154 |
151 |
151 |
168 |
153 |
151 |
154 |
139 |
162 |
147 |
159 |
179 |
194 |
202 |
FSU countries |
99 |
97 |
97 |
104 |
97 |
84 |
43 |
58 |
64 |
71 |
59 |
50 |
38 |
30 |
38 |
33 |
Addition to Russian UGSFs |
49 |
43 |
46 |
50 |
43 |
52 |
16 |
48 |
48 |
44 |
38 |
35 |
27 |
25 |
44 |
49 |
GTS’ own technological needs |
51 |
52 |
52 |
52 |
50 |
50 |
36 |
44 |
46 |
41 |
41 |
33 |
32 |
32 |
38 |
41 |
Increase in GTS reserves |
11 |
10 |
11 |
9 |
11 |
9 |
7 |
6 |
6 |
10 |
6 |
7 |
4 |
5 |
4 |
4 |
Note: Excludes non-Russia storage movements and re-sold volumes in export markets.
Source: Gazprom, Renaissance Capital
In our view, the most salient points on the supply side are:
▪Gazprom produced 474bcm last year, which includes its 10bcm share of Yuzhno-Russkoye and 9bcm share of Sakhalin-2 production.
▪We estimate 8bcm was sold or consumed locally before reaching the UGSS. Gazprom has not reported this figure, and our estimate is therefore subject to change.
Total supplies of 693bcm
510bcm of Gazprom’s or Gazprompurchased gas
▪We estimate Gazprom also purchased 21bcm from Central Asian and 22bcm from other Russian producers for delivery to customers.
▪This means Gazprom shipped 510bcm of gas that it has either produced or acquired from third parties.
▪Other Russian producers also shipped 129bcm out of their total production of 251bcm via the UGSS.
▪This means 122bcm of Russian gas was consumed locally, shipped directly to customers (such as in the form of LNG) or merely flared last year.
▪Storage facilities supplied 52bcm of required seasonal demand, while UGSS capacity released 2bcm.
▪Total supplies were 693bcm.
On the demand side, we note the following:
▪Gazprom delivered 365bcm to Russian customers.
▪Of this, we estimate Gazprom’s owned gas accounted for 240bcm (this figure includes third-party gas that Gazprom re-sells).
▪Non-FSU deliveries were 202bcm.
▪33bcm was shipped to FSU markets.
365bcm delivered to Russian customers
99
vk.com/id446425943
Renaissance Capital 20 June 2019
Russian oil & gas
▪Deliveries into storage in Russia were 49bcm.
▪The pipeline system itself consumed 41bcm.
▪UGSS capacity absorbed 4bcm.
▪Total deliveries were 693bcm.
100