Globalization and International Regimes

During the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the advancement of technology has made it possible for more and more people to come into increasingly close contact across the globe. World­wide communication is now instantaneous in many areas of activity. Not every aspect of this globalization of world politics is beneficial how­ever. Technology has made it possible to see and talk to people on the other side of the globe and to fill the supermarkets, at least those in the wealthy sectors of the global economy, with increasingly exotic commodities from all round the world. But it has also made it possible to build weapons with the potential to wreak global devastation and to pollute the atmosphere with chemicals that could possibly have irreversible and certainly very dangerous global consequences. Our impact on the world we inhabit is both frightening and exciting. But either way it is becoming increasingly apparent that if we are all to benefit rather than suffer from global­ization, it is essential to manage the process. No one thinks that this task will be easy; pessimists doubt that it is even possible. Regime theorists, on the other hand, see grounds for optimism. They believe that survival depends upon our capacity to regulate global activity by means of regimes; and, as we demonstrate in this section, although not in any comprehensive fashion, the evidence indicates that states can establish regimes across a wide range of activities.

Security Regimes

Although security regimes are primarily a twenti­eth-century phenomenon, permitting states to escape from the security dilemma (see Ch. 10), it is possible to identity earner examples. The Concert of Europe, for instance, constitutes a regime formed by the conservative states of post-Napoleonic Europe to counter future revolution and conflict. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, the British and Americans established the Rush Bagot agreement in 1817 to demilitarize the Great Lakes. But whereas the tacit regime in Europe began to decay soon after it was formed, the full-blown bilat­eral regime in North America became steadily stronger until eventually, the long border between Canada and the United States was permanently demilitarized.

Regular attempts to establish full-blown security regimes, however, only started to proliferate during the twentieth century, particularly after the onset of the cold war. But the effectiveness of these regimes has often been questioned. Jervis (1983), for example, argued that some of the major regimes, such as SALT 1 (1972) and SALT 2 (1979) designed to bring the armistice between the United States and the Soviet Union under control, were effectively dead-letter regimes. Despite the pro­longed negotiations and detailed agreements, there was no evidence that they brought the arms race under control, because neither super power expected the other to desist from developing new weapons technology.

Nevertheless, there are arms control agreements which do seem to have established fragile security regimes. The Partial Test Ban Agreement of 1963, has undoubtedly encouraged a prohibition of atmospheric testing. And the 1968 Non-proliferation Agreement continues to act as a restraint on any increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. The agreement has been signed by over 170 states—the vast majority of states in the interna­tional system. Although fragile, the regime enjoys a very broad measure of support, so that any state breaching the agreement will confront widespread opposition.