The origins of World War One

Why did Europe lose its predominant place in the world in the years between 1900 and 1945? The answer lies partly in Europe itself and partly beyond. European states fought viciously with one another on their own soil. However, the continent which had given birth to the Industrial Revolution, and had formed the hub of global financial activity, also faced economic challenges from rapidly industrial­izing states—most obviously the United States. Similarly, in the Far East, Japan underwent rapid expansion in the early twentieth century, posing a significant economic and military challenge to the European powers' trading and colonial interests in East Asia.

We will consider global economic developments in due course, but first we will examine the internal roots of Europe's instability. These are frequently dated back to the 1870s, when the continent's rela­tive tranquility following the Napoleonic Wars was disturbed by the creation of a single, unified German nation-state.

Germany's bid for world power status

The unified Germany's territorial ambitions rapidly became apparent. Although Bismarck himself had cautioned against further German expansionism, his successors were less circumspect, and sought to assert German parity with the other great powers by acquiring the most important badge of great power status—an overseas empire. Imperial disputes were thus an important contributory factor to the out­break of war in 1914, and in Marxist accounts of the war's origins were allotted causal primacy. Certainly, Britain was not keen to see its own position as the world's most powerful trading nation overshadowed by Germany, with whom it was now engaged in fierce naval rivalry. France had equally compelling reasons to fear German expansion. The opening years of the twentieth century thus saw a hitherto unlikely alliance of Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia merging in an attempt to halt Germany's deter­mined search for territory and markets. Germans, however, saw themselves not as the aggressors but rather as the victims of an imperial system which operated entirely to their disadvantage: Britain and France dominated Africa, Asia, and the Middle East; Russia, Japan, and Britain competed in China, while the US held sway in Latin America. Between them, these powers appeared to have carved up the inter­national market to their exclusive satisfaction. Gain­ing colonies was thus not solely a matter of prestige or status but was regarded as an economic imperative for Germany. The main areas of contention were North Africa, where clashes occurred with France and Britain over Morocco in 1906 and in 1911, and the Middle East, as Germany sought to build a railway from Berlin to Baghdad.

The European colonial powers had, however, clashed over imperial issues before. Consequently, many historians regard these disputes alone as insufficient to explain the war which broke out in July 1914. The evaluation of various explanatory fac­tors continues to generate much historiographlcal debate. Some historians concur with, others dispute, the verdict of the war's victors—that 'war guilt' belonged to Germany alone. The most famous expli­cation of this view was Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der Weltmacht (Bid for World Power), published in 1961, which emphasized the extent of Germany's annexationist aims in the war, arguing that the German government deliberately went to war in their pursuit. Others have insisted that a general war came about more by accident than design, partly due to the way in which military plans had been drawn up. German strategy, devised by Count Alfred von Schlieffen, was designed to counter the prospect of Germany fighting a war on two fronts against France and Russia. His plan therefore envisaged a decisive blow against France before German troops turned to the tardily mobilized Russians. Thus the 'Schlieffen plan' served to widen the war rapidly, once the open­ing shots had been fired. Those opening shots were fired, not by Germany, but in Sarajevo at Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire) by a Serb nationalist. This assas­sination should alert us to other deep-seated origins of Europe's crisis, and ultimately of the war itself.