- •The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations Edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith
- •Editor's Preface
- •Key Features of the Book
- •Contents
- •Detailed Contents
- •13. Diplomacy
- •14. The United Nations and International Organization
- •List of Figures
- •List of Boxes
- •List of Tables
- •About the Contributors
- •Introduction
- •From International Politics to World Politics
- •Theories of World Politics
- •Realism and World Politics
- •Liberalism and World Politics
- •World-System Theory and World Politics
- •The Three Theories and Globalization
- •Globalization and its Precursors
- •Globalization: Myth or Reality?
- •Chapter 1. The Globalization of World Politics
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction: a Globalizing World
- •Globalization: a Definition
- •Aspects of Globalization
- •Historical Origins
- •Qualifications
- •Key Points
- •Globalization and the States-System
- •The Westphalian Order
- •The End of History
- •The End of Sovereignty
- •The Persistence of the State
- •Key Points
- •Post-Sovereign Governance
- •Substate Global Governance
- •Suprastate Global Governance
- •Marketized Global Governance
- •Global Social Movements
- •Key Points
- •The Challenge of Global Democracy
- •Globalization and the Democratic State
- •Global Governance Agencies and Democracy
- •Global Market Democracy?
- •Global Social Movements and Democracy
- •Key Points
- •Conclusion
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 2. The Evolution of International Society
- •Reader's guide
- •Origins and Definitions
- •Key Points
- •Ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy
- •Key Points
- •European International Society
- •Key Points
- •The Globalization of International Society
- •Key Points
- •Problems of Global International Society
- •Key Points
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 3. International history 1900-1945
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction
- •The origins of World War One
- •Germany's bid for world power status
- •The 'Eastern Question'
- •Key points
- •Peace-making, 1919: the Versailles settlement Post-war problems
- •President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'
- •Self-determination: the creation of new states
- •The future of Germany
- •'War guilt' and reparations
- •Key points
- •The global economic slump, 1929-1933
- •Key points
- •The origins of World War Two in Asia and the Pacific
- •Japan and the 'Meiji Restoration'
- •Japanese expansion in China
- •The Manchurian crisis and after
- •Key points
- •The path to war in Europe
- •The controversy over the origins of the Second World War
- •The rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe
- •From appeasement to war
- •Key points
- •Conclusion
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading General
- •World War I and after
- •World War II
- •Chapter 4. International history 1945-1990
- •Introduction
- •End of empire
- •Key points
- •The cold war
- •1945-1953: Onset of the cold war
- •1953-1969: Conflict, confrontation, and compromise
- •1969-1979: The rise and fall of detente
- •1979-86: 'The second cold war'
- •The bomb
- •Conclusion
- •General
- •The cold war
- •The bomb
- •Decolonization
- •Richard Crockatt
- •Introduction
- •Key points
- •Internal factors: the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union Structural problems in the Soviet system
- •The collapse of the Soviet empire
- •Economic restructuring
- •Key points
- •The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
- •The legacy of protest in Eastern Europe
- •Gorbachev and the end of the Brezhnev doctrine
- •Key points
- •External factors: relations with the United States Debate about us policy and the end of the cold war
- •Key points
- •The interaction between internal and external environments
- •Isolation of the communist system from the global capitalist system
- •Key points
- •Conclusion
- •Key points
- •Chapter 6. Realism
- •Introduction: the timeless wisdom of Realism
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction: the timeless wisdom of Realism
- •Key points
- •One Realism, or many?
- •Key points
- •The essential Realism
- •Statism
- •Survival
- •Self-help
- •Key points
- •Conclusion: Realism and the globalization of world politics
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 7. World-System Theory
- •Introduction
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction
- •Key Points
- •The Origins of World-System Theory
- •Key Points
- •Wallerstein and World-System Theory
- •Key Points
- •The Modern World-System in Space and Time
- •Key Points
- •Politics in the Modern World-System: The Sources of Stability
- •States and the Interstate System
- •Core-States—Hegemonic Leadership and Military Force
- •Semi-peripheral States—Making the World Safe for Capitalism
- •Peripheral States—At home with the Comprador Class
- •Geoculture
- •Key Points
- •Crisis in the Modern World-System
- •The Economic Sources of Crisis
- •The Political Sources of Crisis
- •The Geocultural Sources of Crisis
- •The Crisis and the Future: Socialism or Barbarism?
- •Key Points
- •World-System Theory and Globalization
- •Key Points
- •Questions
- •A guide to further reading
- •Chapter 8. Liberalism
- •Introduction
- •Varieties of Liberalism
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction
- •Key points
- •Varieties of Liberalism
- •Liberal internationalism
- •Idealism
- •Liberal institutionalism
- •Key points
- •Three liberal responses to globalization
- •Key points
- •Conclusion and postscript: the crisis of Liberalism
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 9. New Approaches to International Theory
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction
- •Key Points
- •Explanatory/Constitutive Theories and Foundational/Anti-Foundational Theories
- •Key Points
- •Rationalist Theories: The Neo-Realist/Neo-Liberal Debate
- •Key Points
- •Reflectivist Theories
- •Normative Theory
- •Key Points
- •Feminist Theory
- •Key Points
- •Critical Theory
- •Key Points
- •Historical Sociology
- •Key Points
- •Post-Modernism
- •Key Points
- •Bridging the Gap: Social Constructivism
- •Key Points
- •Conclusion
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 10.International Security in the Post-Cold War Era
- •Introduction
- •What is meant by the concept of security?
- •The traditional approach to national security
- •The 'security dilemma'
- •The difficulties of co-operation between states
- •The problem of cheating
- •The problem of relative-gains
- •The opportunities for co-operation between states 'Contingent realism'
- •Key points
- •Mature anarchy
- •Key points
- •Liberal institutionalism
- •Key points
- •Democratic peace theory
- •Key points
- •Ideas of collective security
- •Key points
- •Alternative views on international and global security 'Social constructivist' theory
- •Key points
- •'Critical security' theorists and 'feminist' approaches
- •Key points
- •Post-modernist views
- •Key points
- •Globalist views of international security
- •Key points
- •The continuing tensions between national, international, and global security
- •Conclusions
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Web links
- •Chapter 11. International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction: The Significance of ipe for Globalized International Relations
- •What is ipe? Terms, Labels, and Interpretations
- •Ipe and the issues of ir
- •Key Points
- •Words and Politics
- •Key Points
- •Thinking about ipe, ir, and Globalization States and the International Economy
- •The Core Question
- •What is 'International' and what is 'Global'
- •Key Points
- •What Kind of World have We made? 'International' or 'Global'?
- •Global Capital Flows
- •International Production and the Transnational Corporation
- •'Domestic' and 'International'
- •The Ideological Basis of the World Economy
- •Key Points
- •Conclusions: 'So what?'
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
- •Chapter 12. International Regimes
- •Introduction
- •Reader's guide
- •Introduction
- •Key Points
- •The Nature of Regimes
- •Conceptualizing Regimes
- •Defining Regimes
- •Classifying Regimes
- •Globalization and International Regimes
- •Security Regimes
- •Environmental Regimes
- •Communication Regimes
- •Economic Regimes
- •Key Points
- •Competing Theories: 1. The Liberal Institutional Approach
- •Impediments to Regime Formation
- •The Facilitation of Regime Formation
- •Competing Theories: 2. The Realist Approach
- •Power and Regimes
- •Regimes and Co-ordination
- •Key Points
- •Conclusion
- •Questions
- •Guide to further reading
From appeasement to war
The Nazis made no secret of their territorial ambitions; Mein Kampf spelt out Hitler's racial views and expansionist plans quite explicitly. Why, therefore, did the governments of Britain and France not do more to prevent Hitler from realizing these plans? Why was Hitler allowed to remilitarize the Rhine-land, annex Austria, and invade Czechoslovakia before the Allies confronted him over his incursion into Poland in September 1939? Why, in short, was Hitler appeased for so long?
The policy of appeasement pursued by the Western powers throughout much of the 1930s has received considerable scholarly attention, and remains a potent source of historical analogies for politicians. The first generation of post-war historians was extremely (if understandably) harsh to its verdict on the appeasers: Chamberlain and his French counterparts were the 'Guilty Men of Munich'. By cravenly appeasing Hitler, the leaders of France and Britain simply fed his appetite, and emboldened the Fuhrer to believe that he could successfully carry off ever more audacious violations of the Treaty of Versailles.
A number of subsequent historians have been somewhat kinder to the 'appeasers'. Certainly we should not underestimate the magnitude of the domestic and international crises confronting West European policy-makers and diplomats in the 1930s. Japan's violations of Chinese sovereignty were a source of concern in the Far East. Events in Asia thus provided a convenient cover for Hitler to leave the Geneva disarmament conference and the League in 1933, and to begin the process of German rearmament. Germany also profited from Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, and was a far from reliable ally to Mussolini during the ensuing war there. Although Mussolini announced the formation of a 'Rome-Berlin Axis' between Germany and Italy in November 1936, in fact, Hitler had sent some arms to Haile Selassie's beleagured forces in Abyssinia—precisely to protract the war, enabling Germany to tear more gaping holes in the fabric of the Versailles settlement, while British and French attention was still focused on north-east Africa. As the League grappled with the issue of whether or not to apply sanctions to Italy over Abyssinia, civil war broke out in Spain. The ideological fissures in Europe were now unmistakable.
British and French politicians accordingly faced the daunting scenario of war on three fronts: in the Pacific (against Japan); the Mediterranean (against Italy), and Central Europe (against Germany). Neither Britain nor France was prepared militarily for such an eventuality. Nor, for much of the 1930s, did a majority of British and French citizens appear to favour going to war to prevent or reverse acts of aggression. There were after all pressing domestic issues to be attended to: the Depression had created chronic unemployment and poverty. Moreover, the memory of World War I was still vivid, and this made politicians, mindful of the publics they served, cautious about embarking on military solutions to International problems. Appeasement, some historians would thus argue, was in certain respects a justifiable attempt to 'buy time'. It enabled British and French rearmament to proceed, and public opinion to be mobilized, so that if Germany did have to be challenged militarily, and Hitler's pose as a 'man of peace' was proved a sham, then at least a serious military effort could be mounted against him.
However, this more charitable interpretation of appeasement might be criticized on the grounds that it credits the appeasers with considerable foresight— with seeking a breathing-space which would enable them, ultimately, to wage more effective war against Hitler, whereas in fact they tended to believe that by giving in to his demands, the Fuhrer would cease to make them. Chamberlain not only accepted that Germany did have some legitimate grievances but additionally regarded Hitler in the same light as other statesmen. The British premier therefore assumed that differences between European statesmen could be ironed out through negotiation and compromise, as all essentially wanted peace. This underestimation of Nazi intentions consequently enabled Hitler to launch a spectacular series of assaults on the Versailles settlement with impunity. He reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936, with surprisingly little response from France. He encouraged Nazi movements in Austria, and pressurized the Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg to include Nazis in his government. Then in March 1938 he dispatched German troops over the border to secure the 'unification' of Austria with Germany (Anschluss). Czechoslovakia was next. Here, Hitler again deployed as legitimation the fact that Germany had been wronged in 1919, when three and a half million Germans of the Sudetenland had been incorporated within the new Czech state. German troop movements against Czechoslovakia began in May 1938. While British and French leaders were clearly alarmed by this development, they nevertheless continued to appease Hitler, and indeed the high-point of the policy was the now notorious Munich conference of September 1938. At Munich, the British and French premiers agreed to German occupation of the Sudetenland, but offered a guarantee (with Italy and Germany) of the borders of the remaining Czech state. Hitler also promised Chamberlain that their two countries would 'never go to war with one another again'—the famous piece of paper which Chamberlain claimed would secure 'peace for our time'.
As we know, it did not. In Match 1939, Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and Britain and France ignored their pledges made at Munich, with Chamberlain having decided some months earlier that Czechoslovakia was indefensible. However, in the wake of Germany's effective occupation of all Central Europe, the Western powers showered guarantees on the remaining free states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Why this sudden diplomatic revolution? The answer seems to be that appeasement no longer appeared morally defensible once Hitler's ambitions had clearly outstripped revision of German grievances outstanding from 1919. By sending German troops into Prague, Hitler revealed that his territorial greed was not just
Box 3.7. The origins of World War Two in Europe: a chronology |
|
30 Oct. 1922 |
Mussolini becomes Prime Minister of Italy. |
30 Jan. 1933 |
Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany |
14 Oct. 1933 |
Germany leaves the Geneva disarmament conference and walks out of the League of Nations. |
14/15 June 1934 |
Hitler and Mussolini meet in Venice. |
25 July 1934 |
Murder of Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, by Austrian Nazis. |
16 March 1935 |
Germany reintroduces conscription. |
3 Oct. 1935 |
Italy invades Abyssinia/Ethiopia. |
11 Oct. 1935 |
League decides to impose sanctions against Italy. |
7 March 1936 |
Germany reoccupies the Rhineland (which the Treaty of Versailles had established as a demilitarized zone). |
9 May 1936 |
Italy annexes Abyssinia. |
17 July 1936 |
Civil war breaks out in Spain between Franco's fascist forces and the communist/socialist/syndicalist Popular Front. |
1 Nov. 1936 |
Mussolini announces the existence of the Rome-Berlin Axis. |
11 Dec. 1937 |
Italy leaves the League of Nations. |
13 March 1938 |
Austria united with Germany (Anschluss). |
20 May 1938 |
Rumours of German troop movements against Czechoslovakia. |
15 Sept. 1938 |
British PM Chamberlain meets Hitler at Berchtesgaden. |
22 Sept. 1938 |
Chamberlain and Hitler meet at Godesburg. |
29/30 Sept. 1938 |
Munich Conference. |
28 March 1939 |
End of Spanish Civil War. |
31 March 1939 |
Britain and France extend a guarantee to Poland that they will defend Poland's territorial integrity from German attack, after Germany occupies the remainder of Czechoslovakia. |
17 April 1939 |
USSR proposes alliance to Britain and France. |
22 May 1939 |
Pact of Steel signed between Italy and Germany. |
12 Aug. 1939 |
Britain and France begin military talks with USSR. |
23 Aug.1939 |
Stalin signs Nazi-Soviet Pact. |
25 Aug.1939 |
Britain signs treaty with Poland. |
1 Sept. 1939 |
Germany invades Poland; Italy remains neutral. |
3 Sept. 1939 |
Britain and France declare war on Germany. |
17 Sept. 1939 |
USSR invades Poland. |
30 Nov. 1939 |
USSR invades Finland. |
9 April 1940 |
Germany invades Denmark and Norway. |
10 June 1940 |
Italy enters the war. |
22 June 1940 |
France signs armistice with Germany. |
22 June 1941 |
Germany invades USSR. |
8 Dec. 1941 |
US enters the war. |
for 'Germanic' lands. Why assume that he would be satisfied with Czechoslovakia? Poland, the Low Countries, and France all now appeared in imminent danger of German expansionism. Fearing for their own territorial integrity, the leaders of Britain and France thus determined to go to war with Hitler over Poland in September 1939. The Czechs might have been sacrificed on the altar of appeasement, but the Poles would not suffer the same fate without a fight.