- •November 16, 2002
- •February 14, 2003
- •February 21
- •February 28
- •March 7
- •March 10
- •March 12
- •March 14
- •March 15
- •March 17
- •March 19
- •March 21
- •March 24
- •March 26
- •March 28
- •March 30
- •March 31
- •April 2
- •April 2
- •April 8-10
- •April 12
- •April 16
- •April 20
- •April 20
- •April 23
- •April 25
- •April 27
- •April 29
- •June 6
- •June 13
- •June 17
- •June 21
- •June 23
- •June 24
- •July 2
- •July 5
- •August 14
- •September 8
- •September 24
- •References
- •Virology
- •Discovery of the SARS Virus
- •Initial Research
- •The Breakthrough
- •Coronaviridae
- •SARS Co-V
- •Genome Sequence
- •Morphology
- •Organization
- •Detection
- •Stability and Resistance
- •Natural Host
- •Antiviral Agents and Vaccines
- •Antiviral Drugs
- •Vaccines
- •Outlook
- •References
- •Routes of Transmission
- •Factors Influencing Transmission
- •Patient Factors in Transmission
- •Asymptomatic Patients
- •Symptomatic Patients
- •Superspreaders
- •The Unsuspected Patients
- •High-Risk Activities
- •Transmission during Quarantine
- •Transmission after Recovery
- •Animal Reservoirs
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Modeling the Epidemic
- •Starting Point
- •Global Spread
- •Hong Kong
- •Vietnam
- •Toronto
- •Singapore, February 2003
- •China
- •Taiwan
- •Other Countries
- •Eradication
- •Outlook
- •References
- •Introduction
- •International Coordination
- •Advice to travelers
- •Management of SARS in the post-outbreak period
- •National Measures
- •Legislation
- •Extended Case Definition
- •Quarantine
- •Reduce travel between districts
- •Quarantine after Discharge
- •Infection Control in Healthcare Settings
- •General Measures
- •Protective Measures
- •Hand washing
- •Gloves
- •Face Masks
- •Additional protection
- •Getting undressed
- •Special Settings
- •Intensive Care Units
- •Intubating a SARS Patient
- •Anesthesia
- •Triage
- •Internet Sources
- •Additional information
- •Infection Control in Households
- •Possible Transmission from Animals
- •After the Outbreak
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Case Definition
- •WHO Case Definition
- •Suspect case
- •Probable case
- •Exclusion criteria
- •Reclassification of cases
- •CDC Case Definition
- •Diagnostic Tests
- •Introduction
- •Laboratory tests
- •Molecular tests
- •Virus isolation
- •Antibody detection
- •Interpretation
- •Limitations
- •Biosafety considerations
- •Outlook
- •Table, Figures
- •References
- •Clinical Presentation and Diagnosis
- •Clinical Presentation
- •Hematological Manifestations
- •Atypical Presentation
- •Chest Radiographic Abnormalities
- •Chest Radiographs
- •CT Scans
- •Diagnosis
- •Clinical Course
- •Viral Load and Immunopathological Damage
- •Histopathology
- •Lung Biopsy
- •Postmortem Findings
- •Discharge and Follow-up
- •Psychosocial Issues
- •References
- •Appendix: Guidelines
- •WHO: Management of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
- •Management of Suspect and Probable SARS Cases
- •Definition of a SARS Contact
- •Management of Contacts of Probable SARS Cases
- •Management of Contacts of Suspect SARS Cases
- •SARS Treatment
- •Antibiotic therapy
- •Antiviral therapy
- •Ribavirin
- •Neuraminidase inhibitor
- •Protease inhibitor
- •Human interferons
- •Human immunoglobulins
- •Alternative medicine
- •Immunomodulatory therapy
- •Corticosteroids
- •Other immunomodulators
- •Assisted ventilation
- •Non-invasive ventilation
- •Invasive mechanical ventilation
- •Clinical outcomes
- •Outlook
- •Appendix 1
- •A standardized treatment protocol for adult SARS in Hong Kong
- •Appendix 2
- •A treatment regimen for SARS in Guangzhou, China
- •References
- •Pediatric SARS
- •Clinical Manifestation
- •Radiologic Features
- •Treatment
- •Clinical Course
- •References
30 Virology
Chapter 2: Virology
Wolfgang Preiser, Christian Drosten
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is due to an infection with a novel coronavirus which was first identified by researchers in Hong Kong, the United States, and Germany (Ksiazek, Drosten, Peiris 2003a, Poutanen). The virus was provisionally termed SARSassociated coronavirus (SARS-CoV).
Discovery of the SARS Virus
Initial Research
The epidemic of severe atypical pneumonia which was observed in the Chinese province of Guangdong and reported internationally on Feb- ruary 11, 2003 (WHO, WER 11/2003), was initially suspected to be linked to a newly emerging influenza virus: on February 19, 2003, researchers isolated an avian influenza A (H5N1) virus from a child in Hong Kong. This virus was similar to the influenza virus originating from birds that caused an outbreak in humans in Hong Kong in 1997, and new outbreaks of similar strains were expected. However, bird 'flu', possibly of poultry origin, was soon ruled out as the cause of the newly-termed Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS.
Investigations then focused on members of the Paramyxoviridae family, after paramyxovirus-like particles were found by electron microscopy of respiratory samples from patients in Hong Kong and Frankfurt am Main. Further investigations showed that human metapneumovirus (hMPV; van den Hoogen) was present in a substantial number of, but not in all, SARS patients reported at the time.
At about the same time, China reported the detection, by electron microscopy, of Chlamydia-like organisms in patients who had died from atypical pneumonia during the Guangdong outbreak. Again, this finding could not be confirmed by other laboratories in SARS patients from outside China.
www.SARSreference.com
Discovery of the SARS Virus 31
On March 17, 2003, the WHO called upon eleven laboratories in nine countries to join a network for multicenter research into the etiology of SARS and to simultaneously develop a diagnostic test (http://www.who.int/csr/sars/project/en/). The member institutions communicated through regular telephone conferences (initially held on a daily basis) and via a secure website and exchanged data, samples and reagents to facilitate and speed up research into the etiology of SARS (World Health Organization Multicentre Collaborative Network for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Diagnosis + WHO. WHO Multicentre Collaborative Networks for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) diagnosis. http://www.who.int/wer/pdf/2003/wer7815.pdf).
The Breakthrough
The etiologic agent of SARS was identified in late March 2003, when laboratories in Hong Kong, the United States, and Germany found evidence of a novel coronavirus in patients with SARS. This evidence included isolation on cell culture, demonstration by electron microscopy, demonstration of specific genomic sequences by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and by microarray technology, as well as indirect immunofluorescent antibody tests (Peiris, Drosten, Ksiazek).
Three weeks later, on April 16, 2003, following a meeting of the collaborating laboratories in Geneva, the WHO announced that this new coronavirus, never before seen in humans or animals, was the cause of SARS (Kuiken). This announcement came after research done by the then 13 participating laboratories from ten countries had demonstrated that the novel coronavirus met all four of Koch’s postulates necessary to prove the causation of disease:
1.The pathogen must be found in all cases of the disease;
2.It must be isolated from the host and grown in pure culture;
3.It must reproduce the original disease when introduced into a susceptible host;
4.It must be found in the experimental host so infected.
Proof of the last two requirements was provided after inoculation of cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) with Vero-cell cultured
Kamps and Hoffmann (eds.)