Naumkin_V_-_Islam_i_musulmane_kultura_i_politika_2008

conversations between Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi and Hammarskjold in New York, Egypt believed that until the withdrawal of Iraeli troops from the territory of Egypt, talk on the future of the Suez Canal was premature. Ali Sabri told the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, E.D. Kiselyov, that the Canal users, meeting at a conference in London in January 1957, failed to reach any agreement16. Egypt argued against any priorities whatsoever in the passage of ships through the Canal. Sabri informed the ambassador of the apprehensions Nasser developed in connection with a plan to hold a conference of signatory powers of the 1888 Convention, and of the fact that Egypt deemed it necessary to state its position on the Suez question already then, promising to send the text of the declaration a day or two prior to its publication. A fu n- damental point in it was that Egypt insisted on payment of Canal dues exclusively to the Egyptian administration. This was aimed, said Sabri, against the plans of the USA and other Western powers to put into practice the payments of Canal dues via an international bank17. The main objective of the Egyptians, as followed from the conversation, was to prevent the establishment of an interim regime for the canal on the initiative of the US, Britain and France.

An exchange of information on statements that were only supposed to be published had already become customary in the Soviet -Egyption confidential contacts. On 10 February, the Soviet ambassador also met Nasser and acquainted him with the main principles of the declaration proposed by Soviet government to the three great powers on the question of policy in the Near and Middle East. Nasser supported all its points except one – on the four powers’ renunciation from supplying arms to the countries of the region (point 5), indicating that in such a situation Israel would become much stronger than Egypt, especially in terms of aviation18. He said that if it were possible to “saturate” Egypt with planes before the adoption of the declaration, the objections against the fifth point would be lifted. Nasser also expressed doubts about the realistic nature of the point on the liquidation of military b a- ses and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Replying to the remark of the Egyptian president, the Soviet ambassador observed on his personal behalf that if after the adoption of

16Record of conversation with Sabri of 10 February 1957 in: AVP RF, 087/20/41/9, sheet 23.

17Op.cit., sheet 24.

18Record of conversation with President Nasser of 10 February 1957 in: AVP RF, 087/20/4/9, sheet 17.

239

the declaration Israel were supplied with arms by, say, Canada, then Egypt would find a lot of friends who would supply her with arms, for instance China or Czechoslovakia.

The Egyptian president related that in a letter to Hammarskjold he declared that his country might suspend the clearing of the canal in case if Israel withdrew her troops from the Gulf of Akaba and Gaza, but made it clear that he was not going to delay the clearing for a long time.

According to Nasser, Lebanon, where Shamun wanted to “secure an election campaign for himself with American money”, was a weak spot of the Arab world in terms of the penetration of the Eisenhower Doctrine19. In Nasser’s opinion, the main cutting edge of the Eisenhower

Doctrine was aimed not against Communism and the USSR but against Arab nationalism and Egypt as its vehicle. Here the views of the Egyptian and the Soviet leadership clearly differed: Moscow regarded the Eisenhower Doctrine through the prism of Soviet-American antagonism.

On 14 February 1957, Egypt’s ambassador to the USSR Al -Kuni sent information to the Middle Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the statement of the Director of the Department of Information of Egypt Abdel Kader Khatem on the Dulles plan which, as was stated, “pursues the objective of satisfying Israel's demands on the freedom of navigation in the Egyptian territorial waters in the Gulf of Akaba and on the deployment of UN armed forces in Gaza under the pretext of Israel’s defence from the Egyptian aggression”20. The statement paid much attention to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and the non-observance of UN decisions by Israel. On 15 February, Al-Kuni was received by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs V. A. Zorin. Referring to Soviet proposals expressed by the Foreign Minister D. T. Shepilov in his report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the ambassador pointed to the possible manoeuvres of the Western powers on two issues – the imposition of an embargo on arms shipments to the countries of the Near and Middle East and the liquidation of military bases in the region. The West, the ambassador pointed out, proposed not to extend the application of the embargo to Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, particularly to Turkey as a NATO member. Al-Kuni also said that the US aspired after an internationalization of the Gulf of Akaba for supporting Israel and through this – for exerting pressure on Egypt, and that “it is

19Op.cit., sheet 18.

20AVP RF, 087/20/41/6, sheet 5.

240

in the interests of the Soviet Union to foil the plans of the Western powers with regard to the Gulf of Akaba”21.

Significant for the explanation of the Egyptian political line of that time were the ambassador’s reasoning.that what was involved in the matter was not only the dispute between Egypt and Israel, as the Western powers trying to neutralise Iraq and Saudi Arabia strove to demo n- strate, but the dispute between Israel and the whole Arab countries. Seeking a more active Soviet support of Egyptian rights in the Gulf of Akaba and understanding the essence of Moscow's basic concern, the ambassador asserted that the defence of these rights would help to destroy the Eisenhower Doctrine.

For his part, V. A. Zorin pointed out that Moscow “did not fully understand Egypt’s position during the adoption of the UN resolution on the deployment of international forces in the area of the Egyptian - Israeli armistice line and that there was an impression that Egypt did not particularly object to the deployment of UN forces on its territory”22. The ambassador’s reaction was evidence to Egypt’s unwillingness to enter into a confrontation with the Western powers on this question. Having agreed that the deployment of these forces at the Sinai was a dangerous step, Aluni remarked that “Hammarskjold is a man with a warm heart and good intentions”. This met a strong rebuff on the part of the Soviet diplomat who claimed that “Hammarskjold is an internatio n- al official serving the interests of an organisation in which the USA now represents the uppermost force”23.

Receiving the Egyptian ambassador on 25 February,1957, the new Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko wondered if the data were right concerning the possibility of conclusion of an agreement on leaving UN forces in the Gaza Strip and on Egypt's consent to the deployment of UN troops in the Sinai. The ambassador remarked that such data were not right, but his clarifications bore a very confusing character. As Gromyko informed the top Soviet authorities (the record was circulated among all the senior Soviet party and administrative leaders),

“The essence of this position is that although UN forces may be present near Gaza, they should not be present at the territory of Gaza and, besides, even near Gaza they may be present only as long as Egypt agrees to it. He added that thus also incorrect are the data as though

21Op.cit., sheet 3.

22Op.cit., sheet 4.

23Op.cit., sheet 5.

241

Egypt is ready to agree that in the future the question of the duration of the presence of UN forces in the territory of Egypt will be decided independently of Egypt's consent”24.

Gromyko approved of the Egyptian 'working document 25 on the Suez question, but said that it would be better if it also contained a proposal concerning the convocation of a broad international confe r- ence on the Suez Canal to attract all the countries parties to the 1888 Convention.

Al-Kuni also touched upon the conference of representatives of Arab countries, which was to start its work in Cairo on 25 February.

“Speaking about the position of the conference partici pants, he said that Egypt can completely rely only on Quatli. He offered an opinion that, striving to preserve the unity of the Arab countries, Nasser at first will not directly condemn the Eisenhower Doctrine, but that he, probably, will make a statement on the need of strict observance of the independence of the Arab countries and thus will indirectly express condemnation of the above doctrine”. The ambassador said that Iraq and Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia will vacillate. Saud sets great by his position of the “father A r- ab nationalism”26.

Incidentally, already after that conference, Al-Kuni communicated that Egypt remained pleased with its results and that “the published communique was an expression of unity of the Arabs”27. Al-Kuni informed Zorin that on the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Egyptian territory by the Egyptians “failed to exhibit due firmness”. However, about the UN SC resolution which in convers a- tions with the Egyptians the Soviet diplomats constantly criticized, the ambassador said that it did not affect the sovereign rights of Egypt to its territory, whereas after the withdrawal of Israeli troops the Egyptian authorities at the Sinai Peninsula would be able to dispose of it at th eir own discretion.

24AVP RF, 087/20/40/5, sheet 1–2.

25The memorandum, in particular, contained provisions stipulating the procedure of collection of dues for the passage of ships through the canal and for the opening of accounts in the Egyptian National Bank and the Bank for International Settlements, measures for canal maintenance and development – an item for which 25 percent of the total dues was earmarked -the procedure for the settlement of disputes which might emerge between the canal users and the Egyptian administration.

26Op.cit., sheet 3.

27From V. A. Zorin’s diary, 9 March 1957, in: AVP RF, 087/20/40/5, sheet 14.

242

Obviously, the Egyptians agreed on the deployment of the international forces in the hope for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, while the Soviet Union considered the deployment of these forces as a step towards the strengthening of US positions in the region and the realization of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Zorin called the communique of the four Arab states published after conference “an important political document”, but expressed perplexity that it did not express an attitude to the Eisenhower Doctrine and did not say anything about the proposals of the Soviet Union on the question of peace and security in the Near and Middle East.

Aluni’s answer made it possible to make clear Egypt’s position on that score. The ambassador said:

“The Eisenhower Doctrine is unacceptable for the Arab countries. But if the USA offered their aid without making any conditions, either military or political, the Arab countries could in principle accept such aid, since these countries feel a great need in everything. The heads of four Arab states did not openly state their attitude to the Eisenhower Doctrine and to the Soviet Basic Principles for tactical reasons. Pract i- cally, not theoretically, the main Arab countries carry on policies corresponding to the Basic Principles and directed against the Eisenhower

Doctrine”28. The ambassador did not respond to Zorin’s request to i n- form him on the position of King Saud and King Hussein at the conference. Aluni also declared that an “open statement on the ‘Doctrine’ and the ‘Principles’ was awkward, apparently because in this case it would be necessary to reject the Eisenhower Doctrine and openly approve the Soviet Principles. This could mean that the Arab countries depart from the neutral course in relations with West and East. It would

give food for unleashing a new campaign of hostile propaganda in the

West”29.

He noted that the Americans seemingly intended to add to the Eisenhower Doctrine an item providing for the rendering of “aid” on the part of the USA to UN troops in the Middle East “in case of need” and that if this addition were really made, Egypt would officially reject the Eisenhower Doctrine.

After the entry of UN troops into the Gaza Strip, a new situation emerged there. In Gaza, demonstrations were held with the demands of an immediate reinstatement of an Egyptian administration there, at

28Reception by V. A. Zorin of Ambassador Al-Kuni on 6 March 1957, in: op.cit., sheet 4.

29Op.cit., sheet 5.

243

which Canadian troops opened fire. On 11 March, the Egyptian go v- ernment sent Hammarskjold a telegram of protest, which specified that according to the arrangement between the Egyptian government and the UN Secretary General, as well as to the decisions of the UN General Assembly, the function of international troops consisted in monitoring the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the aggressors' troops from the Egyptian territory. However, in the Gaza Strip the international troops began to perform administrative functions and attempted to impart the administration in the Gaza Strip an international character.

Ali Sabri told Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Egypt P. I. Gerasimov that “after the entry of UN troops into Gaza, the command of the UN troops invited members of the municipal council (who were elected b e- fore the aggression) and asked them to cooperate with the command. The members of the municipal council declared that they agree to follow the instructions of the command on condition that the Egyptian government gives its consent to this. After the Egyptian government took a decision yesterday on the appointment of General Abdel Latif as governor of Gaza, the municipal council refused to cooperate with the UN forces command and began a campaign of passive resistance to them. The newly-appointed governor will urgently go to Gaza if he is permitted to enter”30. The Egyptian government, while keeping an immutable position on the Gulf of Akaba, nonetheless did not wish to raise the question on the withdrawal of UN forces from Sharm el - Sheikh, pending the settlement of the Gaza issue.

Sabri also told the story about the delay in the publication of the declaration of the Egyptian government on the Suez Canal, already known to Moscow, due to objections on the part of India. At that period Krishna Menon put forward his proposals on that question, which were rejected by Nasser, since they put the Canal under the trusteeship of an international bank. Nor did Egypt agree to the Soviet recommendation to include in the declaration a point on the convocation of an extended international conference on the Suez issue.

As to the relations between the USSR and Israel at that period, they were clearly passing through a crisis. Conversing with Israel’s ambassador to Moscow I. Avidar on 16 February, Gromyko replied to the ambassador's reproaches that the USSR in recent months ceased to develop the positive results achieved earlier, annulled the agreement on oil deliveries to Israel for 1957–1958 and recalled her ambassador from Tel-

30 Record of conversation of 12 March 1957, in: AVP RF, 087/20/41/9,sheet 36.

244

Aviv. According to the minister, “Our relations with Israel indeed su f- fered a deterioration, but this is caused by well-known facts that stem from the policies and actions of the government of Israel; Israel with her actions harmed her position and the cause of peace and calm in the Middle East, having unleashed an aggressive war against the Egyptian state. Pursuing such a policy, Israel may lose its friends. From such policy she will eventually lose rather than gain. She can be supported at this stage by utterly extremist circles in some countries and even by some governments, but from the standpoint of the prospect of her own existence and development, Israel has already caused itself great political damage. The realization of such policy is also capable of causing still greater damage henceforth.

With reference to recent facts which bear witness about what kind of foreign policy Israel is pursuing, I took up the question of Gaza. In so doing, I emphasized the fact that the Israeli position on the question of troop withdrawal from Gaza showed to the whole world that she does not strive towards safeguarding peace and secur i- ty in the Middle East, but acts in the opposite direction” 31. Avidar tried to convince the Minister that Israel’s actions in OctoberNovember 1956 bore a defensive character, that it was threatened with danger from Egypt. The Arab countries, he said, “did not want to sign a peace treaty, declared a bo ycott to her and closed the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba for Israeli shipping. Egyptian doc u- ments captured by Israeli troops at the Sinai Peninsula allegedly co n- firmed the fact that the Egyptian command bears responsibility for sending commandos to the Israeli territory”32. The Soviet Foreign Minister flatly rejected the Israeli argumentation:

“I said that the ambassador was trying to ascribe aggressive inte n- tions to Egypt, but hardly anyone can seriously believe that in the light of what happened in the Middle East. What happened is that it was not Egypt who invaded Israel but Israel who mounted an aggression in rel a- tion to Egypt and invaded Egyptian territory, coordinating her actions with Britain and France. The invasion of Egyptian territory by Israeli troops is an objective fact, and its significance cannot be shaken by any reasoning that Egypt allegedly had malevolent intentions towards Israel or was preparing an invasion of Israeli territory”33.

31Record of conversation of 16 March 1957, in: AVP RF, 089/10/23/2, sheet 5.

32Op.cit., sheet 5.

33Op.cit., sheet 6.

245

Simultaneously with efforts in the Egyptian direction, Moscow was trying to secure the support of its proposals from Syria. The Syrian

Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, Ihsan Marrash told V. Zorin at his meeting with him on 16 February that in his opinion “the government of

Syria will find it somewhat difficult to determine its position on this question. This difficulty is linked, in his words, with the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ensuing unresolved issues”34.

Damascus, understanding Moscow’s interest in its support and i in the thwarting of American plans, like Cairo, sought to secure I greater assistance on the part of the USSR. Not all the Syrian | conclusions and demands were appreciated in Moscow. On 30 March, the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution drafted in the Foreign Ministry in a r e- ply to the KGB telegram from Damascus of 27 March 1957, which said that “at present, Moscow does not consider a military attack of states hostile to the Arab world on Syria to be inevitable; it is not excluded that Israel's military preparations serve the purpose of blackmail and intimidation of the Arab countries with a view to compel them to make substantial concessions to the Western powers in the resolution of urgent Middle Eastern problems”35. USSR called on Syria and other Arab countries to show endurance and composure, not to take steps which could “provoke an intervention against Syria, for example, by Israel and Turkey”36. The reply read that the USSR “renders and will render assi s- tance to Syria by arms deliveries on the basis of the understanding reached”. However, in response to a question raised by Hawrani on the sending of volunteer pilots by the USSR to Syria or Egypt, it was declared that “under the present conditions such actions might involve negative consequences for both the Arab states and the Soviet Union37.

As far as the Suez issue was concerned, the USSR closely monitored all the moves of the Egyptian diplomacy on it and adjusted its position with due regard for the development of the situation. The instructions to the Soviet ambassador to Cairo approved by the CPSU Central Committee at the end of March, contained an opinion on the draft memorandum of the Egyptian government on that question as being

“politically motivated”, but said that “the Western powers would o p- pose its adoption, try to impose their conditions on Egypt and aggravate

34AVP RF, 0128/20/2/27, sheet 26.

35AVP RF, 087/20/42/33, sheet 4.

36Op.cit., sheet 6.

37Op.cit., sheet 7.

246

conditions in the region. This was especially important to take into account in connection with the holding in Bermuda of a meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan, and US accession to the military commission of the Baghdad Pact”38. At the same time, Moscow closely studied at which exact point Egypt was ready to make concessions on this question to the Western powers. This is attested, in particular, by the follo w- ing Foreign Ministry reference drafted on 29 March 1957 on the main provisions of the draft memorandum of the Egyptian government on the Suez Canal, which partially met the proposals of the Western powers:

“The following provisions of the draft memorandum of the Egyptian government on the Suez Canal may be viewed as meeting the proposals of the Western powers in some degree or other:

1.Egypt's obligation to firmly observe the Constantinople Convention of 1888 on the freedom of navigation along the Suez Canal.

2.The retention of Canal dues at the existing level. Any augmentation of dues by more than 1 per cent must be the result of negotiation.

3.The obligation to maintain and develop the canal in keeping with the increasing demands of navigation and earmark for that purpose 25 per cent from the sum of dues collected for the passage of ships through the Canal.

4.The opening of accounts to which the canal dues must be paid, not only in the Egyptian National Bank but also in the Bank for International Settlements.

5.Consent to arbitration of disputes which might emerge between the canal administration and the Canal users.

6.Egypt’s consent to arbitration of issues involving claims in

connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in cases of lack of agreement between the parties concerned”39.

The Soviet ambassador to Egypt informed Nasser that “the USA

through its intelligence channels has attempted to disorient the Sov i- et government with a message that President Nasser allegedly came to an agreement with the USA on many questions and, in particular, concluded an agreement on free arms shipments to Egypt”40. This was one element of sounding out the possible steps of Egypt and the

USA to meet each other’s positions. Apparently, Moscow far from always trusted Egypt as yet. Nasser held forth for a long time on US

38Op.cit., sheet 8.

39AVP RF, 087/20/42/33, sheet 12–13.

40Record of conversation of 31 March 1957, in: AVP RF, 087/20/41/9, sheet 50.

247

policies, saying that “in fact it did not render real help to Egypt in a single case”. He related how the US ambassador was putting pressure on him in order to compel him to cancel the decision to send the a p- pointed governor to Gaza, after which Nasser, on the very next day, not only dispatched the governor but gave an order to the Egyptian armed forces and police units to enter the territory of Gaza. After this, the ambassador arrived at night, this time with a message from

Eisenhower who insisted that he “did not resort to provocative, dangerous and conflict-prone actions in the Ga a area”, demanding “a recall of the governor, otherwise Israel would resume its aggre s- sion”41. Based on this example, Nasser called relations with the USA cold, and in support of this conclusion also related to the Soviet ambassador about the scandal that flared up between the US ambassador and Foreign Minister Fawzi over the publication of the Egyptian memorandum on the Suez issue.

Considering the particular Soviet interest to the positions of the four Arab leaders at the February conference in Cairo, Nasser promised to instruct Sabri to acquaint Kiselyov fully with a detailed conference record. Egypt’s President confidentially informed:

“The complexity of the situation lay in the position of King Saud. We managed to convince him that although everyone understands that he is closely linked with the USA, he should not express approval to the Eisenhower Doctrine so as not to give an impetus for an enlivened activity of the pro-American forces in other Arab countries. Saud agreed to this and behaved loyally in this sense. It should be noted that the press incorrectly covered the question of US arms for Saudi Arabia. King Saud does not receive free arms from the Americans but pays for them himself. Saud receives the 50 million reported in the press for the lease of an air-force base in Dahran, and for the weapons he will pay the USA 120 million dollars”42.

Nasser also said that “for tactical considerations it was arranged at the conference of heads of Arab countries not to argue against the Eisenhower Doctrine at government level and with this aim in view not to debar Richards rudely from visiting Arab countries, although no one, naturally, has doubts about the failure of his mission, as far as Egyp t,

Syria, Jordan and even Saudi Arabia is concerned”43.

41Op.cit., sheet 54.

42Op.cit., sheet 57.

43Ibid.

248