Naumkin_V_-_Islam_i_musulmane_kultura_i_politika_2008

Sabri also informed his interlocutor of the opinion of the Egyptian leadership that the mobilization in Israel was also caused by internal reasons – the shaken prestige of Ben Gurion inside the country, due to which the premier was trying “to distract the people’s attention from former mistakes by proclaiming a state of emergency and mobilization.”10 Sabri expressed an opinion, which the Soviet side viewed with great attention, that on the eve of the elections the USA was not ready to support Israel in its desire “to create a serious military conflict.”

Simultaneously, the Egyptians were sure that Israel was unprepared for a serious war, for which in addition there was no immediate cause. A conclusion was reached that no real threat of conflict existed.

However, on the very next day the Soviet leadership received the text of a report of head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff General Shtemenko to Defense Minister Georgi Zhukov, which was distributed to all members and candidate members of the Presidium and secretaries of the Central Committee of CPSU. It repor t- ed that based on the data of radio intercepts, in the evening of October 29, Israeli forces broke through the Egyptian border, wedging themselves 90 kilometers into its territory. According to an intercepted r e- port from Tel Aviv, in the morning of October 30, Israeli troops a t- tacked a settlement 30 kilometers east of the Suez Canal. The following message was couched in a more uncertain tone: “Britain was allegedly ready to render assistance to Egypt in expelling Israeli troops from Egypt and stood by ready to strike a blow within 24 hours against Israel or other aggressor in the Middle East”11. There were reports of conferences held by Eisenhower and Dulles.

The top Soviet leadership seemed to be ready for such a turn of events. On the same day, Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov cabled UN Representative A. Sobolev that he should immediately place before the UN SC the question of Israel’s aggression against Egypt, seeking a condemnation of Israel, an immediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of Israeli troops. At the same time, Ambassador to Egypt Kiselyov cabled to Moscow on “the provocative behavior of the USA,” as he interpreted the instructions to US citizens to leave Egypt, made public even before hostilities began. This was regarded in the ambassador’s telegram as a signal that the US was giving a “green light” to Israel, although, as we know today, this was not the case. Kiselyov was clearly under the impression

10AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 154.

11AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 2.

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of Egyptian data. He wrote that, according to the data of the Egyptian intelligence service, “the Americans and the British believe that after the Hungarian events a propitious moment has come for a proactive, including military, intervention of Western powers in the Middle East.” At this juncture, the ambassador reported, “the USA and Britain contend that in these conditions the USSR will not dare come out vigorously in support of the Arabs, since the Soviet government now has its hands full in Eas t- ern Europe.” The impression was that Moscow did not yet have a clear idea of the policy differences on this issue between the USA on the one hand, Britain and France on the other. Still, it is possible that it was simply to Moscow’s advantage not to dissociate the USA from Britain and France, so as to mobilize public opinion against all the leading Wes t- ern powers as accomplices to aggression.

October 31 saw the publication of a sharply-worded statement by the Soviet government denouncing the armed attack on Egypt. And already on November 1 Gromyko gave instructions to Sobolev at the emergency special session of the UN General Assembly to proceed from a triple character of the aggression, bearing in mind that Britain and France “have already unleashed military operations against Egypt.” To all appearances, this turn of events was unexpected for Moscow. Gromyko instructed Sobolev to propose to adopt a resolution condemning the actions of the three states and demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of the three states’ armed forces. Gromyko also demanded that a provision be incorporated into the resolution on the appointment of a special UN commission to implement these recommendations, advisably including representatives from Arab countries, as well as the Soviet Union,

Yugoslavia, the “people’s democracies” (e. g., C echoslovakia) and the

USA. Now it was already clear to Moscow that the USA was not going to take part in the military action against Egypt and even disapproved of it.

According to the veterans of Soviet diplomacy of those times, they understood that although the Soviet leadership was backing Egypt, it did not wish to be drawn into armed confrontation and sought to keep Cairo from taking risky steps. On November 1, Kiselyov sounded the alarm on account of a statement by the Egyptian government that it had not only broken off all relations with Britain and France, but was also “studying the question of withdrawing from the UN.”12 Kiselyov wrote that such a decision would clearly be erroneous and asked for permission to urgently meet Nasser and advise him not to take that step. However, Nasser himself was

12 AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 166.

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prudent enough in his actions. Kiselyov also noted that the Egyptian newspapers did not publish the statement by the Soviet government, in the words of a journalist, ostensibly because it said nothing about aid to Egypt, with the latter seemingly hoping for Soviet intervention.

Before the session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet leadership via diplomatic representatives contacted the Indian ones with the aim of taking an identical position. This took place during the visit by Sh. Kuatli to Moscow, and, during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov, Syrian Foreign Minister Salah Bitar in a cautious form spoke for an armed intervention by the USSR. He said that British and French planes were bombing Egypt under the flag of Israel, with the Israeli armed forces using British and French pilots, therefore “we need similar assistance on the part of the Soviet Union.”13 Shepilov pretended not to have quite understood Bitar’s words and suggested that the

Syrians think of what concrete forms the assistance could have – arms shipments, their delivery vehicles, and so on. Shepilov spoke of a possible decision by Egypt to withdraw from the UN, calling it a mistake. Clearly, Moscow expected the Syrians to also try to persuade Nasser not to do it. Having heard the Syrian mionister’s skeptical remarks on the role of the UN, Shepilov noted: “I personally do not pin particular hopes on the UN. One has to think of more realistic things. But one should not repudiate the UN. One has to use it.” Shepilov added that he had given the Egyptian ambassador an advice not to leave the UN.

The US role was likewise discussed. Bitar wondered if the USA had known about the landing. Shepilov pointed out that, in his conviction,

“the British and French would not have resolved to undertake such a step without having assured themselves America’s consent to one degree or another.”14 The logic of the Cold War required that the strategic adversary always be found at the other side of the barricades, even if, as in this case, it took no part in the invasion of Egypt. Moreover, under Eisenhower American-Israeli relations were altogether far from being unclouded. For Moscow, nonetheless, it was important that Arab partners should always see US hand behind anti-Arab actions. Still, as shown by conversations with those who took part in the events, Moscow sincerely believed that the role of Britain and France in this military action undermined the interests of these states in the Middle East to such an extent that it could have only been provoked by Washington, inter alia, in order

13AVP RF, 0536/1a/20/80, sheet 3.

14Op.cit., sheet 6.

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to supplant the European allies who were its competitors. Shepilov told

Bitar that “after the election the USA will be more resolute. It will demand its share of the pie, will demand that Britain and France make room and give place to the USA.” He said: “The lessons of Indochina and Iran show that the USA is displacing others in order to take their place.”15 He emphasized that strategic and economic interests were involved there, primarily those of oil and steamship monopolies. While excluding the possibility that the USA would take part in the war against Egypt, the minister said that in return it would certainly demand “petroleum concessions and strategic points.” The USA, Shepilov claimed, was the chief mastermind of conflict.16 Moscow was gradually energizing its diplomats for action in the Middle Eastern terrain, mobilizing support for its political initiatives. Intensive contacts were maintained with the leaders of all Arab and Asian countries friendly to Moscow. Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon Sergei Kiktev, who met President Chamoun, brought to the leadership’s notice Chamoun’s words that Lebanon “was unable to render material aid to Egypt,” that “there was no question of Lebanon’s military intervention against Israel,”17 but political assistance was being rendered. Kiktev conveyed to Chamoun the Soviet government’s opinion that one had to convene a meeting of participants in the Bandung Conference who would demand a cessation of aggression against Egypt and a withdrawal of troops.

Messages to Indonesia’s President Sukarno and India’s Prime Minister

Nehru were dispatched for the purpose. Chamoun, like many other Arab leaders, with whom contacts were pursued, supported that idea, but deemed it more important to immediately convene a conference of heads of Arab states, for during the time required for the convocation of the

Bandung Conference Egypt would have already been crushed. Chamoun’s statement to the effect that close ties with Britain and France would not prevent Lebanon from breaking off diplomatic relations with these countries was unexpected for the ambassador. More than that, he expressed confidence that if the question of severance of relations were posed at the Arab summit, this would be agreed upon even by the Iraqi Premier Nuri Said and Jordan’s ing Hussein.18 During the same meeting, the ambassador communicated to Chamoun Moscow’s agreement to enter into n e- gotiations on the deliveries of military equipment to Lebanon.

15AVP RF, 0536/1a/20/80, sheet 6.

16Op.cit., sheet 7.

17AVP RF, 0106/15/25/3, sheet 171.

18Op.cit., sheets 173–174.

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Moscow was also holding a very tough position in the UN, where on November 2 the General Assembly passed Resolution 997 (ES-1) demanding an immediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of all troops b e- yond the armistice line, and also envisaging measures to resume shi p- ping along the Suez Canal. On November 3, the USA submitted to the UN General Assembly two draft resolutions on the settlement of outstanding problems between Arab countries and Israel, as well as on the settlement of the issue of the Suez Canal. Moscow decided to vote against both drafts and support a draft submitted by 19 states of Asia and Africa.

Egypt asked Moscow to lend it assistance in several aspects, including the dispatch of Soviet volunteers to take part in defense and the sending of Soviet warships to the Egyptian shores. Moscow categorica l- ly did not want to send its warships to the shores of Egypt, conscious of the fact that this was fraught with drawing it into a dangerous conflict. In a cable to the ambassador in Cairo Kiselyov dated November 3, Foreign Minister Shepilov gave him instructions to inform the Egyptian leadership (contact having been established via Ali Sabri) that such a step on the part of the USSR “might only aggravate Egypt’s condition, as it could lead to further strengthening of the fleets of Britain and France concentrated close to Egypt, and to their worsening attacks against Egyptian territory.”19 Simultaneously, Moscow expressed readiness to send to Egypt additional consignments of arms and ammunition, stressing that Soviet military specialists would continue working to assemble the equipment and train Egyptian specialists.

Moscow did not flatly refuse the appeal for the dispatch of “volu n- teers” either, probably not excluding such a possibility in principle, at a certain juncture. In the same telegram, the minister empowered the ambassador to tell the Egyptians that “this question is now being discussed with the governments of allied Asian republics,” but so far there was nothing more to be said on that score.20

Moscow intended to foil the Canadian draft providing for the dispatch of international UN armed forces to Egypt to enforce a cessation of military operations. Although Soviet representatives insisted that such a decision could be adopted by the UN SC alone, the General Assembly on November 4 passed Resolution 998 (ES-1). The Soviet representative was now instructed to seek an examination of that question in the SC, as

19AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 168.

20Op.cit., sheet 169.

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that question was covered by its terms of reference, and if that could be achieved, to abstain from the vote, alluding to Egypt’s request.

At the same time, while understanding that the international forces, despite Moscow’s lukewarm opposition, would be established, the mi n- ister instructed Sobolev to take into consideration that “especially i n- admissible would be the incorporation of troops of great powers as components of these armed forces.”21 Curiously, these directives to the minister had to be sent to Sobolev so urgently that he did not have time to secure their approval by the General Assembly, writing: “Wait for our confirmation.” As is known, on November 5 the UN General A s- sembly adopted Resolution 1000 (ES-1) on the institution of a UN Armed Forces Command, stipulating that citizens of countries that were not members of the UN SC were not to be enrolled into it.

Nevertheless, on that very day started the Anglo-French airborne assault into Egyptian territory in the Port Said area. Head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate Shtemenko reported to Zhukov that from morning till 14.30 under cover of aviation up to one airborne brigade was landed. Messages were coming in about the movements of Israeli troops, that an Israeli detachment occupied Sharm al -Sheikh and was advancing south along the western coastline of the Gulf of Akaba, as well as the redeployment of British and French warships.

Moscow’s reaction was sharp and tough. On November 5, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin sent messages to the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Chairman of the French Council of Ministers Guy Mollet, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, which stated: “The Soviet government is full of resolve to resort to the use force in order to crush the aggressors and restore peace.”22 In making such a grave statement, the Soviet leadership took account of information coming from the USA by diplomatic channels that the USA did not support the escalation of hostilities of the triple forces against Egypt. Therefore Moscow expected that there would be no clash with the main adversary which did not want to take risks either! On the same day, November 5, Bulganin sent a message to US President Dwight Eisenhower with an offer to cooperate in curbing aggression against Egypt, proposing to use its naval and air forces for this jointly with other UN members.23

21AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 171.

22SSSR i arabskie strany. 1917–1960 (The USSR and Arab countries. 1917–1960) (Moscow, 1961), doc. 81, 82, 83.

23Op.cit., doc. 80.

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Kiselyov received instructions to immediately apprize Nasser of the texts of these messages. Calling on Sabri in order to arrange for a meeting with Nasser, the ambassador discovered to his surprise that the former “did not look especially animated, which might be expected as a result of our step.”24 Sabri’s depressed state was understandable: bloody battles were being waged in Port Said, and the Egyptians did not particularly trust in the power of pieces of paper. Questions were put to the ambassador concerning the acceleration of the dispatch of volunteers; a possibility was even mentioned of quickly repairing the runways of airfields to receive Soviet planes with volunteers, and of the need to send submarines to the shores of Egypt,

“at whose appearance the British and French would immediately leave the Egyptian waters.” While understanding Moscow’s apprehensions, Sabri kept stressing that the situation had changed for the better, that the UN and the USA were not ready for joint action and generally “the bottom line is how the USA will behave, whether they are prepared, whether they want to start a third world war against the USSR.”25

That same evening Nasser received Kiselyov and informed him that at 2 a. m. all military operations in Egypt would cease, as Egypt, Israel, Britain and France gave their consent to this, having notified the SC and the UN General Secretary of this. Nasser expressed gratitude to the Soviet government and people, since, as he told the ambassador, it was Moscow’s statement that was of crucial importance. “This can be proved,” said Nasser, “if one is to compare Eden’s letter to the UN yesterday, on November 5, with today’s speech in the House of Commons. The people of Egypt has clearly seen again and again where its true and genuine friend was to be found. Britain and France lost the Middle East forever. Arabs will never forget these days and will hand this down from generation to generation.”26

Although the ships of the Anglo-French fleet continued to disembark servicing units for the landing party amid sporadic shooting, the military operations were effectively ended. A new phase of sharp diplomatic struggle was starting in the Middle East between great powers, parties to the Cold War. And though the new generations of Egyptians hardly harbor resentment against the major European powers, while the Soviet Union had already ceased to exist almost a dozen and a half years ago, history bears witness that imposing rules of managing their affairs on sovereign states by force has no prospects.

24AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 172.

25Op.cit., sheet 173.

26AVP RF, 059a/7/13/4, sheet 176.

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ЭМИР ФЕЙСАЛ В РОССИИ

(работа опубликована на арабском и английском языках:

Emir Faisal in Russia: 1932, Riyad: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2002)1

Родившийся в 1905 г. сын Абдель Азиза б. Абдуррахмана альФейсала Аль Сауда эмир Фейсал был одним из наиболее выдающихся государственных деятелей арабского мира. С юных лет он выполнял ответственные поручения своего отца как внутри страны, так и за рубежом. В возрасте 16 лет командовал победоносным маршем войск в Асир, который закончился их убедительной победой. После установления власти короля над Хиджазом Фейсал был назначен его наместником в этой провинции, а также возглавил департамент иностранных дел, позднее преобразованный в министерство. Поездка Фейсала в Англию привела к признанию Лондоном независимости государства Ибн Сауда, который по подписанному в Джидде 20 мая 1927 г. договору был признан как король Хиджаза, Неджда и присоединенных областей.

Советский Союз был первым государством, признавшим независимость королевства Ибн Сауда и установившим с ним в полном объеме дипломатические отношения. В свою очередь, королевство было первым арабским государством, с которым Москва установила дипломатические отношения. В Джидде действовало российское агентство и генеральное консульство, которое 1 января 1930 г. было переименовано в полномочное представительство.

Несмотря на серьезные различия в государственном устройстве, господствующих в обществе ценностях и ориентациях, два государства проявляли большой интерес к развитию отношений с друг другом. Москва симпатизировала стремлению Абдель Азиза создать в Аравии сильное независимое централизованное государ-

1 Текст, рассчитанный на зарубежного, прежде всего саудовского, читателя и поэтому содержащий ряд необходимых кратких сведений о советских официальных лицах, с которыми встречалась делегация, оставлен без изменений.

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ство. В депешах, направляемых в Центр, российские дипломаты с симпатией отзывались о политике Ибн Сауда, призывали к его поддержке. Понимая, что королевство находилось далеко от России и осознавая специфичность аравийского общества, горячие головы из руководствае большевистской партии, пытавшиеся разжечь пожар революции в ряде стран Востока, не намеревались вмешиваться во внутренние дела королевства, что создавало хорошую основу для взаимопонимания. Король Абдель Азиз, в свою очередь, нуждался в укреплении международных позиций и в создании своего рода противовеса Англии, для чего в то время очень подходила Россия, которая к тому же была хорошим торговым партнером. Королю импонировало то, что Москва строила отношения с ним на равноправной основе, не пытаясь диктовать, как это часто делал Лондон. Спокойному развитию отношений способствовало и то, что они ни для одного из государств не были связаны с их жизненно важными интересами.

Поскольку в Москве не было постоянной дипломатической миссии королевства, между Москвой и Эр-Риядом еще в 20-е годы шли переговоры о направлении в Россию временной миссии, т.е. дипломатической делегации, во главе с Фейсалом, однако поездка откладывалась. В 1927 г., точнее 2 зу-ль-хиджа 1345 г., король Абдель Азиз направил письмо председателю ЦИК СССР Михаилу Калинину, где сообщал о том, что обстоятельства вынудили его сына Фейсала «не посетить СССР» и просил Аллаха, чтобы он дал возможность принять приглашение прислать его в будущем.

В начале 30-х годов обстановка в королевстве изменилась. С одной стороны, примерно к 1932 г. процесс объединения земель и консолидации в основном завершился, с другой – финансовоэкономическое положение в государстве после нескольких лет мирового кризиса, который не прошел и мимо Аравии, ухудшилось. Советский Союз динамично развивался, укреплял свои позиции, о чем не мог не знать Абдель Азиз, и тем самым становился все б о- лее привлекательным партнером в экономическом плане. Москва могла теперь экспортировать не только продовольствие и нефтепродукты, но и машины и оборудование. В то же самое время попытки раздуть искру мировой революции, которые еще предпринимались Москвой в начале 20-х годов, теперь, казалось, были вовсе забыты.

Конечно, серьезным ограничителем для Абдель Азиза была плохая репутация российских большевиков как притеснителей ре-

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лигии. Однако всей меры атеистичности российских властей Ибн Сауд не мог достоверно знать, кроме того, на том этапе огромный практический выигрыш от сближения с СССР заслонял все его негативные стороны, при том чувствующий себя вполне уверенно король мог не опасаться какого бы то ни было негативного влияния Москвы на внутреннюю ситуацию в королевстве.

Поэтому, готовя поездку эмира Фейсала по ряду зарубежных государств в 1932 г. (Франция, Англия, Польша, Турция), король Абдель Азиз решил включить в их число и Россию. 15 зу-ль каада 1350 г. / 23 марта 1932 г. заместитель эмира Фейсала Фуад Хамза направил письмо временному поверенному в делах СССР в королевстве Шакиру Измайлову, в котором сообщал о том, что “принято решение направить политическую миссию в дружественные государства, в том числе в Россию. Мне поручено выяснить у Вас, будет ли Ваше правительство приветствовать прибытие такой миссии или нет. В этом случае поездка в Россию может произойти в июне с.г.” Измайлов, в свою очередь, 25 марта запросил согласия Москвы. 15 апреля 1932 г. / 9 зу-ль-хиджа 1350 г. председатель ЦИК СССР Калинин направил послание Ибн Сауду следующее послание:

Ваше Величество, Пользуясь возвращением в Хиджаз по окончании отпуска

Чрезвычайного Посланника и Полномочного Министра Назира Тюрякулова, я хочу подтвердить мои глубокие чувства уважения к Вашему Величеству и вашему благородному народу.

Радостное известие о предстоящем посещении Москвы летом этого года Вашим благородным сыном Его Высочеством принцем Фейсалом является одним из счастливых проявлений дружбы, связывающей обе наши страны. В лице нашего уважаемого гостя мы будем иметь честь приветствовать также и Ваше Величество, главу дружественного нам государства.

Я убежден, что искренние отношения наших государств б удут развиваться впредь в еще более прочных и отвечающих нашей дружбе формах и что с обеих сторон будет сделано все для ос у- ществления высокой и соответствующей интересам наших стран задачи дальнейшего укрепления счастливо установившихся взаимоотношений.

В заключение прошу Ваше Величество принять мои наилучшие дружественные пожелания.

[Калинин]

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